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The end of the global cold war has resulted^in a 
fluidity in South Asian relations and regional adversaries 
are trying for areas of ccaivergence. There was a time when 
except India and Vietnam, the soviet had no friends in 
Asia now, we have no Soviets as our friends to fall back 
to. China has emerged as a major player on the Asian stage 
with the potential to effect the global balance of power. 
The geo-strateglc location of south Asian sub-continent 
between the two distinct but, of significance regions of 
West Asia and south-East Asia, has figured as decisive 
factors In America's foreign policy calculations. The 
south Asian region has, consequently been a collateral 
factor in this regard. After the emergence of cold war. 
United states tried to design India to contain the commu-
nism, but, India not only spurned all US advances, it also 
acted contrary to United states interest. The military 
alliances between the America and Pakistan was based on 
different expectations and aims from the two sides. The 
America give military aid to Pakistan in the context of 
its problems of security and defence vis-a-vis India. But, 
America consider India as the largest of the nai-allgned 
countries. The emergence of 'Uni-polar world with United 
States as the only surviving super power, posed vital new 
challenges to our decision makers. 
With the rupture of the bipolar system and the 
emergence of new centres of power, and like any other 
region in the world. South Asia has started experiencing 
the realities of a new polycentric world. In the new poly-
centric world, south Asian countries would be guided by 
new paradigms and parameters as compared to what we have 
been used to in the past, south Asia is one such region 
in which the vanable of regional security problems are 
autonanous and indigenous but the Inclination of extra-
regiona^ powers for Increasing interdependence and 
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cooperation in various f ie lds would pave the way of s t ab i l i t y 
and soclo-econcmlc development, ultimately leading to the 
peace and t r anqu i l l i t y in the whole region. However, a poly-
centre international order would undoubtedly make in t e r -
s ta te re la t ions in this reglcn more complicated, because 
a l l the seven nation s ta tes of south Asia - India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Maldives are 
developing countries and are passing through different 
stages of develppment and nat ion-s ta te building. 
There i s a deep-seated element of contention between 
the largest but^ continental power, India and i t s smaller 
neighbours. India i s motivated by both i t s h i s to r ica l im-
pulses and contemporary perceptions to continue i t s drive 
for hegemony to maintain peace in the region. As a response, 
the smaller powers would naturally make efforts to ensure 
their survival as a sovereign s t a t e s . While other countries 
of the region are too weak economically and m i l i t a r i l y to 
stand up to India. Pakistan is the one regional power 
which has persisted in r es i s t ing the Indian drive for 
hegemony. Not withstanding the India pressure by i t s e l f , 
Pakistan has had to conduct an active diplomacy, and also 
entered into an al l iance relat ionship with the west at the 
hight of the cold war, not so much out of a genuine fear of 
canrounist expansion, as out of a desire to po l i t i ca l and 
mi l i ta ry leverage in the face of Indian th rea t . Pakistan's 
fears in th is regard are imaginary for s t ra teg ic analysis 
in India make no secret of their view that Pakistan cons-
t i t u t e s that one obsticle to what they consider to be India ' s 
natural and destined r i s e to the position of paramount power 
in the region. 
Despite the creditable beginning of SAARC and the 
Indo-Pak conuulssion, i t i s evident that the enormous 
difference in size and power between India and the other 
consti tuents of south Asia give r i se to misgivings among 
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Its neighbours. Pakistan finds, it difficult to raccancll 
itself to India's pre-eminence In south Asia; its policy 
makers emphasize that Pakistan can never accept such a 
situation. Pakistan's stances to the Indian approach and its 
over all foreign policy outlook can be seen at two'Specific 
levels - that dealing with problems of the region and the 
other with its relations with the super powers. At the 
regional level Pakistan considers Simla Agreement to be 
equivalent to a No War Pact and the problem of jammu and 
Kashmir to be a problem of continuing concern which should 
oe solved on the basis of Simla Agreement and the relevant 
U.N. Resolutions. 
India and Pakistan still remain trapped in the 
nightmare of enmity and tension. The two countries could 
have settled down to good neighbourly co-existence with 
conunonalities of languages and cultures fostering mutual 
sympathy, trust and understanding. The important thing is 
that since 1947, India and Pakistan have not only saddled 
with bitter and mutually antagonistic postures against each 
other but have also fought three wars. Among the disputes 
and major issues that have incessantly aggravated their 
security concerns are the bitter legacy of the past, Kashmir 
dispute alongwlth linked issues of siachln, Wullur Lake 
Barrage, ccromunalism and the ethnic disturbances, inter-
mittent dcmestic problems the indulgence of extra-regional 
powers, nuclear question and the terrorist activities. 
Pakistani leaders every now and then harp on the Kashmir 
issue; The Internal policy of Pakistan demands that this 
issue be kept alive. No party or government, civil or 
military can afford to forget Kashmir at this stage in the 
evolution of Pakistan. Pakistan consider Kashmir 'A cap on 
the head' while India needs it from the strategic point 
of V lew. 
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USA and the European Economic Cofrimunlty have urged 
both India and Pakistan to resolve their outstanding pro-
blems bilaterally within the framework of the Simla Agree-
ment, china, another Important actor In the polycentrlc 
world order, wants that both India and Pakistan should 
find a "just solution" to Kashmir dispute through bilateral 
peaceful negotiations. As regards India's ties with Pakistan, 
though the two countries have been able to initiate an 
agreement on the non-attack of each others nuclear and other 
key installations, the bilateral relations have generally 
suffered because of the growing help to terrorist, seme of 
the pronouncements of Pakistan's Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sherif that his government would continue to support 
terrorist activities In Kashmir and Punjab have contributed 
to a deterrioration of Indo-Pak relations. 
Another major factor aggravating Indo-Pak security 
concern is the nuclear issue, with China being a nuclear 
power and Pakistan crossing the nuclear threshold, India has 
not closed its nuclear option. Public evidence indicates 
that both states are within easy reach of nuclear device. 
Indeed the present ambiguous situation seems to suit the 
interests and pocket books of both countries. A Pakistani 
bonb would mean the loss of American financial and military 
support and would be followed by a much larger Indian pro-
gramme. An Indian bcmb might led to greater prestige in 
the developing world but, it too would be followed by a 
Pskitanl equalizer and might endanger India's access to 
western high technology. 
While advocating international peace and disarmament, 
India has sustained a throny arms race with Pakistan which 
has created ever higher degree of Insecurity for both. 
At the diplomatic level, it calls for a shift towards poli-
tical techniques of conflict resolution and confidence 
building measures. As a matter of fact, India has brought 
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almost a l l south Asian na t ion s t a t e s except Pakis tan wi thin 
the reach of her informal reg iona l s e c u r i t y framework* In 
the case of Nepal, Bhutan and Sr i Lanka, formal t r e a t i e s , 
accords and agreements have connected these count r i es with 
the reg iona l secur i ty framework of I nd i a , Most s i g n i f i -
c a n t l y , even through Nepal might have s t r i v e d to balance 
China agains t India in the diplomatic game. Nepal could not , 
but follow the Indian l ine on a l l s e c u r i t y i s sues a f f ec t i ng 
south Asia in a po lycen t r ic world order . India had for 
more than two decades been persuading Nepal t o agree t o 
a common endeavour on water resources development and 
proceeding with hyde/multipurpose p ro j ec t s on commcxi r i v e r s . 
As regards Bhutay, i t i s worth mentioning tha t the 
way in which Bhutan f inds accommodation in the s ecu r i t y 
framework of the south Asian sub-system i s s t i l l marked 
l a r g e l y by the s t r a t e g i c percept ions of the past and the 
China f a c t o r . Bhutan agreed, to be guided by the advice of 
the Government of India with respec t to i t s foreign r e l a -
t i o n s . Like other south Asian n a t i o n - s t a t e s , Bhutan a l s o 
faces the problems of development and nat ion - s t a t e 
bu i ld ing . At the same time, the e thenic Nepalese fac tor in 
the southern Bhutan c o n s t i t u t e s an emerging th rea t t o i t s 
i n t e r n a l s t a b i l i t y and s e c u r i t y . 
Turning towards Indo-sr i Lanka scenar io , i t can 
be speculated that the s t r a t e g i c and p o l i t i c a l dimensions 
of t he i r secur i ty framework have been r ap id ly changing on 
the bas i s of emerging pa t t e rns of r e l a t i o n s between them 
over the recent years . I nd i a ' s percept ion of Sri Lanka 
fac tor has been compounded by an ensemble of many cons i -
d e r a t i o n s . There has been, f r i s t l y , the inf luence of Tamils 
on the domestic p o l i t i c s of both Colombo as well as New 
Delhi , secondly, there has been ser ious t h r e a t s to I n d i a ' s 
s e c u r i t y due to the in f lux of refugees of Sri Lankan Tamil 
o r ig in as the f a l l - o u t of the e s c a l a t i n g Sinhala-Tamil 
ethnic conflict In srl Lanka since July, 1983 and evidently, 
India's approach and direction to the management and resolu-
tion of this crisis. There have also been, thirdly, some 
irritants in the Indo-sri Lanka relations that related to 
the political and diplomatic behaviour of Sri Lanka govern-
ment towards India. Furthermore, Geo-political and geo-
strategic and responses to Sri Lanka turmoil. 
As regards Bangladesh, it can be stressed that its 
major security concerns are the product of its danestic 
vulnerabilities, the challenges of nation - building, the 
tribal sub-nationalism in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the 
environjnental challenges, the high population growth rate 
and its divergent perception and position on the issues 
of mutual interest vis-a-vis India, A section of the public 
opinion in Bangladesh, including the government circle 
itself, subscribes to the view that the Indian factor over-
shadows the rest of external threats to the security of 
Bangladesh, Negotiations on eastern water settlement and 
the transfer of Tin algha through the Tndo-Bangladesh 
Agreement of 1974 have been striking examples. As the 
Supreme Court has decided in favour of the transfer of Tin 
Bigha to Bangladesh and transfer has taken place, this 
should be followed to remove the last hurdle in enforcing 
the 1974 Agreement, This would certainly open fresh avenues 
of mutual trust and cooperation in other fields. 
As regards Maldives, it can be visualised that 
for all practical purposes, its political stability and 
interests be protected and promoted within the framework 
of the SAARC, and India should be more inclined to do so 
as a consequence of the commonalities of interests in the 
Indian Ocean, Maldives was already indebted to India for 
its ready support to foil a coup an November 3, 19 88. 
Equally, notably is the fact that the SAARC Heads of State 
or Government not only condemned the attempt to destabilise 
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India has the largest area, the highest population, 
the profoundlng natural resources and ccmmandable strong 
army to protect its borders, a navy to safe guard its ports 
and trade and no other country of South Asia can standby 
India in industrial developments. It is only India which 
has the capacity to act as a check to extra-regional powers 
from interference in the region, India is a guarantee of 
peace to small neighbour, a treasure of resources to needy 
neighbours and a ray of hope in the regicn. It is the best 
out of the good neighbours, econanically more sound than 
any other SAARC country, militarily more strong than any 
other country in south Asia and politically more realistic 
than six nations. The study reveals undoubtedly, *'the 
emergence of India as regional power". 
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P R E F A C E 
I recol lect the statement of Sir Alfred Zimmern, made 
in 193 5, than holder of the Oxford chair , that Internat ional 
re la t ions should not be a separate subject at a l l . I t was "a 
point of view" as he put i t , "a way of looking a t things". 
Instead of attempting t o develop a d isc ip l ine the effort 
should be made to t r y to assimilate in the study of in t e r -
national r e la t ions pract ical ly every thing that was relevant 
to international matters, sociology, po l i t i ca l Science and 
History as well as Philosophy, Mathematics to Engineering; 
s t ra tegic studies began to take the place of the study of 
international ins t i tu t ions with collapse of the league syst 
these perspectives and emphases were pushed into the back-
ground and an analysis of power p o l i t i c s took the central 
stage. E,H. Carr ( l ) , Hans J . Morgenthau and Kenneth W. 
Thompson suggested that the core of internat ional re la t ions 
i s international po l i t i c s a n d , , , , . , , the subject matter of 
internat ional p o l i t i c s i s struggle for power among nations. 
The theory was backed by Nicholas J Spykman, Reinhold Niebuhr, 
Hans J . Morgenthau and Frederick L, Schuman, 
The South Asian countries are now faced both by challen-
ges and opportunities and, consequently, the i r a t t i t ude i s 
not surprising, speaking about Cold War Dr. Majeed said, 
"The end of the global cold war has resul ted in a 
f lu id i ty in south Asian re la t ions and regional 
adversaries are trying for areas of convergence. 
There was a time when, except India and Vietnam, 
the Soviets had no friends in Asia. Now, we have 
no Soviets, as our friends to fa l l back t o . But 
with the end of deideologisation of internat ional 
r e l a t ions , the Russians are not seen as adver-
sar ies , or even a threa t , by any one in Asia, If 
the regional security in south Asia i s to be 
based on mul t i - la te ra l de-escalation of mi l i ta ry 
confrontation than the col lect ive securi ty has 
to envisage ful l part icipat ion by extra-regional 
actors of the multipolar world",^ 
1. Majeed Akhtar, "south Asia After the Cold war : An Indian 
Perspective", Strategic studies Journal, vol, 5, No.l and 
2, 1992, p . 93. 
There have been five powers effecting the events in 
South Asia : India, Pakistan, China, U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. 
with the total transformation of the U.S.S.R., there would 
be effect of a different type now, Cornmunism had to far 
prouded a secular Ideology to countries of south Asia and 
decline now resulting in proliferation of ethnic and religious 
revivalism in many parts of south Asia. 
In the recent past we have been witnessing an uncre-
dible rush of events driven by the transformations of the 
international political landscape following the end of the 
Cold War. Just two years ago we saw the emergence of the 
commonwealth of independent states from the rubble of the 
former soviet Union. The disintegration of Yougoslovia, 
Unification of Germany and Korea brought significient changes 
in the parameters of the South Asia strategy. In various part 
of Europe, Africa and elsewhere, political and economic change 
appears to be gaining monentum, utmost on a daily basis looking 
at the dramatic events that have swept ovor the European con-
tinent since 1989, one can not but, be sti"uck by the apparent 
time - lag between Europe and south Asia In the pace of change. 
On September 27, 1991, President Buish announced that 
he quite justifiably called "a series of .sweeping initiations 
effecting every aspect of our nuclear powers'*. These were 
unilateral actions to eliminate or to remove nuclear weapons 
from their existing deployment patterns and to lower the 
nuclear alert posture. President Bush pointedly called on 
the soviet Union to take comiparable measuies. He said "if 
we and the Soviet leaders take the right nteps some on our 
own, some on their own, some together, we can dramatically 
shrink the arsenal of the world's nuclear weapons. India 
continues its opposition to the NPT and to regional agree-
ments to control or eliminate nuclear weapons and both 
countries seem to devote much attention to the development 
0 Of. 
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of the i r mi l i ta ry potent ia ls . Indo-Pak agreement signed in 
January, 1991 by which both sides pledged not to s t r ike each 
others nuclear i n s t a l l a t i ons , was the f i r s t posi t ive develop-
ment on the sub-continent after the i r 1972 accord call ing 
for the gradual normalization of r e l a t i ons . In January 1992, 
India and Pakistan exchanged l i s t s of nuclear f a c i l i t i e s 
under the agreement. These events have a direct bearing upon 
the strategy of South Asia, 
Strategic policy presupposes cer ta in in te res t s and 
object ives. The importance of South Asia to American s t r a -
tegic concurence i s mainly der ivat ive. US viewed i t s mil i tary 
concerns in south Asia as an important element of i t s con-
tainment strategy directed against the perceived threat to 
the region from the people's Republic of China. Us intervened 
d i rec t ly in south Asia on the side of India during the 
Sino-Indian border dispute, china have i t s own policy and 
i s increasing psychological pressure and ass i s t ing Himalayan 
Kingdoms, s r i Lanka and Palcistan to counterweight India. 
Asia i s in the process of emerging into modern era 
and establishing new pattern of re la t ionship with res t of 
the world. Asia will play a more active ro le in world 
p o l i t i c s , a ro le more commensurate with i t s s i ze , i t s popu-
lat ion and i t s might. Robei"t Payne r i gh t ly observed, 
"The major task of our generation i s the under-
standing of Asia for Asia represents po ten t ia l ly . 
the mastry of the world in manpower and resources". 
The nationalism i s the pulse of a nation. The past 
weighs heavily upon the Asian, present nationalism, obser-
ved Paul M.A. Linebarger, 
"Asian Nationalism Involves, the application 
to a var ie ty of non-European culture of 
1. Robert payne. The Revolt of Asia, New York, The Johnday 
Company, 1947, p. 290. 
political concepts not indigenous to those 
cultures through Asian nationalism 
functions in the modern world, it is derived 
from an identification on the part of Asians 
themselves with 'Asian* projected to Asia by 
Europeans, whether in person or through mass 
communications, and by the further mimesis on 
the part of Asians of the European concept 
•nationalism*. The Asian nationalism is 
an entirely valid response to massive western 
emotional and spiritual demands".! 
The acronym SAARC was adopted only after the first 
summit of heads of state and governments held in Dhaka on 
7-8 December, 1985. Speaking about the importance of SAARC, 
Jigme singyne Wangchuk, King of Bhutan reiterated that, 
"In the geo-political realities of our region, 
it would be un-realistic to ignore the primary 
of the political factor, as, in the final ana-
lysis* it would be political environment of the 
region which will determine the shape and scope 
of the regional cooperation in south Asia", 
Indian ruling elite have planned foreign policy of 
the country with clear cut objectives, viz, national secu-
rity, friendship with neighbours, development and world 
peace. India continues its opposition to the irPT and to 
regional agreement to control or eliminate nuclear weapons, 
India and Pakistan seem to devote much attentIon to the 
development of their military potentials. It .seems that 
both India and Pakistan recognise the futility of nuclear 
proliferation in the region and the dangerous implications 
of a nuclear arms race for their economies. The economic 
cost of remaining in the nuclear club is rising steeply 
and thoughtful people in both countries have began to 
consider the Soviet Union's obession with Security and power 
led it along the path of dangerous neglect of economic, 
social and political priorities thereby hastenning its 
disintegration. 
1. "Asian Nationalism, Some Psychiatric Aspects of Political 
Mimesis". Psychiatry, XII, August 1954, p. 262. 
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with the rupture of the bipolar system and the emergencd 
of new centres of power, and like any other region In the 
world, south Asia has started experiencing the realities of 
a new polycentrlc world. In the new polycentrlc world, south 
Asian countries would be guided by new paradigms and para-
meters as compared to what we have been used In the past. 
All the seven nation states of South Asia - India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Maldieves are 
developing countries and are passing through different 
stages of developnent and nation state building, 
India is motivated by its historical impulses and 
contemporary perceptions to continue its derive for hege-
mony to maintain peace in the region. All countries except 
Pakistan are too weak to stand upto India. Pakistan is one 
regional power which has persisted in resisting Indian 
drive for hegemony and had entered into an alliance relation-
ship with west, 
India and Pakistan still romain trapped in the night-
mere of enmity and tension and rel:use of the burdens of 
the past. India and Pakistan have not only saddled with 
bitter and mutually anlagonistic i)Ostures against each other 
but, have also fought three wars. Among the disputes and 
major issues that have aggravated their security concerns 
are the bitter legacy of the past. Kashmir dispute, siachin 
and sponsored terrorism are some l>urning problems between 
the two nations. 
As a whole in the inter-recional perspectives, it can 
be speculated that south Asia is an Indo Centric region to 
the extent that India is capable of playing as the Central 
actor in this region on account oi: its tangible elements 
of power and performance. 
VI 
Despite all the plus points some scholars like 
Israni Kiniat and Hakim Israni (l) have not accepted India's 
Suzernity on the basis of calculated drawbacks. 
The present study reveals some thing different. Began 
with the end of cold war, the disintegration of USSR, uni-
fication Germany and Korea, rise of unipolar power - USA, 
Chinese power game, the military buildup in Indian ocean 
and its effect on south Asia. The SAARC countries their 
relations with India, economy, defence, political stability 
balance of power, all arranged in eight systematic suitable 
chapters goes to the credit side of India's balance sheet. 
The study is a Library Research based upon historical analy-
tical, speculative and apriori approach and formal descrip-
tive - layonomic and normative prescription method. 
All datas, comments available against or in favour 
have been placed with out any malice. On the basis of the 
pre-emance of India its highest population, largest area, 
commandable defence, political stability, devotion, world 
opinion and policy undoubtedly India is regional power, 
I have met with many ups and down during this study, 
but, have been provided profound motivation by my research 
guide. Professor M,A. Kisbore, Department of Political 
science, A,M,U,, Aligarh, I wish to acknowledge my heartful 
gratitude and deep appreciation to him, I am also thankful 
to Professor Hasan Ahme3, chairman. Department of Political 
Science for his encouragement, cooperation and useful 
suggestions. 
I find pleasure to express my warmest thanks to 
Dr. Naheed Murtaza, Reader, A,M,U., Aligarh for her valuable 
help in the pursuit of this study, I would fail in my duty 
if I do not mention the names of Dr. G.K, Gahrana, Dr. R,N, 
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CHAPTER - I 
NEW GLOBAL GEO-POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS l IMPACT ON 
SOUTH ASIA 
NEW GliPBAL GEO-POLITICAL DEVEIDPMENTS : IMPACT ON SOUTH ASIA 
There were a s e r i e s of dramat ic e v e n t s i n t h e world 
for t h e l a s t few yea r s which e f f ec t ed t h e g l o b a l defence 
s t r a t e g y and t h e s e c u r i t y a s p e c t s of sou th As ia , In December 
1991 t h e Soviet Union ceased t o e x i s t a s a super-power and 
gave b i r t h t o new 15 sovere ign r e p u b l i c s , 11 of which a r e 
un i t ed in a loose c o n f e d e r a t i o n known a s t h e Commonwealth of 
Independent s t a t e s ; 6 of them remained in t h e Asian t e r r i t o r y 
of t h e former Sovie t Union. The d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of t h e s o v i e t 
Union l e f t t h e world wi thout i t s g e o g r a p h i c a l l y l a r g e s t 
coun t ry and m i l i t a r i l y one of t h e most powerful s t a t e s . I t 
l e f t t h e people remain ing in the successor s t a t e s w i th a 
massive economic s e c u r i t y and s o c i a l problems, which t h e 
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reform at tempts of Gorvachev were unable t o r e p a i r . 
'One of the most unexpected r e s u l t s of the 
demise of the soviet Union has been the fac t 
tha t the focus of Moscow's foreign po l icy 
concerns has swept t o former republ ics of 
the Union i t s e l f . As Vladis lav Zubok has 
argued tha t the ' f i l i a l r i n g ' of the f r i e n -
dly republ ics around Russia has become the 
major source of p o t e n t i a l confronta t ion . 
•The enemy r ing now l i e s within Russia i t s e l f ; 
the f i l i a l and f r a t e rna l r i n g s are anything 
but , f i l i a l or f r a t e r n a l , and the enc i r c l i ng 
c a p i t a l i s t world i s not so much h o s t i l e ag 
ind i f fe ren t t o Russ i a ' s f a t e . ^ 
The Bi-pol^r power s t r u s tu r e with which tb« world 
l ived for about 45 years , cause t o an end qui te suddenly in 
1990. Th«=> eollspr!** of th«» raooi« liraitlc oystom i n tho ©x-US.TP 
was an spec t icu la r event . I t transformed the whole nature 
of the global p o l i t i c s and dramat ica l ly a l t e r e d the.- bas ic 
parameters in which the various r e l a t i o n s h i p s between na t ions , 
s t a t e s and c l a s ses have h i t h e r t o operated. This i s so far 
the r e l a t i o n s between North-South, East-West, West-West, 
Eas t -Eas t , and south-south within imperial ism, between imperia-
liom and i t s victim'*« between explo i t ing and exp lo i t ed c l a s s e s , 
between f rac t ions of the dominant c l a s s e s , between s t a t e s 
and c l a s se s . 
Gorbachev wrote ea r ly in 1987 
•The 20th century (however) i s unique. I t has 
witnessed the range of new fac tors t h a t compel 
us to perceive d i f f e r en t l y the a f fec t t h a t the 
decis ions taken by ind iv idua l governments would 
have on the future c i v i l i z a t i o n between the 
extension of our knowledge and the way we use 
i t and time and space themselves. Power p o l i -
t i c s t h a t does not go beyond the use of gun 
1. Vdadislav Zubok, "Tyranny of the workd R u s s i a ' s " , New 
Fort^iqn po l icy Journ,i[,l, Moccow, vo l . 9, No, 7, 199'}, 
p . i'J-^. 
2. Vanik, Achin, 'Occassional^ P^ apers. on History and society' , 
September, 1992, p^ l. 
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pov^r i s one thing and power p o l i t i c s , based 
on a p o t e n t i a l capable of making myth about 
the wor ld ' s end comes t rue in a matter of 
minutes i s qui te another ro say, i t i s one 
thing when a handful of workshop emit smoke 
i n t o a i r , and qui te another when we have over-
a l l a i r po l lu t ion threa tening the world with 
a l l e co log i ca l d i s a s t e r . Life i t s e l f demands 
t h a t each na t iona l economy and the world 
econcxny as a whole be r e -cons t ruc ted vAiether 
we l i k e d t or n o t . l 
The coup of 19 August and i t s co l l apse two days 
l a t e r ended the process of s o c i a l i s t o r ien ted pe res t ro ika 
begun in March 1985 when Mikhail Gorbachev succeeded t o 
the General Secre taryship of the communist Pa r ty of the 
sovie t Union (CPSU) following the death of Konstantin 
Chernenko, Gorbachev suffered the same fate of the other 
major re formis t sov ie t leaders l i k e Nikela Khurchev who 
was diposed as General Secretary of the CPSU by h i s P o l i t -
buro col leagues in October, 1965* 
The sov ie t t h r e a t of a concerted ideo log ica l and 
m i l i t a r y chal lenge from m i l i t a n t cotranunism t o i t s non-
communist and even weaker communist neighbours has disapp-
eared. The Marxist concept of c l a s s s t ruggle for the l i qu i -
dat ion of e x p l o i t a t i o n of the t o i l i n g masses by p r iv i l eged 
r i c h , so appeal ing t o the iraproverished masses of Asia 
and Africa - proved to be the g r e a t e s t hoax of the twen-
t i e t h cen tury , because c l a s s in e q u a l i t i e s and c l a s s p r iv i -
leges of the upper c rus t in the former sov ie t Union were 
1. S. Gorvachev, Michai l , Towards a Bet te r World, New York, 
Richardson and stieman, 1987, pp, 1-4, 
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grea te r than in most other s o c i e t i e s . 
(a) The s t r a t e g i c Arms Reduction Treaty 
The S t r a t eg i c Arms Reduction Treaty was agreed in 
199 0 and was a major developnent in the terms between the 
two super power, USSR and USA. The t r e a t y was a s ign i f i can t 
event in the h i s t o r y on which the past and the future of 
the global dynamics may depend. I t was the f i r s t time tha t 
the USS^ agreed t o conproniise regarding space based wea-
pons. The START seeked to reduce the s t r a t e g i c offensive 
weapons to equal intermediate l e v e l , i n a phase manner, 
over a period of seven years from the date of the signing 
of the f i n a l d r a f t . The reduct ion during the f i r s t phase 
of the t r e a t y , equal c e i l i n g sha l l apply t o both the 
sov ie t Union and the United s t a t e s regarding s t r a t e g i c 
offensive nuclear weapons. The t r e a t y put a c e i l i n g on 
the number of the s t r a t e g i c Nuclear Delivery Vehic les . 
I t included the I n t e r con t inen ta l B a l l a s t i c Mis s i l e s 
(iCBMs), Long Range Suixnarine, Launched c ru i se Miss i l es 
and t h e i r Launchers and heavy Bombers. Both the super powers 
agreed to i t . The t r e a t y f u r t t e r prescr ibed a l i m i t for 
Sea Launched Cruise Miss i les to 88 0 u n i t s for the Miss i les 
with a range i n excess of 660 km for armed SLCMs with a 
range of 300-600 Km. 
The v e r t i f i c a t i o n procedure was a l so prescr ibed 
under the START. The f i r s t aspect was to make ava i l ab l e 
t o each o t h e r , data regarding the systems included in 
1, United Nat ions , Disarmament, Topical Papers 9, United 
Nations P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1992, p , 41. 
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START before and after the reduction took place. Site 
vertification and monitoring of the elimination process 
was also prescribed, A quick look at the meanings of 
limitation placed upon super powers by START. 
Pre START 
USA USS^ 
550 760 
192 97 
START 
USA 
154 
150 
USSl 
154 
210 
Actual 
USA 
1540 
3000 
Warheads 
USSR 
1540 
1680 
Heavy 
ICMBs 
AXiCM 
Bombers 
U.S . : 1 BcMiiber wi th 20 ALCM * lO war heads 
USSR : 1 Bomber wi th 12 AIO! » 8 war heads 
ICBMs 1800 2552 3000 3000 3000 3000 
war heads 
on ly 
T o t a l 16000 15000 6000 6000 6000 8000 
c u r r e n t 
war heads 
source : US DOD> SUSSR MOD USIS."^ 
The most s i g n i f i c a n t a s p e c t of t h e s t r a t e g i c Arms 
Reduct ion T r e a t y was t h a t nuc l ea r warheads i n e x c e s s of 
Megation y i e l d were t o be reduced by an average of 76% over 
the c u r r e n t l e v e l s . However, a l l t h a t t h e START adds up to 
i s t h e f a c t t h a t i n s t e a d of be ing a b l e t o d e s t r o y t h e p l a -
n e t E a r t h t h r e e t imes o v e r , t h e super powers minimized t o 
d e s t r o y the p l a n e t one and a h a l f t imes ove r . 
1. M i l i t a r y Year Book, 1990-91 , Guide P u b l i c a t i o n s , 
New D e l h i , p . 78 . 
After the cold war was declared t o bs over , following 
the Bush-Gorbachev Summit in December 1989, former sov ie t 
S a t e l l i t e s in Eastern Europe broke loose from Moscow's hege-
mony and moved towards democracy. A great many d i spu tes and 
t ens ions had been resolved in the world or a t l e a s t deprived 
of t h e i r eminence, as a f lash p o i n t . The world b rea ths 
e a s i e r , as a spectre of a global c o n f l i c t involving nuclear 
or chemical weapons, recedes i n t o the realm of the impossible, 
Defence budgets had been reduced as i s a l so the case with 
armouries of nuclear and conventional weapons. In gome a r e a s , 
even a s i g n i f i c a n t divers ion of resources from warl ine t o 
peaceful cons t ruc t ion has been v i s i b l e , 
(b) chemical warheads 
Another s i g n i f i c a n t developnent of the increased 
cooperat ion between the uni ted s t a t e s of America and the 
Soviet Union, was the agreement on the reduct ion of chemical 
weapons. The agreement was based upon P r e s i d e n t George Bush 
i n i t i a t i v e of Sept. 1989, which proposed t h a t the United 
S ta tes and Soviet Union come forward t o destroy t h e i r chemi-
c a l weapons stock p i l e s in order t o pu t ban on nuc lear 
weapons. 
The b i l a t e r a l agreement signed between George Bush 
and Gorbachev of the sovie t Union a t the Washington Summit 
in May 1990 c a l l e d for a nxrnber of s i g n i f i c a n t s t e p s . The 
f i r s t of which was the reduction of US stocks (over 25,000 
agent tonnes) and the Soviet stock (over 40,000 agent 
tonnes) by 50% \3pt0 1999, The des t ruc t ions was' t o began 
with e f f ec t from 1992. I t was a l so agreed t h a t both super 
powers s h a l l s t c^ production of chemical weapons a f t e r the 
1. Bhat t , Maqbood Ahmed, s t r a t e g i c Balance Tn South Asia 
including the Indian Ocean, Publ ished in s t r a t e g i c 
S tud ie s , Islamabad, Vol. XIV, No, 4, Summer, 1992, 
agreement. Fur the r , i t was decided tha t the United S ta tes 
and the sov ie t Union sha l l co-develop the environmently 
sound means t o destroy chemical weapons. The agreement for 
the des t ruc t ion of the chemical vjeapons was designed to give 
an impetus towards a Global Chemical t-teapons Ban Trea ty . 
I t was a l so decided t h a t v e r i f i c a t i o n s h a l l be monitored by 
both s ides and w i l l be aided by data made a v a i l a b l e . The 
t r e a t y was the r e s u l t of the confidence bu i ld ing measures 
adopted by the USA and the Soviet Union s t a r t i n g in l a t e 1989, 
Russia a l so pledged to stop long-range a i r - and sea 
based Cruise Miss i l e s . Russian Government h a l t e d production 
of Tu-160 ("Black jack") and TU-95M5 ("Beer") bombers, and 
cut shor t i t s weapons purchases in 1992 by 70 pe rcen t . There 
had been a general cessa t ion of a c t i v i t i e s of the former 
sovie t p a c i f i c Navy out of i t s home waters . 
(c) The M T C R 
The Indo-Russian agreement on crygenic engines and 
technology have been flushed down the dra in in Washington. 
The r a t i o n a l apparently i s the p r o l i f e r a t i o n concerns of the 
USA for v^ich Missile Technology cont ro l Regime (hfTCR) was 
c rea ted in Apri l 1987 by the US and s i x of i t s a l l i e s , with 
the os tens ib le purpose of con t ro l l ing the p r o l i f e r a t i o n of 
nuclear capable m i s s i l e s . 
The purpose of t he MTCR was to l im i t the r i s k of 
nuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n by con t ro l l i ng t r a n s f e r s t h a t could 
make a con t r ibu t ion t o nuclear weapon de l ive ry system. The 
us has maintained tha t the Cryogenic Sale Vio la tes the MTCR 
gu ide l ines and hence the ban onlSRO since May 11 , 1992 and 
the cont inuing piressure to have the con t r ac t cance l l ed . 
1. "There are no surface combatants deployed any vhere in the 
world. Now, 'Zero ' sa id a Pentagon o f f i c i a l who follows 
developments in the foinner soviet Navy" , Washington Times, 
10 January, 1992, p , 1. 
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The MTCR has become an important f ac to r t o Ind ia 
a f te r t he cance l l a t ion of the Cryogenic dea l . The MTCR 
Guidel ines are not intended t o impede the objec t ive of peace-
ful cooperat ion in space i s exact ly v^at the U.S. i s doing 
through i t s sanctions agains t ISRO and follows on p r e s s u r e s . 
There i s another fundamental po in t . The US had sought to 
j u s t i f y the sanct ions f inder the a u t h o r i t y of i t s na t i ona l 
laws - the key one in t h i s case being Missi le Technology Act 
of 1990 as p a r t of the National Defence Authorisat ion Act 
FY 1990-91. The MTCR i s ne i the r a t r e a t y nor an i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
regime. 
There are a l so g la r ing incons i s t enc ies in US p o l i c i e s 
on the sub jec t . The MTCR came in to force in 1987 b u t , the 
U.S. took no act ion v^ien China supplied 30 launchers and 
over s i x t y KM range CSS-2 nuclear-capable m i s s i l e s from the 
following year . China has t r ans fe r red M-11 mis s i l e s and t e ch -
nologies t o Pakis tan as per o f f i c i a l US sources . I t had a l so 
supplied guidance lui i ts usable in M-11 miss i l es to Pak i s t an 
and Pak i s t an i s developing 600 wa range Hatf M-9 m i s s i l e s 
based on French technology. The us imposed sanct ions on 
China and Pakis tan on June 23, 1991 under MTCR for two yea r s . 
Sanctions against China were l i f t e d in February 1992, Saudi 
Arabia even continues to upgrade i t s nuclear capable long-
range b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s with Chinese a s s i s t ance r i g h t under 
American noses without any pena l ty , but America i s s t i l l 
adopting 'Spec ia l r e l a t i o n s ' with China, Ind ia i s not the 
member of the FfTCR and i s not £ound t o follow g u i d e l i n e s , 
(d) US-Soviet Cooperation 
The most s i g n i f i c a n t f i e l d - Soviet-US has been to 
•Aviation*. I t was considered tha t some US Avionics manu-
fac ture may, in the near future began to supply the 
Soviets-equipment in order to enhance the c a p a b i l i t i e s of 
1. S ingh*Jas j i t , Rocket Deal , Hindustan Times, New D e l h i , 
July 19, 1993. 
MIG-29, The Soviet economy was opened t o US companies and 
a number of them were looking towards t h i s end. In the geo-
p o l i t i c a l f i e l d both USA and USSR came nearer to each o ther . 
Moscow used i t s leverage to p ressur i se the Cubans t o with-
draw from Angola and the Vietnamese £rcm Cambodia. In August 
1990 Moscow, joined the United kingdom, the United s t a t e s 
of America, France and China in order t o approve the UN 
Peace p lan to end the Combodian Civil war. The sov ie t and 
USA j o i n t l y p re s su r i sed the Sandinistas Government in Nica-
ragua t o allow free e l e c t i o n s which r e s u l t e d in the f a l l 
of Marxist government. 
The most s i g n i f i c i e n t par t of the cooperat ion between 
the two superpowers was the use of vetos in c r i t i c a l i ssues 
with wide cons ide ra t ion . The Combodian c i v i l war could be 
solved only due t o t h i s good ges tu re . This new found coopera-
t i o n between the two super powers on the Geo -po l i t i c a l a rea , 
led t o the United Nations becoming the I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i c e -
man, i t s founders wanted i t to be. Another important develop-
ment has been the United Sta tes Clark F ie ld Air Base and 
four smaller American bases in the P h i l i p p i n e s to the Manila 
a u t h o r i t i e s and the s t a r t of p a r t i t i o n t o terminate a century 
old United S ta tes m i l i t a r y presence in the country by c los ing 
the Subic Bay Naval Base. For the United s t a t eg ,a Soviet 
Union without being able t o control t h i r d world may not be 
of much use . In the pas t Soviets spoke in a monoli thic 
command \diile US often babbled incoherent ly . This i s not 
the case now. The non supply of cryogenic Engine and can-
c e l l i n g the agreement by Russia for the supply to Ind ia 
apparent ly r e f l e c t s the hight of cooperat ion between the 
two na t ions . However, i t can not be suppressed t h a t i t i s 
a well thought po l icy of USA t o take use of the c r i s i s and 
he lp les sness of the Soviet and aloof them from the Third 
world con tac t s and pave the way for regional power p lay . 
However, u n t i l the Soviet economy recovers , i t can hold 
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much future for Washington. The Soviets are now a long term 
prospect as a major market for consumer goods and an invest-
ment sector with low overheads, 
(e) The Middle East 
Despite the military victory of the coalition forces 
over Iraqp the ejection of the Iraq forces from Kuwait and 
its immediate environment, saddara Hussain remained in power. 
However, his country spilted in three broad regions, with the 
Kurdish community concentrated in Northern Iraq, the Shites 
in southern Iraq and the sunni Muslims in the Centre. It is 
the latter who constitute the power base of Saddam Hussain. 
There are no chances of the removal of Saddam Hussain 
presently. The Saudi Arabians, sunnis themselves, have no 
wish to see a strength ended and Shites presence on the 
northern border. A part from it saudi Arabia, now even views 
high technology American bases as an embrassment, they wish 
to avoid. Kuwait on the other hand, being concerned with a 
possible resurgent Iraqi threat, prefers the guarantee of an 
effective western presence, which has given rise hostility 
from Arab Nations. 
(f) The Arms Sale 
The Gulf war has provided another grain warning that 
arms transfers are dangerous to the long term interest both 
of the buyer and seller states and are linked to the problem 
of proliferation. It has also provided further proof that 
transferring arms, to days 'friendly' nations may end in 
creating enemies that are far more expensive than any arms 
sales are worth. Iraq, which was once seen as a stabilising 
force against Iran, suddenly emerged as a major threat to 
western Interests and as a threat which costed nearly $ 100 
Bn dollars to defeat. The arms sales continue to involve 
big business. They involve annual volumes of $ 30 Bn to 
$ 60 Bn in new agreements. Arms sales involve cyclical 
patterns. They rise and fall according to the pattern of 
conflicts in the Third world. The total Third world arms 
imports in constant dollars peaked in 198 4 when they reached 
at the total of $ 50 Bn. Total imports then fluctuated bet-
ween $ 44 Bn and $ 36 Bn a year during 85-88 than dropped 
sharply in 1989 to $ 30 Bn only.^ 
In the Middle East 1989 was the first year after the 
end of the Iran-Iraq war, and Israil concentrated more on 
the Palestinian uprising than arms technology. Although Iraq 
imported $ 1.9 Bn worth of arms in 1989 and Iran 1,2 bn 
American dollars, their imports were lower than $ 8 bn 
imported in 198 6. These countries imported exactly 20% of 
all arms transfers to the Third world. 1990 and 1991 was the 
end of cold war and scarcely the end of history for the arms 
trade. The Southern Gulf nations alone ordered in excess of 
20 bn arms in 1990. 
(g) Arms Export to Third World States 
The arms sales is not only driven solely by the 
developed world, states like Brazil, North Korea and China 
have played a steadily more important role in exports to 
developing countries. China emerged as the world's largest 
fifth arms seller during 1980s and the increase in volume of 
Chinese sales is indicated by the fact that China sold $ 4,1 
bn^worth of arms during 82-85,but $ 9.9 bn, during 1986-89 an 
3 
increase in the sales by 138 per cent china has found arms 
1. In constant 1989 dollars. See Richard F. Grimmett, Trends 
in conventional Arms.'Transfers to the Third world, by Major 
suppliers Washington DC, Congressional Research Service, 
CRS 90-298,June 19, 1990, p. CRS-50 and 51. 
2 . I b i d , P . CRS-40. 
3 . Richard F . Grimmet, Trends in c o n v e n t i o n a l Arms T r a n s f e r s 
t o the Thi rd Vtorld by Major s u p p l i e r s , Washington DC, 
c o n g r e s s i o n a l Resea rch S e r v i c e , CRS-90-298F,June 19 ,1990, 
PCRS 45. 
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to be one of its few successful industrial exports, inclu-
ding missile technology, nuclear reactors and other weapons 
of mass destruction. India also made exports of 5 to 40 
million and Pakistan 10 to 350 million dollars annually. 
After I960, developing countries have consistently imported 
more arras than developed countries. Throughout 1980*s, 
developing countries spent about 4 times as much on arms 
imports as developed states. 
(h) NATO 
A strategic review has been underway in NATO since its 
London summit in 1990. The new NATO strategy was announced 
at a summit in Rome in November 1991. However, this had 
already been pre-erapied by the announcement of Its conven-
tial force structure and by President Bush's initiative in 
the drastic reduction of nuclear weapons. Moreover, NATO's 
new strategy will now be measured against a disintegrated 
soviet Union following the abortive Coup in Moscow, infant 
democracies in Eastern Europe,which may be the component 
of any future European foreign policy. 
(i) Disintegration of Yugoslavia 
In September 1989 a number of constitutional amend-
ments considered controversial were adopted by Slovenia 
which asserted republican sovereignity and by early July 
1990, Slovenia moved towards full sovereignity. Its parlia-
ment decided that the federal constitution would only apply 
in Slovenia if it did not conflict with the republic 
These Sales included M-9 Missiles to Pakistan I^ eavy 
water to India Precursor Chemical to Iran and Iraq 
Nuclear Reactor 10 Algeria and M-11 missiles to Syria. 
Time 22 April 1991, p. 44, The Washington Times, April 
11, 1991, p. 3.April 18, i99l, p. 2. 
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constitution. Simultaneously, it proposed to develop its 
own foreign policy. It was difficult for Serbia to accept. 
Slovenia and Croatia propounded confederalism. In 
Oct. 1990, they presented "Model of confederation in 
Yugoslovia", In 1991 the Yugoslavia's republics tried to 
negotiate the future of the country. The talks were destined 
to be dead locked as there were irreconciable differences 
between Serbia, Slovenia and Croatia. The Serbs of 
Croatia held a refrendum on "cultural autonomy" in August 
3 
1990 and endorced it. By October 1990, they declared regional 
autonomy. Slovenia and Croatia also declared independence. 
Once, there were clashes hundreds of soldiers, mostly Slo-
venes and croatians deserted the federal defence and joined 
republic arms forces. There was a war in Slovenia which only 
lasted for 12 days. The Croatian war was different. The 
fighting continued for months.The minority serbs in Croatia 
supported army and army refused to widraw because of the 
safety problem of Serbs. Macedonia and"Bosnia-Herzegovnia 
declared independence in Sept. 1991 and Dec. 1991 respecti-
ve ly"; 6y April 1992 both the European Commission and US 
recognised Bosnia Herzegovania as an independent state and 
became member of UN in May 1992. The conflict remained far 
from resolved. 
The Yugoslav crisis coincided with the European 
community's march tov/ards a united Europe and building 
supra-nations. During the cold war Yugoslavia was of 
strategic importance to US and USS^. There being no USSR 
1. A communist Constitution framed in Russia. 
2. Yugoslavia's eight member collective federal presidency 
and Prime''Minister Markovic and the six republican 
presidents underscored the authority of the republics 
themselves. 
3. It is said,that these moves were taken because serbs 
were remained by the a'trosities commutted by croats 
during world war II. ^ 
l o 
any more which caused a decl ine of the i n t e r e s t of super-
powers. 
By d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of Yugoslavia, South Asia has 
missed a s t rong supporter of the non-allignment and India 
has l o s t i t s f r iend . 
(j) German Reunif icat ion 
The f a l l of Ber l in wall was a remarkable event 
which resounded througtout the world and put a new era 
in h i s t o r y . No one ever thought i t poss ib le in such a shor t 
period on October 3 , 1990.The map of Europe, and Germany 
underwent transfcs^mation for the t h i r d time around. Unlike 
the t imes by gone, the event was of euphoria since t h e r e 
was no fear of h o s t i l i t y and the world re joined alongwith 
Germany. German r eun i f i ca t i on was brought a t a high c o s t . 
The Soviets had to be compensated as they were dependent on 
German goods. Trade ob l iga t ions had to be f u l f i l l e d and so 
the uni ted s t a t e s had to be p laca ted . 
The euphoria of r eun i f i c a t i on s t a r t e d to fade . The 
scores of d iv i s ion in 1945 though have not yet been f u l l y 
healed, which i s evident by the fac t t ha t German j u d i c i a r y 
i s a l ready overwhelmed by over a mi l l i on l i t i g a t i o n s u i t s 
demanding r e t u r n of proper ty to west Germans in East Germany 
and the v i ce -ve r sa . Unemployment has increased . Teachers 
have been barred from the i r profession as have diplomats 
and o ther workers due to lack of demand for eas te rn goods. 
In the V,'est the employmerL i s increas ing for the same 
reasons . The armed forces have to be s t ruc tured as has the 
economy. The fixed cost of r e u n i f i c a t i o n s has gone 100 
b i l l i o n DM and more per annum. 
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The United Germany has withdrawn form the Warsaw 
Pact and as more states are thinking to withdraw from the 
part it is likely to cease early. Germany, however, has 
continued to remain in,NATO. It is admitted that Germany 
will now allow foreign troops to base on their soil. The 
NATO will be too weak to act without Germany, The combined 
arms forces of East and Vtest Germany outstrip those of 
any other single European Nation with the sole exception 
of the soviet Union. However, the- potential mix East and 
West Block Military hardware is a logistic night mare. It 
is therefore, logical that hundreds of MIGs Sukhois, T-72, 
MBT's, a large number of helicopters and missiles will be 
placed on the International market with the result that 
the prices will fall down. Thus a new round of framtic arms 
purchase will begun in the third world. 
Impact on India and Pakistan 
India had extensive trade agreements with East 
Germany, against rupee payments. Germany has explicitly 
assured India that these agreements will be honoured. 
Militarily, Pakistan, is unlikely to receive us military 
assistance any longer and thus may also get benefit of the 
rock bottom prices and obtain warheads. It will raise arms 
race in south Asia. The very fact that the West German 
companies have in the past supplied Uranium, enrichment 
equipment for Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. It is 
definate that now, Pakistan will receive East German 
weapons at will. 
The unification of Germany has been welcomed in 
India. India not meerly expected to build strong, mutually 
beneficial relationship with rich, powerful German state 
but, because Indians have always reached positively to the 
existance of a strong power on the continent of Europe as 
n 
a counter to British and the United States. India believe 
that the world of today is different from the world of 193 9 
and will be given more different in the years and decades to 
come. United Germany will be fully integrated in the European 
common market and hopefully in tomorrow's one European home. 
Fran the Indian point of view»Germany unification will 
emerge Europe more stronger and it will be a power centre 
to balance the United States and the Russia. It will make 
a stable Europe and a stable world. 
(k) The Korean Unification 
Unification of Korea has also been an important 
event after the fall of soviet Union which implicates the 
change of attitude and sense of cooperation between the two 
super powers. The two divisions of Korea (south Korea and 
North Korea) not only impared the two but» had effected the 
security of the vrorld at large and of the Asian pacific 
region in particular. The partition of Korea was marked 
as much by bloody Korean war as by intensification of super 
power rivalryo The unification was possible only due to 
end of the cold war between the super powers, collapse of 
the soviet Union and the global set-back of the communist 
ideology which reduced the tensions in this region and 
strengthened the possibilities of unification of the two 
Koreas. 
(U Gombodian Settlement and other Positive Develorment 
The evolving peaceful settlement in Cambodia also 
contributes to the reduction of tensions in Asia. The 
approach^deployment of 22000 United Nations peace keeping 
1. Gupta, Bhabani sen, "India and German Unification", 
National Herald, New Delhi, July 25, 1990. 
soldiers in Cambodia will be a strong disincentive to the 
resumption of an armed struggle and will hopefully contri-
bute to the full. implimentation of peace. 
The chances of peaceful settlement in Afghanistan 
have increased as both Russia and the United states finally 
have stopped arms shipments to the warring parties. The 
only realistic option left for the conflicting parties is 
peaceful negotiation. The Pakistan government has also taken 
decision to stop all weapon supplies to the rebels waging 
war in Afghanistan. It has been reported that the Muhajedeen 
hard livers not to obstruct the United Nations plan of a 
peaceful settlenent in Afghanistan,^ 
A very positive development is the decision by the 
leadership of the Chinese People's Republic to further cur-
tail the size of its armed forces by one million men - from 
2 
three to two million, china also decided to accede to the 
NPT and pledged to observe a 1987 pact - known as the 
Missile Technology Control Regime designed to limit the 
proliferation of missiles that can carry chemical or nuc-
3 
lear warheads. 
Japan, too is considering cuts in its defence 
forces in response to the end of the cold war and the reduc-
tion in United states and former soviet military forces. 
Allegedly, these cuts in personnel and hardware were started 
in mid 1990s.^ 
1. See Washington Times, January 31,1992, p. A2 and Rising 
Nepal, January 28. 1992, p. 1. 
2. Rising Nepal, January 30, 1992, p. 7. 
3. V^ashington Times, 'November 18, l99i, p. Al, 21 December 
1991, p. A6. 
4. Financial Times, New Delhi, January 31,i992, p. 3. 
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There are some s l i g h t l y encouraging developments 
i n the India~PaldLstan confronta t ion . On January l , 1992 
India and Pak is tan exchanged l i s t s of nuclear f a c i l i t i e s 
under the agreement thus showing some degree of confidence 
i n each o thers non-bel l igerence ,^ I t has a l s o been repor ted 
t h a t the Indian Government had offered to t a l k id.th United 
s t a t e s on h a l t i n g the spread of nuclear weapons i n Asia. 
The break up of the Soviet Union and the demise 
of the cold war a re r a i s i n g concerns , about v o l a t i l e south 
A s i a ' s m i l i t a r y b a l a n c e . , , repor ted Steve Coll of the 
Washington Post frcsn New Delhi , "(T) he subcontinent i s 
becaning a c t i v e , i f some what Shabby arms bazzar , where 
merchants from around the world peddle cold war, l e f t 
ove r s , second grade equipment and spare p a r t s to buyers 
2 
short on cash b u t , eager to dea l " . 
1. New York Times, New York, March l l , 1992, p , 43. 
2 . Washington P o s t , January 5, 1992, p , Al9. 
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P- ] Military Buildup In Indian Ocean 
The Indian ocean enjoys a vital security threat 
perception in Asia pacific region. This linkage betv^ een the 
Indian ocean and the pacific is a post world war II pheno-
menon, and more particularly, after the decline of the 
traditional powers, like Britain, France and the ris® of 
new great powers, like the USA and the USSR. Traditional 
powers, that had dominated the Indian ocean for centuries, 
were European powers and hence their line of communication 
PAKISTAN 
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passed through the mediterranean and the A t l a n t i c . The new 
e n t r a n t s were pac i f i c powers and t h e i r force p ro jec t ion in 
the Indian ocean was d i rec ted from the p a c i f i c . That was 
t r u e , not only of the USSR but a l so the USA. 
The world has seen a remarkable t ransformation of the 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l scene in the course of the l a s t two yea r s . 
After the cold war was over , following the Bush-Gorbachev 
Summit in December 1989, former sovie t s a t e l l i t e s in Eastern 
Europe, broke loose-from Moscow's hegemony and moved towards 
democracy, inc luding p lura l i sm. Even more dramatic happenings 
in soviet Union in August 1991 have seen, communism la rge ly 
d i s c r ed i t ed as a p o l i t i c a l or economic model. A grea t many 
d i spu te s and t ens ions have been resolved in d i f f e r en t p a r t s 
of t he world, or a t l eas t deprived of t h e i r eminence as poten-
t i a l f l a shpo in t s whether in Asia , Africa or Lat in America, 
The Indian ocean provides a l ink between Europe and 
the Eas t . I t provide a connection between the western and 
Eastern spheres of Russia and a rou te between Europe and 
East Africa as well as with west Asia, These r o u t e s , t he r e fo re , 
connect reg ions both in the East-West and North-South d i r e c -
t i o n s . Including i t s bays , seas and gu l f s , the Indian ocean 
i s 283 mi l l ion sq, miles larger than e i the r of the At lan t i c 
ocean. I t encompasses 20,7% of the World's Sea area and 14% 
of the ea r ths sur face . The area c o n s i s t s of 36 l i t t o r a l and 
11 h in te r land s t a t e s making a t o t a l of 47 independent nations 
2 including 30% of the world 's popula t ion . 
After the world War I I , and spec ia l ly during the 
l a s t two decades , the g e o - p o l i t i c a l importance of the 
Ind ian ocean reg ions has increased immensely, as the 
l i t t o r a l and h in te r land count r ies have become l i v e r a t e d 
from the co lon ia l Yoke of the European ru l e s and became 
1, Singh, K.R, , "Emerging i s sues in the Indian Ocean : The 
p o l i t i c a l Dimension", IPSA J o u r n a l , 17(4), Apri l-June 
1985, p . 377. 
2. Banerjee, D. , Geo-Pol i t ics of Indian Ocean, s t r a t e g i c 
Studies J o u r n a l , v o l . 1 . No.2, AMU, Aligarh, Ju ly 1988, p . 8 . 
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independent sovereign states»Decolonization, internal poli-
tical upheaviles, liberation.struggles, interference by 
outside powers, regional unbalances and internal incompa-
tibilities within the region have contributed to the 
evolution of a more complex and less orderly state system 
in this area» The recent shift of centre of geo-political 
gravity and the super power rivalry into the Indian Ocean 
region has now assumed for confrontation as a strategic 
Crossroad and as a future arena for confrontation between 
2 
the super powers. Truely speaking, it has only now entered 
the world stage in its own right, and its future is still 
very much in the making. The Indian ocean has now been 
turned into an arena of various overt and covert operations 
4 '^ by aircraft carriers and spy ships. Cohen has identified 
the Indian Ocean area as the potential third Geo-strategic 
region in the world and is vitally important to inter-
national security. 
The Indian Ocean region comprises 3 6 littoral and 
9 hinterland states. It extends from 20° East to as far as 
147 East longitude and from 60 south to the Arab and 
1. Reddy, N.B.K., "The Emerging Geo-political patterns 
of the Indian Ocean Region", in Mix Kerr (ed.). The 
Indian Ocean Region ; Resources and Development, 
(caiorado) 1981, p. 215, 
2. I b i d . , p« 215. 
3 . Chopra, Mahera j , K., I n d i a n and the I n d i a n Ocean, New 
Hor i zons , New D e l h i , 1982, p . 63. 
4. Ghosh, H.M., " c r e a t i n g a iPeace Zone", i n .'=!3ra1 pat-ra 
( e d . ) f l n d i a n Ocean and Great powers . New D e l h i , 1979, 
p . 59. 
5 . Cohen Saul B . , Geography and P o l i t i c s i n Divided world, 
London, 1975, pi 66. 
6. Gupta, Ran jan , The I n d i a n Ocean - A p o l i t i c a l Geography, 
Marv^ah P u b l i c a t i o n s , New D e l h i , 1977, p . 4 - 8 . 
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Indian land mass t o the North. The economy of the Ocean 
s t a t e s i s p r imar i ly or iented towards the supply of raw 
mate r ia l t o the developed block, Japan purchases 90%, Austra-
l i a SQp/o, France 7C%, Europe 8C^ and the United S t a t e s 26% of 
t h e i r o i l requirements from the Indian Ocean S t a t e s . 8 0% 
Gold, 5C%t in , 77% "of rubber a l so come from t h i s a r e a . 
Dr. Ross Babbage of Aust ra l ia who was the head of s t r a t e g i c 
Analysis i n the office of National Assessment, s t a t e d tha t 
the Indian Ocean had considerable g e o - p o l i t i c a l , economic 
and s t r a t e g i c s igni f icance not so much from what t he region 
i t s e l f contained but a l so from the r o l e t h a t i t played as 
the s t r a t e g i c and economic l i nk with other reg ions i n a 
broader g lobal context.He e luc ida ted tha t the combined 
GDPS i n 1990 were $ 333 b i l l i o n in south Asia. $ 264 
b i l l i o n in south East Asia; $ 350 b i l l i o n in East Asia and 
$ 274 b i l l i o n in Oceania. Nonetheless the i n t r a - r e g i o n a l 
expor ts were 50.7 b i l l i o n in south Asia, $ 27 b i l l i o n in 
south East Asia; $ 141 b i l l i o n in East Asia and $ 5 b i l l i o n 
i n Oceania. Indian Ocean was the super freeway with $ 1 
b i l l i o n o f ' t r a d e f loa t ing in the warm embayed waters which 
inc ludes considerable m i l i t a r y hardware and hence merited 
2 g rea te r a t t e n t i o n . 
The west i s heavily dependent on Gulf o i l for i t s 
i n d u s t r i a l and c u l t u r a l p ro spe r i t y . The fac t t h a t the sur -
v iva l of t he western econonlcs i s dependent on the assured 
and unin te r rupted flow of Gulf O i l , was twice demonstrated 
during 1970s. The f i r s t was in 1973, when Arab members of 
OPEC imposed an embargo on the count r ies and many of them 
rev i sed t h e i r stand on the quest ion of Pa l e s t i ne t o get 
3 
embargo removed. King Fa isa l of Saudi Arabia attempted t o 
1. D.S.S.C. study Team, S t r a t eg ic and Economic Signif icance 
of the Ind ian Ocean, T r i s h u l , v o l . 2 , December 1992, 
Well ington, I n d i a , p . 1. 
2. Ross Babbage, Indian Ocean : viewpoint . Seminar, Indian 
Ocean News & Views, v o l , 2 , No.3, December 1^92, p . 5 , 
3 . s r i d h e r , "The Producers Block", Journal of the I n s t i t u t e 
for Defence s tud ies and Analys is , New Delhi , v o l . 7 . No.4, 
1974-75, p.446-541. ' 
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a s s e r t the sovere ign i ty of o i l producers in determining the 
production leve l and the pr ice of oi l« But, o i l i s not the 
only resource for which there i s a scramble of b ig powers 
in the Indian Ocean region. In fac t o i l dependence has been 
highly publ ic ized while the other reasons have been side -
t r a c k . USA imports c o b a l t , copper , corundum; and columbium 
form Zambia and Mozambique, suger from Maur i t ius , tea and 
cinnamon from Seychel les , t e a , rubber and coconut product 
frcxn s r i Lanka, palm o i l from Malaysia, petroleum, rubber 
and t i n from Indonesia for hundreds of mi l l ions of d o l l a r s 
and had t o make export t o t h i s par t of the world. The eco-
nomic p rospe r i ty of the West thus depends on the free flow 
of t r ade and con t ro l over the Indian Ocean t rade r o u t e s . 
The Western po l icy i s t o convert the former c o l o n i a l depen-
dency r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h a t of interdependency between the 
developed na t ions and developing na t i ons . As a r e s u l t of 
the laws of the sea Conference, the world community now, 
have recognized as exclusive economic zone of 200 miles 
from the coas t as t ha t nat ions ocean space which i s exclu-
s ive ly for t h a t country t o exp lo i t for mineral wealth. This 
has given Ind ia an area of 2 mi l l i on sq.tan. of ocean space 
as our EEZ. 
The northern par t of the Indian Ocean had a t h r i -
ving maritime t r a f f i c since ancient t imes . The pe r ip lu s of 
the Erythr ian sea,covering the East African L i t t o r a l , the 
Hadramaut, Pe r s i an and west coast of India was ccstipiled by 
a Greek mariner sometime during the 3rd century a f t e r 
Ch i r s t , I t gave a wealth of information on the p o r t s and 
h i n t e r l a n d s , approaches to harbours , the t rade and customs 
t o be paid and other nau t ica l informat ions . Like the 
Pac i f i c but unl ike the A t l a n t i c , the mid-Indian ocean ' s 
dotted^with vo l can i c , and cora l i s l ands spreading r i g h t 
1. Hauks, Robert J . , "The Indian Ocean Negot ia t ions Rocks 
and shoa l s " , s t r a t e g i c Review, Washington, winter 1978, 
p . 2P. 
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across I t s width, from the eas t coast of Africa t o the Bay 
of Bengal, between the t r o p i c s of cancer and Capricorn, 
These i s l and are the focal po in ts for t h e i r - g e o - s t r a t e g i c 
and g e o - p o l i t i c a l importance for the ongoing power s t ruggle 
i n the Indian Ocean, The b e l t of i s l ands from comoros in 
the Mozambigue Channel, the Seychel les , the Masearenes, the 
Andman and the Nicobars a t the ea s t e rn end of the Bay of 
Bengal, s t r e t c h e s across thet main t r ade r o u t e s of Europe, 
around the cape of Good hopes, and t o the fa r East through 
the s t r a i t s of Malacca from the Pers ian Gulf. 
In t h e i r search for a base in the Indian ocean, 
the United S t a t e s was impressed by the c e n t r a l loca t ion 
of Diego Garcia which seemed t o be an i d e a l base f ree from 
p o l i t i c a l impediments. I t was there fore decided, by B r i t a i n 
and the United s t a t e s t o permanently move the 1200 odd Diego 
Garcians from t h e i r homes t o a place in Maur i t ius . 
To c o n s t i t u t e the new t e r r i t o r y B r i t a i n detached 
from Seychelles group other i s l and of Aldabra, Desroches 
and Forquhar and the changes. Archipelago then under Mauri-
t i u s . The Americans choose Diego Garcia for severa l reasons . 
The decis ion was endorsed under an exchange of notes between 
the UK and USSA at the end of 1966. La t e r , when Seychelles 
gained independence on 3 0th June 1976, Aldabra Desroches, 
Farquhar were re tu rned t o the new Seychelles government. 
The Americans wanted to avoid future p o l i t i c a l problems, 
and by pu t t ing up the cost of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n amounting t o 
$ 650,000 t o the Mauritian government, u l t ima t e ly effected 
the t r ans fe r through the p rocess , which took severa l years . 
On 16th December 1971, General Assembly adopted, 
the r e so lu t ion No. 2332, dec lar ing the Indian Ocean as a 
zone of peace. The r e so lu t i on ca l l ed for : 
"The Great Power t o en te r i n t o immediate 
consu l t a t ion with the l i t t o r a l s t a t e s of 
the Indian Ocean with a view t o (a) h a l t i n g 
the fur ther e sca l a t i on and expansion of t h e i r 
m i l i t a r y presence in the Indian Ocean and (b) 
e l imina t ing from the Indian Ocean a l l b a s e s . 
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military installations, logistical supply 
facilities, the disposition of nuclear 
weapons of mass destruction and any mani-
festation of Great power military presence 
in the Indian Ocean context of great power 
rivalry",! 
It also called upon the littoral and hinterland states 
of the Indian ocean, permanent members of the security coun-
cil and other maritime users of the Indian ocean to consult 
on, the establishment of a system of Universal collective 
security In the region and to facilitate the implementation 
of the declaration. The security arrangements indicated in 
the declaration covered abroad range of subjects especially 
the proposal that warships and military aircrafts would not 
use the Indian ocean for any threat or use of force against 
the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of 
2 
any littoral or hinterland state of the Indian ocean. The 
pattern of inter-relationship among the regional powers and 
3 
the great powers determine tV» fate of peace zone issue. 
The arms race between the great powers is persued globally 
with the conclusion of the Helsinki Final Act, the main 
focus of confrontation and the cold war has shifted frcxn 
Central Europe of the developing world,particularly the 
Indian Ocean. 
Two great streams have characterised the Indian Ocean 
politics since 19503, The competitive influence building by 
the external powers on the one hand, and nation building 
efforts by the littoral and hinterland countries of this 
region on the other hand. This came to the fore in the 
form of the policy of containment by the United states 
and the influence building into newly emerging nation 
1. United Nations, General Assembly, Twenty Sixth Session, 
Annexe, Resolution 2832 (XXVI), December 16, 1971, 
Operative Paragraph 2,' 
2. I b i d . 
3 . Singh, K . P . . Emerging i s sues in the Indian Ocean : The 
P o l i t i c a l Dimension", IDBA Jou rna l , 17(4), Apri l -June 
1985, p , 377. 
s t a t e s persued the policy of nonalignment, marked by a 
na tu ra l an t ipa thy towards o u t s i d e r s . The United Sta tes 
did not want t o loose control over the ex-colonies of 
B r i t a i n as these contr ibuted p o l i t i c a l , econcsnic and s t r a -
2 
tegic-Importance t o i t . Besides t h i s , the Indian Ocean 
emerged as a par t of the 'Global S t ra tegy ' a f t e r second 
world war t o conta in the expansion of communism in the Afro-
3 
Asian reg ion . The United s t a t e s conceived t h a t Indian Ocean 
has p o t e n t i a l i t i e s t o bring major s h i f t s i n the global power 
balance, 
s e r i o u s l y , American s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t i n the Indian 
Ocean began only i n the 1960s. The main irajjetus was the 
technologica l development in nuclear weapon de l ive ry - the 
emergence of the nuclear powered submarine capable of 
launching nuclear b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e s . The development of 
SLBM's, not e a s i l y detectable by the adversary, gave a 
secure second s t r i k e c a p a b i l i t y t o t h e US. The nuclear sub-
marines a l so had a de te r ren t ro le against the Soviet Union 
by being deployed in the Indian Ocean reg ion , while there 
i s a controversy whether the US a c t u a l l y deployed these 
during the s i x t i e s in the Indian Ocean, a number of obser-
4 
vers feel t h a t the deployment did take p lace , Indian 
Ocean, t h u s , p lays a s ign i f i can t r o l e i n s t r a t e g i c and 
space war s cena r io s . I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note the broad 
1. Mohammed Ayoob, "The Quest for Autonomy : Ideologies of 
the Indian Ocean region" , i n Dowdy and Trood, I b i d , 
pp. 29-45. 
2 . Singh, K.R., "Emerging i s sues in the Indian Ocean : The 
p o l i t i c a l Dimension", o p . c i t . p . 378. 
3 . Siddhu, K.S. , The Indian Ocean, A Zone of Peace , Harnam 
P u b l i c a t i o n s , New Delhi , 1983, p . 92, 
4. Singh, K.K. , Indian Ocean, New Delhi : Manohar 1977, 
P. 23 , argues t h a t the deployment did take p l a c e . K. 
Subralmanyam, "Indian Ocean", IPSA Journa l , v o l . 14, 
No. 5, Jan-March 1982, suggests t he same. Rodney W. 
Jones , " B a l l i s t i c Missile submarines and Arms con t ro l 
in the Indian Ocean", Asian survey, vo l . 20, No. 3 , 
March 1980, p . 269-79, quest ions these conclus ions . 
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para l l e l i sm i n the chronology of the development of d i r e c t 
ascent HIT system against the background of us s t r a t e g i e s -
and m i l i t a r y development in the. Indian Ocean. ••• In 1978, the 
US Defence s e c r e t a r y Brown s a i d , "in the next f ive years we 
wi l l be s t rengthening our forces in the region by the i n t r o -
duct ion of severa l advanced weapons systems : Tr ident nuclear 
m i s s i l e s for our submarine f l e e t ; c ru i se m i s s i l e s for B52s. 
F-14 f i g h t e r s for our c a r r i e r s , F-15 for our a i r force squa-
drons; the a e r i a l warning and con t ro l system and.other 
improvement". 
The us seems to have v i t a l s takes in un in te rpre ted 
access t o o i l and passage on seas and waterways through out 
the region p r imar i ly t o l imi t sovie t power and inf luence in 
the r eg ion . The JCS describes the m i l i t a r y pos tures of the 
United s t a t e s i n the Middle E a s t , Pers ian Gulf, and the 
Indian Ocean as follows : 
"The United s t a t e s has a number of major 
i n t e r e s t s i n the region comprising the 
Middle Eas t , the Pers ian Gulf, and the 
North-west Indian Ocean. These I n t e r e s t s 
involve access by the us and i t s a l l i e s t o 
the resources of the a r ea , most notably t o 
o i l frcHTi the Persian Gulf s t a t e s - to 
include protec t ion of t r a n s p o r t a t i o n rou t e s 
for the flow of t ha t o i l t o North America, 
western Europe, and Japan, support for f r i e n -
dly r eg iona l governments against p o t e n t i a l l y 
h o s t i l e s t a t e s and groups; l imi t a t ion of 
sovie t power and inf luence throughout the 
reg ion ; and deterrence of d i r e c t soviet 
m i l i t a r y in t e rven t ion" .2 
1. Singh, J a s j i t , "Indian Ocean in Global s t r a t e g i e s ; Sc»ne 
pe r spec t ive" , i n Akhtar Majeed, ' Indian Ocean : Confl ict 
and Regional Cooperation, o p . c i t , p . T4l 
2. Annual US Mi l i t a ry Pos tu re , prepared by the J o i n t Chief 
of Staff , February 7, 1981, USI CA : New Delh i , p . 1. 
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For the containment of major strategic (nuclear) 
weapons in the Indian Ocean region,the interaction betvjeen 
the great powers and regional powers therefore developed 
on two levels - first dealth with the cold war 
and global nuclear strategy and second with regional 
interests o£ the great powers. "'• Regarding the establishment 
of peace zone in the Indian Ocean, they did not respond 
positively. Soviet Union held that all continents, islands, 
oceans and sea (should) become total zone of peace, and 
suggested that it was difficult to achieve everything at 
the same time. The V5^ favoured nuclear weapons - free 
zone for naval forces but the US disagreed on the question 
3 
of total exclusion of all nuclear weapons. The US 
supported the General Assembly resolution for nuclear 
weapons free zones in South Asia, middle East and Africa. 
Like the nuclear weapons free zones in the regions 
of the Indian Ocean, mutual arms reduction among the regional 
powers and a built-in mechanism for ensuring peace and for 
conflict resolution were gradually added to the Indian ocean 
4 
peace zone proposal. The acceptance of these proposals by 
the regional powers were made complementary for the Indian 
ocean peace zone proposal by the great powers. Sinc^ India 
was the major motive force behind the proposal, these tools 
were used to present India as the main hurdle in the esta-
blishment of peace zone. 
1. Singh, K.R., Emerging issue in the Indian Ocean : The 
political dimensions, op.cit.,p. 378. 
2. Byelorussia's statement in GAOR. session 26, First 
committee, 18 40 meeting. No. 3 0, 1971. 
3. George w. Shepherd Jr., "Arms Limitation in the Indian 
ocean : Retrospect and Prospect", IPSA Journal. 17(4), 
April-June 85, p. 435. ' ' 
4. Singh, K.R., Emerging issues in the Indian Ocean : The 
political dimension", ABC Publishing House, New "Delhi. 
1985, p. 392. 
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Pak i s t an took advantage of p ro jec t ing her r i v a l r y 
with India and thus ca l led for acceptance of nuclear weapons 
free zone in South Asia, as well quest ion of p a r i t y in 
conventional arms between India and'ipakistan, condi t iona l 
for P a k i s t a n ' s support for the e l iminat ion of g rea t power 
presence from the Indian ocean. In the spec i f i c context 
of the Indian Ocean, there i s a p o s s i b i l i t y of i pak i s t an ' s 
i n t eg ra t i on in t o the US.RDF s t r a t egy . The former Chairman 
of Jo in t Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Thomas Moorer", has made 
a strong p lea for TJS. access to Pak is tan f a c i l i t i e s , 
2 p a r t i c u l a r l y the Gwadar por t and the Peshwar a i r base. 
Pakis tan could serve as an "important en t repot for an 
RDF moving in to the Pers ian Gulf from the East , with the 
increas ing s e c u r i t y nexus between Pakis tan and Gulf regimes, 
there i s p o s s i b i l i t y of Pak armed forces serving as a US 4 proxy force in the Gulf, Whether Pakis tan would a c t u a l l y 
accept the US " k i s s of death" by agreeing to serve as such 
a proxy i s perhaps a debatable i s s u e . 
In t h i s r ega rd , ' Fak i s t an proposed in the United 
Nations to evolve a code of conduct r e g u l a t i n g regional 
r e l a t i o n s and balanced m i l i t a r y s t rength among the s t a t e s 
1. Rasul B. Ra i s , The Indian Ocean and the ,^uper powers, 
p . 237. 
2. J , Alvin, c o n t t r e l l . Admiral Thomas on Moorer, "The 
Search for US Bases in the Indian Ocean : A Last Chance", 
S t ra teg ic Review, Spring 1980^ 
3. Francis Fukuyama, The Securi ty of Pak i s t an : A Trip 
Report, Rand Corporation N-1548-RC. 
4. Ib id . 
5. Tahir , s h i r i n , "Proxies and Al l i e s : The case of I ran 
and Pak i s t an" , Orbis , Summer 1980, 
5 'I 
of the region, Ind ia considered i t an obstacle i n the 
eatabl is i roent of Indian ocean peace zone as i t i s bound t o 
2 
c r ea t e new con t rove r s i e s . Pakistan alongwith China r a i sed 
the quest ion a t the meetings of Ad Hoc committee of the 
United Nations in 1974 arguing tha t I n d i a ' s nuclear explo-
sion has affected the peace and s ecu r i t y of the whole region 
i n the Indian Ocean. 
south A s i a ' s pos i t ion in the Ind ian ocean, and i t s 
i n t e r a c t i o n with the outside i n t e r e s t s , could be explained 
3 
on the ba s i s of i n t r a - r e g l o n a l development. The nature of 
the r e l a t i o n s h i p between India and Pakis tan has determined 
by the r e l a t i o n s h i p of the two supers because they have 
t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s i n the main local c o n f l i c t of the 
r eg ion . The establ ishment l inkages between the super powers 
and the reg iona l c o n s i s t a n t s have been covered by the chan-
ging clouds of peace a f te r the development of de ten te and 
r e l a x a t i o n of the t ens ion between the two super powers a t 
the global l eve l and the emergence of another g rea t power 
i n the v i c i n i t y of South Asia. 
Sr i Lanka took i n i t a t i v e for t he United 
Nations General Assembly r e so lu t i on dec la r ing the 
Indian ocean zone of Peace, got d iver ted from i t s b a s i c 
concept . I t c a l l e d , a f t e r the nuclear explosion of Ind ia 
1. Siddhu, K. s. The Indian Ocean : A Zone of p e a c e , o p . c i t , 
p . 85. 
2 . I b i d . , p . 85 . 
3 . D. Brawn, "Changes in South Asia I n t r a - r e g i o n a l and 
ex terna l Relartions" , i n The World Today, v o l . 3 4 . No. lO, 
pp. 399-400. 
4. U.N, Document, A / C , I / W , 590. 
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for interlinking of nuclear weapons - free zone in the Indian 
Ocean region, which could be the first stage in the process 
of creating peace zone, Amersinghe expressed the view, "If 
a new nuclear weapon power were to emerge in the Indian 
Ocean region, the denuclearization and also the demilitari-
2 
zation of the area would be seriously Jeopardized"o The 
responsibility from inviting and sustaining the military, 
especially Naval rivalry in the region and the subsequent 
failure of peace efforts lies basically with the regional 
nations* as they provide opportunities to the great powers 
to interfere and magnify the regional conflicts into bigger 
3 
wars. 
I n d i a ' s ambition t o r i s e t o the pos i t ion of the 
dominant power in i t s region arose from the percept ions of 
i t s leaders and scholars of the h i s t o r i c a l pre-eminence of 
the ancient t imes from South-East Asia to count r ies of Cen-
t r a l Asia beyond the Himalayas. Having gained independence 
a f te r near ly a thousand years of co lon ia l bondage, I n d i a ' s 
s i g h t s are se t on playing the r o l e of a world c l a s s power 
commensurate with i t s s i z e , populat ion and pas t g l o r y . 
Short ly af te r independence, the f i r s t Indian Ambassador 
t o ch ina , sardar K.M, Pannikar emphasized the s t r a t e g i c 
pos i t ion of the Indian Ocean and s t ressed the I n d i a ' s con-
4 
concern over i t . 
1, U.N. Document, A / C , I / P V , 2089, November 17, 1975, p .36 , 
2, U.K, Document, , A / C , I / P V , 2015, p . 244. 
3 , U.N. General Assembly Meeting, May 3 , 1974. 
4, Bha t t , Maqbool Ahmad, " s t r a t e g i c Balance in South Asia 
including the Indian Ocean", published in s t r a t e g i c 
S tud ies , A Quarter ly Journal of the I n s t i t u t e of 
S t ra t eg ic S tud ies , Islamcibad, vo l , XIV, No. 4, Summer 
1992, p . 23, 
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I n d i a ' s secur i ty can not be detached from the 
developments in the Indian Ocean, when the peace of Indian 
Ocean i s d is turbed Indias s ecu r i t y i s d i s turbed . I t w i l l 
c e r t a i n l y have an impact on I n d i a ' s s ecu r i ty . Securi ty has 
var ious dimensions such a s , s ecu r i t y - from m i l i t a r y t h r e a t s , 
from p o l i t i c o - s t r a t e g i c t h r e a t s , from t h r e a t to i t s eco-
nomic i n t e r e s t s and against psychological p r e s s u r e s . The 
d i r e c t s t ruggle and competition between the super powers 
r e l a t e s to p o l i t i c a l , economic and m i l i t a r y a c t i v i t i e s in 
2 the race for the r i g h t to impose one ' s wi l l on the otlr^r. 
The Indian ocean has predominant influence on the Indian 
3 des t iny because, India has an open 'coas t l ine of about 
2,000 miles and over 90% of her foreign trade i s sea-borne. 
Thus, vJio con t ro l s the Indian ocean wi l l dominate her sea 
borne t r ade and independence. 
T h a t ' s why India continued to advocate for the 
Indian ocean as a zone of peace, according to the 1971 
r e s o l u t i o n . Y.B, Chavan s t r e s sed in the General Assembly 
t h a t , " p r i o r i t y a t t e n t i o n should be given to mobi l is ing the 
support of the i n t e rna t i ona l community for concrete and 
cons t ruc t ive ac t ion for implementing the dec l a r a t i on of 
the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace by e l imina t ing a l l 
m i l i t a r y bases , conceived in the context of grea t power 
r i v a l r y and revers ing the presen t trend of e s c a l a t i n g 
great power r i v a l r y in the e r a " . 
1, Chopra, surendra, "Indian Ocean P o l i t i c s - A chal lenge 
to I n d i a ' s diplomacy" in Akhtar Majeed (Ed) Indian 
Ocean : Confl ic t and Regional Cooperation, o p , c i t , p , 8 3 , 
2, Singh, J a s j i t , "Indian Ocean in Global S t r a t e g i e s " , 
IPSA Journa l , 17 (4) , Apri l-June 1985. p . 453. 
3, S e t h , S , P . , "The Indian Ocean and Indo-American Re la t ions" , 
Asian Survey, 15 (8 ) .Auguct 1975 , p . 645, 
4, Statement in the U.N. General Assembly by Sri Y. B, 
Che van A/pv 23 64, September 16, 1975, p , 81 . 
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India has been vehemently opposed to the newly 
added proposals. India feels that these proposals are the 
pretexts to kill the objectives of peace and security in 
the Indian ocean. The adhering to the nuclear safeguards, 
will cause setback to her economic development. She wanted 
also to keep nuclear options open in view of the hostile 
nuclear power, China. The dispatch of the Us naval task 
forces into the Indian ocean, at the time of Indo-Pak war 
over Bangladesh/in December 1971, and later during the 
1973 Arab-Israeli war can be seen in the way that its pre-
sence is intended to provide support facilities for a more 
effective Us role in the Indian Ocean, On the other hand, 
she has been soft regarding the USSR. She consider^ USSR 
2 
more in the Indian ocean as reactive and defensive. 
Further, Soviet Union has certain responsibilities under 
the Indo-Soviet Treaty of I^lendship, peace and cooperation 
1971, Soviet presence may he helpful to India in case of a 
3 
threat to her, as happened in 1971, However, India can not 
ignore the effects of naval competition among super power 
as they,"fuel the regional conflicts and it might result 
4 
in local wars by proxy". India, one of the states directly 
interested in the Indian ocean, has been aware that without 
persuading the big powers, the idea can not be realised. 
1. The United Nations Disarmament Year Book, vol. 6 : 1981, 
Department of political and Security Council Affairs, 
U.N. Centres for Disarmament, United Nations Publica-
tions, New York, 1982, p. 312. 
2. S.P. Seth, "The Indian Ocean and Indo-American Relations", 
Asian Survey, 15 (8), Aug. 1975, p. 645. 
3. Chopra surendra, "Indian Ocean.and Politics - A chall-
enge to India's Diplomacy" in Akhtar Majeed (Ed,) 
Indian Ocean : Conflict and Cooperation, op.cit,, p. 80. 
4. Seth, S.P . , "The Indian Ocean and the Indo-American 
Relations", Asian survey, 15(8), August, 1975, p. 649, 
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It desired, as other Indian Ocean states, the participation 
of those po\vers in the deliberations of the international 
conferences held for this purpose. The 1971 declaration 
was initially criticised by both western and eastern bloc 
nations. Only in the second half of the seventies the Soviet 
Union started to support the proposal. It was criticized on 
the basis that a group of states in a certain region could 
not establish a legal regime for the high sees in the 
region. It was argued that the extra regional naval pre-
sence in the Indian Ocean area was required, '*in the 
interests of not only the security of the nations concer-
ned but also of the states that rely on the stability 
created by a political and military balance". Oil embargo 
of 1973 provided the justification that the oil lanes had 
to be protected and access to oil fields should be secured. 
On October 4, 1977, President carter of United States told 
2 
the United Nations General Assembly that neither the 
United states nor the soviet Union had a large military 
presence there, nor was there a rapidly mounting compe-
3 
tition between these two nations. The United States stated 
that while it appreciated and shared many of the goals of 
the supporters of the declaration of the Indian ocean as a 
peace zone, it believed that such zones of peace could 
only come into effect through an agreement of all states 
concerned, wherever situated. It could not accept the pro-
position that a regional group of states could declare 
a legal regime for the seas to which other states without 
1. United Nations Document A/C I/PV 1849, Dec. 10, 1971, 
pp. 16-17. 
2. Ibid, 
3. United Nations Disarmament Year Book, vol. 4 : 1979, 
op.cit., 1975, p. 304, 
39 
their consent, nor could the General Assembly by itself 
take meaningful action to establish such a legal regime, 
beyond endorsing what might have been negotiated and agreed 
upon, among member states by consensus. 
In 1979, the General Assembly by resolution 3 4/8 0 A 
and B, decided to convene the conference in 1981 at Colombo, 
Sri Lanka and to enlarge the Ad Hoc committee furtl^r, 
invited the permanent members of the Secxirity council and 
major maritime users of the Indian Ocean to serve on it and 
participate in its work, particularly in the preparation 
for the conference. The USSR abstained from voting on draft 
resolution ^ ~ while the United States abstained from both. 
The General Assembly adopted resolution 3 5/150 on December 
12, 1980 include'^ ,"To make every effort, in consideration 
of the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean 
area, particularly recent developments as well as the 
progress made in the harmonization of views referred to in 
sub-paragraph (a), to finalize, in accordance with its 
normal methods of work, all preparations for the conference 
including the dates it convening". The United states 
questioned the validity of the existing concept of zone 
of peace and called for a change in mandate of the Ad Hoc 
committee. It pointed out that it had never accepted the 
1971 declaration, as it regarded the Declaration as "faulty 
and outmood", as inconsistent charter to individual and 
collective self-defence, and difficult to reconcile with 
internationally recognized rights to freedom of navigationo 
It called that there"was no harmonization of views on the 
basic issues in the Ad Hoc committee, and because of 
soviet Union's refusal to withdraw its forces from Afghani-
stan, the climate of confidence needed for holding a 
1. The United Nations Disarmament Year Book, vol. 6, 1981, 
op.cit. 1982, p. 313. 
successful conference,was lacking. The Soviet Union argued 
that United states w^s using the events in Afganistan as 
a pretext to justify the introduction of its military, 
naval and airforces into the region. Facts made it clear 
that long before these events, the United States had 
broken off talks with the Soviet Union on the limitation 
of their military presence in the Indian Ocean, and had 
begun to create the base in Diego Garcia, bringing aircraft 
carriers and other ships into the Persian Gulf preparing 
plans for forming a rapid deployment interventionist force, 
and laying down a broadly based infrastructure for military 
bases. 
In the veil of political concluciveness, as an 
essential factor towards the implementation of the proposal 
the Indian Ocean states were asked to accept them at regiona 
level, some of the Indian Ocean states also appeared to make 
these factors conditional upon the acceptance of such zone 
as they feel danger from regional powers also. Viewing,this 
attitude of regional powers and the big powers especially 
the United states and the Soviet Union which wanted to enjo^ 
the canmanding position by using the pretexts one or the 
another, the prospects for the implementation of such zone 
in the Indian Ocean appear bleak. 
The importance of Indian Ocean drew dramatically after 
August 2nd, 1992 invasion of Kuwait, The Rapid Deployment 
forces stationed at Diego Gracia formed the very first 
contingent of Troops to land in Saudi Arabia at their behest. 
The subsiquent Embargo on Iraq ratified by the United Nations 
hit Indian Oi^ l Supplies hard. The loss of Kuwait oil fur-
ther intensified the crisis which was compounded by the 
fact that oil prices hit US dollars 35 a barrel. 
1. Ibid, p. 314. 
The increased m i l i t a r y presence in Gulf was a major 
cause for worry. The Mul t inat ional Task Force remained i s 
l i k e l y to remain i n the reason for a long t ime. The more 
important aspect i s the f ac t t h a t Pan-Islamism i s l i k e l y 
to reer i t s ugly heed. The . US pol icy of supplying hi-Tash 
armaments t o what i t deems a^ United Nations in the region 
are l i k e l y to cause many a s leep less n igh t s to Indian 
s t r a t e g i s t s . I t i s l i k e l y tl iat a s i g n i f i c i e n t proport ion bf 
these armaments are l i k e l y to find t h e i r way to I n d i a ' s 
western Borders. 
China Factor in Indian Ocean 
The Indian Ocean and Asian-Pacif ic region are expected 
to be the cent re of g r av i ty of economic and p o l i t i c a l a c t i -
v i t y of the twen ty - f i r s t century world. I n s p i t e of the r e l a -
xat ion in the frozen India-China r e l a t i o n s , i t i s important 
to assess the nature and d i r ec t ion of t h e i r emerging naval 
r i v a l r y , p a r t i c u l a r l y in the Indian Ocean. I n d i a ' s power 
equation has to be seen in r e l a t i o n to China 's because China 
i s in a geo - s t r a t eg i c p o s i t i o n vJiich provides challenge 
2 
t o India as a reg ional power, 
Chinese naval modernization programme has been geared 
towards a t t a i n i n g a survivable r e t a l i a t o r y force , China had 
s t a r t ed the development of a f u l l fledged blue-water navy 
t o enable rap id deployment to the western l i t t o r a l of the 
Indian Ocean, China has 97 submarine as agains t 17 Ind ian , 
137 of USA, T-372 of USSR, 32 of UK and 14 of Japan. I t 
has 300000 personnel aga ins t Indias 52000 and 53 p r i n c i p a l 
1. Mi l i t a ry Year Book, 1990-91, p . 86. 
2. Majeed Akhtar, "Sino-Indian vjaves in the Indian Ocean", 
The Indian Ocean News and News, Vol .2 , No. l , March 1992, 
Society for Indian Ocean Studies , New Delhi , p . 15, 
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combatants against Indias 31. The naval exercises that 
China has conducted during the past and around Spartly 
and Parcel is lands and establishment of a permanent marine 
observation s ta t ion in spartleys have a long term effect 
on Ind ia ' s future naval planning. Chinese naval v i s i t s to 
Pakistani and s r i Lankan or Iranian ports in the Indian 
Ocean would be a v i t a l concern for Indian securi ty . Russia 
has also impored i t s re la t ions with China and had sold 
24 sU-27 Flanker Aircraft alongwith'40 MIG a i rc raf t putting 
a grave concern to Ind ia ' s naval capacity, 
China has already emerged as a dominant regional 
power in South-East Asia, especially in the South China 
Sea, despite the US and the soviet mil i tary bases in the 
Philippines and Vietnam respectively. There are pressures 
for the removal of these foreign bases which, in f a c t , 
favour China. The division of South-East Asia into two 
camps, the ASEAN and the Ino-Chinese s t a t e s , also enable 
China to play a great power role in South-East Asia. Thus 
the South China Sea has become a base for the possible 
naval expansion in the Indian Ocean. India needs to monitor 
these developments carefully, l es t i t finds i t s e l f isolated 
and encircled in the coming decade. 
China had star ted the development of a ful l fledged 
blue-water navy. Such a navy has to have rapid access even 
to the western l i t t o r a l of the Indian Ocean and free move-
ment in these waters. Chinese navy possesses a large naval 
infantry force, and bases her s t ra tegic defence on a 
nuclear t r i a l . This navy i s security considerations 
re la ted to India.. This i s designed to give china a decisive 
1. Military Balance, 1988-89. 
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r o l e in s t r a t e g i c a l l y observing such Indian moves as 
ass i s tance t o the Maldives and Sri Lanka. The naval exer -
c i s e s t h a t China has conducted, during the pas t few yea r s , 
in the South-china Sea reg ion , and around Spar t ley (Naushe) 
and Parce l (xisha) i s l a n d s , establishment of a permanent 
marine observat ion s t a t ion in the Spar t leys and frequent 
movements of Chinese East and North f l e e t s in the waters 
of the south China Sea a l l have long term e f fec t on I n d i a ' s 
future naval p lanning. 
1. Majeed, Akhtar , ' S i no-Indian Waveij-in the Indian Ocean' , 
The Indian Ocean News and Views, v o l . 2 . No, 2 , March, 
1992, p . 15. 
CHAPTER - I I 
S U P E R P O W E R S 
A N D 
S O U T H A S I A 
i^ 
SUPER POWERS AND SOUTH ASIA 
(CX) Amer ican I n t e r e s t s I n S o u t h Asia 
The g e o - s t r a t e g i c l o c a t i o n of S o u t h A s i a n s u b - c o n t i n e n t 
be tween t h e two d i s t i n c t b u t of s e r i o u s s i g n i f i c a n c e r e g i o n s 
of West A s i a and S o u t h - E a s t A s i a , h a s f i g u r e d a s d e c i s i v e 
f a c t o r s i n A m e r i c a ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y c a l c u l a t i o n s . The S o u t h 
A s i a n r e g i o n h a s , c o n s e q u e n t l y been a c o l l a t e r a l f a c t o r i n 
t h i s r e g a r d . However , t h e p r i m a r y o b j e c t i v e m o t i v a t i n g 
Amer ican i n v o l v e m e n t i n S o u t h As ia h a s b e e n t h e power p o l i t i c s 
among t h e b i g p o w e r s , e s p e c i a l l y t h e i r r i v a l r y w i t h t h e S o v i e t ' s 
Twen ty f o u r yea r e a r l i e r O l a f C a r o e , t h e B r i t i s h s c h o l a r , s a i d , 
" I t w i l l n o t be d e n i e d t h a t o f t h e r e g i o n of 
t h e g l o b e where t h e r e i s c o n f r o n t a t i o n be tween 
t o t a l i t a r i a n and f r e e w o r l d s , t h e l a r g e s t i n 
a r e a and t h e most p o p u l o u s i s i n A s i a n o t i n 
E u r o p e . The a b s o r p t i o n of S o u t h A s i a i n t o t a -
l i t a r i a n sy s t em would l a y A f r i c a open t o f u r -
t h e r p r e s s u r e and c o n f i n e e v o l u t i o n a r y p o l i t i -
c a l s y s t e m s t o t h e p e n i n s u l a o f Eu rope and of 
N o r t h A m e r i c a . T h i s would b e t r u e whe the r t h e 
t i d e Swept i t , from C h i n a , o r from R u s s i a , o r 
from b o t h . The main f o r c e s of t h e s e p r e s s u r e s 
may f a l l n o t so much on t h e w i n g s n o t , t h a t i s 
on s o u t h E a s t A s i a or t h e M i d d l e E a s t b u t on 
t h e c e n t r a l p o s i t i o n , t h e s u b - c o n t i n e n t o f 
I n d i a and P a k i s t a n . The s u b - c o n t i n e n t i s i n a 
v e r y r e a l s e n s e t h e c e n t r e of t h e f r e e w o r l d " . ^ 
The u s media and l e a d e r s c o n t i n u e d t o c o u r t I n d i a a s a 
p o t e n t i a l c o u n t e r p o i s e t o China t i l l t h e Korean war and i t s 
a f t e r m a t h d i s a b u s e d them on a c c o u n t of N e h r u ' s n e u t r a l s t a n c e . 
T h i s became e v i d e n t i n t h e a f f a i r s of t h e J a p a n e s e P e a c e 
1 . Muni , S . D . , " R e g a n ' s S o u t h As i a P o l i c y , The S t r a t e g i c 
D i m e n s i o n s " , IPSA J o u r n a l , New D e l h i , v o l . XVI, No, 2 , 
O c t o b e r - D e c e m b e r , 1983 , p . 132. 
2 . O l a f Ca roe " P r o b l e m s of Power c o n f r o n t a t i o n i n I n n e r A s i a , 
Roya l C e n t r a l A s i a n J o u r n a l , O c t o b e r 1969 , p . 2 2 1 . 
^5 
Dfpurtment of Sdnc 
Uiiiied Slates Collective Defense Arrangements 
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Treaty in 1951 in which India joined Soviet Union while 
Pakistan, not only signed the Treaty but, gave it an absolute 
support. Traditional Us interest in the affairs of South Asia 
limited, with active American involvement in Asia largely 
restricted to the pacific region countries notably China, 
Japan and Philippine. There was very little awareness of 
the Pakistan movement. Roosevelt-Churchill correspondence 
reveals how ignorant US leaders were about the demands and 
strength of Muslim League. Since, in the word of Churchill 
his mind was back in the American war of independence and 
he thought of the Indian in the American war of independence 
and Indian problems in terms of the thirteen colonies 
fighting George III Emmanuel Celler, a US Congress represen-
tative called Nehru "almost a saint to uncounted millions, 
while Celler introduced a revolution to erect a monument to 
his memory and compared him a Moser, Budha, St. Francis of 
2 
Asia and Abrulium Huicopn . 
After the emergence of Cold War, United states tried 
to design India to contain the communism, but, India not 
only spurned all us advances, it also acted contrary to United 
3 
States interest . paniker remarked that "the US was delivera-
tely opposing India at every stage and was taking an anti-
4 
Asian policy. 
Following communist success in Vietnam the Western 
powers decided to establish a collective defence system in 
South East Asia. A conference at Manila created the South 
1. Churchill winstor s., The second World war, London, 
vol. IV, p. 190. 
2. Burke, S.M., Pakistan's Foreign Policy, Oxford University 
Press, Karachi, 1990, p. 117. 
3. Quoted by Burke, S.M., op.cit. pp. 150-151. 
4. Ibid. 
East Asia co l l ec t ive Defence Treaty (known a SEATO) in which 
Pakis tan was ^^  raember^ , 7n 1955 Pakis tan acceded t o Baghdad 
Par t which was reinforced as c e n t r a l t r e a t y organisa t ion in 
August 1959, By joining CENTO and SEATO Pakistan had to pay 
a p o l i t i c a l pr ice in terms of p r o t e s t s ^nd h o s t i l i t y from 
ccriTraunist: pc^ersc Though America aimed a t enc i rc l ing t.he 
communist world led by the So</iets« as also the Chinese, 
i r r e s p e c t i v e of the fact tha t i t served no useful purpose 
for e i the r Pakistan or America, G.w. Choudhury observed 
t h a t , 
"The m i l i t a r y a l l i ances between the America 
and Pakistan was based on d i f fe ren t expecta-
t ions and aims from the two s ides , the America 
give mi l i t a ry aid to Pakis tan in the conte^ct 
of i t s global pol icy d>f containing communism, 
Pakistan considered the whole deal from the 
angle of i t s problems of secur i ty and defence 
v i s - a -v i s I n d i a , , <,Pakistan's entry into the 
American sponsored piacts, both b i l a t e r a l and 
m u l t i l a t e r a l , was mainly due to the desperate 
urge to improve the balance of power in the 
sub-cont inent" ,1 
For much of the post world war I I era , American 
pol icy towards South Asia wag charac ter i sed by th ree major 
tendencies , the global pol icy of containment of communism 
was extended to and applied in south Asia as i t was e l s e -
where, with the key exception t h a t no American m i l i t a r y 
forces were s ta t ioned in the region, American aid has been 
provided in the past: 40 years , near ly 22 b i l l i o n d o l l a r s 
in economic loans and grants in an e f for t to l imi t the reach 
of China and even more the Soviet Union. Pakistan was incor-
porated in to the ^^rld wide system of a l l i a n c e , while India 
was seen by many Americans as a p o t e n t i a l show case of 
1« Choudhar7, G,w. ^ Ind ia , PaKistan,^ ^_g,"g,^gj^gjlA^:^, '":^ h ,^„ .^^ J°^ 
Powers9 London 3 975p p, 87„ 
non-communist development . Secondly, America sought to 
carryout a policy that promised close American relations 
both with India and Pakistan. They often ended up with a 
policy that left them little choice but to choose between 
friendship with India and Pakistan. And even this less than 
ideal policy often fell short of the mark, more than once 
they did enough on Pakistan's behalf to alienate India but, 
2 
not so much that they could manage to please Pakistan, 
Thirdly, and the most significant aspect of American interest 
in these countries at best uneven as it was decided more on 
the basis of need and expendiency. The tendency was to ignore 
South Asia except when local conflict or tension boiled up 
and forced themselves on to their agenda, America would 
then engage in some crisis-diplomacy, only to pull back once 
the crisis has passed. The result was that America was not 
in a position to do as much as they might have to help 
prevent crisis or manage them effectively once they did 
3 
occur. 
The us a t t i t u d e towards a regional framework of 
peace and secur i ty in south Asia has thus been ambivalent. 
Conceptually, the re can be two poss ib le approaches or models 
for peace and secur i ty in south Asia. One i s the t r a d i t i o n a l 
balance of power approach, which regarded peace and secur i ty 
t o be a function of equilibrium of power in a system tha t 
p o s i t s the weakness, tempts aggress ion. The other i s the 
4 
"Organski Model" where the dynamics of peace and secur i ty 
are provided by the preponderance of power in one s t a t e 
1. Richard N. Haass, "US and south Asia", S t ra teg ic Digest , 
vo l . XX, No. 4, Apr i l , 1990, pp, 2171-7TI 
2. I b i d . , pp. 2172-83. 
3 . I b i d . , pp, 2177-78, 
4. organski , A.F.K., M'torld P o l i t i c s ' New York, Alfred A, 
Knopf, 1968, 
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of the system. The weaker s t a t e have e i the r to accept the 
pro tec t ion and the d i k t a t of th(=» preponderant power or face 
the p o s s i b i l i t y of war, which they cannot hope to win. Thus, 
an environment conducive to peace and secur i ty I s automa-
t i c a l l y created. 
American i n t e r e s t s in the sub-continent can be 3UiTwn«»d 
up lejjs In t«sriri« of. the "Defence of the sub-continont" than 
<iH th«3 rnaintonance oj: som** lnfluo>nei=» or the prevention of a 
dornlnont or cxclualve poai t lon Lor the Soviets . I n d i a ' s place 
in American policy Ponc»rns has rrangwd from relatlv** impor-
tance in a benian environment to i r re levance or margina l i ty 
2 (if not opposition) in a secur i ty dominated one. In 1970's 
the American pol icy with regard to the South Asian region 
e spec i a l l y India was re f l ec ted in statement of the American 
pres ident Jimmy Carter : 
"In global p o l i t i c s , h i s to ry ^ s c a s t e d our 
country in d i f fe ren t r o l e s , the America i s 
one of the so-cal led "super powers, India 
i s the l a rges t of the non-aligned coun t r i e s " , 
each of th«»m respect ing the other* s concep-
t i o n of i t s i n t e rna t iona l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s 
and the values which "provide a bas i s for 
coop€'-ration in a t taching the great global 
probl^rn.T of <=»oonomln ^unt . l r f , human r i g h t o 
and t h « p r e v e n t i o n of war" . - ' 
I t i s for these and r e l a t e d reasons t h a t south 
Asia have remained an important foreign pol icy concern for 
1. Rai A. Khan, Pakistan-Us Rela t ions Divergences and 
doxtvergences of Percept ions , Karachi, p . 42. 
2, G. Timothy, L. Robert, L. and c . shahrans. Securi ty of 
Asia, Hampshire, England 1984, IISSE, p , 156. 
3.. Stephen P. Cohen and L. Park Richard, Indian Emergent 
New York, 1972, p . XVIII. 
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the Americans. Having alliance relationship with America, 
Pakistan demonstrated its zeal by defending western atti-
tude and interests at international levels such as Colombo 
Conference of April 1964 and Asian Conference at Bandung 
in 1955. However, America did not abandon its interest in 
retaining a friendly equation with India. Two countries 
signed a Mutual Defence Assistance Treaty in 1951 which 
was renewed in 1958 and 1962 which provided that Government 
of India is prepared to agree to participate effectively 
in arrangements for individual and collective self defence. 
The treaty which was not publicised amounted to India's 
2 
membership of defence alliance. The US gave sufficient 
economic aid to India which enabled it to divert its own 
economic resources towards building up its military 
strength. In October 1962, a turning point came in US 
policies towards South Asia when an open clash occurred 
between China and India. The Chinese forces inflicted 
defeat on Indian troops. On India's demand, US decided to 
renew military aid to India which continued till 1963-64. 
In return for this India agreed to the installation of 
sensitive electronic devices in the Himalayas to monitor 
China's nuclear and missile programmes. United States, 
kept Pakistan away from any consultation. This led to change 
in its foreign policy and took steps to improve relations 
with Soviet Union and china. As Pakistan improved its 
relations with China, in the wake of large scale western 
aid to India, the US interest in Kashmir, visibly cooled 
1. Richard N. Haass, "US and South Asia", strategic Digest, 
vol. XX, No. 4, April 1990, IPSA, New Delhi, p. 2177. 
2. chaudheri, M. Ahsen, Paldlstan and Great Powers, Council 
for Pakistan Studies, Karachi, 1970, p. 29. 
3. Ibid., p, 31. 
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when Kashmir was debated in the Securi ty Council i n 1964, 
the US represen ta t ive suggested b i l a t e r a l negot ia t ions 
between India and Pakis tan , By Ju ly 1965 there was t a l k of 
doubling aid to India from $ 435 mi l l ion t o 900 mi l l ion a 
year„ 
1971 - A c ruc i a l Year 
The US c o r d i a l i t y towards Pakis tan increased as 
Islamabad emerged in an int«rmodiary for h i s t o r i c approach-
rnctnt be tween Wash ing ton &nd D e i j i n g ^ r o m 1969 onward, , 
Premier Zhou-Enlai selected Pakis tan from among var ious 
f r iends t o be the channel for secret con t rac t s between 
the US and China and i t was due t o Islamabad tha t Dr,Henry 
Kissinger flew to Beijing in Ju ly 1971 t o plan for Nixon's 
v i s i t to China in 1972. The Indo-soviet Treaty of 1971 
paved the way to take advantage of the p o l i t i c a l c r i s i s in 
East Pakis tan and midwife the b i r t h of Bangladesh xn 
December 1971, The break up of the country r e su l t ed in the 
end of f ia r t ia l law. regime; and under 2.A.Bhutto.Pakistan 
withdraw from SEATO which wag considered meaningless 
without East Pak i s t an , However» Pakis tan continued member-
ship of CENTO and strengthen her r e l a t i o n s with I r a n and 
Turkey. Nixon adminis t ra t ion warned India not to act 
towards i t s neighbours in a manner t h a t would jeopardise 
the s t a b i l i t y of the region. I t did not get much enthusiasm 
in India and Kiss inger , the Secretary of s t a t e received a 
cool recept ion when he v i s i t e d India in 1974. The Indian 
nuclear explosion of 197 4 and Emergency declared in 1975 
by Mrs. Gandhi made the r e l a t i o n s C h i l l . Ttie change of 
adminis t ra t ion i n 1981 brought q u a l i t a t i v e change in US 
a t t i t u d e and p o l i c i e s towards South Asia. The Regan J. 
adminis t ra t ion saw the need for a stronger and more ac t ive 
US-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s h i p . The dialogue between US-Pakistan 
became unusually coordial and product ive . 
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Until 198 0 when Soviet t roops withdraw from 
Afghanistan Pakis tan played a c r i t i c a l ro le and thereby 
Position,, 
received a leading / After 1983 there was an improve-
ment in Indo-US r e l a t i o n s India toned down i t s anti-American 
rhetOfic and l i be r a l i z ed i t s economic p o l i c i e s t o a t t r a c t 
western investment v^ich continued upto Rajiv Gandhi, 
Michael Armacost,under secre tary of s t a t e has r i g h t l y 
claimed, tha t the Regan adminis t ra t ion had forged close 
r e l a t i o n s with both Pakistan and Ind i a . During period when 
Afghanistan c r i s i s was at i t s height the Regan adminis t rat ion 
welcomed I n d i a ' s e f f o r t s in s r i Lanka and act ion in Maldives, 
US counselled other south Asian regimes t o accept I n d i a ' s 
peramount r o l e . P res iden t Bush a lso introduced changes and 
ret^tttreflieftts and the differences between h i s r h e t o r i c 
before the 1991 Gulf-war and h i s pronouncements t h e r e a f t e r , 
were based on d i f fe ren t foot ings . The core a l l i ances of the 
US being with western Europes and Japan, the other regions 
involving American i n t e r e s t s are i t s immediate neighbours, 
Canada and Mexico, with which Washington i s forging a free 
t rade area , the Middle East for i t s o i l and I s r a e l ' s secu-
r i t y , and then the countr ies of the pac i f i c r im, now 
emerging as a major t rading zone in the •world. These include 
Korea, China, Austra l ia and the ASEAN coun t r i e s . Russia and 
other Republics of the former Union notably those adjoining 
Eastern Europe form an extension of Europe and Russia alone 
r e t a i n s importance as the successor s t a t e of the Soviet 
Union which s t i l l possesses enough s tockpi le of nuclear 
Quel 
and conventional weapons w^fch s t i l l cons t i t u t e a t h r e a t 
t o American secu r i ty . The ttiree main components of the 
Third world namely Latin America which i s h i s t o r i c domain 
of American influence under Monroe Doctrine. Africa, geo-
graphica l ly c loser than Asia and the South Asia \^ ich i s 
the remotest in terms of the dis tance and i s a t present 
of l e s s importance. The trade has declined from 26% to 1% 
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in recent years . 
The recent US e l ec t ions have thrown away the 
Democratic Pres ident a f t e r twelve years of Republican 
incumbancy. The US foreign pol icy has b i - p a r t i s a n since the 
second world war. Mr. Clinton with h i s commitment t o change 
have come with new changes and order . In view of the l a s t 
democratic adminis t rat ion of Jimmy C a r t e r , i t i s expected 
tha t non-pro l i fe ra t ion i s sues wil l r ece ive h i ^ e s t value . 
The pressure wil l be adopted on India and Pakis tan to 
endorce the N.p.T. since Pakis tan h a s . a l ready int imated i t s 
readiness t o join Regional nuclear f ree arrangements the U.S. 
adminis t ra t ion may c e n t r a l i z e in I n d i a . The Kashmir i ssue 
may again be ra ised with new approaches. In the x^ Tords of 
Narasimha Rao, U.S.-India r e l a t i o n s h i p may r i s e t o the level 
of c o r d i a l i t y that ex is ted during the Kennedy Presidency in 
1950. 
The pol icy of Clinton adminis t ra t ion towards south 
Asia i s s t i l l not c l ea r . The e f fo r t s so far have been akin 
t o those of the s ix blind n^n at tempting to become famil iar 
with the e lephant . Each one received a d i f fe ren t impression 
2 depending on the i s s u e . The fact i s t ha t the re i s jus t no 
Clinton pol icy on south Asia and the Clinton adminis t rat ion 
i s taking more time to accoritplish the t a sk of r e s e t t i n g 
agenda. The democrates have been out of power for 12 years 
and are short of i n t e l l e c t u a l date base. During h i s e l ec t i on 
compaign Pres ident Clinton s-et few p r i n c i p l e s including non 
p r o l i f e r a t i o n of nuclear weapons of mass des t ruct ion and 
b a l l i s t i c miss i l e s promotion of democracy and human r i g h t s , 
encouragement of unfet tered t rade and investment 
1. Regional Studies , vo l . XI, No. 1, under 1992-93, p . 25 , 
2, Menon, N.C. ,"Focus on South Asia*; ThgHindus tan Times, 
New Delhi , August 7, 1993. -^  
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Opportunit ies on a global sca le . 
The U.S. has grea t i n t e r e s t in much talked about 
Indian middle class market of 200 mil l ion p l u s . Clinton 
adminis t ra t ion takes i t s e r ious ly tha t South Asia covers 
an area of 1,3 b i l l i o n people , one fourth of the mankind and 
a f te r the end of cold war,, a unique opportunity has d i k e d 
to Washington to solve a l l global problems independently. 
America's new adminis t ra t ion i s ser ious to the south 
Asi^n developments and want t ha t i n t e rna l problems do not 
jeopardise the south Asian region . 
American Po l icy Towards India 
The crux of the problem tha t bese t s the r e l a t i onsh ip 
between the two la rges t democracies of the world, the United 
Sta tes and Ind ia , springs from the r e a l i t y that i t i s a 
r e l a t i o n s h i p of unequal s t a t u r e . In the i n t e rna t i ona l h i e -
rarchy of power, the United Sta tes i s an undisputed global 
power while India i s a regional power, b u t . s t i l l uncer ta in 
of s t a t u s because the guardian of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l system 
2 has not recognized. There was a phase when US wanted t o 
befriend India for reasons of what one could c a l l ideal ism 
on the bas i s of shared democracy, va lue , commitment to ru l e 
of law e t c . Ind ia , also s ince re ly believed tha t t h i s was 
indeed the motivation of American po l i cy , b u t , soon the 
American commitments t o the cold war and the consequential 
g loba l i za t ion of the American i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of i t s na t ional 
i n t e r e s t introduced a r a d i c a l change in the American p e r s -
pect ive on the sub-cont inent , p a r t i c u l a r l y Ind ia . 
1.The Indian Express, New Delhi , March 16, 1993. 
2. pa r the S. Oiosh, Neither Abel nor Cain A Frame work of 
India-US Rela t ions , New Delhi , p . 77. 
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In gtaVr- cont ras t by the 1940's the US and India 
had f r iendly r e l a t i o n s h i p . On the eve of I n d i a ' s indepen-
dence Nthe US Pres iden t , Harry Trueraan sent a telegram to 
Lord Mountbatten : 
"On t h i s memorable occasion, I extend to you, 
to rrim(=» Minister Jawahar Lai N«hru, and t o 
the people oC th® dominion of Ind ia , the s i n -
cere best wishes of the goverrmient and the 
people of USA. We welcome I n d i a ' s new and 
enhanced s t a tus in th«» world community.. . . In 
the yedX s to come the people of t h i s gre«it 
nf^ w nation wil l find the US a constant f r iend. 
I ea rnes t ly hope that our f r iendship in the 
futur<=> a<? in the pait„ continuf^.rj to bo exprw-
ssed in close and f r u i t f u l cooperation in 
in t e rna t iona l undertakings and in c o r d i a l i t y 
in our r e l a t i o n s on<> with the o ther" . 
Us search for a mi l i t a ry a l l i a n c e system to contain 
China with the sub-continent as the pivot of t h a t system 
rendered thecommon democratic values permeating the two 
i n t e r n a l systems of the Us and India l e s s r e levan t in 
shaping the i r mutual relat ioi>s. India believed tha t Am<=rica 
in befriending Pakis tan has projected the primacy of i t s 
s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s over promoting democratic va lues . America 
on the other hand considered tha t the ob l iga t ion t o contain 
rommunJarn li.on on i t a ahou Idssra'' and should work for I t , 
iJI i n t e r e s t in 1950 was thug baaed upon the c r i t e r i o n of an 
ac t ive s t r a t e g i c presence conched in terms of the defence 
of democracy. The American decision t o build a cold war 
Maginot Line along the Hindukush and the Western Himalayan 
"^ange, meant the cu l t i va t ion of Pakis tan to the detriment 
of India , During 1950 to mid l960 's Indo-American r e l a t i o n s 
reached a s ign i f i can t level of con f l i c t of i n t e r e s t , though 
varyingly in te rpre ted by e i the r s i de . 
1. Quoted in A Common Fai th i 40 Years of Indo-US 
Cooperation, 1947-87, New Delhi , 1988, p , 17, 
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John F. Kennedy's strong sentiments about India were 
well known^Arthur M. Schlesinger , J r . puts i t "Kennedy was 
most i n t e r e s t e d in I n d i a , which he had long regarded as "the 
key area i n Asia. Schlesinger r e c a l l s Kenney's remark i n 
1959" we want India to win the race with China . . . I f China 
succeeds and India f a i l s , the economic development, balance 
of power w i l l sh i f t against u s . At the time \ihen US was 
chah^ l l i s ing i t s e f fo r t s towards m i l i t a r y s t rengthing the 
Afro-Asian nat ions t o meet the assumed t h r e a t of i n t e r -
na t ional communism, Nehru spoke in terms of e s t ab l i sh ing 
a "peace a rea" . Nehru's conceptual izat ion of a "Zone of 
Peace" s t rove to keep the cold war out of Asian boundaries. 
The United States t r i e d to achieve peace through m i l i t a r y 
s e c u r i t y , while India t r i e d to secure s ecu r i t y through 
binding, mutual measures of peace. 
In December 1956 Vice Pres ident Richard Nixon 
condemned the brand of neutral ism t h a t makes no moral d i s -
t i n c t i o n between "the communist world and the free world". 
Nehru opposed i t and said "the world can be divided i n t o 
good and e v i l " and tha t " i t i s not democracy to want a l l 
2 people t o th ink the same way as you do", John F. Kennedy's 
era of Presidency ra i sed hopes of c loser Us-Indo r e l a t i o n s , 
bu t , Washington's c r i t i c i s m of New Delhi act ion in Goa in 
1961 and America's continued Arms supplies to Pakis tan 
undermined Indo-us r e l a t i o n s . Sino-India war in 1962 
deeply appreciated the ac t ion of the US and Br i t i sh 
government i n immediately providing shipments and m i l i t a r y 
1. Bal Shrnik, No, 23-20, December 25 . 1945, Also See 
Trusteeship Question, pp. 3-6, 
2. Chakravar t i , P . C . , "Indian Non-Alignment and United 
S ta tes Po l i cy , current His tory , .Ph i l ade lph ia ', v o l . 4 4 . 
No. 259, March 1963, p . 131. 
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equipment 44if^-ng~the immediately a f te r the Chinese a t t ack 
in October 1962. Though Nehru was happy over t h e i r ac t ions 
his hopes turned in to d i squi te when US s t a r t ed using I n d i a ' s 
c r i s i s with china as a lever to force for concessions to 
Pakis tan on Kashmir. Chester Bowles sa id , 
"Pakistan was high, we had attempted to force 
him to make compromise which the Indian people 
and the Indian parliament would not possibly 
accep t" .1 
By 1966 p a r t l y due to Johnson's unsympathetic stance 
towards I n d i a ' s arms shopping l i s t and p a r t l y due to I n d i a ' s 
ra ther i n s e n s i t i v e l y harsh a t t acks aga ins t American pol icy in 
Vietnam, the Indo-U3 pol icy c o r d i a l i t y vanished. By the ear ly 
1970's , the s i t u a t i o n had changed. Broadly, -ia 1970s once 
again became considerably s ign i f ican t for super power impact 
over the sub-continent . In the spring of 1971, led t o the in-
flow of almost ten mi l l ion refugees to India and the slaughter 
of thousands of East Pakis tan is ^ t the hands of repress ive 
West Pak i s tan i m i l i t a r y r u l e r s . The Nixon adminis t ra t ion 
2 
refused to condemn these developments. Kissinger too 
repea tedly warned India tha t China might not remain aloof 
from a war in sub-continent and tha t the US might not give 3 i t ' s support as i t had in 1962. Pres ident Nixon's well 
known theme "From confrontation t o negot ia t ions" resu l ted 
in the US standing for th for the ro l e of safeguarding her 
secu r i ty i n t e r e s t for long term purposes. The development 
of siB technology made i t possible for the US to adopt a 
sea-based deterrence pol icy. The Us has a subs tan t i a l 
economic stake in Ind ia . K.R. Narayan, former Indian 
1. Chester Bowles, Promises to Keep my years in Publ ics l i f e , 
1941-69, New York 1971, p . 473. 
2 . The New York Times, June 29, 1971. 
3 . Max Frank "To India the US In A B i t t e r Dis-appointment", 
The New York Times, November 30, 1971, p . 2. 
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Sta tes 
Ambaaaador to Unlted/expresaed the view '«^at the economic 
and commercial t i e s t ha t bind our two cou^ntries are strong 
and growing. Douglas s. Rose a lso observed "the US has a 
subs t an t i a l economic stake in Ind ia , we are the countr ies 
l a rges t t rading pa r tne r , i t s leading foreign investor and an 
important par tner in i t s development programmes" 
Even before the end of cold war, the US had taken 
s teps to improve i t s own perception of I n d i a . This was done 
under the Regan adminis t ra t ion . Since Jlndia was t i l t i n g 
towards the soviet Union, the Regan adminis t ra t ion des i red 
to vrean India away from the soviet Union and help i t t o move 
3 
towards grea ter autonomy in m i l i t a r y arms. Since 1976, the 
U.J corjyrtBfcja hatj taken an increas ing ly ac t ive ro l e in the 
rtwkino and itriplenwanting o£ f o r e i g n p o l i c y . I t s e f f o r t s a t 
'^  co-determination ind ica te the s i l i ency of foreign pol icy 
iasue to doitestic p o l i t i c s in the United Sta tes today, but^ 
a l so r e f l e c t l e g i s l a t i v e discontent with pa r t executive 
4 
manipulations abroad. The dominant image of India in the 
United s t a t e s i s of poor, over 'populated i n - e f f i c i e n t , h o t , 
hungry and harmless Land, 'needing h e l p , but refusing to 
express g r a t i t u d e . "While acknowledging India as the 
1. Narayanan, K,R., India and America, Essay in understanding, 
New Delhi 1984, p . 2. '^  
2. Rose, s . Douglas, "A l e t t e r from the P u b l i s h e r s " , S£an 
(New Delhi), vol. 24, No. 8, August 1988. p. 2. 
3. Cohen P. Stephen, Right for Right Reasons? : The Regan 
Adm.lnigtration and S'^th Aala, A pap«3r prevailed at the 
Annual Meeting of the Association for the Asian Studies, 
March 2 5 to 27, 1988. " 
4. Thomas M. Frank and Edward Wenbond, Foreign Policy by 
congress. New York 1979 for a well documented analysis' 
of this movement, 
5. Chnrles II, Heimsath, "Images of India and United states 
Policy", Asian thought and society. New York, January 
1978, p. 214, 
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"dominant" power in south Asia dest ined to play a s i g n i -
f i c i e n t roLe in the region. \J3 pol icy makers spokesmen 
disclaim any in ten t ion to advocate or support the notion 
of Indian hegemoney. India being considered as a l l y of the 
US in the e f fo r t s contain and f ru s t r a t e Is lamic fundamen-
ta l i sm. An awareness has developed in Washington of the 
l i k e l y adverse react ion am.ong f r iendly Is lamic countr ies to 
any impression tha t ,' . US views Islam as the nexi " i ssue" 
confronting the most or t h rea t ing world peace. As Edward P . 
Djerei ia s ta ted in a public address on June 2, 1992. t h a t 
"/•.mericana recognize Islam "one of the world ' s great f a i t h s 
which In pr«icl-1 nod on nvnry cnnt-Inont including tho US. 
Acknowledging the ro le of Islam as a h i s t o r i c c i v i l i s e d 
fo rce , he mentioned tha t while count r ies throughout the 
Middle East and North Africa were seeking to reform t h e i r 
s o c i e t i e s in keeping with Islam i d e a l s , the US did not see 
any monolithic or coordinated i n t e r n a t i o n a l e f fo r t behind 
these movement*. Fur the r , he declared t h a t American p r i n -
c i p l e s encouraging grea ter openness and responsiveness of 
p o l i t i c a l system everywhere, ahd declared t h a t the us would 
oppose any extremist philosophy tha t "prac t iced t e r r o r i s m , 
preeched in to le rance or v io la ted i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y accepted 
standards of conduct regarding human r i g h t s . 
>/v^ en an American scholar wrote a couple of year back 
couid s t i l l be the l a s t words of Indo-US r e l a t i o n s . He 
wrote " , . . . in both the t r a d i t i o n a l and in te rmes t i c a r e a s , 
the new s t ruc ture of i n t e r e s t involving US foreign po l icy 
wi l l probably have pos i t i ve e f fec t s on US-Indian r e l a t i o n s . 
That r e l a t ionsh ip i s not l i k e l y to be too close because 
there are few cen t ra l common i n t e r e s t s to f u l l i t together 
but i t should be poss ib le to avoid some of the h o s t i l i t i e s 
1. Burke,S.M., o p . c i t . p . 150„ 
en 
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of the past. Neither country will be very high on the 
foreign policy priority list of the other ^ut that should 
also help keep them off the enemies list", Indo-US relations 
have now entered a crucial phase of negotiation which will 
test south Blok's diplomatic skills severely as it seeks to 
establish an honourable equation with the sole military 
power determined to police a post cold war world. There 
were clear discussions between Indian foreign secretary 
and the Us officials on several vital issues during visit 
to Washington. Washington did not appreciate India's space 
and missile programme. India's repli'^ s were equally blunt, 
as it reiterated the peaceful nature of these programmes, 
but the tone and terror of the Us administration left no 
one in doubt here that "the fancing had begun in earnest". 
India's military capabilities and the policy of 
non-alignment are baffing the think tank of the American 
administration and the United State. The only super power 
in the world is anxious to know the purpose of building 
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its military strength after demise of the bipolar world 
and the reason for sticking to its non-alignment policy. 
However, United states considered India under us 
Pacific Command (PACCOM) area of responsibility as one of 
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the emerging power centres in the new multipolar world 
of Europe, us, Japan, Russia and China. America 
1. The Indian Express, May 2, 1993. 
2. The Times of India, New Delhi, March 11, I99i. 
3. The Indian Express, New Delhi, January 7, 1993. 
4. The Lt. Gen. Clande M. Kicklighter, closer Indo-US 
Defence Ties Likely, The Indian Express, New Delhi, 
January 7, 1993. 
considered India as a fas t emerging strong U.S. par tner . 
C l in ton ' s adminis t rat ion i s adopting two-track pol icy towards 
Ind ia . I t i s supportive of Indian economic reforms p o l i c i e s 
and helpful with loans from In t e rna t i ona l i n s t i t u t i o n s . On 
the other t r ack , i t wi l l continue to pursue r e l e n t l e s s l y 
i t s agenda t o force New Delhi t o follow i t s non-prol i fera t ion 
goals and use' human r i g h t s as a lever to t r y to get India 
to conform to American s t r a t e g i c and p o l i t i c a l ob jec t ives . 
American Pol icy Towards Pakis tan 
pakistan-US secur i ty r e l a t i o n s during l a s t t h i r t y 
seven years have been based as much on the geos t ra tegic 
r e a l i t i e s and compulsions of both the south and South-West 
Asian region as on super power globalism a f t e r world war 
I I , In a message to Quaid-l-Azam on Independence Day, US 
President Truman assured Pakis tan tha t the new Dominion 
embarks on i t s course with the firm f r iendship and goodwill 
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of the United States of America. Waltier Lipptnann high 
Us 
ranked t h e / r e l a t i o n s and sa id , "Though Pakis tan and America 
are fa r a p a r t in space, though they are very d i f fe ren t i n 
t h e i r ways of l i f e , each has great r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s for 
t t e peace dnd welfare of mankind which i t can not hope t o 
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meet fu l ly without the advice and help of the o ther . In 
1981 a new era in U.S.-Pakis tan secur i ty r e l a t i o n s began 
as the Reagan adminis t rat ion r e a l i s e d that "some where, 
somehow. Us foreign policy wi l l have t o find a way of 
1. Husain, A. Noor, "Pakistan US Security Relat ions Arms 
sa les Bases» And Nuclear I s sues in United s t a t e s •• 
Pakistan Forum, ed i ted by Leo-E. Rose and Noor A, 
Husain p . 1. 
2 . I b id . 
3 . Khan, Liyakat A l i , Pakistan ; The Heart of Asia 
Cambridge, Mass, I9"?rri 
rewarding fr iends and penal iz ing Opponents. Pakis tan to 
perceived, "we do believe in the determination of the New 
U3 adminis t ra t ion to s t rongly support the independence of 
FaMstan".^ 
pakistan-US r e l a t i o n s have been both cooperative and 
confident. The surpr i s ing thing i s tha t the r e l a t i o n s h i p 
has survived the s t r e s s and the s t r a i n s i t has been through; 
even during the worst of times* the two governments, no 
matter v^o the incumbents i ^ r e , have managed to r e t a i n 
a t l e a s t a working relationship."^ The present pakistan-US 
r e l a t i o n s are rev iva l or re inv igora t ion of t h e i r past t i e s . 
The new r e l a t i o n s h i p i s an add - cum sales r e l a t i o n s h i p . 
Though the 1959 b i l a t e r a l agreement between Pakis tan and 
the United Sta tes i s s t i l l in force . I t i s not an a l l i ance 
re la t ionship^This agreement i s not binding on Congress and 
i s hostage to public mood in America. The new re l a t i onsh ip 
i s a l so not an "exclusive" r e l a t i o n s h i p . The Washington 
membership i s not the anchor of Pak i s t an ' s s ecu r i t y as i t 
was in the 1950's . P a k i s t a n ' s membership and s t a t u s in the 
Non Aligned Movement (NAM) and in the Organisat ion of 
Is lamic Conference (OIC) and i t s very close r e l a t i o n s with 
China as well as with Muslim neighbours to the \^test are 
important components of i t s secur i ty a r c h i t e c t u r e . 
The new US-Pak r e l a t i onsh ip i s more durable and 
credible than the old one, not only because i t i s more 
informal and f l ex ib le but because i t i s based on greater 
commonality of perceptions and i n t e r e s t s . The Us never 
1. Henpry Kiss inger , address to the American Society of 
News "paper Edi tors Washington, D.C., Apri l 10^ 1980, 
pr in ted in The New York Times, April 11 . 1980. 
2. Agha shahi , Foreign Minis te r , New Yorks Times, Apri l 22. 
1981, 
3 . Khan, A., Ra i s , pakistan-US Relat ions ! Divergencies and 
Conyengences of Percept ions , published in United Sta tes 
P£.kistan Forum edi ted by Leo-E. Rose, p .34 . 
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backed up the Pakistan's arms race and comparison with 
India. As early as 1951 office of the Intelligence Research, 
in the report 'Pakistans current Economic Situation and 
Prospects* openioned as follows : 
"Pakistan's main reason for devoting more than 
a quarter of its budget to defence, and seeking 
additional us arms is not to protect the coun-
try against a soviet or Chinese attack for which 
Pakistan's resources will never be sufficient, 
nor to maintain internal security for which the 
present military establistment is excessive. Its 
chief purpose is to bolster-Pakistan*s position 
vis-a-vis India. Although every Pakistani inc-
rease in military expenditure has been justified 
in Pakistani eyes by the need to counter Indian 
military development,^ it may also be true that 
the Pakistani Army has developed as a pressure 
group to the point that regardless to Indian 
movement. It might continue to have priority 
over economic development for appropriations., 
what is required to mobilize Pakistani resources 
and utilize foreign aid effectively is a govern-
ment that is strong and stable enough to carry 
out a consistent development program.... and 
politically skilled enough to reduce its large 
defence budget by improving relations with India". 
After i960 Pakistan came to rely almost exclusively 
on America for its military hardware. Nearly total Pakis-
tan^* s combat tanks, much of its artillery, all fighers, 
bombars, and transport aircraft including supportive 
2 
equipments, were of American origin. By 1962 America 
shifted from strategic to political emphasis, implying a 
1. Office of Intelligence Research, Department of state 
Intelligence Report- No. 7706, May 15, 1958 in Jain ed., 
US south Asian Relations, p. 150. 
2. Quoted from SIPRI worksheet, the total value of US 
Military shipment to Pakistan during 62 to 64 at $ 1-5 
billion, Stockholm. 1975, p. 122. 
departure from a containment of soviet policy in West Asia, 
though the American administration retained the containment 
of china as an essential aspect in their foreign policy. 
The India-Pakistan war of 1971, revealed the new alignment 
of international forces in the stib-continent. The Soviet 
gave diplomatic support to the liberation movement in 
Bangladesh and were behind India in the war, whereas 
America and china gave diplomatic support to Pakistan along-
2 
with providing necessary military equipment. The American 
position after the declaration of cease fire was stated in 
the official communique of the sino-American conference 
held in Peking in February 1972 as follows : 
"The US favour the continuation of the case fire 
between India and Pakistan and the withdrawal of 
all military forces within their own territories 
and to their own sides of the cease fire line in 
Jammu and Kashmir, the America supports the right 
of the people of south Asia to shap« their own". 
The America-Pakistan strategy of having the subs-
tance of a security alliance without it seems to be based 
upon a programme of preparing the infrastructure of mili-
tary facilities in Pakistan with American support with 
a political understanding that such facilities could be 
made available to America on short notice if and when the 
situation so demands. Alternatively, Pakistan could 
perform assigned military tasks, with the help of these 
facilities and equipment under American guidance to meet 
3 
necessary contingencies. The Americans in pursuance of 
1. Rose, E. Leo, "The Super Powers in A&ia, A Geostrategic 
Analysis", Orbis, Summer, p. 396-97. 
2. shelton Kodiker, op.cit. p. 43-44. 
3. Cohen p. Stephen and Richard L. Park, India Emergent, 
New York, 1972, p. 136. 
t h i s s t r a t egy in the region, have been taking i n i t i a t i v e s 
of providing equipment/stores prepos i t ioning and forx^rdt^nc 
deployment in the other pro-American regional countr ies 
such as Oman, Egypt and Saudi Arabia e t c . The American 
assurances about "not seeking buses" in Pakistan are often 
2 
tagged with an exception" unless Pakistan asks for them". 
The main plan of American pol icy in south Asia i s of 
bui ld ing and consol idat ing an ant i -Sovie t s t r a t e g i c consen-
sus has met with very recept ive and responsive ground in 
Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. 
The American support t o Pakis tan ex is ted widely. 
Surveying the region e a r l y in 1982 Richard cronin of the 
Congressional Research Service observed t h a t the ' 'us -
Pakistan r e l a t i o n s h i p i s l a rge ly devoid of any sentiment 
of af fec t ion from the Paki.stani s ide . In fact he noted 
l a t e r on , tha t President Zia at tempting to move in a 
d i rec t ion ( Is lamiciza t ion) t h a t i m p l i c i t l y r e j e c t s many 
western va lues . Doubts on the r e l i a b i l i t y of the us are 
widespread among supporters and opponents of the regime. 
As a matter of fact there i s considerable doubt as t o 
a l l 
whether the US has gained anything a t / i n t h i s sh i f t of 
po l icy , t ' ak is tan i reac t ions to American concerns over 
the t h r ea t to t h e i r country were qui te soph is t i ca ted . The 
Flikuyame repor t was c l e a r l y overs ta t ing the case for 
w. Scott Ihompson, The Persian Gulf and the co r r e l a t i on 
of f o r e e s " . In t e rna t iona l Secur i ty , vo l . VII , No. 1. 
Summer 1982, p . 19, 
Posen R. Barry and V, Everd Stephen, "Defence Policy 
and the Regan adminis t ra t ion" , I n t e r n a t i o n a l Secur i ty , 
vo l . V I I I , No, 1, Sunkher 1983, p . 3-45. 
Rana, Swadesh, "south Asia in US S t ra teg ic ca l cu l a -
t i o n " . S t r a t eg ic Analysis , vo l . I I , No, 8 , Nov. 1982, 
p . 182, 
Richard P. Cronin, Current S i tua t ion in south Asia and 
out-look for US I n t e r e s t s : Report on a t r i p t o I nd i a , 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka, February 20-March 20, 1982, 
Washington, D.C. Congressional Research Service mlmeo. 
June 2 1 , 1982, p .36. ""^  ' ~ ~ 
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p a r a l l e l us -Pakis tani r e l a t i o n s , w i t i n g in the Muslim, 
Mushahid Hussain. an independent J o u r n a l i s t , c r i t i c i z e d 
those in Pakis tan v,--;re going overboard on the renewal of 
the Pakistan-US r e l a t i o n s . He ca l led for Pak i s tan r e t a i n -
ing f a i t h in i t s non-aligned and Islamic block t i e s . In h i s 
view, American pol icy had come to accept Ind ian pre-eminence 
in the south Asian region wtilch would negate a l l s ecur i ty 
t i e s in the ev<»nt of a future Indo-pak c o n f l i c t . ^ 
Mont of the rokio tanl oppooitlon leaders do not so© 
the oppor tuni t ies provided by the Soviet in te rven t ion in 
Afghanistan in the manner of the Zia regime. Ret i red Air 
Marshel Asgher Khan probably speaks for many Pakis tan i when 
he advocates c loser sov ie t -Pakis tan i r e l a t i o n s as the only 
method of redress ing the secur i ty th rea t t o Pakis tan , He 
does not advocate breaking of the -^ak-American r e l a t i o n s 
bu t , argues tha t a n e u t r a l i s t stance offers more b e n i f i t s 
in the present i n t e rna t i ona l context than an open I d e n t i f i -
2 
cat ion with the super powers. 
There were some differences between America and 
Pakis tan . America showed i t s anidty over the quest ion of 
Terrorism and Narcotics.Washington was keen to check out 
a more even-handed policy towards South Asia. Having 
shif ted openly towards Pakis tan in the p a s t , i t t r i e d t o 
r i gh t the balance. Though Pakis tan was a lso out of the 
s ix countr ies Cuba, I r a n , Libya, I r a q , North Korea, Syria 
1. Cited in H.J. J a i n , e d , , U.S. South Asian Rela t ions 
1947-82, New Delhi , Radient , 1983, vol , I I , pp, 470-482 
and Robert M. Crunden, New Perspect ives on American 
south Asia, chanakya Pub l i c a t i ons , Delhi , p , 49, 
2. see Robert M. crunden. New Perspect ives in American 
and south Asia , Chankya P u b l i c a t i o n s . 1986, 2.' '^ ^ ^^'^ 
Mohammad Asgher Khan, Generals i n P o l i t i c s , Pakis tan 
1958-1982, New Delhi , prj, 204-7. ~ ~ 
3 . The Indian Express, March 29^ 1993, 
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and Pakistan bu t , America considered Pakis tan d i f f e ren t ly 
and weighted a l l the lapses in the l igh t of i t s f r iendship 
and mi l i t a ry pa r tne r . The Gary Ackerman house foreign 
a f f a i r s committee expressly warned Pakis tan aga ins t 
ter ror ism bu t , did not t i ke to designate i t as a t e r r o r i s t 
2 
s t a t e as i t would af fec t a whole range of us i n t e r e s t . 
and only asked Pakis tan to des i s t from the quest ionable 
a c t i v i t i e s . America did not feel happy over the supply of 
missi les and miss i l es technology by Beij ing to Pakis tan , 
but, did not l ike to took i t seriously. 
US Armsv Sales t o Pakistan 
During the period 1954-1965, the U.S. provided 
mi l i t a ry ass i s t ance valued a t $ 619 mil l ion . (defence 
support a s s i s t ance valued at $ 619 mil l ion and cash or 
commercial based purchases of $ 55 mil l ion) Arms sales 
were a t a peak from 1954 to 1961. As a r e s u l t during the 
period 1955-1965 Pakistan was able to forge a credible 
3 deterrence aga ins t Ind ia and Afghanistan, 
The terms of US-'^Pakistan b i l a t e r a l agreement of 
March 1957 covered corTmunJ.st aggression only. On the eve 
of the council meeting in January 1958, Prime Minister 
Firoze Khan Noon sa id , that Baghdad Pact should have the 
same rule as NATO, The main aim of .^yj to provide arms 
to Pakis tan was t o keep the Pakis tani Army commanders 
f r iendly t o us"' r a the r than to Russians. USA pleaded 
1, Ib id , 
2. The Times of I nd i a , June U , 1993. 
a.Th^Hlndustan Times, July 26, 1993. 
t h a t , "we are arming Pakistan in order t ha t she may defend 
herself against soviet a t t ack" . subs tan t i a l amount of 
modern planes and equipment supplied to Pakis tan by us 
consis ted of B - 5 7 Jet-Bombers, F-86 sabre J e t s , F-IO4 
Supersonic s t a r F i g h t e r s , Sidewinder Miss i l e s , Transport 
p l anes , he l i cop t e r s and supporting equipment. _ USA 
also supplied Rader for the P-104, M-47 t a n k s . Anti-tank 
miss i les and C-130 turbo J e t s , Cargo p lanes , F-104 
I to Pakistan af te r General Ayub Khan's re turn 2 from h i s tour of Washington in 1961, 
After the 1965 Indo-Pak h o s t i l i t i e s , Washington 
formally suspended the supply of arms to both the countr ies 
( Ind ia -Pakis tan) . But in case of Pak is tan , t h i s pol icy was 
suddenly reversed in 1967.-America s t a r t ed arms supply to 
3 Pakistan on a grant bas i s . ' In 1967 Pakis tan turned to 
China, v^ich agreed to equip th ree newly r a i s ed Pakis tan i 
d iv i s ions and to provide tanks and MIG-19 Aircraf t (renamed 
F-6) and some fas t pa t ro l boats for i t s Air Force. Pakistan 
a lso approached France for Mirages and sub-marines. In 1968 
the soviet Union agreed to offer Pak $ 30 mi l l ion worth 
of guns.M-18 he l i cop te r s and vehic les and even offered to 
develop Gwader as a naval base. 
Between 1965 and 1971, Pakis tan was not able to 
obtain s ign i f i can t quan t i t i e s of modern equipment, la rgely 
due t o us ' embargo and lack of funds. The American r e luc -
tance u n t i l 1972 to supply arms t o Pakistan in a big way 
1. Raw N. 11 p . lOO : Quoted-from U.S. Arms to Pakistan ; A 
Study in Alliance Re la t ionsh ip , Dievidas B. Lohateker, p.48, 
2 . Raw N. 1 1 , p . 101, 
3 . Chopra, V.D. , 'Asian Peace and Neo-lmperial is t Asia 
(ed,) Pakis tan and Asian Peace, New Delh i , 1985, p. 51 . 
3 . Hussain No, 23, p. 4. 
had been the r e s u l t of v a r i o u s f a c t o r s , USA unders tood t h a t 
t h e r e was no r e a l danger of any massive supply of American 
arms t o Pak as a giild Pro quo fo r I s l a m a b a d ' s a e r i e s i n 
West Asian r e g i o n . The Pak-us r e l a t i o n s remained s t r o n g , 
d e s p i t e P a k i s t a n i withdrawal from SEATO as P a k i s t a n 
en la rged i t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n CENTO. 
I n March 1973 us ag^^in removed arms s u p p l i e s t o 
Pak with a s imul taneous suger coa t ed announcement, d e c l a r i n g 
t h a t I n d i a t o o could buy communication equipment worth $ 
91 m i l l i o n . L a t e r on , us changed i t s p o l i c y and s t a r t e d 
Lo give arma on th*- b.ial« of Vjo l l ing Anna' and pa l t ia tan 
s t a r t e d t o purchase $ 301035 m i l l i o n of arms ©very y e a r . 
The s o v i e t i n t e r v e n t i o n i n Afghanis tan i n the l a s t 
week of December 1979 provided a l e a se of l i f e t o Z i a ' s 
m<irtial law reg ime. In view of Z i a ' s e x p l o i t a t i o n of 
r e l i g i o u s f e e l i n g s of e n t i r e Muslim wor ld , Z ia c o n s o l i d a t e d 
power a t both t h e i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l f r o n t s i n t h e name 
of I s l a m . The Ca r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n dec ided t o make 
P a k i s t a n s t r o n g e r and propose $ 4000 m i l l i o n a i d . P a k i s t a n 
even cons ide red i t shor t and c a l l e d ' p e a n u t s * • The Reagan 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n 1981 gave a c l e a r s i g n a l t h a t t h e Us 
need t o supply arms t o Afghan i n s u r g e n t s th rough P a k i s t a n . 
2 The US supp l i ed arms and equipments i n c l u d i n g TOW 
m i s s i l e s , C o h r e h e l i c o p t e r s . M i s s i l e Launche r s , 2000 a n t i -
Tank "Missiles e t c . Washington ' s resumpt ion of s e c u r i t y 
r e l a t i o n s h i p with Pakifetan I n June 1981 r a i s e d P a k i s t a n 
t o a p o s i t i o n of prominence i n h i e r a r c h y of Amei^icas arms 
c l i e n t s and the major arms s u p p l i e s were made by U,SA. 
1. Singh, R a j i v , U . S . - P a k i s t a n and I n d i a , S t r a t e g i c 
R e l a t i o n s , Al lahubad , 1985, p , 151. 
2 . S i n g h , NG, p p . 1 6 8 - 1 6 9 . 
Q^) CHINA A^ 7D SOUTH ASIA 
China h a s emerged a s a ma jo r p l a y e r on t h e A s i a n s t a g e 
w i t h t h e p o t e n t i a l t o e f f e c t t h e g l o b a l b a l a n c e of power . 
The f reedom from t h e g e o - p o l i t i c a l embrance of t h e fo rmer 
s u p e r powers h a s r e s u l t e d i n t h e emergence of s i x a c t u a l 
c e n t r e s of power i n t h e p o s t c o l d war w o r l d . T h e s e a r e 
U5A , t h e E .G . ( w i t h Germany, F r a n c e and UK - p l a y i n g a more 
a c t i v e r o l e ) R u s s i a , C h i n a , J a p a n and I n d i a . 
S p e a k i n g a b o u t C h i n a ' s p o l i c y t o w a r d s South A s i a , 
G e r a l d S e g a l s a i d , " I n s h o r t c h i n a i s a ma jo r p l a y e r on t h e 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t a g e and p o t e n t i a l l y major t r o u b l e maker f o r 
t h e o t h e r f o u r G r e a t Powers who a r e i n t e r e s t e d i n d e v e l o p i n g 
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a c o n c e r t of p o w e r " . B e g i n n i n g w i t h Nor th K o r e a , t h r o u g h 
I n d o - C h i n a t o T h a i l a n d , Bang ladesh and w e s t w a r d s , t o 
P a k i s t a n , I r a n and Saudi A r a b i a , China h a s managed t o "Ring" 
As i a a s i t were and t h e s t r a t e g i c i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s f o r 
n a t i o n s l i ^ J a p a n , I n d i a , I n d o n e s i a and Vie tnam n e e d s l i t t l e 
a m p l i f i c a t i o n . I n a s s e s s i n g C h i n a ' s r o l e i n r e g i o n a l s e c u -
r i t y , two t h i n g s a r e c e r t a i n . China w i l l o n l y grow s t r o n g e r 
and i t s c e n t r a l g e o g r a p h i c p o s i t i o n i n A s i a w i l l d i c t a t e 
t h a t i t h a s a n i n t e r e s t and a r o l e t o p l a y I n a l m o s t e v e r y 
3 
r e g i o n a l i s s u e . 
C h i n a , t h o u g h p r i m a r i l y an E a s t A s i a n Power u n l i k e 
j a p a n or K o r e a , h a s m a i n t a i n e d a r a t h e r c l o s e r e l a t i o n s h i p 
w i t h s o u t h A s i a . I t a p p e a r s t h a t t h e f i r s t c o n t a c t of t h e 
1. Bhasker , C. Uda i , Role of china In The Emerging world 
Order , s t r a t e g i c Analysis» A p r i l 1993, 
2. Gerald Segal James , " I n t e l l i g e n c e Review", J a n u a r y , 1993. 
3 . David shambaugh, "Ch ina ' s S e c u r i t y p o l i c y I n The Pos t 
cold War E r a " , S u r v i v a l , Summer, 1992, note 7 , pp , 98-99. 
71 
Chinese with south Asia took place a t the beginning of the 
Chr is t ian e ra . The border region between China and India 
was mostly inhabi ted by 'barbar ian ' t r i b e s of Mongoloid. 
The f i r s t e f fo r t to delimit a c lear boundry between China 
and India was made in 1914 Simla Conference where the 
Br i t i sh put pressure on china to accept a B r i t i sh proposal 
2 for a new border. In the western sector t o o , the Indo-
Tibetan boundary was f i r s t set by the B r i t i s h Government 
of India between 1873-78. "China seeks to se t l im i t s on 
I n d i a ' s r o l e in south Asia by hobnobbing with some of i t s 
d i f f i c u l t neighbours. Apart from the obvious case of 
Pakistan (where i t has even helped in the development of 
a nuclear bomb) other countr ies l ike Bangladesh, Sri Lanka 
and Nepal had a l so provided s ign i f ican t m i l i t a r y aid or 
p o l i t i c a l support as an exercise in Indian b a i t i n g " . 
China refused to recognize Sikkim as I n d i a ' s pa r t and 
disregarded in Lin Uang Guang, a Chinese scholar ca l led 
Indian 'expansionism' and 'hegemonism' toward i t s smaller . 
neighbours and sa id , "Nepal, Bhutan and Sikkim denied even 
breathing spe l l were placed under Indian Umbrella over-
night" a f t e r the Br i t i sh lef t Ind ia . The Chinese 
'^-feltanchanung' enables them to "maintain an object ive over 
an unusually long period of time without -seeing f ru s t r a t i on 
or impatience r e s u l t i n g from long delays . Time to the nth 
degree mul t ip l ied by the nth root of e f fo r t eefual r e s u l t s , 
described MaOo A touching point in Chinese foreign pol icy 
was entente cord ia ly with USA which r e s u l t e d from Sino-Pak 
1. B a ^ a l a , P.C. , India and china , Bombay, Hind Kitab Ltd. 
1950. 
2. Noirlle^Maxwell, I n d i a ' s China War, New York,Anchor 
Books Doubled Day, 1972, p . 44-49. 
3 . The Indian Express, New Delhi , March 3 0^ 1992. 
4. Lin Liang Guang, a Chinese Scholar r e i t r a t e d in a 
Seminar in Colombo, 1987. 
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r e l a t i o n s . I t created a Washington-Beljing-Islamabad axis 
which led to stronger India-USSR r e l a t i o n s . China's f i r s t 
issue i s towards war. Mao had cons i s t en t ly urged that China 
should be prepared "for an e a r l y nuclear war". Den Xiaoping 
made a departure from t h i s view in 1978 when he s ta ted t h a t , 
a major war between the super powers was not l i k e l y in the 
near fu tu re . Time was opportune to build the nat ional 
economy. China sees new development in the arena of i n t e r -
nat ional r e l a t i o n s in the comming decade. P r imar i ly , on 
the bas is of us -Soviet de t en t e , i t sees the t r iangular 
China-USSR-USA r e l a t i o n s as maturing. China do not now 
prefers to be a "Card" to be 'used* by one super power 
against the other . A mature balanced and equal r e l a t i o n -
ship will emerge in which china wi l l be the ' t h i r d polar ' 
i n the Asia-Pacif ic region,, 
China considers tha t South Asia wil l continue as an 
area of per iphera l concern to china even though minori t ies 
Xinjiang and Tibet may be cause of Increas ing anxiety which 
may then enhance t h i s regions future Importance. I t will 
be in China 's i n t e r e s t t o see t ha t these out laying provinces 
adjacent to the ' I s l amic ' be l t re-mains s t ab le and secure. 
China's f i r s t most e f fo r t vrill l i e to see t h a t r e l a t i ons 
with Pakis tan remain close to provide easy asses to T-test 
Asia. The people ' s war doctr ine I s , "only by loss can loss 
be avoided". China consider disadvantageous pos i t ion easy 
and follow , "We should have the courage to r e t r e a t so 
as to preserve our forces and h i t the enemy v^en new oppor-
t u n i t i e s a r i s e " . The pol icy of, " turning the enemy in deep" 
i s t h e , "most e f fec t ive mi l i t a ry pol icy for a ^eek army 
1. Pan Zhenglang "China's Securi ty Options in the 1990s", 
NATOS Sixteen Nations, April 1989, p . 14. 
s t r a t e g i c a l l y on the defencl've t o employ against a strong 
enemy". China aftermath of the Tiananmen Massacre^ con-
vinced tha t the PIA performance in May-June 1989 had 
exposed p o l i t i c a l and ideologica l def ic ienc ies and (^hina 
should modernize h i s defence^^p.R.C. Minister of Defence 
Gin Jiwei s t r e ssed that the PLA " i s determined t o make new 
con t r ibu t ions" . CCP Secretary General Jiang Zemin s t a ted -
"To ensure a s tab le environment for s o c i a l i s t modernisa-
t i o n , we must maintain a strong force and bu i ld up strong 
na t ional defence, i f we have a mi l i t a ry force whose s t r en -
gth corresponds to our count ry ' s s t a t u s , we wil l e a s i l y 
deal with whatever contingency tha t may occur and wi l l 
3 
remain inrniscibl*^. 
China-India Today 
iiiHiw iiKiii B T •T III! • irii [ -r - t f inr i i i ' T'lii 
There had always been a sense of r i v a l r y between 
India and China. In a dialogue between Chinese Monk Hsuan-
Tsang and monks of Nalanda wiien the former announced to 
r e tu rn to china. The monks of Nalanda, when they heard of 
i t , begged him to remain saying, "India i s the land of 
Buddhist b i r t h , and though he has l e f t the world, there 
are s t i l l ntviny t races of him. What greater happiness could 
there be than t o v i s i t them in t u r n , to adore him and chant 
h i s pra i ses ? Why then do you wish t o leave having come so 
far 7 Moreover, China i s a country of the mlecchas who 
!• selected_ Mil i ta ry wri t ings of Mao Tsetung, Published 
by Dei j ing 's For' 'ign Language P r e s s , p . 81 , 
2, Harlan w. Jencks "Civil Mi l i t a ry Relat ions in China : 
Tiananmen and After" , Problems of corrmunism (Washington, 
DC) May-June 1991 pp. 14-29, Richard H. Young Ed. The 
PLA and the Tiananmen Cr i s i s SCPS Papers» No, 1, Sim 
Yatsen Center for Policy s tudies , ' National Sinyat Sen 
Universi ty Kaohsiung Taiwan Oct, 1989, 
3 . Quoted in Chen Xiaogong, world Mil i tary s i t ua t ion_ in 
the 1990s", J ietangjun Bab, FJB, Sept. 7 , 1990. ' 
despise the r e l i g i o n s and f a i t h . That i s why Buddha was 
not born the re . The mind of the people i s narrov/, and the 
coarseness profound, hence ne i ther s a i n t s nor sages go there, 
The climate i s cold and the country rugged you must think 
again". •'• i t r e f l e c t s past r e f l ec t ion of China 's pos i t i ons , 
a t t i t u d e and coarseness . 
The h i s t o r y a lso es tabl ished the fact when China 
betrayed India once more and shrinked a l l the t i e s of 
f r i endsh ip , s t ruck off the p r inc ip le of 'Panchsheel* and 
occupied a su f f i c i en t par t of i t s border. The pol icy between 
the two countr ies remained of doubts and mise r i e s . The steps 
taken by e i t h e r t o f i l l the vaccuras can not be described an 
act of f r iendship . Rajiv Gandhi, soon af ter taking over as 
Prime Minister i n 1988 had frequent d iscuss ions t o normalize 
r e l a t i o n s with China. To accomplish t h i s he ca l l ed for a 
process of modernization on a l l f r o n t s . There was a change 
of opinion in the e ightees and China praised Indian achieve-
ments in the f i e ld of education, science and technology. 
India-China entered in to a Trade Agreement in 'August 1984 
a f te r a gap of t h i r t y years . Both the coun t r i e s accorded 
each other the most favoured nation treatment in t rade and 
commerce. A degree of professionalism now has created ra ther 
than fr iendship and both countr ies have exchanged trade and 
t r a n s i t . But, the main problem for which Indian Prime 
r-linister los t h i s l i f e , the Defence Minis te r , Menon lost 
h i s seat ando on account of v^ich India los t h i s world wide 
influence and c r e d i b i l i t y stands the same. I t i s a mis-
fortune that todays p o l i t i c s i s based on i n t e r e s t s India 
has become vict im of the Chinese psyche, had he taken strong 
hold of the s i t u a t i o n , the boundary problem would have 
a l t e r ed so f a r . 
1. Joseph Needhami, Science And C i v i l i z a t i o n In China, v o l . 1 , 
Oxford Univers i ty P r e s s , New York, 1954, p . 214. 
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With regard to territorial disputes with china and 
Pakistan, Izvestia said, "the territorial dispute between 
India and China is not decided. It is solely 'frozen' and 
whether they want it or not, the dispute is literally a 
"hot geyser" which periodically comes into open". After 
the disintegration of Soviet Union, China is much safe on 
his borders today while India has further weakened pollti° 
cally, economically and psychologically. India and China 
has taken major steps towards normalising their relations 
by signing four agreements including the long awaited 
peace and transquility along the Line of Actual Control 
(LAC) in the border areas and pledged to work for expanding 
their relations in the economic, scientific, technological, 
2 
cultural and other fields. 
Sino"Bhutan 
China's connection with Bhutan are equal ly re levant 
for the study of Bhutanese p o l i t i c a l developments as tha t 
of Ind ia . Shortly a f t e r the establishEnent of the People ' s 
Republic of China in October 1949. china s t a r t ed i t s claim 
on T ibe t . In October next year China entered Tibet through 
eas te rn f r o n t i e r s . After few months China entered the western 
side from slnkiang through Indian a r eas . Indian Prime Minister 
announced in Parliament in December 1950, " tha t an a t t ack 
on Nepal or Bhutan would be tentamount to an a t t a c k on 
Indian t e r r i t o r y " . ^ 
1. Upadhyay, Dadan, "Indo-Chinese Ties Bordering on Caution", 
The Indian Express, September 16, 1992, 
2. The Hltidastan Times, New Delhi , September 8, 1993. 
3 . Nehru's statement in Lok sabha on August 28, 1959 and 
in Rajya Sabha on December 8, 1959. See A. Appadoral ed. 
se lected Documents on Indias Foreign Pol icy and Rela t ions , 
1547-1972, i )e ihi , oUp. 1^52; vol . 1, pp. 547-4^. 
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China adopted a pol icy of blow hot and blow cold 
towards Bhutan, The accent of t h i s diplomacy was not to 
t r e a t Bhutan as an appendage of I n d i a , China i n s i s t e d to 
deal with Bhutan d i r e c t l y without India in the sino-Bhutan 
boundry mat ters . Chou En-Lai r e i t e r a t e d the Chinese pos i t ion 
tha t sino-Bhutanese border question was not within the 
scope of s ino-Indian boarder d i scuss ions . Nehru refuted 
t h i s idea and rep l i ed to the Chinese Premier' Si^letter dated 
September 8 , 1959, " I t i s not c l ea r to us what exac t ly i s 
the impl icat ion of your statement tha t the boundries of 
Sikkim and Bhutan do not f a l l within the scope of the 
present d iscuss ion. In f a c t , Chinese maps show s izeable 
areas of Bhutan as pa r t of T ibe t . Under Treaty r e l a t i o n -
ships with Bhutan, the Government of India are the only 
competent au thor i ty to take up with other Government matters 
concerning Bhutan's ex terna l r e l a t i o n s and in fac t we have 
taken up with your Governme^nt a number of matters on behalf 
of the Bhutan Government",' In 1959 there x.rere even incur-
2 
sions in to Bhutanese t e r r i t o r y by armed Chinese, The 
Chinese war 1962 and the defeat of India ra ised suspecion 
in the minds of Bhutanese bu t , despi te these d i a l e c t i c s 
Bhutan decided in favour of a l igning c lose ly with India 
and did not l ike to share the same fa te l ike tha t af Tibet 
a t the hands of Chinese, 
India took timely steps against the perceived <Qjiinese 
t h r e a t , strengthened i t s defence forces a t Bhutan and a lso 
provided adequate economic aid in the five years plan of 
For the Text of the Chou* s l e t t e r and Nehru's l e t t e r 
See I b i d , pp. 550-76, 
Valent ine , J . Belf ighio , "Indies Economic and P o l i t i c a l 
Relat ions with Bhutan", Asian Survey (Berkeley), vo l ,12 , 
No, 8 , August, 1972, pp, 683-684. 
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t h e Dragon c o u n t r y . Broadlyr=^E^s^i«S=^efence s t r a t e g y s i n c e 
t h e mid 1 9 7 0 ' s was t o rreet a t p a r what e v e r f o r c e s China 
was l i k e l y t o d e p l o y i n T i b e t a l o n g t h e n o r t h e r n b o r d e r of 
I n d i a and Bhu tan t o m a i n t a i n enough s u p e r i o r i t y of s t r i k i n g 
power ove r P a k i s t a n , so a s t o d e t e r a t t a c k t o p o l i c e t h e 
b o r d e r w i th B a n g l a d e s h and t o d e f e n d I n d i a ' s economic zone 
and i s l a n d t e r r i t o r i e s i n t h e I n d i a n o c e a n . 
The f a c t China does n o t r e c o g n i z e I n d i a ' s s p e c i a l 
r e l a t i o n s w i t h Bhutan and Nepa l from t h e v e r y b e g i n n i n g 
due t o h i s v e s t e d i n t e r e s t s : . F e a r i n g I n d i a n r e s i s t a n c e t h e 
C h i n e s e q u e s t i o n e d p r i m a r i l y I n d i a n s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s w i t h 
Bhutan and a c c u s e d I n d i a of h a r b o r i n g e x p a n s i o n i s t i n t e n -
t i o n s w i th b a c k i n g of t h e i m p e r i a l i s t power . I n t h e e a r l y 
5 0 ' s China c r i t i c i s e d t h e I n d i a n T r e a t y w i t h Bhu tan and 
s a i d , "The Nehru government c a n n o t deny t h a t i t h a s s e n t 
man t o L h a s e . The New York Times r e p o r t e d from New D e l h i 
on August 8 t h t h a t t h e spokesman of t h e I n d i a n F o r e i g n 
M i n i s t r y an no unced t h a t ni .ght t h a t Bhutan h a s become a 
p r o c t e c t o r a t e of I n d i a , s i n c e , t h e I n d i a n Government h a s 
announced i t s s o v e r e i g n i t y o v e r Bhutan and d e c l a r e d t h a t 
T i b e t had n e v e r r e c o g n i z e d C h i n e s e s u z e r a i n t y , w i l l i t n o t 
d e c l a r e s u z e r a i n t y o v e r T i b e t , . . . The Nehru Government h a s 
no r i g h t t o d e c l a r e s o v e r e i g n i t y o v e r B h u t a n . The U n i t e d 
3 
N a t i o n s s h o u l d examine t h e m a t t e r . The C h i n e s e i m p a c t 
on Bhutan and s i k k i m would seem t o be g r e a t e r i n c o m p a r i -
s o n , i n r e c e n t y e a r s . P e k i n g h a s r e p u d i a t e d I n d i a ' s 
s p e c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h b o t h kingdoms and h a s b e e n 
1. I n t e r v i e w i n New D e l h i and u n p u b l i s h e d t h e s i s a t 
N a t u r a l Defence c o l l e g e . New D e l h i , 198 0 - 8 1 . 
2 . G u p t a j S e n , B h a t h a n i , The Fu lc rum of As i a - Kohark 
P u b l i s h e r s V l k a s Marg, New D e l h i , 
3 , Ths P e o p l e ' s D a i l y , C h i n a , ^teptember 13^ 1950 , 
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urging them to edge out of Indian fold . In fac t Chinese 
pol icy in the northern par t of South Asia has been of 
continuous t ens ions . Mao and h i s followers took p r a c t i c a l 
s teps t o e s t a b l i s h Chinas supermacy in South East Asia. 
To t h i s end, they employed, "No v^r no peace" t a c t i c e s 
which were designed to weaken the countr ies and br ing them 
under Chinese r u l e " . The border conf l i c t with Ind ia i s 
going on, for ten years now with tension a l t e r n a t i v e l y 
heightening and relaxing,Peaking pe r iod i ca l l y presents 
India with ultimatums and t r i e s to i n t e r f e r e in her a f f a i r s . 
Mao's agents are weaving a net work of i n t r i g u e s and p lo t s 
2 in Bhutan and sikkim. In the ea r ly stage Bhutan did not 
l ike any change in the provisions of 1949 t r e a t y under 
which Bhutans ex te rna l r e l a t i o n s were bound by I n d i a ' s 
guidance. The young king declared a t various occasions 3 
tha t par t with India needs no change. The king s a i d , t ha t 
we f ee l what i s in prac t ice i s more important than vi^at i s 
4 5 
on paper and declined for any new t r e a t y with India . But, 
i t began t o f l ex i t s diplomatic pol icy soon and declared 
the t r e a t y can c e r t a i n l y be brought upto d a t e . The king 
fur ther asser ted tha t there are no problems between our 
coun t r i e s , and our fr iendship i s deeper today than in 1949, 
bu t , why loose any thing for loose i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i t wil l 
be the advantage of both India and Bhutan t o upto date 
1. Gupta Sen, Bhabani, o p , c i t . p . 2 9. 
2. Prof. M. Kepitsu,"National Liberat ion and Mao's Group 
S p l i t t i n g Ac t iv i t y " , In t e rna t iona l Af fa i r s , No. 7 , 
1968, pp. 15-16. 
3.The P a t r i o t , New Delhi , November 9, 1979. 
4.Tte Statesman, New Delhi , November 9, 1979, 
5.The Indian Express , New Delhi , November 9, 1979. 
6.The Indonesia Times, Indonesia, October 13, 1979. 
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the t r e a t y . In f a c t , the t iny kingdom began t o seek 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l recogni t ion and came out of the i s o l a t i o n . 
In 1979 at the Havana, Cuba, Bhutan supported the Pol Pot 
regimes claim to be recoginized as the r ep resen ta t ive of 
Kampuchia (Cambodia) v^i le India was n e u t r a l . The King 
draw i t s own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t o Ar t i c l e 11 of the 1949 
Treaty and contended tha t the c l ause , "agrees t o be guided 
by "Indian advice implies that the advice wi l l not be man-
2 datory". vJhen Bhutan joined the UN and acquired a Charter 
r e l a t i o n s h i p with India as a fellow sovereign member of 
tha t i n t e r n a t i o n a l . Bhutan Prime Minister ascer ta ined that 
"from time inroemorial the Himalayas have provided us i n to 
raagnificient f r o n t i e r s . . . we can not allow the b a r r i e r to 
be penetrated because i t i s a l so p r inc ip l e b a r r i e r to 
3 India" , Later on Nehru ascer ta ined the logic of not 
allowing the b a r r i e r to be; crossed or weakened would apply 
equal ly to Bhutan. 
Sino-Tibetan r e l a t i o n s in 1950s strengthened. A 
cause of d i s t r u s t made home in the minds of the Bhutanese 
and consequently t h e i r t r u s t for India was cemented. Chinese 
policy destroyed the Tibetan way of l i f e and the r e l i g ious 
I n s t i t u t i o n s . I t had a d i rec t e f fec t upon the psyche of 
the Bhutanese people , most of whom were Mongoloid and from 
Tibetan o r ig in . The s t o r i e s of Chinese c r u e l l t y , h a r r a s -
raent and a t r o c i t i e s nar ra ted , by the Tibetan refugees , who 
came to Bhutan created hatred and fear against China. 
Simultaneously Ind ia came much nearer due t o asylum to 
Dalai Lanr.a t and the fear psyche removed to some ex ten t . 
1. The Times of Indiv^, New Delhi , September lO, 1979. 
2. Hong Kong s tandard, dated October 12^ 1979. 
3 . Rose E. Leo, 'Bhutans' External Re la t ions , pp. 193-194. 
Pac i f ic Affairs (Vancouver), vol , 47, No, 2, Summer 
197 4, pp. 1^2^193. 
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Si no-Pakistan 
Friendship makes room for indulgence, but enmities 
a lso mellow in the course of t ime. The fact of In ternat iona] 
p o l i t i c s are subject to constant change, "world a f f a i r s " 
said Hans J . Morgenthau have surpr i ses in s tore for whoever 
t r i e s to read the future from h i s knowledge of the past 
and frcxn the signs of the present . Pakis tan choose to be 
the f i r s t Muslim country to accord recognit ion t o the 
Beijing government and vociferous support to china on i t s 
r i g h t to the seat i n the United Nations. In the Korean war 
Pakistan adopted an ambivalent a t t i t u d e and i t s stand on 
Japan Peace-Treaty was pro-west although Pak i s tan i leader-
ship was aware that Chinese stakes were involved i n these 
2 
two i s sues . Pakis tan i leaders i n t e r ac t i on with the 
Chinese leaders a t the Bandmig conference led to some 
understanding between the two coun t r i e s . The rec ip roca l 
v i s i t s of the leaders of the two nat ions improved the 
r e l a t i o n s fur ther and es tab l i shed tha t there was no c l ea r 3 
clash of i n t e r e s t , China had succeeded in keeping i t s 
r e l a t i o n s with Pakistan f a i r l y free of s t r a i n s . Pakistan 
membership in SEATO and CENTO was not condemned i n Chinese 
4 P re s s . 
Chou-En-Lai made the dec lara t ion "Although Pakistan 
was a member of sEATO since i t s governn^nt and people had 
1. Hans J . Morgenthan, P o l i t i c s Among Nations - The 
Struggle for Power and Peace, Knot, New York, 1967, Ch,2, 
2. Bhole, P.L. , Pakistan-China Relat ions Search for 
P o l i t i c o - s t r a ' t e g i c Re la t ions , J a ipu r , 1986, p . 55-66. 
3. survey o£ China, Mainland P r e s s , Hong Kong, No, 1440, 
December 3 1 , 1956, 
4. Gupta Sen, Bhabani, The Fulcrum of Asia, Rela t ions among 
China, Konark Pub l i she r s , New Delhi , p , 113, 
expressed f r i end l iness for China, there was no reason why 
China could not be f r iendly with Pakis tan . In the f i r s t 
ins tance the r e l a t i o n s between China and Pakis tan were not 
f r i end ly . In New Delhi , Chou found India and Burma respon-
sive to new image and gave a c l ea r formulation of the policy 
of peaceful coexistence and s a id , "All the nat ions in 
the world, can peacefully c o - e x i s t , no matter whether they 
are big or smal l , strong or weak, and no matter what kind 
of soc ia l system each one of then has . The r i g h t s of the 
people of each nation t o nat ional independence and self 
determination must be r e s p e c t e d , , . . Revolutions can not be 
exported, a t the same time', outside in te r fe rence with the 
common,will expressed by the people of any nation should 
not be permit ted . After the border dispute Pakistan 
approached China t o redermarcate the boundary between 
Pak-occupied Kashmir and Sinkiang, but,China did not agree 
because Sino-Indian t a lks were going on : In i960 chou-
Nehru t a l k s resu l t ed in a f a i l u r e . With the signing of the 
Indus water Treaty in i960, in September 19 50, the process 
of peaceful set t lement of Indo-Pak disputes came to an end, 
Pakistan changed h i s policy in favour of china a f t e r the 
American aid t o India , 
After development of ICBMs and P o l a r i s submarines 
the importance of mi l i t a ry bases a t the periphery of the 
sovie t Union was reduced and a favourable atmosphere of 
cooperation was i n s t a l l e d , Kashmir question was bas i ca l ly 
not important i n r e l a t i o n s with china. -Bhutto said; i f 
Indo-Pak t a l k s resu l ted in a set t lement of Kashmir 
dispute they would strengthen t 'akis tans r e l a t i o n s with 
2 
china. Bhutto considered that Pakis tan should at tempt. 
1. Quoted i n an Ed i to r i a l in Peop le ' s Daily, china , July 2, 
1954. 
2, Year Book of United N a t i o n s , 1961, p , 128. 
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" to s e t up b l l a t e r i a l e q u a t i o n s with each one of them with 
the c l e a r unde r s t and ing t h a t t h e n a t u r e and complexion of 
t h e equa t ion should p r o m o t e . . . . . mutual i n t e r e s t (of the 
g r ea t power and P a k i s t a n ) without a d v e r s e l y a f f e c t i n g the 
l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t s of the t h i r d p a r t i e s (each equa t ion 
was t o be) de termined by t h e l i m i t s of t o l e r a n c e and 
acceptance of t h i r d p a r t i e s with whom might be a b l e t o 
e s t a b l i s h b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s ' o f mutual b e n e f i t , soon 
Pak i s t an -Ch ina r e c e i v e d a complete agreement on t h e l oca -
t i o n and a l ignment of boundary between s i n k l a n g and the 
a r e a s of Kashmir under P a k i s t a n s c o n t r o l and s igned the 
Sino-Pak boundary agreement on March 2.', 1963. On October 23 , 
P r e s i d e n t Ayub Khan d i s c l o s e d h i s i n t e n t i o n t o approach 
China for peace fu l s e t t l e m e n t of t h e b o r d e r . I n case China 
showed encouraging r e sponses t o P a k i s t a n ' s d e s i r e fo r 
s e t t l i n g t h e boundary between Sinkiang and n o r t h e r n reqtcr.s 
of Gilgit^, r ank ing s ta tesmen of the two c o u n t r i e s may even-
t u a l l y meet t o l a y down p r i n c i p l e s f o r s p e c i f i c demarcation 
2 
of the boundary. The s o l e purpose of the agreement was t o 
3 
e l i m i n a t e a p o s s i b i l i t y of c o n f l i c t i n f u g u r e . However 
P a k i s t a n d id not e n t e r with any defence t r e a t y with 
P a k i s t a n , a s i t vADuld have meant a complete break away 
4 ^ from the West. China provided P a k i s t a n , economic and $ 142 
m i l l i o n and a l s o s u p p l i e d 4 MIG-15, 4 -11 -28 , 40 MIG-195 
(F-6) and 80 T-59 Tanks between 1965 and 1956.^ When Yahya 
1, Khan Mohd. Ayub, F r i ends Not M a s t e r s ' , London 1967, 
p . 117, 
2 , Dawn, k ^ r a c h i , November 24 , 1959, 
3 , Kh^n Mohd. Ayub, F r i e n d s Not M a s t e r s ' , London 1967, 
p . 162, 
4, Sayed H. Anwar , -yak i s t an and China ; Diplomacy of an 
Entente C o r d i a l , London 197 4 , p . 2 44. 
5, Barke , wolfqaug, Q h i n a s Economic Aid, New D e l h i , 1975 
pp , 10-11 , 
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Khan succeeded, he changed the foreign pol icy and declared, 
"We, t h e r e f o r e , t r y to hold a balance in our r e l a t i o n s 
vath the major povjers around us and with the UsA, vfe do 
not s o l i c i t the fr iendship of one at the expense of the 
i n t e r e s t s of the other"• 
In 1977 Pakistan was again beset by p o l i t i c a l up-
heavels . In July,General Zia seized power from Bhutto, By 
tha t time there was a change in Chinese pol icy towards India 
and when Zia ra i sed the question of Kashmir on h i s v i s i t to 
China, Deng Xiaoping said,"South Asian count r ies could solve 
2 
t h e i r mutual r e l a t i o n s through consu l t a t i ons" . Pakistan 
played i t s cards with considerable s k i l l during Zia ul Haq's 
regime, v^ i le the old CENTO l inks with Turkey were kept up, 
very close economic and mi l i t a ry l i nks v;ere developed with 
saudi Arabia and Gulf s t a t e s . China 's f r iendship was kept 3 
at an in t imate l e v e l . The other neighbours did not go as 
far as Pak i s t an , bu t , they too saw the western and Chinese' 
r e l a t i o n s h i p as ^ useful lever agains t Ind ia . China has 
acquired an important pos i t i on , as one of the most important 
suppl ie rs of arms to Pakis tan. Chinese weapon systems form 
the back bone of the Pakis tani m i l i t a r y a r s e n a l . Not only 
t h i s , China a lso helped Palfcistan in the Nuclear Set up. 
According to CIA in t e l l i gence report china a lso helped 
Pakis tan t o achieve nuclear weapon c a p a b i l i t y . 
1. Yahya Khan's speech a t the Jo in t Senior of I ran ian 
Parliament on October 30, 1969, c i t e d in S.M. Burke 
P a k i s t a n ' s Foreign Policy ; An Hi s to r i ca l Analysis, ' 
London 1973, p . 3 60, " 
2, Foreign Affai rs of Pak i s t an , December 1977, p , 6-8, 
3.The Times of I n d i a , NewDell-ii, January 15, 1991, 
4. Kumar, B.K, , Nuclear Nexus Between Peking and Islamabad, 
an over view of some s ign i f ican t development I ssues 
Studies . A Journal of china Studies and I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 
Ta ipe i , vo l , 2 1 , No. 8 , August 1985, pp. 14U-5U. 
Chinese Arms Transfer to Pakis tan 
As regards China 's arms t r ans fe r p o l i c i e s , proceeding 
since the m,position of the f i r s t embargo, China being 
Pakistan main suppl ier i n the period from 1966-71 and had 
provided Pakis tan $ 133 mil l ion worth of arms, China had 
sent apart from the arms, rod i n s t r u c t o r s t o t 'akis tan to 
2 
t r a i n the i r t roops i n coun te r -gue r r i l l a warfare, China 
also offered to equip , two d iv is ions being ra i sed in west 
Pakis tan to replace those sent t o East Pakis tan ,^ In 1971 
when Pakistan defeat became inminent, Chinese rescue ships 
v^re based in Ganges de l ta for evacuation of Pakis tan i 4 forces in East Pakis tan . However China supplied a l l weapons 
and aommunition t h a t Pakistan needed and tha t feome were 5 
supplied f r ee . 
CoTnt4 -
1. All Mehrunnisa, China's Diplomacy During Tlie Indo-
Pakistan war 1971, Pakistan Horizon, 25 ( l ) , 1972, p , 58, 
quoting USIS News Text, Karachi, February 9, 1972. 
2. I b i d , , quoted Dawn, Karachi Nove,ber 25, 1971, p . 13. 
3 . I b i d , , quoting Economist London, November 13, 1974. 
^' I^i<3, Daily Telegraph, December 13-14, 1971, 
5. Dr. Nisha sahari Achulhan, soviet Arms Transfer Pol icy 
In south Asia - 1955-1981, p . 8 1 . 
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china hag emerged as a major conven t iona l wf?apon.i 
supiplier i n Asia and s p e c i a l l y t o P a k i s t a n . The Arms 
r i a l e n f r o m 1950 t o 1990 eocm a s beXow. 
C o u n t r i e s r e c e i v i n g Major c o n v e n t i o n a l 
1 9 5 0 - 1 9 9 0 
M i s s i l e s L a n d Weapons S h i p s 
Weapons f r o m C h i n a 
A i r c r a f t 
A f g h a n i s t a n 
A l b a n i a 
B a n g l a d e s h 
Burma 
C a m b o d i a 
Oxl ! ci 
^^gypt 
I r a n 
I r a q 
N o r t h K o r e a 
P a k i s t a n 
S ^ u d i A r a b i a 
S y r i a 
T h a i l a n d 
A f g h a n i s t a n 
A l b a n i a 
A n g o l a 
B a n g l a d e s h 
Burma 
C o t i i b o d i a 
C o n g o 
K g y p t 
O u i e n e a 
G u i e n e a - B i s s a u 
I r a n 
I r a q 
M a l i 
Nepa 1 
N o r t h K o r e a 
N o r t h V i e t n a m 
Oman 
P a k i s t a n 
S o m a l i a 
S u d a n 
T a n z a n i a 
T h a i l a n d 
Z a i r e 
Z imbabwe 
A l b a n i a 
A l g e r i a 
A n g o l a 
B a n g l a d e s h 
C a m b o d i a 
C a m e r o o n 
C a p e V e r d e 
Congo 
E g y p t 
E q u i t o r i a l 
G u i n e a 
Ghana 
G u i n e a 
I n d o n e s i a 
N o r t h K o r e a 
N o r t h 
V i e t n a m 
P a k i s t a n 
R o m a n i a 
S i e r r a L e o n e 
S r i L a n k a 
T a n z a n i a 
T h a i l a n d 
T u n i s i a 
Z a i r e 
A l b a n i a 
B a n g l a d e s h 
Burma 
C a m b o d i a 
E g y p t 
I r a n 
I r a q 
L a o s 
N o r t h K o r e a 
N o r t h V i e t n a m 
N o r t h Yemen 
P a k i s t a n 
S o m a l i a 
S r i L a n k a 
S u d a n 
T a n z a n i a 
T h a i l a n d 
U n i t e d s t a t e s 
Z a m b i a 
Z i m b a b w e 
Reproduced from s t r a t e g i c D i g e s t , November 1992. 
source •. R. Bakes J i l l - ORBIS 3 6 / 3 , sunmer 1992. 
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China had succeeded in keeping i t s r e l a t i o n s with 
Pakistan f a i r l y free of s t r a i n s . Pakis tan Membership in 
SEATO and CE^ 7^ 0 was not condemned in Chinese p ress . 
Chou-En-Lai made the dec la ra t ion "Although Pakis tan was 
a member of SEATO, since i t s government and people had 
expressed f r i end l ines s for China, t he re was no reason why 
China could not be f r i end ly with Pak i s tan" . 
1. Gupta, Sen Bhabani, The Fulcrum of Asia, Relat ions among 
China, Ind ia , Pakis tan and the USSR, p . 133. 
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Slno-Nepal 
China has emerged as a Important factor in South 
Asia. Nepal's relationship with China goes back to a hoary 
past and is a story of Indifferences and friendshipr Nepal 
and China have no close contacts at an^ time. Contacts 
between the two countries were limited and may be traced 
back to fifth century A.D. Tibet was more important and 
close to the hill state than China. 
After the end of the second world war, there were 
many changes of far reaching importance all round the world. 
Success of Indian national movement influenced Nepal and 
touched off several abortive resrdlts against the Rauas. 
It was only around the mid 1946, when Interim Government 
was formed in India, that the Ranas realized the might 
soon have to deal with elected, representatives of the 
Indian people while they were not prepared to introduce any 
change in the domestic affairs, they decided to expand inter-
2 
national relations with the US, France and Brazil. They 
also made overtures to China but, the civil-war and the 
communist victory stalled any further development in Nepal-
China relations. The Ranas were also of the view that they 
may persuade the Nehru Government not to interfere in the 
Nepalese domestic affairs. They even decided to conclude 
the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950. As the pressure 
of democratic mounted and the Nehru Government supported 
the King, the revolution of 1950 in a way swept the Ranas. 
In fact India initiated Nepal to proceed to develop rela-
tions with China. Sure of its hold on Nepal, India in order 
1, Kant, Rama, Ibid., p. 16. 
2, Chatterjee, Bhole, A Study of recent Nepalese Policies, 
Calcutta, 1967. 
3, Bhasin, A.S, (ed) Documents on Nepal's Relations with 
India and China 1946-66, New Delhi, 1970, p. 8. 
to dofuso th«s anti-forelqn 8tat«sment o£ the Nepdlese towards 
China and at the samf time to assure China that it had no 
designs against it, put pressure on Nepal to establish 
diplomatic relations with China, what India did not foresee 
was that Nepal after establishing relations with China 
would try to balance the two for achieving more freedom in 
its affairs. Diplomatic relations with China were establi-
shed in Aujust 1955 to counterweight the influence of India. 
After the Chinese military takeover of Tibet. India and 
China came nearer, china also enlarged a picture of reason-
ableness and accomodation both towards India and Nepal. 
India and China concluded the convention of Tibet, in April 
1954 signed the panchshila. China reoriented its policy 
towrirdn Nopal on threw point b^ses. 
(fi) Termination of unequal riahtn and pr 1 vi 1 «>g«»iri thnt 
Nepal enjoyed in Tibet. 
(b) Remuneration of its own imperial claims on Nepal. 
(c) Prior understanding with India on the Himalaya Region. 
King Mahendra's accession heralded a new era of 
foreign policy in Nepal. In his design China occupied a 
vital place. India having readjusted its relations with 
China, Nepal had' to breakway from the an chronistic rela-
tionship and bring it,to live with modern ideas based on 
the principle of equality and reciprocity. In 1955 Nepal and 
China entered into an agreement and established normal 
<2iplomatic relations. As a first step an Agreement to main-
tain "^ riendly Relations and on Trade and Inter course was 
signed between Nepal and China, which regulated the travel 
across border, normalized trade relations and did away with 
the privileges of the Nepalese traders in Tibet.^ 
1. Tt . i f f ' J tudy. " r n k l f t t a n and Nfspnl", Pf> kiutr tn J'Tor i z o n , 
v o l . XV, No. 2 , 1962 , p . 1 3 1 . 
''* As lun R e c o r d e r , J u n e 1 3 - 1 9 , 1959, p . 2 7 1 4 . 
China's pol icy towards Nepal moved with caut ion . 
Despite t he i r i n t e r e s t s , Chinese Government continued to 
pay regard to the Indian pxDsition and s e n s i t i v i t e s in 
Nepal. During 1955 to 1958 Nepal made s ign i f i can t changes 
in h is pol icy towards China. After the appointment of B.P. 
Kbirala as Prime Minis te r , there was a change in the pol icy . 
Dalai Lama, taking she l t e r in India and the Khampa rebe l s 
in Tibet taking refugee in Nepal t e r r i t o r y , the newly 
e lec ted government was put to a d i f f i c u l t pos i t i on . There 
was yet a nat ional consensus in Nepal tha t a meaningful 
r e l a t i o n s h i p with China should be enlarged. B.P. Koirala 
was pro-India and his par ty on Tibet was highly c r i t i c a l of 
the Chinese, china appeared more appealing and more honou-
rab le than I n d i a ' s "middle way" of non-alignment and mixed 
economy. On the sub-continent the Indian Government was 
unsympathetic to r evo lunar i e s , had d i f f i c u l t i e s with the 
t r i b a l people in the Nort.h-East and v a c i l l a t e d in i t s 
deal ings with the Himalayan kingdom of Nepal, Bhutan and 
Sikklm, On each cour t , China projected i t s e l f as friend 
and sympathiser agains t a reac t ionary bourgeonis imper ia l i s t 
I n d i a . •'• 
Soon a f t e r , Nepal was faced with a grave s i t u a t i o n , 
Sino-Indian r e l a t i o n s had de te r io ra ted much, china chal len-
ged the e n t i r e Sino-Indlan border and even questioned i t s 
r e l a t i o n s with sikklm and Bhutan, The I n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the 
1954 convention as well as the Nepalls border with Tibet 
were challenged. The Chinese a t t a c k on India In 1962 marks 
a watershed in the Nepalese foreign pol icy towards China. 
The revolut ion of 1950, the Delhi Agreement of 1951 and 
the Const i tu t ion of 1959 could not reso lve the bas ic Issues 
whether the sovereign power lay with people or the king. 
1. Singh, s u r j i t Man, I n d i a ' s Search for Power, Sage 
Publ ica t ion , New Delhi , p , 196. 
India wanted that monarchy may develop as a symbol of 
national unity and make the government broad based with 
the help of peoples representative. King Mahendra prefe-
rred to abrogate the Parliamentary system. It was criticized 
by public and the Indian press. Nehru declared that kings 
action was a set-back to the democratic process. In view 
of the king Nehru's diplomacy was an obstacle in his way, 
so king used China to gain popularity and scare India, It 
was in the wake of this delimma that the Chinese Foreign 
Minister declared on behalf of the Government and people 
of China to assure His Mejesty king Mahendra, His Mejesty's 
Government and the Nepalese p»eople that if any foreign 
forces attack Nepal, we Chinese people will stand on your 
side. 
In this way Nepal was su-tcessful to pressurize India 
and gain substantial concessions both in economic and poli-
tical field. Chinese conflict with India and its increased 
involvement in Nepal, occurred at a time when Nepal had 
started asserting its international personality. China 
wanted Nepal to protect Chinese interests by observing 
centrality in sino-Indian struggle and not allow its soil 
to be used against Tibet. The period of 1961-62 was set 
back to India. Chinese attack on India led to some hard 
thinking. The rise of powerful China altered the balance 
of power in the Himalayan kingdom, Nepal assured China, of 
its goodwill and friendship. It supported china on Tibet, 
did not allow its soil to be used by Tibetan refugees and 
even disarmed the Khampas. In 1972 when Mahendra passed 
away, his son Birendra succeeded on Throne. The Chinese 
leadership after 1971 particularly after the death of Mao, 
adopted the way of flexibility in its foreign policy. 
1. Survey of China Main Land Press» No. 1835, October 9, 
1962, p. 34. 
Towards India, it agreed to discuss all border issues 
while no headway could be made. It did not extend full 
support to the king as before. 
King Birendra has been trying to keep China in good 
humour, while China has extended fair amount of economic 
and technical aid to Nepal in some important sectors, road 
constructions ^nd industries. China has acquired an impor-
tant place in Nepals foreign policy. 
China's new policy shift opposes super power's 
domination and encourages the unity amongst third world 
countries. In this broad frame work in South Asia also she 
tries to establish friendly relations with India and en-
courages a bilateral settlement of disputes between the 
core and peripheral powers of the region. From this point 
of view she has welcomed the emergence of SAARC and finally 
for the present. She seem not to have any desire to invol-
ve herself in the internal crisis of the South Asian 
countries. Sino-Nepalese relations in post 1980s may be 
viewed in this perspective, China has taken pain to assure 
Nepal that there was no weakening of its friendly relations 
2 
with her but, she can not efforts to strengthen friendly 
ties with India. 
1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, June 4, 1981. 
2. Mahanty, M.R. , "China's recent Policy in south Asia", 
Dharmdasani (Ed.). Contemporary South Asia, shalimar 
Publishing House, Varanasi, 1985, pp. 174-175. 
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SINO-Bangladesh 
Bangladesh-China r e l a t i o n s may be traced in the i r 
countr ies old t i e s . Sultan of Bengal, Ghiyas-ud-din Azam 
Shah, sent emissaries to China's ernperor Yung-log of the 
Ming dynasty i n 1405-1409. The emperor of China a l so r e c i -
procated t h i s f r iendly gesture of the sultan of Bengal 
and sent enjoys and g i f t s in r e t u r n . 
China did not support the Bangladesh war of Indepen-
dence, because of China's perception that the new s t a t e 
Bangladesh, in the creat ion of which both India and 
ex-sovie t Union played important r o l e , would remain under 
influence of New Delhi and Moscow and c o n s e q u ^ t l y , China 
declared i t "Manchuko" Government, thereby dubbing i t as 
2 
"the q u i s l i n g government" se t up by New Delhi. China's 
post-1971 diplomacy was t a i l o r e d to contain the soviet and 
Indian influence in south Asia. The Indo-Bangladesh Treaty 
of Friendship and cooperation of March, 1972 was considered 
by Beij ing as inimical to the Chinese i n t e r e s t s . The Mujlb 
government which e x p l i c i t y t i l t e d towards Indo-Soviet axis 
following i t s independence was viewed by Beijing to be 
an tagon i s t i c t o the l a t t e r ' s S t ra teg ic i n t e r e s t s . Cbvlously, 
China's a t t i t u d e towards Bangladesh did not change u n t i l l 
the f a l l of Hujlb government s p e c i f i c a l l y , belong the Mujlb 
government remained determined to t r y the Pr isoners of 
war (POWS) and a lso blocked the admissioi of Bangladesh 
in to the United Nations."^ 
1 . Mujumder, R.C., An Advanced History of Ind ia , Macmillan 
• Meloourne, Toronto, §t, Mar t in ' s Press , New York, 
' 1967, p . 337. 
2. Peking Review, December 17, 1971, p . 15. 
3. Abu Taher Salahuddin Ahnied, "Bangladesh-China Relat ions i 
An Assessment", BUSS Journa l , v o l . 13, No, 2, 1992. 
The changed political scenario in Bangladesh 
following the overthrough of Mujib in 1975 suited china's 
perception of its role in South Asia. The beginning of 
Ziaur Rahman's period witnessed a marked slide back in 
Bangladesh-India relations. By contrast, China has being 
cultivated as a counterbalance against perceived hegemonis-
tic designs of New Delhi. During the Zia regime foundation 
of close ties between Bangladesh and China was laid and 
cooperation took off in all aspects, political, economical 
and strategical. During Zia's visit Chinese vice Premier 
Li Hsinenien stated that, "China firmly supports the Govern-
ment and people of Bangladesh in their just struggle to 
safeguard national independence and state sovereignty and 
resist foreign interference". On the other hand Zia while 
speaking of a banguest said : 
"We believe that only in an environment of sta-
bility free from outside interference can we 
consolidate our independence and state soverei-
gnity. The people of Bangladesh are determined 
to continue their struggle and in concert with 
the people of the third world will oppose expan-
sionism and hegemonism,2 The Chinese charged 
Affairs in Dhaka, Man ping declared in March 
1977, "We firmly support the reasonable stand 
taken by Bangladesh on the question of sharing 
the waters of the Ganges river".3 
The foundation of Bangladesh's close ties on the 
military front was also laid during Zia period. Several 
factors motivated the two countries to cooperate in this 
field. Following the dramatic change in Bangladesh in 
1975, Kremlin refused to supply spare parts for military 
equipment to Bangladesh in 1976. China stepped into fill 
in the vaccurae, Besideo the supply of arms, China built 
1. Bangladesh, vol. 2, No, 4. Dhaka Ministry of Information 
and Broadcasting, January 15, 1977, p. 5. 
2. Iftikher, A. choudhery, Op.cit. p, 6. 
3. Bangladesh, Op.cit, vol. 2, No. 9p p, 2, 
the country's arms and ammunition factory in Joydevpur. 
Bangladesh and China signed a memorandum of understanding 
on cooperation in the shipping sector on May 29, 1988. •^  
China also supplied to Bangladesh a multipurpose cargo-
Banglar Doot, on December 13, 1989 and promised for another 
ship of 300000 metric tons capacity. Every year since 1977 
china also offered Bangladesh 12 undergraduate and 2 post 
graduate scholarships and developed cultural relations. 
After assuming power through bloodless coup in 1982, Ershad 
in an interview to the New York Times termed Russians as 
3 
"crude and imtrusty" and applauded Beinging having very 
good military terms". 
At the political level both countries continued to 
share identical views on matters related to international, 
regional and disarmament issues. The two maintained iden-
tical approach to the question of the New International 
Economic order on regional issues like Indo-China, Arab. 
Israel conflict Indian Ocean as zone of peace, de-nucleari-
zation of South Asia, both china and Bangladesh hold similar 
views which brought them on a common political plateform. 
1. Bangladesh Times, May 31, 1988. 
2. News Review on South Asia, February 1989 from Bangladesh 
observer. 
3. SIPRI Year Book : world Armaments and Disarmament, 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1980, 
p. 97. 
4. The New York Times, April 17, 1982 and also International 
Herald Tribune, April 12, 1982. 
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3IN0-Srl Lanka Relations 
In the beginning Sri Lanka adopted the policy of 
"Mid-way" - the way of not getting Involved in the conflict 
of rival ideaologies and power blocks, they maintained an 
attitude of anti pathy tov/ards the communist block countries. 
The UNP Prime Minister had an intense dislike for communism 
and commonist countries. Prime Minister, John Kolelnale 
expressed his views and said, that "I have all my life been 
opposed to this lamentable. And if there is anything that 
I can do, whether in my capacity or any where else to stop 
the further advance of ccmmunism, I shall certainly do it". 
However, they had different attitude towards China and 
Soviet Union. Lalithe Raj Pakasa, a UNP member said, "I 
have no sympathy for Russia but, I am quite sure that Ceylon 
has a great deal of sympathy and good will for China 
... I earnestly hope she will be able to shake off the 
Russia impedements and get rid of the Dolshevik hindrances 
2 
that stand in the way of her progress". UNP leadership 
never brainded China as an aggressive communist power John 
Kotelawale once expressed his opinion -
"we have no reason to consider Red China a 
growing menace to peace in South Asia, we 
have to observe its actions before we come 
to such a conclusion. China has its own trou-
bles and so long as it keeps its redness to 
itself and does not seek to impose it on 
others, there would be tittle justification 
to consider it menace".3 
China was the first country with whom Ceylon esta-
blished trade relations. In 1951 sri Lanka sold rubber to 
1. Between Two Words, "The Collected Speeches of the Right 
Honourable Sir John Kotelawale, Ceylon, 1954,* p. 30. 
2. Ceylon, senate Debates, vol. 5, June 26, 1951, 
3. The Cbserver, London, September 12, 1951. 
China "Not so much from economic motives as frcjn econcraic 
compulsions". Ceylon's acSministration was caut ions about 
Chinese closeness and Sri Lanka even refused to permit the 
v i s i t of the Chinese good w i l l mission to Sri Lanka in 1953 
because s r i Lanka considered " v i s i t i n g communists were apt 
2 to disseminate more harm than goodwill", 
v;hen Bandaranaike ciame to power there emerged "New 
Sri Lanka" with new look and n e u t r a l i s t po l i cy . Br i t i sh 
evacue Trinccraalee naval base on 15th October 1957 and 
Katunayabe a i r base on November 1, 1957, Sri Lanka a lso 
granted diplomatic t e ^ to China and USSR. 
China offered econanic ass i s tance and cul tured coopera-
t i c n . An agreement on Ecaicmic Aid was signed between the 
two countr ies providing for S r i Lanka Rs. 75 mi l l ion in 
3 
commodities spread over a period of five years . 
In 1965 when Dudley Senanayake took over, he declared 
his adherence to non alli<3nment and fr iendship with a l l 
na t i ons . His a t t i t u d e towards the communist countr ies was 
cautions and a t times s t r a ined p a r t i c u l a r l y with China 
during the c u l t u r a l Revolut ions. 
After the 1971 war, the balance of power in south 
Asia to the extent i t had ex is ted e a r l i e r between India 
and Pakistan disappeared. China cons t i tu ted the p r inc ipa l 
'counter weight and the cey lon ' s government ccnsidered i t s 
r e l a t i o n s with China in t h i s contex t . China a l so increased 
i t s i n t e r e s t in Lanka's a f f a i r s and offered" f u l l e s t 
1. Garden John, "Ceylon's Trade with China The Economic 
Background", New Commonwealth, London, vo l , 25 , p.377. 
2 . Kotelawall , Sir John, An Asia Prime M i n i s t e r ' s Story, 
London, 1956, p . 115. 
^' Ceylon Daily News, Ju ly 3, 1956. 
s'; 
cooperation to speed up the socialist merch of Ceylon Dy 
helping it economically and in every otherway appreciated 
later on and said, "a relationship based on mutual respect 
and good will has sufficient substance to stand by itself 
with out the need for formalization, \^e, therefore, 
sincerely appreciate the understanding which China has 
shown in its relation. Witn us these relations are a model 
of interstate relations", 
J.R. Jayewardene, advocated for "independent foreign 
policy" Rubber, Rice, Agreement was changed for the sixth 
Time. Both Cnina and sri Lanka condemned the Soviet inter-
vention in Afghanistan, Foreign Minister of Sri Lanka 
said, "the principle of intervention or to give it legi-
timacy in any form would be to make small state vulnerable 
2 
and powerful states bellicjerent". 
1. Gamira Navaratne, The Chinese Connection, Colombo, 
1976, p, 81, 
2. Kodikara, note 1, p. 154. 
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The Dis in tegra t ion of the soviet Union and af ter - Effect 
on India 
The Soviet i n t e r e s t in South Asia were determined 
by i t s conception of global s t r a t e g i c i n t e r e s t s . The beg i -
nning of i t s regional s t a t e s in the developments in south 
Asia can be traced more p a r t i c u l a r l y since 1950*s, because 
of two major f ac to r s , v i z , P a k i s t a n ' s adherence to American 
m i l i t a r y pac t s ; and the soviet r i f t with China.^ 
The process of image building was i n i t i a t e d by 
Khrushchev during 1950's through the pro jec t ion of ideas 
based on the spectacular girowth of the soviet m i l i t a r y and 
economic power under the soviet dominated s o c i a l i s t bloc 
t o help the newly l ibera ted "peace-loving, a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t 
na t ions , such as India , in t h e i r p o l i t i c a l and economic 
2 development". 
In August 1971, the soviet Foreign Minister Andrei 
Gromyko came to New Delhi and signed a Treaty of Peace, 
Friendship and cooperation, the f i r s t of i t s kind tha t 
3 
India had signed. The Indo-soviet Treaty within provis ions 
ind ica t ing the determination of the two powers to repel 
aggression and s t i pu l a t i ng immediate mutual consul ta t ions 
in case e i t h e r country has subjected to a t t a c k from outside 
unevilably aroused suspicion and dismay in the Vtest and 
4 
angered paking. The Treaty l en t a new dimension to the 
1, she l ton , Kodikara; s t r a t e g i c Factors in I n t e r s t a t e 
Rela t ions in south Asia, New Delhi , 1984, p . 45. 
2, Gupta Sen, Bhabani, soviet-Asian Rela t ion in 1970's and 
Beyond, An In te rpercept iona l Study, New York 1976, p. 107< 
3. For t e x t of the Treaty, See Foreign Affairs Record, 
August 1971, p . 161. 
4. Dutt , V.P . , I n d i a ' s Foreign po l i cy , Vikas Publishing 
House, New Delhi , 1984, p . 154. 
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Indo-soviet r e l a t i o n s h i p wherein Soviet backing came to be 
c ruc ia l forwarding off the most ser ious t h r e a t t o I n d i a ' s 
i n t e g r i t y and socio-economic pol icy. 
Individual humans d i e s when they do f i n a l l y and 
i r r e t r i v a b l y , whether death comes suddenly or in a l i n -
gering manner. I t i s not the same with na t ions , s t a t e s or 
coun t r i e s . Through the h i s to ry of cen tu r i e s one has seen 
how they evolve, growing strong or weak c u l t u r a l l y , econo-
mical ly, g e o - p o l i t i c a l l y or m i l i t a r i l y . They e i t he r flower 
or bloom, or wi l t and drop. Occasionally, they lose 
t e r r i t o r y , or gain, or regain i t . sometimes there i s an 
e f for t to erase them through war but , mostly such a pheno-
menon u l t ima te ly proves a temporary one. The mix of 
h i s to ry and geography and l i t e r a r y , c u l t u r a l and ethnic 
t r a d i t i o n s , that fashion nat ions and people and countr ies 
i s such t h a t they hardly if ever , can be said to d ie in 
a fu ia l or i r r e t r i e v a b l e manner. 
Lenin must have thought tha t he had destroyed the 
Czar 's family but not h is domain. Many th ink today tha t 
the Soviet confederation i s dead, never again to be seen 
on the world s tage. One can not s t a t e with any f i n a l i t y 
what kind of p ic ture wi l l emerge in those t e r r i t o r i e s , a 
quarter of a century, or half a century, down the road. 
After a l l we have jus t witnessed chancel lor Kohl regain 
the t e r r i t o r i e s lo s t by chancellor H i t l e r . 
On December 8, l99l the death Knell t o i l ed for 
Soviet Union. Leaders of the three s l av i c republ ics -
Russia, Ukraine and Belarus - cal led for the crea t ion of 
a commonwealth of independent s t a t e s (Cis) to replace 
1. TRISHUL, Defence Services Staff co l l ege , Wellington, 
Ind ia , vo l . V, No. 1, July 1993, p . 1. 
the impolding soviet state left moribund in the v/ake of 
the failed August coup, within two weeks this contederation 
had replaced the decaying Union, with eleven former Union 
Republics joing the CIS. The newly independent Baltic 
States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania decided not to 
join as did Georgia. The once powerful central apparatus 
in MOSCOW, weakened by failing economic output and a lack 
of popular legitimacy, was unable to fight off the final 
blows against it. The soviet Union officially passed into 
history on December 25, 1991, taking with it the legacy 
of the world's first socialist state committed to the 
task of restructuring society. 
The death of soviet Union did not alleviate the 
immense problems that faced the new commonwealth. Rather, 
the problems of the former all union governments were placed 
squarely in the hands of the eleven member states. It was 
left to the new commonwealth foreign policy structure to 
sort out the problems of the Soviet Union international 
debt, the remnants of the soviet Army, and most alarmingly 
for the West, the fate of the soviet nuclear arsenal. The 
soviet successor states have managed the drive each other 
apart, with petty turf battles over the removal of Soviet 
troops from their territory, the imposition of trade 
restrictions, and discrimination against non majority 
ethnic communities. Vice President Alek Sandra Russkoi, 
called for a re-establishment of Russian hegemony over 
Brian V. Souders and Roger E, Kanet, "An Emerging 
Interstate System, Russia and Other Former Republics 
of USSR", Occasional Paper, John D, and Catherine T. 
Mac Arthur Foundation, University of Illioniss, 
September 1992, p, 1. 
the erstwhile republics of the soviet Union. 
After the demise of the USSR, the Western and soviet 
concerns focussed immediately on the issue of control of 
the soviet Union's nuclear weapon arsenal. Among the first 
provision of the new CIS security structures was the agree-
ment on the control of the nuclear stockpile. On December 
23, 1991, the four nuclear states of the CIS (the Russian 
Federation, Ukraine, Kazakhistan, and Belarus) signed an 
agreement on joint measures of Nuclear Weapons. It followed 
the soviet non-first use pledge of nuclear weapons and 
granted control over eventual usage to the Central CIS 
authorities. The article of the agreement noted that until 
nuclear weapons have been completely eliminated on the 
territory of (Belarus, Kazakhistan and Ukraine), decisions 
on the need to use them will be taken, by agreement with 
the heads of the member states of the agreement by the 
Russian soviet Federation socialist Republic (RSFS^) 
president, on the basis of the procedure drawn up jointly 
2 
by the member states. This agreement was strengthened 
further by the agreement between the Member States of the 
commonwealth of Independent states on strategic Forces 
of December 30, l99l. Article 3 of the agreement laid that 
the member states agree to the joint control of the nuc-
lear weapons of the former USSR. Article 4 has Ukraine, 
Belarus and Kazakhistan relinquishing control of their 
nuclear weapons to the Russian Federation for destruction 
1. Eduerd Kondratov, Vizit A. Rutskogo V. pridnestrov* s 
Izvestlia, April 6, 1992. Cited in Suzanne Crow, 
Russians Relations with Members of the Commonwealth, 
RFE/RL, Research Report, vol. 1, No. 19, 1992, p. 11. 
2. Agreement on Joint Measures on Nuclear Vteapons, 
Pravada, December 23, 1991, p.2; in FBIS-SU, December 
23, 1991, p. 30. 
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by the end of 1994. Belarus was to be free of strategic 
nuclear weapons' by 1996 or 1997, reported by Chairman of 
the commission for Matters of National security of the 
Belar'usian parliament. The Kazakhistan's missiles were 
to be returned to Russian territory by 1994. 
Ukraine president suggested that an international 
commission needed to be set up, consisting of the four 
nuclear states of the CIS, but also international obser-
vers, to assure that the missiles were actually dismentled. 
Kravchuck proposed the establishment of a nuclear proce-
ssing region in Ukraine to take care of nuclear waste 
within republic, Russian Federation president Boris Yeltsin 
emphasized the problems of dissolving the unified command 
of the army. 
The real conflict in the CIS arose when Ukraine 
claimed control over the Black Sea fleet as the new indep-
endent navy, but Ruslam Khasbulatov of Russian Supreme 
soviet, claimed that all the fleets naturally belong in 
4 
their entirely to Russia, 
In addition to the above problems between the CIS 
members, there were economic problems. The highly inte-
grated structure of the centralized Soviet economic system 
meant that economic developments in one republics or 
1, An agreement between the Member States of the cotranon-
wealth of independent states on Strategic Forces, 
TASS International Service, December 31, I99i, in 
FBIS-SU, December 31, 1991, p. 17. 
2, TASS, January 26, 1992, in FBIS-CE, January 27, 1992, 
p. 59, 
3, POSTFACTUM, January 25, 1992; in FBIS-CE January 27, 
1992, p. 53, 
4, For the Moment the Guns Are Silent, It is the Politi-
cians Who Are Exchanging shots, Izvestiita, December 
28, 1991, p, 2; in FBBI-CE, January 14, 1992, p. 15. 
10 
region would have almost irainedlate influence elsewhere. 
TASS referred to the commonwealth as a way to prcmote 
economic development in the former soviet Republics, The 
member states of the CIS proposed the formulation of an 
International Economic Commonwealth. Its role was to 
institute a common economic area for market relations with 
the free movement of goods, labour, services and capital. 
It called for improving the currency and tax regulations. 
Finally it called for coordination of the development of 
2 
inter-republic trade relations. 
While the economic collapse hastened the disinte-
gration of the soviet Union, the canmonwealth states have 
been facing severe economic challanges. Production of indus-
trial and agricultural goods has been going down steadily 
during last few years. In 1991, the decline was officially 
reported to be 20-30 per cent over the level of 1990. 
Budgetry deficit reached to a very high level. Soviet 
3 
external debts swelling to 80-100 billion. 
Despite agreements concerning continued economic 
collaboration, problems arose almost immediate in the 
arena of ethnic nature. The ethnic situation of groups 
unleashed from central rule has proven to be the bloodiest 
part of the collapse of the Soviet Union, soviet rule had 
pranoted the ideal of a nation where the 130 ethnic groups 
lived togather in peace and harmony. Ethnic problems 
TASS, December 18, I99i; FBls-SU; December 19, 1991, 
p« 20. 
Draft Treaty on 'Instituting International Econanic 
commonwealth, Izvestiita, January 13, 1992, p. 3; in 
FBIs-CS, January 14, 1992, p. 6. 
Kothari, Raj Kumar, Demise of Soviet Union, Third 
world Impact, Bombay, August 1992, p. 7, 
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became a major headche for Mlkchail Gorbachev in the 
waning days of the soviet Union. Apart from it human rights 
involving minorities were one of the highlights of the 
initial meetings of the CIS but, were not sustained. 
One of the most unexpacted results of the demise 
of the Soviet State has been the fact that the focus of 
Moscow's foreign policy concerns is now the former repu-
blics of the former Soviet Union. 
The External Relations with Asian States 
These new emergea countries are conscious of their 
'Asianness', as also their Islamic identity, with the dis-
appearance or removal of tte old heroes of the soviet era, 
they are busy discovering new ethnic cultural heros like 
Ali Sher Nawai in UzbekiLstan and the poet Abai in Kaza-
khistan. These countries recognize their traditional histo-
rical, cultural, geo-graphical and religious links with 
Turkey, Iran, India, Pakistan and china, Kirghizistan 
and Kazakhastan, also seeing the logic of geography and 
of econcxnic requirements, they are working to build 
closer relations with South Korea, China and Japan. The 
Arabs are showing great interest in the emergence of 
these republics. Basically it is their attraction as 
Muslims mingle with curiously about how communism has 
affected their perceptions. The Saudis have made a 
beginning by inviting the state recognized Muftis and 
Mullahs of these countries to join the Rabita-al-Islami 
and by sending hundred of thousands of copies of the 
1. MOSCOW, Central Television, December 21, I99i; in 
FBIS-SU, p. 34. 
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Holy Quran for d i s t r i b u t i o n . The new Republics can not 
afford t o appear unsympathetic to these moves as t t e y 
expect Arab and o i l count r ies to a future gain. Since 
pandi t Nehru's two v i s i t s to t h i s a rea , in 1956 and 1961 
India forged special c u l t u r a l and economic l inks with 
Central Asia even while these republ ics were par t of 
soviet realm. 
This region of Central Asia i s f u l l of h i s t o r i c a l 
memories. Places with evocative names in t imate ly t ied up 
with I n d i a ' s p o l i t i c a l a r c h i t e c t u r a l , a r t i s t i c and dyna-
s t i c h i s t o r y . Samarkand, Tashkent, Bokhera, Alam Ata, 
Askhabad and Ahokbad are a l l par t of the medieval l o r e . 
Babar 's beloved Ferghane Valley Andijan City and Ulugh 
Begs observatory in Samerkand are known p laces . 
soviet Union marked a ce r t a in stage in Indo-soviet 
r e l a t i o n s . Both countr ies so adjusted t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p 
tha t i t has survived the r a d i c a l changes in the i n t e r -
nat ional order in Asia and in Europe not to forget the 
2 growing understanding between the super powers. On Indian 
t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and secur i ty on Kashmir and in a l l 
the es tab l i shed sphere of Indo-Soviet cooperat ion, the 
soviet stand has remained s u b s t a n t i a l l y the same. Soviet 
Union, cons i s t en t ly taken a strong stand against nuclear 
non-pro l i f e ra t ion , i t has cooperated with India in the 
nuclear f i e l d , despi te I n d i a ' s opposit ion to the NPT. 
For some past I n d i a ' s spec ia l r e l a t i o n s ' came in to hot 
exchange. Ms. E, Arefeva c r i t i c i s e d the I z v e s t i i a and 
1. Singh, S.K. , "The Demise of the Soviet Union and 
. . After" , TRISHUL, Defence Services Staff College, 
Wellington, India , vo l . 5, No. l , J^tly 1992, p . 4. 
2. Noorani, A.G., "Indo-Soviet Relat ions Today", 
Indian Express, New Delhi , August 21 , 1990. 
in 
said, tha t the ideologized policy of sus ta in ing special 
r e l a t i o n s between India and the Soviet Union a lso lacks 
g e o - p o l i t i c a l c l a r i t y . Alexander Mozgovoi on the point 
of supply of another submarine to India c r i t i c i s e d Russia 
and said why did nuclear fuel to the f i r e of Indo-Pakistan 
2 
disputes further he added that the supplying nuclear 
submarine to India runs counter to the idea of turning 
the Indian Ocean into the zone of peace. Not all this a 
new. On October 26, 1989, a Soviet journal specialising 
in American affairs, U.S.A. Economics, Politics, Ideology, 
urged Moscow and Washington to take joint steps to restrict 
Arms sales to the countries in the Indian sub-continent on 
the basis of principles of responsible sufficiency, it 
added that the two could discuss a number of concrete 
joint steps regarding promotion of the policy of nuclear 
3 
weapons. Russian Foreign Ministry was of the view that 
while maintaining close relations with India, Russia 
should not let it be interpreted that its policy is deli-
berately pro-India. A draft concept paper prepared by 
Russia Foreign Ministry said, that 'On the whole the policy 
towards India should be pragmatically renewed based on 
realistic possibilities and the legitimate interests of 
4 
both sides with an emphasis on economic stimuli. 
1. E. Arefeva is an expert of economics in Moscow. 
*^ Moscow News, Moscow, July 8, 1990. 
3. Noorani, A.G., "Indo-soviet Relations today", 
Indian Express, New Delhi, August 21, 1990. 
4. Indian Express, New Delhi, November 23, 1992. 
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India thought otheryise and considered the Russian 
changes on the basis of time-tested relationship between 
them. India and the erstwhile soviet Union were able to 
develop a unique phenomenon in the world by developing what 
came to be known as the Rupee-Rouble rate of exchange. It 
kept dollars and hard currencies out of all transactions 
between the two countries, and increased upto-Rs. 9000 
crores in 1990. with the disintegration of the soviet Union 
Rupee-Rouble exchange system has now broken down. There is 
practically no movement now either in the sphere of trade 
or in joint ventures, between India and the CIS Republics. 
The Russian Federation is still willing to maintain this 
2 
old Rupee-Rouble rate. 
India and Russia finalized a new political treaty and 
signed memorandum of understanding (MOU) on trade and supp-
lies of defence and power generation equipments in 1992. The 
political treaty contained elements of the 1971 Indo-Soviet 
friendship treaty, while the memorandum on trade, defence 
and power equipments have been structured to all flexibility 
to meet changes. Indian deligate described the steps as the 
'finalization of the political treaty as a positive response 
from India to Russian president Boris Yeltsin's suggestions 
3 
for such a arrangement'. The two countries agreed on a two 
year transitional arrangement that would ensure continuity 
of all existing contracts between the two, specially with 
regard to the defence supplies, spares and setting up of 
power projects. 
1. Vats, B.R., "India and Russia; New Perspectives", 
Hindustan Times, New Delhi, October 13, 1992. 
2. Hindustan Times,'New Delhi, October 1'3, 1992. 
3. Indian Express. New Delhi, January 15, 1992. 
1 
In January 1993, India and Russian Federation reached 
on understanding on utilization and liquidation of Indian 
technical credit by the latter, repayment of Russian loans 
and improvements of counter trade arrangements. India 
agreed that Russia could utilize till May 31, 1993 the 
technical credit granted by the former in 1992. For liqui-
dating the 285 million ci"edit, Russian Federation agreed 
to pay India Rs. 850 crore by transferring this amount from 
the Central Account of the Bank for Foreign Economic 
Affairs with Reserve Bank to the Central Account of the Bank 
for Foreign Trade with RBI. As regards Russian debt, it 
was decided that the funds received from India as repayments 
of credits granted by the erstwhile Soviet Union shall be 
utilized by Russia for purchase of goods and services. In 
pursurance of the five years bilateral agreement on trade 
and economic cooperation signed on May, 1992, the tvrc> sides 
agreed that persons of either country shall be free to 
2 
import and export goods and services from each country, 
Mr. Kremenjunik Deputy Director of the Institute of USA 
and Canada in Moscow said, "in the post-cold war world, 
the only super power was using all the means at its disposal 
to win contracts and guarantee for itself a major place 
under the sun". A space expert further added that ('The 
American have become the world's policeman and we have no 
option but, to follow when they below the whistle". 
India regretted on Saturday (July 18, 1993) the Russian 
4 
decision to cancel the cryogenic rocket engine deal. 
1. Indian Express, New Delhi, January 29, 1993, 
2. Indian Express, New Delhi, January 29, 1993. 
3. The Sunday Times, Delhi, July 18, 1993, 
4. Indian Express, New Delhi, July 18, 1993. 
no 
The visit .of President Boris Yeltisan proved very 
successful. For the first time Moscow considered Delhi as an 
equal partner rather than a client state. This explains the 
offer of defence joint ventures rather than the existing 
Licence - production implies equal sharing of finances, 
joint research, development and exports. Whereas Licence 
production means assembling of ^important components,, called 
semi knock Down (sKD) and complete knock-down (CXD). A more 
practical suggestion was the offer of spares technology 
transfer and joint ventures, both of which, however, were 
limited to the use depending upon the cost-effectiveness on 
case to case basis. 
A solution was sought for very urgent equipments for 
the defence purpose by transfer of technology to India. 
Speaking to the members of Parliament and other eminent 
persons. President Yeltsin talked of an overall Asian policy 
as the Russian objective and the improvement in Russian -
Chinese and Sino-Indian relations were perceived as part 
of this policy. 
The relations of India with the CIS countries remained 
more sympathetic than expected. It was expacted that the 
new Republics will move towards Pakistan as a muslim majo-
rity country and Pakistan v^ as also hopeful to make a 
confideration of these countries including Afghanistan, 
Iran, Iraq, saudi Arabia to fulfill its growing ambitions. 
Kazakhistan signed two pacts with India on May 25, 1993 
for bilateral cooperation in political, trade, economic, 
2 
scientific, ecological cultural and information areas. 
India Uzbekistan signed five agreements to promote 
1. 3:ndian Express, New Delhi, January 30, 1993. 
2. Times of India, New Delhi, May 26, 1993. 
Il l 
cooperation in the economic and commercial fields, science 
and 1 
and technology,/tourism. The agreement on cooperation 
between the foreign ministries provided for regular consul-
tations every year and to train Kazakh diplomats. Another 
agreement on Science and technology stated that the govern-
ments would promote developnent of cooperation in area of 
mutual interest, and for close interaction between scien-
tific institutions. The agreement was valid for five years, 
president Nazarbaev said, that the future was in favour of 
Asia which had immense human resources, but, unfortunately 
the.' continent was riven with conflict which could be only 
/ 2 
resolved by the Asian nations themselves. 
There were some differences over the supply of cryo-
genic engine by Russia under pressure from the USA, which 
India considered discriminatory in its attitude. The U.S. 
has not been able to subscribe to stop China from providing 
M-11 and other missiles to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia. India, 
considered it a voluntary agreement and not binding. The 
future of Indo-Russian cooperation in the defence field 
does not seen-;'very bright either despite agreements and 
promises. The supply of spares for the equipment supplied 
by the former soviet Union to the Indian armed forces which 
had stopped completely has yet to pick up. It is not 
possible to tie up supplies from individual manufactures 
numbering above 3000 spread over the CIS. The search for 
spare for AN-32 transport aircraft has been intensified 
in the Ukraine. 
In the political field, admittedly India is a vital 
factor in Russia's Asian policy but due to the woes of the 
1. FUndustan Times, New Delhi, July 30, 1993. 
2. Times of India, New Delhi, ^ 5ay 26, 1993. 
*•• Wfl 
crisis - ridden national economy during its transition to 
market relations and pressure from United states, the 
Russia's policy towards south Asia and specifically India 
may be changed. Jyoti, Malhotra, rightly observed that the 
days of 'Hindu-Russi Bhai 3hai' are over. Those old soviet 
hands who so pains takingly developed a special relationship 
between the two nations may now be told that they belong 
to a super fluous generation, while the pragmatist knights 
of a new shinning order hold up candles to terminologies 
such as 'self interest' and 'Commerce'. 
1. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, July 22, 1993. 
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CHAPTER - I I I 
A S I A 
1 
[Al Asia 
Asia i s in the process of emerging in to the modern 
era and e s t a b l i s h i n g new p a t t e r n of r e l a t i o n s h i p with r e s t 
of the world. The c o n t i n e n t ' s sh i f t i ng from neo-colonial ism 
to nat ional ism i s symptomatic of a new order of a f f a i r s . 
Although the revolut ion for na t ional independence i n Asia 
i s over, the more deep rooted " revolut ion of r i s i n g expec-
t a t i o n s " i s proceeding. The masses of the people are 
beginning t o be a r t i c u l t u r e - a development tha t has 
revolut ionary impl ica t ions for the world. Asia w i l l play 
a more ac t ive ro le in world p o l i t i c s , a r o l e more commen-
surate with i t s s i z e , i t s popula t ion , and i t s might. Robert 
Payne r i ^ t l y observed, "the major t a sk of our generat ion 
i s the understanding of Asia, for Asia r ep resen t s poten-
t i a l l y the mastery of the world in manpower and resources" . 
Asia i s geographical ly divided in to s i x major land r e g i o n s , 
separated from one another by mountains - Northern Asia, 
Central Asia , Eastern Asia, south-East Asia, south-'i^test 
Asia and South Asia. 
CO.) South Asia 
south Asia cons i s t s of Ind i a , Afghanistan, Pak i s t an , 
2 
Bangladesh, Sr i Lanka, Nepal, Ehutan and Maldives. This 
region l i e s South of Himalayan mountains. I t i s r i ch in 
na tura l r e sources . I t i s bounded on the North by As ia t i c 
Russia and China, on the South by the Arabian sea , the bay 
of Bengal, and the Indian Ocean. On the Vtest by I r a n and 
on the East by Thailand and Laos. The most important of 
the s t a t e s i s I n d i a , with wiiich Pakis tan forms an enormous 
1. Robert Payne , The Revol t of As ia , New York : The John 
Day company, 1947, p . 2 9 ^ 
2. See Annexure 1 to 7 for d e t a i l s about the coun t r i e s . 
iU 
p e n i n s u l a commonly r e f e r r e d to a s a s u b - c o n t i n e n t . T h i s 
p e n i n s u l a i s j o i n e d t o t h e g rea t land mass of Asia r i n g of 
sma l l e r s t a t e s and i s s e p a r a t e d from t h e south China Sea by 
Burma and t h e Halaya P e n i n s u l a . The r e g i o n c o n t a i n s v a s t 
human and m a t e r i a l r e s o u r c e s s e v e r a l r eg ioned c o u n t r i e s 
p o s s e s s impres s ive p o l i t i c a l s M l l s and m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h -
2 
ments t o back them up. The demarcat ion of South Asia a s 
a r e g i o n has been ach ieved through South Asian Regiona l 
Coopera t ion (sAARC) Forum. I n d i a cove r s the l a r g e s t a r e a 
wi th a p o p u l a t i o n of 8 4 7 , 1 iTiillion and Maldives i s l a n d s 
h a v i n g the h i g h e s t pe r c a p i t a GNP of 470 US d o l l a r s . The 
compara t ive f i g u r e s a re g iven below : 
Country c a p i t a l Area p o p u l a t i o n 
Sq.kms. m i l l i o n 
1990 est. 
GNP per-
centage 
(us dollars) 
Bangladesh 
Ehutan 
I n d i a 
Maldives 
Nepal 
P a k i s t a n 
S r i Lanka 
Ehaka 1,43.999 118.0 
Thimphu 46,50 0 1.6 
New Delhi 3 ,287 ,263 847 .1 
Male 298 0.2 
Kathmandu 147,181 19 .1 
Is lamabad 976.096 113.1 
Colombo 66,610 17.1 
208 
160 
310 
470 
160 
3 65 
In whole of the world t h e r e i s no o t h e r r e g i o n 
forming such n a t u r a l bounda r i e s a s t h i s s u b - c o n t i n e n t . I n 
the North f o u r thousand k i l o m e t e r s s t a n d s Himalays and 
1. Das, S . T . , The south Asian C o u n t r i e s . F i t a b Mahal, 
A l l a h a b a d , p . 4 1 . 
2 . Thorn ton , p . Thomas, The s e c u r i t y of South A s i a , 
A n a l y s i s and s p e c u l a t i o n s i n Stephen p . Cohen, (ed. )y 
The__SecuiLlt^LJ2f__Soiith__A^^ American and Asian Perspec-
t i v e , V i s t a r P u b l i c a t i o n s , New D e l h i , 1987. 
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Hindu Kush ranges . The mountains separat ing the sub-cont inent 
from I r a n , Afghanistan and the Islamic world to the West are 
less impress ive , but are bu t t e r e s sed by extensive semi-ar id 
winter lands on both s ides of the f r o n t i e r , south Asia i s 
comprised of a r i c h mosaic of r e l i g i o n s , languages, r aces 
and c u l t u r e s and i s heterogeneous in natxire, Hindus are 
the majority coramunity i n Ind i a and Nepal, Muslims are i n 
majority in Pak i s t an , Bangladesh and Maldives and in mino-
r i t y in India and Nepal. The d i s t r i b u t i o n of l i n g u i s t i c 
s then ic communities ac ross the s t a t e system in south Asia 
makes harder the problems caused by r e l i g i o u s he t e rogen i t y , 
Bengalis , both Hindus and Muslims c o n s t i t u t e about 98% of 
the populat ions of Bangladesh, large number of people in 
west Bengal and Tripura i n I n d i a , and a good number in Assam, 
Punjabi speakers form about two- th i rds of t h i s populat ion 
in Pakis tan and Punjab and Haryana s t a t e s of I n d i a , Urdu 
the na t iona l language of Pak is tan i s the home language of 
more fami l ies i n India than in Pakis tan . There a re Hindi 
speakers in Nepal, Nepali speakers in Ind ia and Bhutan, 
Tamil speakers in Sri Lanka, and English i s used as a common 
language even a f t e r f o r t y s ix years of independence. 
I t was I n d i a ' s s t a t u s the p r inc ipa l enterpor in a 
con^l ica ted bu t , h ighly p r o f i t a b l e oceanic t rade s t ruc tu re 
tha t made the Western and Southern coas ta l areas of south 
Asia, so v i t a l to a succession of maritime empires, from 
the West Asian Muslims Consnercial e n t i t l e s in the eleventh 
t o four teenth cen tu r i e s to the Portuguese, Dutch, French 
and Br i t i sh co lon ia l powers i n the s ix teenth to e ighteenth 
c e n t u r i e s . Ind ia became the jewel in the crown of the 
Br i t i sh Empire in Asia due t o i t s ro l e as the fulcrum, 
upon which the Br i t i sh Imperia l and commercial system in 
Asia was balanced, with the r e s u l t t h a t ex te rna l world 
dares to in t rude upon south Asia. 
At l e a s t 23 major languages and several hundred 
minor languages and d i a l e c t s are spoken throughout the 
region and the foreign p o l i c i e s of each region in south 
Asia are sepa ra t e . 
Nationalism in South Asia 
The power equi l ibr ium which prevai led t h r o u ^ o u t 
most of the Asia a t the tu rn of century was sha t t e red due 
to the na t iona l consciousness of the Asian people and weak-
ness of the co lon ia l powers. Invasion of Manchuria by Japan 
i n 1931 inaugurated a compaign of expansion i n Asia and 
c rea ted the oppor tun i t i es wliich culminated world war I I . 
Japanese slogan "Asia for the Asians" had explosive e f f e c t s 
which las ted long af te r the sun of Nippon had se t i n the 
waters of the p a c i f i c . The defeat of Japan crea ted a vacuum 
in the i n t e r n a t i o n a l balance of power in the Far East and 
United Sta tes and Soviet Union rushed to f i l l the vacuum. 
Howsoever, US could not r a i s e i t s s u i t a b i l i t y in Asian con-
t i nen t and r e se rvo i r of goodwill has reached a new low. 
Besides, the United States has never before been so deeply 
involved in Asian a f f a i r s ; her influence i s cons ide rab le , 
even i f her objec t ive and i n t en t i ons are of ten misunderstood 
and her p o l i c i e s and act ion widely c r i t i c i z e d . The Asian 
nationalism which confronts the world today i s , i d e o l o g i c a l l y 
and emotionally considered, not an i n t e rna l dynamic springing 
from the o lder pre-modern Asian c u l t u r e s . I t i s , i n s t e a d , 
an e n t i r e l y v a l i d response to massive ^'festern emotional 
and s p r i t u a l demands. Japan for i n s t ance , was the f i r s t of 
the Asian coun t r i e s to be Influencec'by modern na t iona l i sm. 
1, Asian Nationalism : "Some Psych ia t r i c Aspects of 
P o l i t i c a l Minesis", Psych ia t ry X^/II, August 1954, p . 262. 
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s t rongly flavoured by t r a d i t i o n a l p rac t i ces and b e l i e f s . 
What happened under Mac Arthur in Japan has paved the way 
2 for the insurgance of Japanese, Ul t ra na t ional i sm. In 
add i t i on , the grovrt^h of modern nat ional ism in China has been 
very g rea t . The concept of one nat ion among many was foreign 
t o d i inese t r a d i t i o n . P o s i t i v e Chinese nat ional ism however, 
goes back to the l a t e years of Manchu Rule and from the 
Revolution of 1911-12. I t s g r e a t e s t leader was Dr. Sun Yat 
Sen the f a the r of the Chinese Republic. Chiang-Kai-Shek 
a l so promoted the ideology of Nationalism, He s a i d , "In 
order to enable t o pass from i n s t a b i l i t y to sa fe ty i t i s 
necessary t h a t education throughout the country focus on 
the concept of s t a t e hood, and place the ideology of na t ion-3 
alism before anything e l s e " . 
In India ReV'olt of 1857 was the f i r s t organised 
expression of an t i - fo re ign sent iments . The b i r t h of na t iona-
lism may be dated back to the formation of Indian National 
Congress in 1885. The congress soon became the dynamic, 
consol ida ted expression of Indian na t ional i sm. In 1920 
Gandhi launched a compaign of non-violence and force were 
r e so r t ed to by some of h i s non-fol lowers. Both Gandhi and 
Tagore subordinated the idea of Na t iona l i sms ' , as represen-
t i n g the p o l i t i c a l power and economic mastery of the s t a t e , 
to the l e s s m a t e r i a l i s t i c and more s p i r i t u a l conception 
Yoshide Shoin and a few of h i s d i s c i p l e s who became 
leaders of Melji Japan expossed views which might be 
described as n a t i o n a l i s t i c or even u l t r a n a t i o n a l i s t i c i n 
the mid nineteenth cen tury . Japanese Nationalism and 
Expansionism. The American H i s t o r i c a l Review, LX (July 
1955), pp. 820-82i, 
Hesse l l Tilkman "Japan : The S t r i c t l y Democratic Banjai" , 
The Reporter, March 20, 1951, p . 19. 
Shek, Chiaug-Kai, 'Chine ' s Destiny", English t r a n s l a t i o n 
by P h i l i p Suffe, New York, Roy Pub l i she r s , 1974, p . 462. 
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t ha t nat ional ism means the well-being development and 
uni ty of i t s people , i-^ile addressing the j o i n t session 
of congress in May 17, 195 6, Sukarno, P re s iden t of Indonesia 
declared t h a t , "Nationalism may te an out of date doct r ine 
for many in t h i s world, for us of Asia and Afr ica , i t i s 
the main-spring of our e f f o r t s understand t h a t , and you 
have the key to much of post-War h i s t o r y " . 
Thus, nat ional ism has proved a dynamic force in Asia. 
I t played an important pa r t i n the independence of the 
Asian c o u n t r i e s . I t was the importat ion fix»m abroad. The 
or ig in of nat ional isms in"Asia was i n the na ture of a 
2 
rebound from the European imperialism of the last century. 
India achieved the freedom in 1947 but, at the cost 
3 
of partition the Chinese attack on India in 1962 was a 
threat to India^ security which, however glorious, India 
acquired through the war^^ results of 1971 with Pakistan, 
Nehru said that "Nationalism has a place in each country 
and should be fostered, but, it need not be allowed to 
become aggressive and come, in the way of International 
developments"• 
'(C) The Security of South Asia 
The strategic importance of South Asia lies in its 
geographical location as also its political, cultural and 
ethnic structure. South Asia lies in the center of two 
volatile regions of West Asia and South-East Asia and 
dominates the vital Sea communication between the West and 
1. Mery E. Towmerd with the collaboration of CH Peake, 
European Colonial Expanoion since 1871, Philadelphia, 
JP Lippinestt Co. 1941,, p. 412. 
2. >5en, E.R., "Nationalism and the Asian Awakening", The 
Annals of the American Academy of political and social 
Science CCL. July 1952, p. llO. 
3. Asian Relations. A report of the proceedings and 
documentations of the first Asian Relations Conference , 
New Delhi, March 1987, p. 2 6. 
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East . A nat ion i s secure t o the extent to \*iich i t i s not 
in danger of having to s a c r i f i c e core v a l u e s , i f i t wishes 
to avoid war, and i s able i f chal lenged, to maintain them 
by v ic tory in such a war. Stanley Hoffman has defined 
na t ional s e c u r i t y as the "protec t ion of a nat ion from phys ica l 
a t t ack and safeguarding i t s economic a c t i v i t i e s from devas-
t a t i n g ou ts ide blows". Arnold X'jolters pleaded the s ecu r i t y 
as a value of v^ich a nat ion can aspi re to have in grea te r 
or l e s se r measures. I t has much in common in t h i s respect 
with power or wealth, two other values of grea t importance 
in i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s . But, v^ i le wealth measures amount 
of a n a t i o n ' s mater ia l possession and power i t s a b i l i t y to 
con t ro l the ac t i ons of otheirs, s ecur i ty in an object ive sense 
measures the absence of t h r e a t s t h a t such values wi l l be 
a t tacked . 
The meaning and nature of s ecu r i ty d i f f e r s from 
nat ion to na t ion as each of them face a d i s t i n c t type of 
t h r e a t . The na t ions v^ich are s t rong though, t h e i r s e c u r i t y 
surrounds towards p ro tec t ing the ex te rna l t h r e a t . The na t ions 
which are weak, they had t o face a generated t h r e a t in t h e i r 
dcsnestic sphere . The t h i r d x ?^orld nat ions f a l l under the 
l a t t e r condi t ions which don ' t have or have fa i l ed to gene-
ra t e a domest ical ly strong p o l i t i c a l and soc ia l consensus 
to e l iminate large scale use of force as a major and con-
t inu ing element in the domestic p o l i t i c a l and soc ia l l i f e 
1. Lippman, Walter , us Foreign Po l i cy , S i la of Republic 
Boston, 1943, pc 51 . 
2. Hoffman, Stanley, "Securi ty in the age of Turbulence : 
Means of Response in Third world. Confl ict and I n t e r -
nat ional Secur i ty" , Adelphi Papers , no. 167, summer 1981, 
p . 4-5. 
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of the na t ion . Speculation about the future of South Asian 
secu r i ty , says Thomas P. Thoranton, can be discouraging 
because the range of t h i s future seems to be between the 
des i rable and unacceptable. Despite i t s lack of formal 
i n s t i t u t i o n s or even the objec t ives .South Asia de f ine te ly 
2 
c o n s t i t u t e s a system, with the cold war having sh i f ted t o 
the Asian sub-cont inent . South Asia and South East Asia 
f a l l as a region of i n t e r e s t to the super powers. Most of 
the maritime sea routes pass through the hemisphere and 
admittedly t h i s i n d u s t r i a l l y under-developed region i s r i ch 
i n manpower, na tu ra l resources and therefore a good market 
to the foreign powers and have increased the importance of 
the sub-continent from s t r a t e g i c point of view. 
The Soviet i n t e rven t ion and presence^ythe Asian regior 
has proved to be mor^ e f f ec t i ve and durable than those of 
3 i t s two r i v a l s , the United S ta t e s and China. After the 
demise of USSR, the Chinese pol icy of "no peace no war" has 
affected the balance of power in the iregion. The Chinese 
view of the ex te rna l world has designed the complex h i s t o -
r i c a l geographical and o ther f ac to r s t h a t have c o n s t i t u t e d 
to a m i l i t a r y doctr ine emphasizing a s t r a t e g y for defence 
against invasion by super ior enemy fo rces . China i s fol low-
ing i t through large conventional forces capable of f igh t ing 
a protected war and a c rad ib le nuclear r e t a l i a t o r y capa-
b i l i t y . China 's nuclear forces and the doctr ine of peoples 
1. Earry Buzan. People, s t a t e s and Feers ; The National 
Securi ty Problem in I n t e r n a t i o n a l Re l a t i ons , Transasian 
Pub l i she r s , New Delhi , 1987, p . 18. 
2. Thornton, F. Thomas, "The Securi ty of south Asia, 
Analysis and Speculat ions" in Stephen P. Cohen (ed.) 
'"^he Securi ty of South Asia, American and Asian 
Perspect ives , "p^ 214. 
3 . Rose, E. Leo, "The Super Powers in South Asia" , Orbis . 
A Journal of World A f f a i r s . 22(1), 1978-79, p . 3 65. 
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war are p i l l a r s of Chinese de te r rence . China 's primary-
s t r a t e g i c area l i e s in i t s neighbouring region, -with v;hich 
i t shares common boundries. 
The cold war between the East and the West, p r i n -
c i p a l l y between United S ta tes and Soviet Union was faught 
on many f r o n t s , such as monolithic communist block one side 
and the containment of communism on the o the r . I t went 
through a per iod of r i v a l r y and confrontat ion between 7^AT0 
and Warsaw p a c t . In 1985 Gorbachev dec la r ing the policy sa id 
tha t our As ia -pac i f ic platform i s o r i g i n a l l y l inked with 
our programme of stopping the arms race and l iqu ida t ing 
the nuclear t h r e a t to man kind. In terms of I n d i a ' s secur i ty 
concerns, the Soviet Union played a dual roal as a d i rec t 
suppl ier of arms and a l i c ense r of c e r t a i n c l a s s e s of m i l i -
t a r y hardware produced in I n d i a . 
Both the United S ta tes and the USSR regarded India 
as the preponderant power in South Asia, bu t , Chinese stake 
in some south Asian count r i es precluded i t from considering 
India in the same l i g h t . Japan too began to take i n t e r e s t i n 
South Asia. The Japanese Prime Minister in May 1979 expressed 
t h a t the development of f r i end ly r e l a t i o n s between Japan 
and China as between the United Sta tes and China have 
broadned the foundation for our Asian p o l i c i e s . Japan wi l l 
ac t in close concert with United Sta tes and ^-testern Europe 
to extend appropr ia te cooperat ion to China 's economic 
2 
development e f f o r t s . 
Muni, S.D., India and Gorbachev's Asia Pac i f i c Security 
Proposal , Stockhoim, Sv.'edish I n s t i t u t e of I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Affa i r s , 1988, p. 7. 
saburo o k i l a , Japan, China and the United States^ 
Economic Rela t ions and Prospec ts , Foreign Af fa i r s . 
September 1979, Council of Foreign Rela t ions I n c . , ITew 
York. 
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Robert H. Donaldson observed, "The 1971 Indo-Soviet 
Treaty was perceived by Moscow not simply as a guarantor 
of I n d i a ' s preponderance over Pakis tan but as a symbol of 
•a special re la t ionship* between i t s e l f and the New Delhi 
aimed a t j o i n t l y balancing the regional inf luences of 
Peking and >toscow. In the changing world o r d e r , the indo-
Soviet Trea ty and Pakis tan a l l i a n c e with US have l o s t t h e i r 
importance, P a k i s t a n ' s value as a s t r a t e g i c a l l y of the US 
has too been reduced due t o end of Afghanistan war and has 
come within the ambit of the P r e s s l e r Amendment. 
(A\ I n t e rna l secur i ty Dimensions : 
There are winds of change, blowing across South As ia , 
but some of these are having e f fec t of reviving o ld t r a d i -
t ions and of giving new importance to old i n s t i t u t i o n s l i k e 
c a s t e , community and r e l i g i o n . The extent of separat ion of 
powers, the freedom of mass media, ind iv idua l r i g h t s of 
expression and conscience, the standards of l iv ing of the 
masses, geographical and soc ia l mobility are some of the 
p a r t i c i p a t o r y charac te rs of p o l i t i c a l system. The coun t r i e s 
of South Asia have mixed boundaries l ike Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
Burma, Nepal and Pakistan having common border with India 
separa te ly and ind iv idua l ly in terms of t h e i r c u l t u r a l 
i d e n t i t i e s , economic p a t t e r n s , phi losophical t rends and 
h i s t o r i c a l exper ience. Conversely there i s a b i t of India in 
2 
every o the r country of south Asia. Pak is tan i l eaders tend 
t o forget t h a t - India - a much larger country has common 
border not only with Pak i s t an , but also with a number of 
1, Robert H, Donaldson, "The USSR, the sub-continent and the 
Indian Ocean", in Lawrence Zining, (ed) . The sub-continent 
in world P o l i t i c s , New York, 1978. For d e t a i l s of Treaty 
See Appendix 8. 
2 . Muni, S.D., 'South Asia' in Mohammad Ayub (ed.) Conf l ic t 
and Inter i rent ion in Third world, Vikas, New Delhi , I96u, 
p . 131. 
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(^ 6) SAARC OOnd SSUt^ ASaA-
The genesis of regional cooperation in south Asia can 
be traced to 1945 when Jawahar Lai Nehru had advocated the 
need to establish south Asian federation for unity, peace 
and progress in the region. The initial conference was 
convened in New Delhi in March 1947. Nehru emphasized the 
need of cooperation to find solution for the common 
problems, and said : 
"The countries of Asia, we must remember, are 
very backward and the standards of living are 
appallingly low. These econcmic problems demand 
urgent solution or else crisis and disaster may 
overwhelm us. We have therefore, to think in 
terms of the common man and fashion our politi-
cal, social and economic structure so that the 
burdens that have crushed him may be removed 
and may have full opportunities for growth".! 
Substantial progress was made in this regard because 
the Asian continent was denied against itself. The growth 
of militarization in various parts of the world also con-
tributed to undermining the process of regional cooperation. 
The political and social structure of newly emerging 
nations also began to disintegrate due to their internal 
weaknesses and external intervention. 
One of the most significant facets of contemporary 
International politics has been the proliferation of 
regional groups whereby most of the regions of the globe 
have been covered. In fact the whole of Europe (East and 
West), America (both North and South) Africa and the Arab 
world and South East Asia iTave been covered by distinct 
regional groups. The NATO, the DEC, the OAU, the ASEAN 
1. Nehru, Jawahar Lai, India's Foreign Policy' , Selected 
Speeches, September, 1946 - April 1961, New Delhi, p.29, 
2. Professor Rajni Kothari perceptively observes that due 
to "a growing permeation of the super powers tempo of 
militarization has accentuated a sense of insecurity 
and mutual suspicion compelled them to choose to encircle 
the global, Rajni Kothari, State and Nation Building in 
the Third World. Bombay» 1976, p. 8.' 
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and LAFTA are some of the important regional o rgan i sa t ions 
which emerged a f te r the second world war. The progress of 
SAARC i s based upon the proximity of ASEAN and t h e general 
influence of the caut ious approach of the ECAFE/ESCAP 
philosophy of regionalism tha t has influenced the general 
thinking of the Asian bureaucraf t s . Regional cooperat ion 
has emerged as an important fac tor during the post second 
world war per iod. Post co lon ia l coun t r i e s tended toge ther 
in many groups. There are fo r ty f ive such groupings among 
the developing and l e s s developed n a t i o n s , five i n Asia , 
eleven in Lat in America and Caribbean, nineteen i n Africa 
and ten of i n t e r - r e g i o n a l na tu re . 
In the reg iona l and i n t e r r eg iona l cooperation the 
main force l i e s i n the urge t o ensure the p a r t i c i p a n t s and 
t o c rea te confidence about t h e i r i n t e r e s t and sa f e ty . 
Although in the i n t r a - r e g i o n a l and i n t e r - r e g i o n a l coopera-
t i o n the s t a t e s are the dominant p a r t i c i p a n t s , but the 
i n t e r a c t i o n p rocess , t o a great e x t e n t , i s influenced by 
the " in t rus ive fo rces" . The ex te rna l powers play a great 
par t i n shaping the nature of the cooperat ion. 
south Asian coun t r i e s have many problems of mass 
poverty, hunger, ma lnu t r i t i on , d i s e a s e , i l l i t e r a c y and 
dogmatism. On the other hand, the high level of i n f l a t i o n 
and the inc reas ing r a t e of unemployment have accentuated 
domestic problems. The re luc tance on the par t of the 
developed world t o increase Off ic ia l Development Assis tance 
(ODA) on l i b e r a l terms have led Third v?orld leaders t o 
be l ieve tha t grea ter south-South cooperation i s e s s e n t i a l 
2 desp i te t h e i r inherent handicaps and l i m i t a t i o n s . 
1. Jackson, A. Robert , south Asian C r i s i s : I n d i a , Pak i s t an , 
Bangladesh, New Delhi , 1978, p . 103. 
2. Haza Hasemplung and Karlsauvans, The New I n t e r n a t i o n a l 
Economic Order, Confrontation and Co-operation Eet-z/een 
North and South, Boulder, 1977. 
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The acronym SAARC was adopted only af ter the f i r s t 
summit of heads of s t a t e and government held in Dhaka on 
7-8 December 1985. The proposal for e s t ab l i sh ing a 
reg iona l forum of seven South Asian States-Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, I n d i a , Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka -
was o r i g i n a l l y made by Pres ident Ziaur Rahman of Bangladesh 
in May 1980 and was follo\<ed by working paper c i r c u l a t e d 
by h i s country e n t i t l e d "The proposal for Regional Coopera-
t i o n in south Asia" in November 198 0. The modus operandi 
for south Asian regionalism was eventual ly worked out 
through thetneetings held up at foreign S e c r e t a r i a t l e v e l , 
beginning on April 1981. In August 1983, P res iden t Z i a - u l -
Haq of Pski tan observed " I t would be b e n i f i c i a l for us a l l 
t o make a c o l l e c t i v e p ledge, renouncing the t h r e a t or use 
of force against one another. 
At the same occasion Jigme Singyne Wangchuk king 
of Bhutan r e i t e r a t e d t h a t , 
"In the g e o - p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s of our r e g i o n , 
i t would be u n r e a l i s t i c to ignore the primary 
of the p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r , a s , in the f i n a l ana-
l y s i s , i t would be p o l i t i c a l environment of the 
reg ion , which wi l l determine the shape and 
scope of the reg ional cooperation in south Asia. 
The main o b s t i c l e i s not only to overcome the 
psychological and emotional b a r r i e r s of the 
past but the f e a r s , anax i t i e s and apprehensions 
of the p resen t" .2 
The foreign min i s t e r s of the seven coun t r i e s issued 
a Delcarat ion on south Asian reg ional cooperation (SARC) 
which defined ob jec t ives and p r i n c i p l e s and the i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
and f inanc ia l arrangements for the new organiza t ion . 
1. Address by General Mohammed Zia ul Haq, P res iden t 
Is lamic Republic of Pakis tan at sAARC Summit Meeting 
December 7 , 1985, p . 7. 
2. Address of His Majesty Jigme Sv;gye Manchuk, King of 
Bhutan t o the F i r s t sAARC Summit Meeting, Dhaka, 7-8 
December 1985. 
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In the Second summit Meeting Rajiv Gandhi pu t t i ng 
emphasis on regional cooperation summarised -
"The important statements made by each one of 
you yesterday, and the d iscuss ions tha t followed 
at Nandi H i l l s , shov^ed t h a t you at the mechanisms 
of reg ional cooperation an3 v.eshing in to gear , 
mat te rs of grave na t ional import , have impinged 
upon and permeated our d e l i b e r a t i o n s - peace 
s t a b i l i t y and s e c u r i t y , confidence b i ld ing and 
nuclear t h r e a t , non-violent and co -ex i s t ence , 
the un-mitigated e v i l of t e r r o r i s m . The l e s s ion 
t o be drawn i s t h a t the p e r t i c u t bui ld ing of 
reg iona l cooperat ion i ^ i d e n t i f i e d areas of 
cooperation must take place in an atmosphere 
of good neighbourl iness and responsible i n t e r -
na t iona l behaviour". 
south Asia r ep re sen t s one of the l a rges t cont iguous 
geographical uni ty of s t r a t e g i c importance with a vast 
popula t ion. Each country of the region has i t s own fea r s 
and apprehensions. The region has a tourmented and I ranmat ic 
h i s to ry of c o n f l i c t s and clavages . Between India and Pak i s ta r 
three wars have been faught. Besides severa l border c l a s h e s , 
the region . ' i s prone t o e thnic t ens ions and t r o u b l e s . Any 
step by the small coun t r i e s for any reg ional cooperation 
may be a cause of counte rva i l ing mechanism and the same on 
the par t of India "runs the r i s k of being i n s t a n t l y per -
ceived by others p a r t i c u l a r l y Pak i s t an , as yet another 
manifes ta t ion of I n d i a ' s hegemonism". 
In f a c t , I n d i a , which commands more than 70 per cent 
of the land area populat ion and na t iona l income of the 
r eg ion , does not need any regional cooperation when i t has 
the capac i ty t o ac t alone independently and any move 
by India for reg ional cooperat ion i s understandable. In 
1. Pande, Raja Ram, "Recent Development in South_Asia", 
Asia Pac i f i c Community, A Quarter ly Review, Spring 1984, 
No. 24, Tokyo, p . 54. 
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f a c t , i t was a widespread openion t h a t Ind ia should be 
generous towards h i s neighbour coun t r i e s . Selig Harrison 
suggested, 
"India should begin to show a s p r i t of large 
heartedness and magniamity t h a t i t has r a r e l y 
displayed i n deal ing with i t s smaller neigh-
bours . Indeed, i n the absence of such a s p r i t . 
New Delhi i s un l ike ly to win enduring accep-
tance of i t s r eg iona l preponderance regard less 
of the degree of m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y i t 
achieves .1 
The process of south Asian Regional Cooperation was 
i n i t i a t e d by the l a t e Pres ident Zia-ur-Rehman of Bangladesh 
in 198 0. The south Asian countr ies were of the view t h a t 
they are being explo i ted of the "Unholy a l l i ance" of power , 
2 p r iv i l ege and technology. The i n i t i a t i v e of a r eg iona l 
cooperation may be t raced to the developments of l a t e 
seventees when the i n t e r n a t i o n a l economic s i t u a t i o n had 
become d i f f i c u l t for South Asian and there was much enthu-
siasm to explore south Asian cooperat ion. The pos i t ion of 
Bangladesh a t that time was complex due to Gangawater 
dispute between India and Bangladesh. King Birendra 
endorced the idea of regional cooperat ion in his inaugurol 
address to the Colombo Plan . In a c o n s u l t a t i v e meeting he 
asked for cooperation among Asian coun t r i e s such as I n d i a , 
3 Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh and China. The western e l i t e 
a lso supported the idea of regional cooperat ion when they 
v i s i t e d South Asia in 1978. south Asian academicia a lso 
undertook s tudies of var ious dimensions of cooperat ion for 
development in South Asia with the f i n a n c i a l backing of 
l."The Flames in south Asia Foreign Policy" , New York, 
No. 45, Winter 1981-82, p . 99. 
2. Ward House "Separate Unec^ual But More Autonomous 
Technology, Squity and World Order i n , The Milennia l , 
September 1980-3 57-407. 
3 . Text of the Speech in H. M. King Birendra* s Proclama-
t i o n s , Speeches and Ranges, I t i s Majesty 's Government 
P r e s s , Kathmandu, 1982, p . 179. 
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i n t e rna t i ona l agencies including western foundations . 
Defeat of Mrs. Gandhi in the e l e c t i o n s and overthrow of 
ZA Bhutto in Pakis tan a l so enco-uraged formation of an 
i n s t i t u t i o n for reg ional cooperat ion. The Carter Doctrine 
in January 158 3 for cooperat ive regional s ecu r i t y framework 
gave b i r t h t o the SAARC in South Asia and GCC (Gulf coopera-
t i ve council) i n Pers ian Gulf. 
Indias support for the SAAPlC 
The Indian r u l i n g e l i t e have planned foreign po l icy 
of the country with c l e a r - c u t object ives v i z . na t ional 
s ecu r i ty , f r iendship with neighbours, development and world 
peace, SAARC can be considered as an offspring of NAM 
because i t gave a major thr^ust to south~south cooperat ion 
and Economic Cooperat'p.afteK Developing count r i es (ECDC). 
I n d i a ' s r u l e r s have r e i t e r a t e d on many occasions 
that they respect the indej>endence, autonomy and sovereignty 
of other South Asian c o u n t r i e s . India has t r i e d t o assuage 
fears of the smaller na t ions t h a t i t does not want to ha r -
bour u l t e r i o r motives. Ind ia agreed t o exchange s c i e n t i f i c 
and technica l knowledge with i t s neighbours in f i e l d s of 
hea l th and populat ion c o n t r o l . I t a l so assured t o cooperate 
curb chronic d iseases and agreed to formulate research p ros -
pects t o conduct in-depth s tud ies so t h a t impending na tu ra l 
d i s a s t e r s could be avoided. On a non governmental bas i s 
India has agreed t o expend cooperation in Trade and Indus t ry . 
Prime I4inister Rajiv Gandhi r e i t e r a t e d "Indians commitment 
t o "search for peaceful and cooperative r e l a t i o n s " with 
the neighbours Ind ia a lso gave assurance to other na t ions 
of the sub-cont inent t h a t India will se t t les* b i l a t e r a l 
problems through f r iendly and peaceful nego t i a t ions . 
However, ^outh Asia bears a unique psycho-po l i t i c s . 
1. Committee m s tud ies for cooperation in Development in 
south Asia (CSCD) has set up at Colombo. 
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Preitn Chopra has r i g h l y observed "Far from f a c i l i t a t i n g 
regional cooperat ion the overhang of h i s to ry has cas t a 
shadow.upon south Asia, c r ea t i ng a fog of mis t rus t in which 
the problems of the c e n t r a l i t y of India and the d i s p a r i t y 
between Ind ia and i t s neighbours form even larger than l i f e " . 
Chopra fur ther s t a t e s t h a t "although nature has c rea ted the 
Indian sub-continent as a s ingle stratei^^ic whole, and 
although re levan t p a r t s of the subcontinent have been s ing le 
s t r a t e g i c area for long per iods in the p a s t , during the pas t 
four decades i n t e r - coun t ry r e l a t i o n s through out south Asia 2 have been poisoned by con f l i c t i ng percept ions of t h r e a t " . 
There are four types of con f l i c t i ng percept ions of 
OV\y— •. perceived t h r e a t i n South Asia. In the f i r s t type,^South 
Asian country f e e l s threa tened by another d i r e c t l y and 
be l i eves i t s e l f t o be the vict im of ac tua l or po t en t i a l 
aggression by the l a t t e r . In the second type a South Asian 
country under t h r e a t from a country outs ide South Asia sus -
pects the l a t t e r has an accomplice or a proxy within South 
Asia. The t h i r d type i s the in t rus ive of super powers r i v a -
l r i e s i n t o south Asia which made or are seen to more on 
South Asia country an enemy of another . The fourth the 
most pern ic ious types i n t e r e s t with each other and r e i n -" 3 force a l l of them. 
India i s the lynchpin of south Asian cooperat ion. 
India has not made c lear i t s r o l e in reg iona l a f f a i r s and 
t h i s i s because the other member nat ions of the SAARC con-
sider Ind ia as "prudent for a funct ional approach t o reg iona l 
coopera t ion" . In order t o face t h e i r past boldly and 
1. Quoted in Far Eastern Econcroic Review Year Book, 198 5, 
2. I b i d . 
3. Gupta, Bhabani Sen, SAARC-ASEAN. o p . c i t . p , 74. 
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t ack le the present with s incere mutual understanding and 
t r u s t under-wri t ing one ano the r ' s sovere igni ty and 
independence, regional cooperat ion i s essentiaL,. The. e x t e r -
nal powers are po\>;erful only due to our past ^laiima^vand 
b icker ings . 
SAARC cannot remain a closed system t o impervious 
to ex te rna l in f luence . Therefore^i t should e f f e c t i v e l y use 
the pos i t i ve elements for the common i n t e r e s t while 
t ry ing to sh ie ld i t from the negative ones. External ac to rs 
which can have an influence on the funct ioning of the 
organizat ion include foreign governments, r eg iona l and 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l organiza t ions and t r ansna t iona l co rpora t ions . 
On the negative side these forces have been blamed for 
e i t h e r attempting t o undermine the process of coopera t ion , 
i t s e l f or using i t for t h e i r own purpose. On the pos i t ive 
side these ac to rs offer incen t ives which regional organi -
za t ions in the t h i r d world need the most for an e f f ec t ive 
operation funds, t a l en t ed manpower and i d e a s . In a nu t she l l 
i t wi l l be necessary to search for a broad based system 
which wi l l be l ess dependent on the p o l i t i c a l s t ruc tu re of 
r e l a t i o n s among the member count r ies for continued v ia -
b i l i t y . 
The SAARC coun t r i e s have entered i n t o a South 
Asian P r e f e r e n t i a l Trade Agreement at Dhaka on April I I , 
1993. The t rade blocs in the world l ike EEC, ASEAN, NAFTA 
are funct ioning according to t h e i r plan desp i t e a l l sor t 
of con f l i c t s but SAARC has not moved even a few paces 
forward despi te i t s 7 years old ex i s tence . 
1. Vai t sos , V. cons t an t ine , "Cr i s i s in Regional Economic 
cooperation ( In tegra t ion Among Developing Countries',' 
A 5urvey_._v{or_Id_DeveloT;ment . 1978, pp. 726-736, 
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All the seven coun t r i e s - Bangladesh, Bhutan, I n d i a , 
Maldives, Nepal, PalcLstan and Sri Lanka continue t o remain 
in the same pos i t ions they enjoyed seven years back. The 
clear a n t i - I n d i a stance of the Organisation of Is lamic 
conference (Oic) at Karachi on April 27-29, 1993 Pakis tan 
continued t o promote cross-border te r ror i sm and violence 
in Jammu and Kashmir, Punjab and other p a r t s of I n d i a . 
The south ^s ian region has a t o t a l populat ion of 
13 0 c rores people. SAARC enjoys 22 ,^ of the world 's f o s s i l 
and fuel depos i t s , 460 cubic kilometers of renewable water 
r e source , 86 mi l l ion hec ta res of the fo res t cover , 250 
mi l l ion hec tares of the farm land, l a rges t Animal popu-
l a t i o n and abundance of milk. The t o t a l import by SAARC 
count r ies was around US $ 38 b i l l i o n in 1990. 
The members of the South Asian coun t r i e s have 
many commonalities - c u l t u r a l her i tage soc ia l hab i t s and 
r e l i g i o n s equ i ty . There are vast p o s s i b i l i t y of cooperat ion 
on many f ron t s . India produces 15 per cent of the I ron ore 
and expor ts major par t of i t while Pakis tan imports I r an 
from Aus t r a l i a , Canada, Braz i l and Liber ia at a higher 
p r i c e , s imi l a r ly Sri Lanka expor ts 120000 tonnes of na tu ra l 
rubber every year and Ind ia imports nearly 40000 tonnes 
of rubber from Malaysia and a deal may pctve good foreign 
currency. Pakis tan imports t ee frcro Kenya, china and Indo-
nesia wliile Indian t ea w i l l prove less c o s t l y and of b e t t e r 
qua l i ty , Ind ia exports coffee and Sri Lanka imports coffee 
from Ivory coast but, the both countr ies could not ccme t o 
terms. 
THE SAARC has f a i l e d a economic front t o achieve 
any f r u i t f u l r e s u l t s as well as have fa i l ed t o t a l l y on 
p o l i t i c a l f ron t , 
1. Hindustan Times, June 20, 1993. 
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Cf) The Secoria Cold War -. ImSacg off South" Asia 
There was a time when, except India and Vietnam, the 
Soviet Union had no friends in Asia, Now, there is no 
Soviet Union, as friends to fall back to. With the end of 
dideologiation of international relations, the Russians 
are not seen as adversaries or even a threat, by anyone 
in Asia. Regional security in south Asia to be based on 
multilateral de-escalation of military confrontation than 
collective security has to envisage full participation by 
extra-regional actors of the multipolar world. Jawahar Lai 
Nehru's dream for independent India was to keep it out of 
maelstrom of power play, tension and conflict that had 
2 
affected the history of nations. 
Neither of the socalled superpowers were able to 
use their overv^elraing military and economic resources for 
purposes of effectively projecting power or controlling 
developments in regional conflict situations in the third 
world. Neither superpower was able to dictate terms to its 
allies or clients. Although both could provide assistance 
in ways which exacerbated local or regional tensions, 
neither was really able to resolve those tensions in ways 
favourable to its own objectives.At the same time bilateral 
relations of the us and the soviet Union were restricted 
because of the dangers of nuclear confrontation which was 
recognised by Presidsnt Mikhail Gorbachev and his advisors 
and lay, in part at least, at the base of the shift in 
soviet policy. 
1. strategic studies Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1 and 2, 1992, 
p. 93, 
2. The Indian Express, New Delhi, January 15, 1991. 
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While nexv thinking in soviet policy was resulting in 
rather dramatic shifts in Soviet foreign policy behaviour, 
the US ]3egan to reassess its own position. Prior to the 
end or the superpower confrontation and of the cold war, 
US policy throughout the third world, for example, had been 
influenced to a substantial degree by a concern for Soviet 
expansion and of its influence in regions viewed as impor-
tant or essential for overall US interests. This "zero 
sum" approach to relationship in the Third world had 
characterized both US and Soviet policy until the late 
1980s. 
By the summer of 199l, even prior to the aborted 
coup in Moscow, the US-Soviet relationship had changed 
dramatically. Soviet policy was committed to expanding 
economic and political relationships with the US and its 
western allies as an essential component of economic and 
political rehabilitation at home. Rather than competing with 
the US for influence across the Third world something which 
had characterized Soviet policy for more than three decades • 
the soviet leadership increasingly sought to cooperate with 
the US in resolving regional conflicts. This was most 
evident in Soviet political support for the US and UN, in 
the persian Gulf crisis of 1990-91. •^  
The year 198 9 proved to be a watershed, in terms of 
the transformation of the global scene, with major changes 
taking place in many parts of the \«rld. The Soviet Union 
completed the withdrawal of its forces from Afghanistan 
in February 1989. By the middle of the year. Eastern Europe 
1. :n shifts in the relationship between the soviet Union 
and the United States see "International security and 
the Collapse of the soviet Union", The Washington 
Quaterly, vol. 15, No. 2, 1992, pp„ 15-32, Stephen R, 
Covington and John Lough, "Russia Post Revolution 
Challenge, Reforms of the soviet Superpower paradigm. 
The Washington Quarterly, No. 1, 1992, pp. 5-26. 
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ivas in ferment, with communist regimes tottering and 
collapsing in the Warsaw Pact countries as the democratic 
movement gained a hold on countries no longer afraid of 
soviet-backed repression. The collapse of the Berlin-Wall 
became a milestone in European history and the reunifi-
cation of Germany which had looked a distant dream, materia-
lised in 1990 with the acquiescence of Moscow. The effects 
of the democratic movement were felt also in China, where 
demonstrations by students and young workers were tolerated 
in major cities till they iDecame violent and destructive, 
and were suppressed in June in the Tiananmen Square of 
Beijing in a manner that attracted Western sanctions. 
The Bush-Gorbachev summit towards the end of the 
year proclaimed the end of the cold war, and public opinion 
in the United States, deeply agitated over massive budgetary 
deficits and neglect of don\estic economic issues, voci-
ferously demanded a scaling down of U.S. commitments and 
expenditures abroad. As the decade of the 1940s began, a 
significant reordering of policies and priorities by the 
US came into evidence. Following the collapse of the 
Warsaw Pact, the relevance and purpose of the NATC) alliance 
came into question. However, it was felt by all the members 
that the plans and structures achieved over four decades 
should not be abandoned, particularly as the world order 
was in a state of flux, and possible future threats to_ 
peace and stability could not be ignored. 
With the communist bloc in disarray, and the soviet 
model of political and economic managemenr discredited, 
V.'est^ ern analysts and policy-makers saw the need to reassess 
future threats to the interests of the capitalist world. 
With a substantial input by powerful Jev;ish and Indian 
lobbies which are specially influential in the media and 
in centres of learning (there being an estimated 800,000 
17^ 
A <M •; 
Indian scholars and scientists in the _lis alone). Islamic 
fundamentalism was identified as the maini3eological cha-
llenge, taking the clue from the rhetoric used in Iran after 
the Islamic revolution of 1979, 
A second potential threat centred on the spread 
of military technology to developing countries, notably 
those in the West and South Asia. When this strand of 
thinking is linked to the first one, concerning the Islamic 
fundamentalist threat, the Muslim countries are perceived 
as being the greater potential menace. This explains why 
pressure was built up against Pakistan to conform to 
nuclear safeguards while India had demonstrated its nuc-
lear capability in l974, began to be seen as a potential 
partner. A suspicion persisted among influential segments 
of US. and European intelligentia that the Islamic coun-
tries might pass high-technology secrets to each other, 
whereas such a risk hardly existed in the case of India, 
so that it had to be viewed as an aspiring regional-
hegemony whose perceptions could be harmonised with those 
of the United states. 
Some Asian countries are now faced both by 
challenges and opportunities and, consequently, their 
incertitude is not surprising. There are potential source 
of iYistability in the changing international relations 
and impredictability may generate destabilization and 
various ethnic identities which are now going to be a 
major international security problem for the countries 
of South Asia, 
1. Strategic Studies Journal, op.cit., vol. 5, No, 1, 
and 2, 1992, p. 93. 
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Most of the south Asian elites have frequently 
ascribed their regional problems to the cold war. The South 
Asian states inherited problem peculiar to decolonized 
societies. These included disputed borders and back^ a^rd 
economies. The brutal nature of the birth of some of these 
countries made conflict an inherent part of regional rela-
tionships. The initial years of the cold war confused the 
priorities of these states. The exaggerated claims of 
capitalism and communism made them dependent on the mecha-
nism of nonalignment. Conflict in South Asia was never 
generic to the cold war but became subject to alignment. 
There were a series of conflicts at regional level. 
The conflicts arising out of disputed areas, "lines of 
control" instead of international borders, nationalities 
with multiple loyalties, and religions, cutting across 
international boundaries of hostile and not so friendly 
states, were irrespective of the cold war. Though the cold 
war has ended as a model of relationship between the US -
and the former USSR, it remains valid elsewhere both as an 
academic concept and an international strategy. 
The bipolar division of the world had been harmful 
to the interests of the new states. A mutual rivalry of big 
powers was anticipated by Nehru,,Long before the advent of 
the cold war \^en he was at the ^ 'elm of affairs. Nehru per-
ceived this before the advent of the cold war and the birth 
of Pakistan which is indicative of a theoretical awareness 
that conflict else^ ^^ ere would imply peace in the region. 
After independence the ruling elite of South Asia did 
lament about bipolar divisions and the cold war more as 
a rhetoric. This included the concept of nonalignment 
v^ich frequently became an instrument and a technique for 
1. Jawaher Lai Nehru, Young India. September, 1936. 
1 0*1 
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gaining moral s t a tu r e and mater ia l b e n e f i t s . In t imes of 
peace i t shel tered them from par t i san , p o l i t i c s and fetched 
economic and m i l i t a r y aid from both Washington and Moscow,; 
a more r e a l i s t i c ideom i n regional r e l a t i o n s needed to be 
evolved independent of c l i c h e s of neo-imperialism i d e o l o -
g ica l hegemonies and p o l i t i c a l e x p l o i t a t i o n . 
• ^Br i e f , a l l the South Asian s t a t e s , face problems of 
e t h n i c , r e l i g i o u s and l i n g u i s t i c character t h a t pose^cha-
l lenges of t h e i r na t iona l p o l i t i c a l order and i n t e g r a t i o n 
and fur ther hinder the process of cooperation among them. 
In the case of China desp i t e her conventional s u p e r i o r i t y 
India can tackle a conventional t h r e a t , i f the c o n f l i c t 
reaches the p l a ins in the northeast as happened by the 
possession of nuclear weapon. Second, i t would condi t ion 
Chinese conventional op t ions . As for Pak i s t an , conventional 
supe r io r i t y as well as the possession of a nuclear weapon 
i s de te r ren t enough. The unintended f a l l o u t of t h i s , could 
be t h a t Pakis tan would d e s i s t from aiding the t e r r o r i s t s 
across the border. Even i f t he i r stance i s demonstrated as 
a peace move, I n d i a ' s nuclear weapons would have done more 
good than the c r i t i c s would have imagined. But, i f we are 
not a nuclear power, Pak i s t an can a t tack India with the 
confidence tha t i t has a nuclear weapon. Since a l l the wars 
between India and Pak i s t an have been s t a r t e d by P a k i s t a n , 
an Indian nuclear weapon wi l l deter Pak i s t an , vhat a massive 
conventional s u p e r i o r i t y could not be a t t a ined in the p a s t , 
a small nuclear weapon could do in the fu tu r e . 
There have been f ive powers a f fec t ing the events in 
South Asia. Various e thn i c i d e n t i t i e s are now going to 
be a major i n t e r n a t i o n a l secur i ty problem for the coun t r i e s 
of south Asia. A s e c u r i t y doctr ine for India wi l l need t o 
1. s t r a t e g i c Studies , O p . c i t . , vol . 5, No.l and 2, 1992, p.93, 
1 4J 0 
Spell out the threats to her security and the appropriate 
Indian responses. The two main adversaries China and PaTcLstam 
and their respective strength would determine its broad 
parameters. 
Implications for India-Paki.stan Relations 
south Asia assumed importance as an international 
sub-system with the withd rawal of the British and a number 
of new states emerged which were either parts of the British 
empire or were its protectorates. India's problem with 
Pakistan is different from its problem with other states. 
The present state of tension in south Asia may be viewed 
against the background of India-Pakistan relations. These 
are the two major countries which account for most of south 
Asian policy. The Kashnir problem became more and more com-
plicated due to the cold war between USA and USSR. However, 
of late, with its end, no major player in international 
politics at the moment follows original political and 
military strategic interest in the region. The end of the 
cold war, thus, not only changed relations between the West 
and East, but virtually the whole nature of international 
relations with implication for Us and south Asia. Recently 
a Clinton administration official said, "The issue of 
Kashmir is complex and multifaceted and "we urge both India 
and Pakistan to ^et to business" in resolving it in line 
with the Simla Accord. "We cannot, however, solve the 
Kashmir problem for them, just as we cannot solve the 
Arab-Israeli problem". 
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f Q ) j^ c^lg^ r Proliferation ; South Asian Perception 
In the past few years the world has changed and a cloud 
of uncertainty and antiquity has arisen. The easing of the 
super powers and the crumbling of the ccmmunist order has 
widely changed the world strategy but the main demographic 
trends are unchanged and in terms of the geography of the 
world panes of communications, continents and ocean look 
the same as at the height of the cold war. The cold war 
thraw has generated regional power centres in the third 
world that have increased the risk of conflict and also 
generated arms race based on the dynamics of action-reaction. 
This trend is disturbing enough for the peace of the region 
in case of sophisticated conventional weapons. It is extre-
mely worriscsne for the world and South Asia is one such 
threatre where the chronic problems still persists. 
As a result of the pressure of domestic public opin-
ion in the West, and Russia to reduce nuclear stock piles, 
and, partly as a result of the momentua of arms control 
efforts, Washington and Moscow signed a series of agreements 
reducing their nuclear stock piles. The first Bush, Yeltsin 
Summit in Washington in June 1992 advanced the process of 
army control. The charter ^^s signed on June 17, 1992 and 
was the landmark in controlling strategic weapons and presc-
ribed a deeper cut to reduc:e warheads 3500 us and Russia 
3 000 i.e. a reduction of 70 percent was considered to be 
implemented by 2003; The Bush-Gorbachev and Bush-Yeltsin 
initiatives concerning nuclear weapons in the autumn of 
l99l/winter ofl992 potentially are a great boost to the 
world disarmament process. Not only do they represent a 
move towards a substantial denuclearization of the former 
soviet Union and the United States ground forces and surface 
navies J curtailment of armed forces and dicreasing military 
1. Mlcheal T, Kalre, An Arms Control Aquede for the Third 
world. Arms Control Today, April 1990, p. 8. 
efforts, Washington and Moscow signed a series of agreements 
reducing their nuclear stock piles. The first Bush, Yeltsin 
Summit in V/ashington in June 1992 advanced the process of 
army control. The cnarter was signed on June 17, l992 
and was the landmark in controlling strategic weapons and 
prescribed a deeper cut to reduce warheads 3500 US and 
Russia 3 000 i.e. a reduction of 70 percent was considered 
to be implemented by 20 03, The Bush-Gorbachev and Bus-
Yeltsin initiatives concerning nuclear weapons in the 
autumn of 1991/winter of 1992 potentially are a great boost 
to the world disarmament process. Not only do they represent 
a move towards a substantial denuclearization of the former 
Soviet Union and the United states ground forces and surface 
navies, curtailment of armed forces and dicreasing military 
budgets, they signify a radical twin form the arms compe-
tition betv;een the two sides to effective cooperation and 
even pax'tnership in disarmament, 
president Bush also announced that all tactical 
nuclear weapons outside the United States have been finally 
withdrawn. The withdrawal of 2 400 war-heads and missiles 
weapons was part of the START Agreement signed in 1990, 
but, its implementation was delayed due to disintegration 
of Soviet Union. These arms control and disarmament measures 
aimed at reducing nuclear stockpiles, eroded a objection of 
the non-l^ PT states, against the treaty. Joseph S. Nye Jr. 
a former 'Ahite House official, observed that Nuclear 
proliferati:n, if not Contained would have a dissolvent 
effect on international relations and increase the pros-
pects of terrorist nuclear attack". 
1. Hanry Trofimenko, "New Geopolitical Developments, 
Disarmament", Topical P aper 9, United Nations, New 
York 1992, p. 42. 
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The older proliferation problem between the two 
edge of Asia lies in south Asia and the continuing compe-
tition between India and Pakistan. In testimony before the 
Congress, reported by the New York Times of 21 January 1991/ 
CIA Director Robert Gates made the following assessment, 
•'we see South Asia at the precipice of a 
nuclear weapons race, within the next five 
years, both sides will have medium-range 
missiles. Each side will have to resume the 
worst of each other. And this is destabili-
zing because of the hair-trigger nature of 
these missiles in tJUnes of tension... not 
only do both countries have nuclear weapon 
and ballistic missile programme; they have 
recently pursued cheimical weapons as well. 
These programmes are particularly Worrisome 
because of constant tension and conflict in 
Kastoir". 
The implications of Director Gates assessment are 
clear. Imagine the following scenario by csneral K. Sunderjii 
in the 30 November, 1990 edition of India Today. 
"Pakistan has escalated its efforts at 
subversion and guerrilla warfare in Jammu 
and Kashmir to a high pitch. Though tech-
nically still convert, its, involvement 
is almost open. Pakistan has also threa-
tened that if India goes through wit its 
declared conventional strategy of carrying 
the war into Pakistan territory in the 
plains, all means would oe used to defeat 
implying the use of nuclear weapons. Will 
through with its conventional counter 
offensive in the plains ? Will Pakistans 
nuclear bluff be called?". 
Since 19 85, the provisions of United States assis-
tance to Pakistan has depended on-a Presidential certifi-
cation to congress that Pakistan does not possess a nuclear 
la 
explosive device . The c e r t i f i c a t e for f i s c a l year 1991 
was not given. As a r e s u l t s ince October 1990, the United 
States has provided no new economic or m i l i t a r y a s s i s t ance 
to Pakistan which amounted to some $ 600 raillion annua l ly . 
The then Prime Minis ter Lai Bahadur Shes t r i while 
refus ing t o change from the Nehru path of using a t c c i c 
energy for peaceful purpose in a subt le depar t ive fron 
the e a r l i e r pos i t ion s t a t ed a t his p a r t y ' s conference in 
Durgapur, in January 1965, t ha t "I can not say any th ing 
about the future but, our present policy i s not t o manu-
fac ture the atom bomo, but to develop nuclear energy for 
cons t ruc t ive purposes" . Evolution for I n d i a ' s f i r s t 
nuclear power s t a t i o n took place in 1961 and the l ega l 
instrument for the most t.angible demonstration of Indo-US 
nuclear cooperation was the "Agreement of the Tarapur 
2 Atomic Station (TAPS), signed on 8th August 1963. 
The Sino-Indian c o n f l i c t of 19 62 and the subsequent 
Chinese explosion in 1974 -^ generated a s t rong des i r e in 
India to obtain nuclear weapon c a p a b i l i t y . During t h i s 
period r e l a t i o n s of India and Pakistan were harsh because 
of the Chinese Border. Agreement 1963. This a l so forced India 
to undertake changes in i t s defence po l i cy . Indian nuclear 
a sp i r a t ions and modernization programme brought India and 
Pakistan to a cross road , simultaneously, Pakis tan a l so 
made up i t s mind to consider p o s s i b i l i t y of nuclear weapon 
1, Bhatia, Shyam, Indias, Nuclear Bomb, New Delhi , p . 12. 
2 . Singh, s u r j i t Man, I n d i a ' s Search For Power, Indra 
Gandhi's Foreign Policy 1966-1982, Sage Pub l i ca t ions , 
New Delhi, p . 96 . 
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programme. The d i s - i n t e g r a t i o n of Pakis tan and I n d i a ' s 
peaceful nuclear explosion i n 1974 charac ter ized the 
emergence of India as a dominant force in Asia, After t h r e e 
weeks of the Indian explosion, Z.A, Bhutto said t h a t 
"Pakistan would ea t grass" i f necessary, t o acquire i t s 
nuclear det terence^ Bhutto was the f i r s t to th ink about an 
Islamic bomb and emphasized tha t the c h r i s t i a n , Jewish and 
Hindu c i v i l i z a t i o n have t h e i r nuclear c a p a b i l i t i e s , the 
Islamic c i v i l i z a t i o n alone was without i t " . 
Pak i s tan along with some v/estern powers charged India 
for v i o l a t i o n of the solemn agreement made with Canada for 
the development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes 
only. She maintained tha t Ind ia had misused i t s atomic 
power p l an t s under the very nose of t h e i r foreign bene-
f a c t o r s . Fak i s t ans Foreign Secretary told a 25 nat ion 
disarmament conference held at Geneva on 23rd May 1974 t h a t 
the Indian explosion has given a death flow t o the nuclear 
non-pro l i f e ra t ion t r e a t y and the road has been thrown open 
2 for emergence of more nuclear powers. Speaking in favour 
of Pak i s t an , New York Times propagated tha t Pakis tan i s 
under great pressure from the Soviet Union a sharply i n c -
reased in recent months and needs out side support to 
continue to r e s i s t t h i s p re s su re . 
In view of the sent iments , p resen t nuclear po l icy 
has benefi ted Pak i s t an . Pakis tan has d e l i b e r a t e l y maintained 
ambiguity regarding i t s nuclear weapons programme although 
3 i t can build a bomb whenever i t v/ishes. I t i s a l so c lear 
1. I<hanna, D.D. , Pak i s t ans nuclear Development and P o l i c y , 
p . 66. 
2. The Aus t ra l i an , Hay 15, 1976. 
3. Cohen, S .P . , "The P o s s i b i l i t y of Arms Control in South 
Asia", S t r a t eg i c Studies Journal , 1990, p . l a l so See 
Time, March 3Q, 1987. 
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t ha t i f Pakis tan dec la res i t s nuclear opt ion, India wi l l 
a l so use i t s option and a Pak i s t an i Bomb wil l not only 
leg i t imate Indian bomb but , xvill occelera te an arma race 
which wi l l d e s t a b l i z e , the s t r a t e g i c balance of the sub-
cont inen t . 
In February 1993, Pak is tan o f f i c i a l l y admitted t h a t 
i t possessed r e q u i s i t e components to assemble a t l e a s t one 
nuclear device . Russian Foreign i n t e l l i g e n c e service placed 
before the US Senate committee tha t "Pakistan i s a t 
presente "• est imated to possess four to seven nuclear bombs". 
The r epor t fur ther added t h a t , "India may be c l a s s i f i e d as 
being among the count r ies wJnich unof f i c i a l ly possessed 
nuclear weapons. 
Pakistarfs m i l i t a r y nuclear programme was s t a r t e d i n 
the middle of the seventees and was i n i t i a l l y or iented 
towards uranium as a means. The uranium enrichment p lan t 
at Kahuta can produce high q u a l i t y uranium to manufactxire 
3 122 nuclear bombs every year. But, P a k i s t a n ' s Foreign 
Secretary claimed t h a t P a k i s t a n ' s nuclear programme had 4 been frozen on the level of 1989 and not 1990. Pak is tan 
entered the nuclear f i e l d much l a t e r and i t s programme i s 
much smaller compared t o I n d i a . India was the f i r s t among 
the developing countr ies to launch a long range atomic 
development programme, soon a f te r independence in 19^1 .[j^LaNc 
Pakis tan Atomic Energy Commission was es tab l i shed in 1958 
and got low p r i o r i t y u n t i l 1972. India acquired i t s f i r s t 
l.The Indian Express, New Delhi , February 26, 1993. 
2 . I b id . 
3.Tte Indian Express, New Delhi , February 26, 1993, 
4. The Muslim, Islamabad, February 10, 1992. 
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research r eac to r Apsara i n Trombay in 1956, while Pak i s t an 
got i t in 1965. On 3 0 March, 1987 General Zia to ld Times 
Magazine "You can v i r t u a l l y wri te today tha~ Pakis tan can 
build a nuclear bomb whenever i t wishes to what i s d i f f i c u l t 
about the bomb? Once you have, the technology which Pak i s t an 
w 1 has , you can do viiat ever you l i k e . In Decenber 1990 the 
former Vice chief of Array Staff K.M. Arif t o ld BBC, 
"Nuclear p r o l i f e r a t i o n has a l ready occurred in south Asia. 
The atomic weapon a re t h e r e , you c a n ' t deny the i r exis tence 
because you refuse t o look at them". 
I t may be i n view of the " l im i t s of nuclear power" 
that India has not exploided the another nuclear device 
since 1974, and Pak i s t an during the l a s t 20 years had made 
a number of proposals t o w:Ln over the nuclear game, i n c l u -
ding e s t a b l i s h i n g a Nuclear: weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) in 
south Asia v^ich Ind ia has b lun t ly refused on the ground 
tha t p r o l i f e r a t i o n i s a global problem. 
Russia a lso wanted India to cooperate in accept ing 
the Miss i l e . Technology Control Regime (HTCR) gu ide l ines 
to a l l a y fea rs i n the West about New D e l h i ' s miss i le 
programme. The Prime Minis te r , Mr. Rao r e i t e r a t e d , " I n d i a ' s 
known stand on t h i s subject - tha t the MTCR, l ike NPT was 
d iscr iminatory in charac ter and compromised with na t iona l 
sovere igni ty . India had made i t known many times t h a t i t 
wes i n t e r e s t e d in d iscuss ing nuclear as •ii'ell as miss i l e 
p r o l i f e r a t i o n on a global bas i s and stood for complex 
3 
abo l i t i on of nuclear weapons". 
l.The. Times, Magazine, 3 0 March 1987, 
„ Radio Minotorinq Reoort , BBC, 20 Deceriber 1990< 
3.The Hindustan Tirr^es, llew Delh i , July 10, 1593. 
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There is no possibility of any future limited 
nuclear war bet;^ ;een India and Pakistan. In context of 
Souch Asia, both India and Pakistan have embarked upon 
nuclear programmes. South Asia in any case is not committed 
to existing non proliferation regime. India gives up its 
weapon option as a potential political and diplomatic if 
not military, deterrent against NWS and against China in 
particular. It is therefore unlikely that India would 
relinquish that option entirely, unless it is a deal 
including at least china. 
TABLE - 1 
NUCLEAR RESEARCH REACTORS (INDIA) 
w 
Name of 
P l a n t 
A s p a r a 
C i r u s 
Z e r l i n a 
P u r n i m a I 
P u r n i m a i l 
D h r u v a ( R - 5 ) 
FBTR 
K a m i n i 
P u r n i m a I I I 
L o c a t i o n 
T r o m b a y 
T r e m b a y 
T r o m b a y 
T r o m b a y 
T r o m b a y 
T r o m b a y 
K a l p a k k a m 
K a l p a k k a m 
T r o m b a y 
R e a c t o r 
T y p e 
L^-fl 
Hl-R 
HVil 
FBR 
H o m o -
g e n e o u s 
HWR 
FBR 
P o w e r 
(MWt) 
1 
40 
4 0 0 wt 
1 0 0 T.vt 
5 Wt 
lOO 
40 
100 Kl-lt 
Date of 
commi-
s s i o n i n g 
1956 
1960 
1961 
1972 
198 4 
198 5 
1985 
198 6 
1988 
S a f e -
g u a r d s 
^7o 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Source : Paper presented at the In tennat iona l Conference on 
Promoting Nuclear Disarmament and Prevent ing Nuclear 
Weapons P r o l i f e r a t i o n held by the I t a l i a n Union of 
S c i e n t i s t s for Disarmament, Cas t ig l ionce l lo 5-8 
October 1991. 
us 
TABLE - 2 
Name L o c a t i o n Power Year S a f e - ( D i s m a n t l e d 
O u t p u t g u a r d s i n 1990) 
PARR-1 N i l o r e 5 MWt 1965 Yes 
PARR-2 N i l o r e 27 KT-ft 1990 Yes 
PARR-3 N i l o r e 10 MWt End 1991 Yes 
s o u r c e : PACE Annual R e p o r t s . 
TABLE - 3 
NUCLEAR POVER REACTORS ( INDIA) 
S r , Name of 
P l a n t 
1 . T a r a p u r - 1 
2 , T a r a p u r - 2 
3 . R a p s - 1 
4 . R a p s - 2 
5 , Maps-1 
6 , Maps-2 
7 . N a p p - i 
8 . Napp-2 
9 . K a p s - 1 
1 0 . Kaps-2 
1 1 - 2 2 R a p s - 3 , 4 
1 3 - 1 4 K a i g a - 1 , 2 
15 -18 K a i o a - 3 t o 
6 
1 9 - 2 0 T a p s - 3 , 4 
2 1 - 2 4 Raps 5-8 
2 5 - 2 6 leundankulam 
1.2 
L o c a t i o n 
Bombay 
Bombay 
Kota 
Kota 
Kalpakkam 
Kalpakkam 
N a r o r a 
N a r o r a 
K a k r a p a r 
Ka kr a p a r 
Kota 
K a i g a 
K a i g a 
Bombay 
Kota 
. Kundankulam 
R e a c t o r 
Type 
BWR 
BW:^  
PHWR 
PHl'^ rR 
PHWR 
PHWR 
PHWR 
PHVR 
PHWR 
PHV7R 
PHWR 
PHWR 
PHWR 
PHWR 
PHWR 
(VVER) 
D e s i g n 
G r o s s 
210 
210 
220 
220 
235 
23 5 
23 5 
235 
23 5 
235 
235 
2x23 5 
4x23 5 
2x500 
4x500 
2x1000 
D a t e of 
Commi-
s s i o n i n g 
1 1 / 1 9 6 9 
11 /1969 
12 /1973 
4 / 1 9 8 1 
7 /1983 
3 /1986 
10 /1989 
1990 
1990 
1991 
1995 
1995 
-
-
-
-
S a f e -
g u a r d s 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
NO 
No 
No 
NO 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
2 7 - 3 2 S i x U n i t s PHWR 6x500 NO 
source : Indian Department of Atomic Energy Annual Reports. 
TABLE - 4 
NUCLEAR POV/ER REACTORS 
t5 i 
Name L o c a t i o n P ower Year 
O u t p u t 
S a f e g u a r d s 
KANUPP K a r a c h i 150' MV7e 1972 Yes 
CKASHNTJPP-1 Chashma 
CHASHNUPP-2 Chashma 
3 00 Mwe 
900 rwe 
1997 Yes 
1998 Yes 
( F r a n c e h a s 
s i n c e b a c t e d 
o u t ) 
S o u r c e : PAEC P u b l i c a t i o n s . 
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CHAPTER - I V 
INDIA AND I T S NEIGHBOURS 
!5 
INDIA AND ITS NEIGHBOURS 
[A) Indo Bhutan Rela t ions 
Bhutan occupies the pivota l pos i t ion from where both 
Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh could be outf lanked. I t faces 
U' 
a part of Tibet t h a t i s ne l l served with road net work and 
with eastern Nepal, sikkim and Western Arunachal, i t covers 
the f e r t i l e and populated West Bengal, Bangladesh and Assam. 
In 1962 c o n f l i c t , i t was i so la ted and out-f lanked on i t s 
eastern and western borders by Chinese f o r c e s , which emphasized 
i t s v u l n e r a b i l i t y . The basic s t ruc ture of Indo-Bhutanese 
r e l a t i onsh ip i s the extension of B r i t i s h Imperial policy in 
the region. As asse r ted by China now, Bhutan was a kind of 
pro tec tora te of the Middle Kingdom t i l l the B r i t i s h a l t e red 2 the s i t ua t ion in Nineteenth Century. Rela t ions between 
Br i t i sh India and Bhutan were formalised on November 11, 1865 
when the t r e a t y of sinchula was signed. The t r e a t y put an 
end to the continued conf l ic t in which the two were engaged 
1. Cohen, P h i l i p s Stephen - The Securi ty of South Asia, 
Vistar Pub l i ca t ion , New Delhi. 
2. Mao used the phrase str ipped away to descr ibe the loss 
of the Chinese r i g h t s to .imperial B r i t i s h . Mao Ise- tung 
The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese communist Party" 
selected works, vo l . 2 (Peking 1965), p . 307. Cited by 
Srikant Dutt ' Ind ia and the Himalayan S t a t e s , Asian 
Affairs (London) vo l . 6 (old s e r i e s v o l . 67, par t 1, 
February 1980, p . 73. 
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since 1837. Britain agreed to pay Rs. 50,000/- per annum 
to Bhutan and under write the independence. Bhutan ceded 
the pass areas at the foot of the hills to British, relea-
sed its prisoners and established free trade between the 
two countries. 
China's influence was cut short on account of the 
Sinchula Treaty. Nepal, Sikkim and Tibet gradually sliped 
away from Chinese influence. Britain sent young husband 
expedition to Tibet in 1903-5 to evaluate the strategic 
importance of the Himalayan states. On 16th December, 1907 
hereditary monarchy was first established in Bhutan and 
Ygyen Dorji, the king was expected to meet the interest of 
the British rule. Another Treaty of Punakhe was signed in 
I9l0, which made significant changes in the former Treaty 
of sinchula. The annual allowance of king of Bhutan was 
increased from Rs. 50,000/- to Rs. 1,00,000.00 and it was 
also agreed upon that the Bhutan will enjoy internal auto-
nany but, its external affairs will be guided by the advice 
of the British Government. In the context of the existing 
situation this was nothing more than dejure recognition of 
the defacto reality, for even without this clause Bhutan 
would in any case have had to clear any foreign policy 
innovations or initiatives with the British authorities in 
2 
New Delhi. 
There was no change of r e l a t i o n s during the 37 years . 
Upto 1947 B r i t a i n did not i n t e r f e r e in the in t e rna l autonomy 
of the kingdom and a l so did not e s t a b l i s h the Residency. 
After independence of India no stand s t i l l Agreement was 
signed between Bhutan and India bu t , p r a c t i c a l l y Bhutan 
adhered to a l l the previous agreements and Indian p o l i t i c a l 
off icer in Gangtok continued to be accredi ted to Bhutan 
as wel l . 
1. Ibid. 
2. Rose, E. Leo, "Bhutan's External Relations', Pacific Affairs, 
(Vaucouver), vol. 47, No.2, Summer 1974, pp. 192-93. 
3. Ibid. 
1. 
(C() The Treaty of 1949 
India snd Bhutan signed a treaty on August 8, 1949 
according to which, India recognised the independence of 
Bhutan and restored the Dewangiri hill strip on the Indian 
border. India raised the annual subsidy from Rs. lOOOOO/-
to Rs. 500000/- under this Treaty, India agreed to provide 
all trade facilities and carriage by land and water through-
out the Indian territory. It was also agreed upon that 
Bhutan shall be free to import with the assistance and 
approval of the Government of India, whatever arms, ammuni-
tions, machinery. Bhutan though expressed that it has no 
problem from India, but, despite the facilities extended 
to Bhutan all was not well. There were potential problems 
regarding the Indian Advisor and the interpretation of 
Article 11 of the 1949 Treaty dealing with the guidance 
clause relating to the external relations. The assassination 
of the Bhutanese Prime Minister Jigme Dorji raised doubts 
and created an atmosphere against India, It was expected 
2 
that the assassination was plotted by pro china lobby. The 
pro-China lobby was also strong enough and there was the 
likelihood of a civil war in the country. The king appointed 
Lhendup Dorji as acting Prime Minister to maintain law and 
order. In the first instance, Lhendup Dorji tried to settle 
the Conflict, but, later on moved to Pro-China lobby. In 
July 196 5, the king too, was assassinated and Lhendup Dorji 
along with his supporters fled to Nepal. This time too, 
blame for the assassination was casted upon India. The 
relations between the two countries declined after the 
assassination of Dorji. 
Any how, both governments tried to maintain their 
friendly terms. King made a visit to India, in May 1966 
1. Muni, 3.D., Bhutan Steps Out, The World Today (London), 
December 1984, p, 517. 
2. The Telegraph, (Calcutta) 29,9.1985. 
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and personal ly expressed'*! am deeply touched by the 
sympathy and understanding with which the Government of 
India viewed our problem. The help and advice furnished by 
the government of India are of great value to us and are 
appreciated by my Government and my people"! India accono-
dated Bhutan in get t ing membership of United Nations^in 1971. 
India adopted a pol icy of gradual accomodation of Bhutanese 
a sp i r a t i ons and s e n s i t i v i t i e s . But, Bhutanis king Patoron, 
made i t c l e a r tha t i t i s not mandatory for h i s country 
t o accept I n d i a ' s guidance in Thimpus Foreign Pol icy and 
tha t i t i s t o the advantage of New Delhi to upto date the 
Treaty . 
The r e l a t i o n s between the two count r ies however, 
reneined f r i end ly . India and Bhutan renewed the agreement 
on trade and commerce for another f ive years from March 2 1 , 
1990 t o March 30, 1995. rinder the agreement, India and 
Bhutan were allowed to continue to have force t rad ing 
arrangements as before. A major modification in the renewed 
t r e a t y was tha t the free t rade was opened far p r iva te Bhutanese 
2 
t r a d e r s . T i l l then i t was cont ro l led by the Royal Government. 
Bhutanese Trade Minis ter , Om Pradhan envisaged the con t i -
nuance of free t rad ing said"a new mile stone has been 
3 
achieved in the age old t i e s between the two neighbours-. 
The Trade Minister fur ther a s se r t ed tha t "we have received 
a l l round cooperat ion. The Government of India has been very 
4 
acconodating and, i t extended a l l help we requ i red" . Bhutan 
1. The Economic Times* New Delhi , dated November 3 , 1979. 
2. The Hindustan Tlrnes, New Delhi , March 3 , 1990. 
3.The Business Standard, New Delhi , March 3 , 1990, 
4. The p a t r i k a . New Delhi , March 5, 1990. 
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king louded I n d i a ' s peace e f f o r t s . The legand of Sindu 
Raja of Bumthaug and h i s b a t t l e s with Na-u-che (Eig nose) 
a neighbouring Indian Ruler» warns tha t i f Non (Bhutan) 
succeeds a l l of India wil l be conquered, i f India succeeds 
a l l of non wi l l be conquerd '." The warning was r e a l l y an 
ejdiortation to peace. I t persuaded the two pr inces to meet 
under Guru padmo Sarabhava's benign and aegis and swear 
ever las t ing amity a t the oath stone F i l l e r which was 
the rea f t e r known as Powerless since the kings rel inquished 
t h e i r own power for the sake of e t e r n a l f r i endsh ip , between 
the two c o u n t r i e s . 
I t i s a p r e t t y t a l e r eca l l ed by the fervour with 
which every one in Thimpu pays t r i b u t e to the Indian 
connection. Following the c lash between India and China in 
1969. Bhutan found i t s e l f inc reas ing ly drawn c loser to i t s 
2 Southern neighbour, Ind ia , From the time of the present 
kings connection in 1974, the Bhutanese have been saying 
even if Sotto Voce, tha t according to t h e i r understanding 
of tne t r e a t y i t i s not ob l iga tory on them t o seek I n d i a ' s 
advice on every foreign pol icy matter and even when such 
3 
advice i s in fac t sought, i t i s not binding on Bhutan. The 
Indian government described i t as tendent ious and unfor-
tuna te . Ttie king of Bhutan Jigme Singva Naugehuk said^ 
tha t the India-Bhutanese t r e a t y leaves room for a l l nego-
t i a t i o n s and changes in the event of d i f f i c u l t i e s . But, 
there are no d i f f i c u l t i e s wi-iatsoever (in the implimentatlon 5 *" 
of the t r e a t y ) in p r a c t i c e . At another occasion king of 
2 
1. Tribune, Chandigarh, September 30, 1985. 
2. The Rising Nepal, Kathmandu, December 2 1 , 1971. 
3 . The Times of India,New Delhi , September 27, 1979. 
'^' The P a t r i o t , New Delhi , October 19, 1979 
5. Ttie Statesman, New Delhi , November 25, 1979. 
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Bhutan lauded the Indian irelat ions and sa id , "As far as 
Indo-Bhutan r e l a t i o n s are concerned they are ca r r i ed on 
within the t r a d i t i o n a l framework in s p i r i t of fr iendship 
t r u s t and co-operat ion. Indo-Bhutan r e l a t i o n s are bound 
to expand." After the annexation of Tibet by China in 
1959, the Bhutanese r e l i s e d the immense disadvantage of 
a close door pol icy . In order to cas t as ide the fears 
hovering over the horizon and to ensure nat ional secur i ty 
and unhindered economic progress , Bhutan came c lose r to 
2 India and found a genuine f r iend . The king said at a 
banquet in honour of the Prime Minister of India Rajiv 
Gandhi," I believe we have succeeded in demonstrating 
tha t enlightened and fars ighted leadership can make i t 
possible for a large country l ike India and small neighbour 
l ike Bhutan to co-exis t in perfect hermony, t r u s t and 
co-operation'. Bhutan's problems with India are bas ica l ly 
the same as Nepals or r a t he r India f inds i t s e l f under 
s imi la r pu l l s and pressures from both i t s Himalayan neigh-
bours. Nepal as i s known wants a p o l i t i c a l end economic 
i d e n t i t y of i t s own and does not want to be a s a t e l l i t e 
of Ind ia . This i s broadly Bhutans a t t i t u d e t o India as well , 
Bhutan i s looking for wider con t rac t s e s p e c i a l l y trade with 
i t s southeast Asian neighbours under b less ings of India . 
I t has opened doors of New foreign a i d s . In the Fif th Plan 
(1981-87) Indias support was l e s s than one- th i rd out of 
the t o t a l outlay of Rs. 433.8 c rores while i t was lOO 
percent in the f i r s t Five ;i^ar Plan. In the Sixth year plan 
India committed for only 57%. Bhutan, did not l ike deploraatic 
4 
over extension just for the sake of i t , 
1. The Tribune, Chandigarh, February 26, 1980, 
2. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi , September 27, 1985. 
3. Financial Express, New Delhi , September 30, 1985, 
4. Financial Express, New Delhi , February 13, 1980. 
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With the raising of India's posture direct talks 
were held between China and Bhutan. Bhutan became the member 
of u:i in 1973, through Indian initiatives. It expanded its 
contracts with outside world, with Bangladesh as well as 
with Singapur and Hongkong, Bhutan became the member of the 
SAARC. It was given a common platform to discuss problems 
of vital importance with other members. King Jigme Singye 
Wangchuk in the First SAARC Summit made policy statement 
and said, "In the geo-political realities of our region, 
it would be unrealistic to ignore the primacy of the poli-
tical factor, as in the find analysis, it would be political 
environment of the region which will determine the shape 
and scope of regional cooperation in south Asia. The main 
obstacle is not only to over come the psychological and 
emotional barries of the past, but, the fears, anxieties 
and apprehensions of the present". It has broad based its 
external aid dependence, established diplomatic relations 
with several countries, Japan, south Korea, Kuwait the EEC, 
Switxerland, Sudan, Norway and Finland including all South 
Asia region including Bangladesh (1979) and Nepal (l983). 
India's policy tov/ards the Himalayan States revolved around 
the idea of special interest. In the case of Bhutan, New 
Delhi was to guide the former in its external relations in 
2 
keeping with the treaty of 1949. Indian policy was essen-
tially a continuation of the British approach. Thus the 
major objective of Indian policy in this region is ultima-
tely to retain control of the area. The merger of Sikklm 
with India in 1975 should be seen as a logical extension of 
the policy towards this region and is a guiding factor. 
1. Address of His Mejesty Jigme Singye Waqchuk, King of 
Bhutan to the Ist SA.^ RC Summit meeting Dhaka, December 
7,8, 1985. 
2, Foreign Policy of India. Texts of documents 1947, 59 
(New Delhi, 1959) pp. 35-40 and Ceylon Dally (Colombo), 
November 13, 1979. 
158 
Geopolitical and strategic compulsions make it explicit 
that whatever status they may try to seek, it is not 
possible for border states to take anti-India stand because 
such an attitude would make them susceptible to threats 
from China or they will be struck down by internal up 
heavals. In the border areas in the Asian Landmass, there 
exist a cluster of traditional societies embracing a vast 
best of sub-culture inherited from centuries of unrecorded 
history. These are Sinkiang, Tibet, Sikkim and Bhutan and 
the tribal areas that lace India's (and Pakistan's) nor-
thern front. These irraditional communities which inhabit 
either side of the national frontiers are also being 
pressed into varying degrees of modernization. The result 
has been rebellions, uprisings political and social ten-
sions and demands or struggles for independence acting on 
and reacting to, relationship between the four major powers. 
Bhutan is slowly marching the way Nepal has once 
crossed. Indian working in Bhutan are being humilated and 
forced to leave that country. Though both governments are 
silent on this aspect but the fact is there. It is on 
record that Bhutan for the last two years has been comp-
laining about Indian labourers who constitute nearly 80 
percent of the lOOOOO strong labourers and do not return to 
India even after the expiry of their contracts instead they 
start agitations. In this regard King of Bhutan expressed 
that, 
"For years people have been coming to Bhutan, 
once they come in, it is difficult to distin-
guish them from our own people, by bribing 
local officials they become Bhutanese nationals. 
The unchecked immigration is creating un-employ-
ment and straing our agrarian economy. It is a 
potential of social tension". 
1. The Indian Express, New Delhi, April 27, 1989. 
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Government of Bhutan in 
order to win over the d i f f i c u l t y decided to i s sue i d e n t i t y 
cards to out side o f f i c i a l s and labourers.' '• In the wake of 
t h i s , 200 workers were expelled by Bhutan chemicals and 
Carbide Ltd, a t pasakho in Phunisholing. Moreover, Bhutan 
Govt, cancel led the t rade l icence of M/S Shyam Sunder 
Stores owned by an Indian at Phuntsholing. Another reirii-
f i c a t i o n of Bhutans pecu l ia r an t i - Ind ian stance has been i t s 
r e s t r i c t i o n s imposed on the owners of t e l e v i s i o n s to watch 
2 programmes t e l e c a s t by the doordarshan. Bhutan has no 
major border problem with Ind ia , bu t , i t has also a minor 
border problem at d i f ferent type with Ind ia . I t r e l a t e s to 
the boundry between Geylemhung in Bhutan and Assam. Accor-
ding to Bhutan the road connecting Geylephung and Sarbhang 
(Bhutanese t e r r i t o r i e s ) had been i n i t i a l l y const ructed within 
the boundaries of Bhutan. But, now t h i s 4 km. s t r e t c h has 
f a l l en under Assam due to some ea r ly demarcations based on 
maps prepared in 1911 and 1914. Bhutan ra ised the issue in 
1980. The National Assembly a l so passed the r e s o l u t i o n in 
1987 to ra i se the matter with Government of Ind ia , contrary 
to the Indias t r e a t y 1949, Bhutan became a s ignatory to the 
Nuclear Non-prol i ferat ion Treaty (NPT) which India has 
opposed vehemently. Bhutan,also joined hands with Pakistan 
in declaring South Asia a nuclear free zone in United 
Nations. The most alarming i s the fac t t ha t i t has s t a r t ed 
d i r ec t border t a l k s with china in order to s e t t l e the 
problem of incurs ions by T i te tan herdsmen in i t s chumby 
va l l ey on the disputed Northern border. I t impl ies tha t 
the Bhutan-China border i ssue w i l l , henceforth not be 
1. TtK Indonesia Times, J aka r t a , February 9, 1983. 
2. Amrit Bazar p a t r i k a , Allahabad, May 5, 1989. 
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considered an in t eg ra l part of the s ino-Indian boundary 
d ispute . In an interview to a west German journal Indo-Asian 
in October 1986, the king i s reported to have said that in 
the event of a Sino-Indian c o n f l i c t , Bhutan wi l l adopt the 
pr inc ip le of Non-al l iance. 
(ij-) Ethnic Problem 
Ethnic problems have always been a source of tension 
•and conf l ic t in i n t e r s t a t e r e l a t i o n s among the countr ies of 
south Asia. Since independence these count r ies have been 
vulnerable to e thnic tensions a r i s ing out of the colonial 
pol icy of 'd iv ide and r u l e ' , accentuated by the controver-
s i a l demarcations of boundry by the B r i t i s h . Recently, a 
long standing and 'low i n t e n s i t y ' e thnic problem between 
Bhutan and Nepal has caused considerable r e l a t i o n s to 
s t r a i n between Nepal and Bhutan. In the past months several 
thousands of these people have crossed in to Nepal and 
Indian t e r r i t o r y . Their primary reason for f leeing Bhutan 
according to these people i s tha t they are being per-
secuted by the Bhutanese a u t h o r i t i e s for t h e i r d i f ferent 
ethnic i d e n t i t y , 
Bhutan, the l a s t bast ion of Mahayana Buddhism in 
the Himalayas with i t s mystical charm has been enveloped 
by the smog of gloom. The problem of the 80,000 refugees 
l iving in camps in Nepal has engulfed the kingdom in a 
2 
c r i s i s and soured r e l a t i o n s between the two coun t r i e s . 
A long standing e thnic problem prevai l ing between Bhutan 
and Nepal has caused considerable concern in South Asia 
and the r e l a t i o n s between Nepal and Bhutan have become 
1. Hossein, Farzana, "Bhutan's Ethnic Problem A case of 
a Fragile Ethnic Mosaic in South Asia", B i i s s Journal , 
vol . 14, No. 1, 1993, p. 17. 
2. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi , Ju ly 5, 1993. 
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strain. Thousands of Nepalese living in Bhutan have crossed 
the borders and camped in Indian territory or Nepal for 
fear of persecution by the Ehutanese authorities for their 
different ethnic identity. The root of the problem is that 
Nepali population in Bhutan has increased greatly over 
the part few years. Bhutan v^ hich has the per capita, GNP 
of 415 Us dollars is one of the richest in south Asia 
and thousands Nepalis teve come to Bhutan in the past ille-
gally in search of livelihood, Bhutan fears that if the 
migration continues, Bhutan may become a Nepali majority 
state. Therefore, Bhutan has taken stringent immigration 
measures to check the Inflow. This position has been taken 
advantage of the migrants living in India and the B.P.P. 
(Bhutans People Party) to establish democracy in Bhutan, 
Bhutas, new worry now corners to stop the psychology of 
"greater Nepal". 
According to Nepal, Ethnic Nepalese, the Tamong 
family are victims of a programme of systematic persecu-
tion being conducted by the Bhutanese Government on the 
2 
southern part of the country. By mid-summer, there were 
6200 Bhutanese refugees living in fire cair.ps, three of 
which were in Tarai. 
The kingdom of Bhutan is divided into three regions -
3 
southern. Central Himalayan and Northern Bhutan, Each of 
these regions have a different cultures and ethnicity. 
The southern region is inhabited mainly by peasants of 
Nepalese origin, high cost people and Tribal population 
who continued to immigrate since 1950, They are full 
Bhutanese. The Central Himalayas is divided into three 
1. The Asian week, January 7, 1993. 
2. The Indian Express, New Delhi, March 4, 1993. 
3. pormaret, Francoise, An Illustrated Guide to Bhutan, 
The Guide Book company Ltd. Hong Kong pp. 44-50. 
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parts. Each part has its distinct language mutually incom-
prehensible to others. The Vtestern Bhutan is occupied by 
Drukpa people of Mongoloid race and speak language of 
Tibeto-Burman family called Dzonqkho, "language of the 
Dzona which is the official language. Eastern Bhutan is 
inhabited by "sharchopas". The region also contains semi-
nomadic people who are called Dakpas. Ihe Northern region 
is inhabited by semi-nomadic Yak traders. 
According to 1988 census, Bhutan has population of 
6,00,000 of whom Bhutanese Buddhist comprised 48%, Nepalese 
Hindus 45% and other 7.5%. The most easily identified 
group is that of Nepalese origin in southern Bhutan. Most 
of them are living in Bhutan for three to four generations, 
representing alien element in the population structure. 
During the last hundred years, the Nepalese have developed 
the south western belt of Bhutan. In 1904 there were only 
14000 Nepalese in Bhutan. By 1905 the winter grazing 
grounds began to diminish with the increase in Nepalese 
settlers which effected the Bhotia's chief source of dairy 
2 
produce and worsened the relations between the two. The 
Nepalese in Bhutan are comprised of three groups, Takuris, 
3 
Newaris and Kiralis and relate to two groups. The esta-
blislment of multiparty democracy in Nepal in 1990 have 
profound impact on Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan. The pro-
democracy movement in Bhutan in August 1990, was spearthe-
aded mostly by non-Drukpa people. 
4 
There are three aspects of the Bhutanese identity. 
The Drukpa church of Lamaism is distinct from other forms 
1. Fejer, July 23 , 1992. 
2. sinha, A.C. , Bhutan ; Ethnic Identity and National 
Dilemma, Reliance Publishing House, New Delhi, 1991,p.38. 
3. Ibid, p. 38. 
4. Ibid., p. 212. 
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of Buddhism. The Druk-Gyalpo bear separate i d e n t i t y and 
the l a s t i s Tshongdu, which a c t s as the dual sovereign 
along with King of Bhutan and i s the symbol of Bhutanese 
natural i d e n t i t y . The genesis of the present problem i s 
the r e s u l t of accumulated hatred which Nepalese immigrant 
have harbored for many years. Nepalese claim pa r i t y with 
the Drukpas who form the core of the people, since no 
p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i s permitted in Bhutan, there i s no 
ou t le t for these grievances. The present s i t ua t i on has 
reached to c r i t i c a l stage and demands of Human Rights , 
abuse have taken home. Nepalese complain tha t they have 
been t r e a t e d as a l i en and Bhutan's pol icy i s to confine 
them to southern Bhutan. The 198 5 c i t i z e n s h i p Act declared 
tha t those non-Bhutanese who have entered Bhutan after 
1958, would not have any c i t i z ensh ip r i g h t s and consequently 
30,000 Nepalese were put to s t a t e l e s s n e s s . Since the pro-
blem i s becoming complicated. The kings act ion to asser t 
Bhutanese cu l tu re led to the outflow of 60,000 refugees in 
2 
1992 and may reach to 100,000, The another p o l i t i c a l g r i e -
vance i s tha t the Southern Bhutanese e l e c t t he i r represen-
t a t i v e through ind i r ec t method while the high landers ft 
follows the d i r e c t e lec t ion procedure. The procedure i s 
manipulled by orthodox landed gentry and c lergy. The 
Nepalese a lso complain about r e s t r i c t i o n s on the i r movement 
3 
to other pa r t s of Bhutan and harrassment on checkposts. 
The t a l k s between king Jigrae singye wangchuk and 
the Nepali Prime Minister Koirala fa i led on April 9, 1993. 
The two leaders could not agree on any v i t a l poin t . The 
king suggested tha t a l l the refugees in the camps in Nepal 
are not bonafide Bhutanese c i t i z e n and could not be taken 
1. Feer, October 3 , I99i . 
2. The Holiday, Dhaka, August 7, 1992. 
3 . Asian Year Book, New Delhi , 1979, pp. 147-148. 
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back, further, many of them had committed criminal and 
terrorist offences in Bhutan. The king also issued an 
edict on 16.1.89 proclaiming the importance and need to 
promote national dress, language and driglam Namzha to 
strength Bhutans unique national identity, the dissident 
group has criticised proclamation. Presently there is no 
hope of any settlement of the problem. 
Defence 
Bhutan's 4000 strong army looks l ike a L i l i p u t 
before the m i l i t a r y s t rength of i t s two large neighbours 
China and India . So i t can hardly be expected to stand even 
a minor th rea t from e i t h e r . Armed defence, however, i s not 
the cen t ra l issue for the secur i ty of t h i s small Himalayan 
na t ion , ra ther i t i s i t s p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s with i t s 
neighbours. I t has specia l r e l a t i o n s with India and China 
and both sides take care of the l i t t l e Himalayan kingdom. 
16n 
j Indo-Bangladesh Relat ions 
Bangladesh emerged in December 1971 with moral and 
mater ia l support of India . The emergence of new country 
changed the g e o - p o l i t i c a l and geo-s t r a t eg ic condit ion of 
South Asia, with the defeat of Pakistan in 1971 war and i t s 
dismemberment, India emerged as a major power in South Asia. 
The Indian factor has s ignif icance for Bangladesh p o l i t i c s , 
but there i s no Bangladesh factor in Indian p o l i t i c s . The only 
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exception in the Indo-Bangla r e l a t i o n s i s the chakma Insur -
gency, while the ag i t a t ion agains t Bangladesh i n f i l t r a t i o n 
i n to Assam has caused immense d i f f i c u l t i e s for India and has 
s t ra ined the r e l a t i o n s to some ex ten t . The Indo-Bangladesh 
r e l a t i o n s s t a r t e d on a happy note . I n d i a ' s ro le in the l i b e r a -
t ion of Bangladesh and p a r t i c u l a r l y the m i l i t a r y ass i s tance 
earned for India the f r iendship of Bangladesh r e s u l t i n g in 
ISi) 
the signing of Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace 
between the tv/o countries in March 1972. The period from 
August 1972 to 1975 (Mujib era), represented a period of 
good relations betvjeen the two countries, Mujib enunciated 
a secular democratic and socialistic policy of nation-
building and steered clear of alliance with super powers. 
However, the inherent contradictions of Bangladesh Society 
and polity, which the Pakistan colonisation and Mujib*s 
steam-roller popularity, had only temporarily eclipsed, 
soon became visible. But, after Mujib, anti-Indianism in 
Bangladesh policies became sharp. The growth of Muslim 
'Sufism* and Hindu 'Sahajive' or folksy 'vaisnavism' had 
resulted in an efflorescence of the Bengali language and 
a dilution of religious distinctiveness between the 
Bangali-Muslims and Bangali-Hindus. As Bengali Hindus 
sought and discovered continuity in the Hindu Indian past, 
within Indian and overseas, the Bengali Muslims discovered 
continuity in the Muslim Indian past, within India and West 
Asia. The process of Hinduisation was paralleled by the 
process of Islamisation not only of the language and culture 
but, of the overall identity and social groups which had 
hitherto been nominally unseIf-consciously, Muslim or Hindu. 
The process of Islamisation beginning in mid-l9th century, 
was to continue through the early part of the 20th century, 
Bengali :^uslims started feeling alienated from their 
Hindu neighbours and began to look for some sort of politi-
cal organisation to ventilate their grievances and was 
assisted by eminent Muslim leaders and intellectuals like 
sir Syed Ahmed Mohammad, Iqbal, Sir Aga Khan and others. The 
past performance; the partition of Bengal in 1905, the Morley-
Minto Reforms of 1909 which provided for separate electo-
rate for the Muslims, and some other acts, of ommissions 
1. Ali, S.M. , After the Dark N^ ight, Delhi Thomson Press 
1973, Josph T,0. Council Dilemmas of Secularism in 
Bangladesh Journal of Asian and African Connel Studies 
(Leiden), vol. II, No. 1-2, pp. 64-81 and Times of India, 
New Delhi, November 2, Dejcember 21, 197 4. 
w 
and commissions were all responsible for this shift. In 
1906 Muslim league was founded in Dhaka. In avowed policy 
was to establish a political association for the protection 
and advancement of the political rights and interests of 
Muslims of India "and to respectfully present their needs 
and aspirations to the Government", The League supported 
the partition of Bengal. It was resolved in Dhaka Conference 
that in view of the interests of the Musalmans of Eastern 
Bengal, the partition is sure to prove beneficial to the 
Mohammadan community which constitutes the vast majority 
3 
of that province. 
Besides, Hindu-Muslim dichotomy in pre-partition 
Bengal, Bengali Muslims were opposed to Bengali Hindus but, 
their interests did not converage with the Muslims from other 
parts of India, The movement of Pakistan in this region was 
spear-headed by the Muslims of Calcutta. Though most of the 
Msulims supported creation of Pakistan, but, failed to reco-
gnize that once East Pakistan was created it would be the 
Biharis, or the Urdu-speaking Muslims migrants from Calcutta, 
Bihar and West Pakistan who would dominate the conomy and 
4 
politics of the province, 
(CX) India's Role in Bangladesh Movement 
The military intervention of India, sharpened the 
contradictions in Bangladeshi politics to the detriment of 
political stability in Bangladesh, Indlas interest in 
Bangladesh was politico-strategic. India and Pakistan had 
1. Bhattacharya, Jnanbrals, Aspects of cultural Policy in 
Bangladesh, Economic And Political Weekly, Bombay, 
March 26v l9S3, p. 5UU, see also Abu jafar Shamsuddln, 
sociology of Bengal Politics and Other Essays, Dhaka, 
Bangla Academy, 1973, pp, 83-98, 
2. Quoted by Chakrabarti, S.K., The Evolution of Politics 
in Bangladesh, 1947-1978, N'ew Delhi, Associated Publl-
shing House, 1978, p. 8. 
3. Quoted in Cooperation and Conflict in south Asia Publi-
cation, New Delhi, p. 6U, 
4. See Kenneth Mc Pherson, The Muslims of Calcutta, 1918 to 
1935. Ph.D. Dissertation, Australian National University, ' 
Canberro April 1972, and .^ mal endu De, Islam in Modern 
India, Calcutta, Maya Prakashan, 1982, pp, 214-27, 
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fought three wars in 1947, 1965, and 1971. The presence of 
10 mil l ion East Pakistan refugees on i t s s o i l and e s t a b l i s h -
ment of an ex i le Bangladesh government in Calcutta provided 
necessary base for Indian in te rven t ion . Indian Parliament 
on 31 March 1971 declared "throughout the length and breath 
of our land, our people have condemned in unmistakable terms, 
the a t r o c i t i e s now being perpet ra ted on an unprecedented 
scale upon an warmed and innocent people. This house records 
i t s profound convict ion that the h i s t o r i c upsurge of the 75 
mi l l ion people of East Bengal wi l l truimph. The house wishes 
to assure them tha t the i r s t ruggle and s e c r i f i c e s w i l l r ece -
ive tne whole-hearted sympathy and support of the people of 
Ind ia . India whole hear ted ly helped Bangladesh in her 
s t ruggle for freedom. 
The m i l i t a r y creckdown of 25th March 1971 worked as 
a c a t a l y s t to bring a l l shades of p o l i t i c a l opinion in 
favour of independence except a few pro-Chinese communist 
groups. The pro-sovie t communist par ty of Bangladesh (Mani-
fact ion) and the National Aw.ami Par ty (Muzaffar fact ion) 
the l e f t forces accepted I n d i a ' s ro l e a l b e i t , with r e l u c -
2 tance or for sheer t a c t i c a l reasons . 
Foreign pol icy of Mujib was according to I n d i a ' s 
choice. Bangladesh accepted to keep the region free from super 
power entanglements. I t gave India a p o l i t i c a l r e l i e f . The 
major challenges which I n d i a ' s foreign pol icy now faces i s 
fran the ex t r a - r eg iona l l inkages of i t s neighbours. The impor-
tance tha t Pakis tan pays to the US or to Is lamic world, Nepal 
to China, or s r i Lanka to the United States or the ASEAN are 
s imi la r . Bangladesh declared tha t shel l not enter i n to or 
p a r t i c i p a t e in any m i l i t a r y a l l i ance d i rec ted aga ins t the 
other par ty and thus forclosed i t s option to r e g i s t e r e x t r a -
1. Quoted in Government of the People ' s Republic of 
Bangladesh, Why Bangladesh, Dhaka, pp. 47-48. 
2. L i f schu l t z , Lawrence, Bangladesh The Unfinished Revolu-
t ion , London, Zed P re s s , 1979, pp. 15-36. 
regional support to counter balance I n d i a ' s supe r io r i t y . 
The f i r s t mi l i t a ry coup of August 1975 led t o 
p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y and resu l ted in establishment of a 
m i l i t a r y d i c t a t o r s h i p in Bangladesh. Army brough Khondaker 
Mushtaque Ahmed to pov^er, one of the Cabinet Colleagues of 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. On November 3 , 1975 the eleven week 
old regime headed by Khonaker Mushtaque Ahmad was over 
thrown by the army under the leadership of Khaled Musharraf 
and Zia-ur Rahman v;ho vere freed from house a r r e s t by Taher ' s 
2 " 
forces was r e i n s t a t e d as chief of the Army Staff. 
After assass ina t ion of Mujib in August 1975, an era 
in Bangladesh p o l i t i c s ended. The secular tenor of Mujib 
pol icy was replaced with Bangladeshi nationalism tased on 
Islamic s o l i d a r i t y . On 23 April 1977 Ziaur Rahman amended 
the c o n s t i t u t i o n of 1972 and dropped secularism from the 
Cons t i tu t ion . I t was la id doiAm in new cons t i tu t ion tha t 
the s t a t e sha l l endeavour to conso l ida te , preserve and 
strengthen f r a t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s amona Muslim countr ies based 3 
on Islamic s o l i d a r i l y . 
Bangladesh r e l a t i o n s with India were not cooperative 
during Ziaur Rahmans period. Anti-Indian compaign had s t a r t e d 
during Mujibur Rehman's time. The ^^vernment and Awami 
League Par ty did not refute an t i - Ind ian charge. The s i l ence 
of Government of Bangladesh was i n t e rp re t ed in Indian c i r c l e s 
as an attempt to diver the h o s t i l i t y of the people from 
4 
the Government of Bangladesh to the Government of Ind ia . 
1. The Indian Express, New Delhi , August 15-17, 1975. 
2. Jahan, Rounaq, Bangladesh P o l i t i c s : Problems and I s s u e s , 
Dhaka, 1980, p. l98- l99. 
3 . Nair , M. Bhaskaran, I n d i a ' s Image in Bangladesh' , Janta 
vo l . XXX, No. 3 , February 16, 1975, p. 8. 
4. see Jayedeva Uyangoda, Indo-Bangladesh Relations in the 
1970's Bangladeshi Ferspectix-es, South Asian St ra tegic 
I s s u e s , p . 78. 
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Mohd. Taha blamed India and said,, 'The Indian expansionis ts 
with the ac t ive support and mart ial he lp from the Soviet 
Union, launched aggression agains t our country and have 
occupied i t . Today, East Bengal, renamed as Bangladesh, 
has become a protec tora te of I n d i a ' , After the a s s a s s i -
nat ion of Ziaur-Rahman the government was replaced by a 
mi l i t a ry coup led by Lt . General H.M. Ershad,Soon a f t e r 
Ershad proposed the se t t ing of Zakat fund and declared to 
base c u l t u r a l l i fe on Islamic p r i n c i p l e s . 
The coramunalisation of p o l i t i c s , in Bangladesh 
a l l the more affected r e l a t i o n s with I n d i a . In the a f t e r -
math of Mujib*s a s sas s ina t ion , India feared t h a t since the 
forces v^ich had toppled, Mujib rode the horse of a n t i -
Indianism the phenomenon \irou.ld now be even more e x p l i c i t . 
I t was feared tha t the de t e r io r a t i on of communal r e l a t i o n s 
in Bangladesh might lead to a r e p e t i t i o n of the large scale 
exodus of Bengali Hindus in to India as had occurred e a r l i e r 
2 
with the communal r i o t s in East Pak is tan . According to 
In t e l l i gence Bureau report t±ie number of Bangladeshis in 
3 
t h i s country i s about one c ro re . India announced to build 
the barbed wire fencing to check a l leged i n f i l t r a t i o n of 
4 Bangladesh na t iona l s . 
There \vere evidences of Bangladeshi involvement 
in supplying arms t r a in ing to revel o u t f i t s of nor th-eas t 
India a t Moulavi Bazar Camp in Sylhat d i s t r i c t . 
1. Mukherji, Di l ip , Uncer ta in t ies in Bangladesh : Problems 
of Identity';The-Tlmex of I n d i a . September 20, 1975. 
2. Ghosh, Far tha , Ethnic and Religions Confl ic ts in South 
Asia, Confl ict Studies , I^ondon No. 178, 1985, pp. 5-6.. 
3.The Indian Express, New Delhi , October 1, 1992. 
4.The f^ising Nepal, Nepal, April 13, 1985. 
5. The Statesman, New Delhi, Ju ly 16, 1990. 
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(ir) Mew f-toore Is land South Talpat ty Controversy : 
The controversy over the new Moore I s land 
generated heat betv;een the r e l a t ions of the two coun t r i e s . 
The cont inen ta l shelf in the Bay of Bengal extends t o a 
s ign i f i can t ex ten t . I t reaches near Sri Lanka and the 
Andaman and Micobar I s l a n d s . Bangladesh and India have no 
agreement on the de l imi ta t ion of maritime zones such as 
t e r r i t o r i a l sea, the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the 
2 
cont inenta l shelf . The United ?Jations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea 1982 (LOS Convention) has ra i sed new 
quest ions on the cont inenta l shelf. v i th in 200 naut ica l 
mile (n.m.) sea zone measured from the base l ines from which 
the breadth of the t e r r i t o r i a l sea i s measured. The con t i -
nental shelf in the 200 n.m. sea zone i s subsumed in the 
regime of the EEZ. In the case of cont inenta l margin 
extends beyond 200 n.m. the cos ta l s t a t e i s not free to 
extend the seabed j u r i s d i c t i o n . The con t inen ta l shelf in 
1. The Is land dispute i s about 24x12 KM and s i t ua t ed in the 
mouth of River Harya Ehana. The Harya Ehana River flowing 
through the Sunderbans forTiS the border between India and 
Bangladesh, since Fur basha i s s i tua ted a t the mouth of 
r i v e r , deternuning the o\^mership of the I s land has become 
d i f f i c u l t . See also Khyber Mail (Pakistan) Ju ly 24, 1985. 
2 . The de l imi ta t ion maritime zones c rea tes Confl ict between 
Bangladesh and India . Disagreement arose mainly with 
India when the Bangladesh government in 1974 signed 
con t rac t s to share production with s ix o i l companies. 
See The Bangladesh Obser^^^r, Dacca, May 9, 1977, VSiite 
Paper on the South Talpa t ty by the 'Min i s t ry of Foreign 
Affa i r s , Govern:nent of the peoples Republic of Bangladesh 
(Dhaka); 26 May 1981. 
3. UN Documents, A/CQNF. 62/l22 of October 7, 1982. 
4. See Ar t i c le 7 6 LOS Convention. 
5. In t h i s case a r t i c l e 76 para 4-8 of the LOS Convention 
i s a t t r a c t e d , para 4(a) speaks for the purpose of t h i s 
Conventions the cos ta l s t a t e shal l e s t a b l i s h the outer 
edge of the cont inenta l margin wherever the margin 
extends beyond eOO n.m. from the base l i n e s from which 
the breadth of the t e r r i t o r i a l sea i s measured by e i t h e r . 
the Bay of Bengal i s qui te extensive and needs de l imi ta t ion . 
I t s sediments a t 16.5 KM are as th ick as any in world. •'" 
The Bay of Bengal has an area of 879,375 sqr . miles and a 
depth of 2586 metres. 
The cont inenta l slopes terminates at less than 
3 000 metres depth. To the West of Bay are Indian s t a t e 
of west Bengal and Or issa , on southern pa r t i s Sri Lanka 
and on e a s t i s Burma, Andman and >7icobar I s l a n d s . These 
i s l ands are the submerged pa r t s of the ou te r fold ranges 
2 
of the Arakan yoma of Burma. The Ganges-Brahmputra Delta 
of the Bengal i s located a t the combined months of Bangla-
desh and Ind ia . Bangladesh has passed the T e r r i t o r i a l 
waters and maritime Zones Act (Mo. XXVI) of 1974 and covers 
the geological shelf and the slope and r i s e s . Bangladesh i s 
in problem as to the de l imi ta t ion of sea zones with her 
neighbours. I s lands are coming up in the Bay of Bengal. 
There i s on agreed sea boundary between Bangladesh and Ind ia , 
problems are a r i s ing on the ownership of Mew born i s lands 
in the maritime zones. 
India has i t s own enactment, and has passed the 
t e r r i t o r i a l waters cont inenta l shelf ^xeclusive Economic 
Zone and other Maritime Zones Act 1976 (Mo. 80 of 1976) 
which speaks. 
1. Francis P. Shepard, Sub-marine Geology, 1973, Third 
e d i t i o n , New York, Harper and Row, ppl 334-418. 
2. Monkhouse, F . J . , P r inc ip l e s of Physical Geography, 1972, 
London Universi ty P re s s , p . 342. 
3. Rahman, M. Habibur, Bangladesh and Ind i a , t h e i r 
approaches to the Law of the Sea and the i ssues of 
conf l i c t involved in the de l imi ta t ions of Sea zones 
between the (Part A) XII (1984). The Rajesthan 
Universi ty Studies , p . l07, 108. 
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"The continental shelf of India comprises the sea 
bed and subsoi l of the submarine areas tha t extend beyond 
the l imi t of i t s t e r r i t o r i a l waters throughout the natural 
prolongation of i t s land t e r r i t o r y to the outer edge of the 
con t inen ta l margin or to a distance of two hundred naut ical 
miles from the fcase l i n e " . In the case of ownership of the 
'new born' I s l ands in the sea zone beyond the t e r r i t o r i a l 
sea there i s l i t t l e chance of Bangladesh to e x i s t by way 
of occupation. Due to the e x i s t i n g pos i t ion of Andaman 
and Nicobar i s l a n d s , India i s in a favourable pos i t ion 
in respect o£ New T'lbore i s l and . The issue was discussed 
when Narsimha Rao v i s i t ed Decca in August 1980, Bangladesh 
re jec ted I n d i a ' s claim over the newly emerged i s l and . In 
a wr i t ten statement in Rajya Sabha the Indian External 
Affairs Minister maintained tha t the newly emerged is land 
was s i t ua t ed within Indian t e r r i t o r i a l waters on the bas is 
of jMedian Line P r inc ip l e s . Charts produced by U.S. Navy 
also confirmed tha t the New >toore I s land claimed by 
2 Bangladesh l i e s well within t e r r i t o r i a l waters of India . 
On May 28, l98 l , Bangladesh Parliament resolved to ask 
India to vacate the i s l and . But, Indian External Affairs 3 Ministry r e i t e r a t e d that I s land always belonged to India . 
The I s l and controversy i s s t i l l unresolved and causing 
tension between the two coun t r i e s . 
(^C) The Chakma Problem 
There are many thorny i s sues between India and 
Bangladesh. The Chakma issue need immediate a t t e n t i o n . In 
November 1986, Bangladesh Pres ident H.M. Ershad himself 
1. The Statesman, New Delhi, December 21 , 1980. 
2. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi , May 30, 1981. 
3 . The Statesman, New Delhi , ?'ay 30, 1981. 
admitted to the then Minister that the situation in the 
Chittagong Hill Tracts is not suitable for the return of 
refugees. Subsequently, when repatriation was to take 
place on January 15, 1987, violent out brust and the trans-
fer was stopped surprisingly Bangladesh accused India for 
2 
p reven t i ng r e p a t r i a t i o n . Kether land-based Ch i t t agong H i l l 
T r a c t s ccnunittee was organised t o look a f t e r t h e r e p a t r i a -
t i o n . The committee appealed to bo th the Governments not 
t o r e p a t r i a t e r e f u g e e s , t i l l normalcy was r e s t o r e d . The 
i n f l u x of r e fugees on I n d i a n s o i l has c r e a t e d many problems 
before I n d i a . Bangladeshi has r a i s e d many q u e s t i o n s about 
t h e n a t i o n a l i t y of t he r e fugees and has o f f e r e d t o take 
back only the genuine "Bangladesh i s" . I n d i a has dec la red 
namber of r e fugees approximate ly 27,000 and 3 2 , 0 0 0 . Bangla 
Desh m a i n t a i n s the f i g u r e as 24 ,000. L a t e r on , I n d i a r a i s e s 
the f i g u r e s t o 49 ,000, but Bangladesh p u t s i t a t 26042."^ 
The number now i s e s t i m a t e d to 50,000 and Bangladesh c la ims 
them about 3 0,000. The Chakma problem i s g e t t i n g more 
tough day by day. I n d i a has accused Bangladesh for he lp ing 
T r i p u r a Na t iona l Volun tee r s and I n d i a has been blamed 
1. The Hindustan Times, New D e l h i , November 12 , 1986. 
2 . The Hindustan Times. New D e l h i , J anuary 2 9 , 1987. 
3 . P u b l i c Opinion Trends 20 and 30 January 1987, 
The Te leg raph , January 3]. , 1987. 
4. The Ind i an E x p r e s s , New D e l h i , February 1, 1987. 
5. The Te leg raph , December 17, 1987, 
6. The Hindustan Times, New D e l h i , November 2 1 , 1986 
and The Bangladesh Times, March 26 , 1987. 
7. The Ind ian E x p r e s s , New D e l h i , Apr i l 3 , 1987. 
8 . The Sta tesman, New D e l h i , September, 1981. 
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by Bangladesh for sheltering shanti 3ahini (The military 
organisation of Cha}<inas). The refugees have denied to 
return till normalcy is maintained in Chittagong Hill 
Tracts. Zaker Party of the peer of Atroshi was pseudo-
named Maulana Dhiren Bagchi and slogans were casted. La 
ilaha ill lallah Dhaner shishe Bisraillah" (Read the 
Kalimah and vote in favour of paddy leaf in the name of 
Allah), The people relaye Anno Bastra, Basosthan-Islam 
Dehe 3ama dhan". (Islam will solve problems of food, 
clothing and shelter) so much so that demonstrators often 
chanted slogans for declaring Bangladesh on Islamic 
Republic and forming a confederation with Pakistan. The 
rise of religion-based politics has proved counter produc-
tive. History is replets with instance of rise in religions 
frenzy leading to communal tensions . Moreover the rela-
tions between India and Bangladesh have become more tense 
due to the Islamic fundamentalism. 
((X) India and Bangladesh After Indira Gandhi 
With the assassination of Indira Gandhi the Indian 
nation faced a threat, both internally and externally. 
Rajiv Gandhi took over reign of the country at a crucial 
time. The functioning of Gandhi was different from his 
predecessor Indira Gandhi revealed that there was a 
notable difference between the style of functioning of 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi and Mr. Rajiv Gandhi with its neigh-
2 
bouring country particularly with Bangladesh. After 
assuming power, in order to improve the relations not 
only with the nearest neighbours, but also with the 
1. Recent press reports have it that in rural areas of 
southern districts the Hindu minority canmunity are 
being harrassed. statement of CPB leader Saifuddin 
Manlk, August, 30, l991. 
2. The Tribune, Karachi, May 26, 1985. 
count r ies of other con t inen ts , Rajiv Gandhi es tab l i shed 
rapport with the Governments of the neighbouring coun t r i e s . 
In 1985, Rajiv Gandhi v i s i t e d Decca and assured fu l l 
support to flood affected people. The inf lux of refugees 
from Bangladesh i s a problem which has been causing s t r a in 
on the r e l a t i o n s of the two coun t r i e s . India and Bangladesh 
have conf l i c t over the e rec t ion of barked wire fence by 
India along the 3 400 kilometers long border between the 
two ^countr ies . Bangladesh opposed the project Fencing 
around Bangladesh on account of boundary d i spu te . 
( £ ) Religion and Ethnici ty in Bangladesh P o l i t i c s 
Bangladesh emerged as a secular p o l i t y with a 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l embargo on r e l i g ion in p o l i t i c s . The f i r s t 
c o n s t i t u t i o n (l972) abolished a l l kinds of comraunalism, 
p o l i t i c a l recogni t ion of r e l ig ion by s t a t e , exp lo i ta t ion 
of r e l i g i o n for p o l i t i c a l purposes and discr iminat ion on 
2 
r e l i g ions grounds. But, soon a f t e r the change of p o l i t i c a l 3 
scenario Islam made a come back in Bangladesh p o l i t i c s . 
Islamic resurgence i s a cornmon phenomenon to the Muslim 
world spreading from Morocco to Malaysia. Banaladesh has 
b a s i c a l l y r e l i e d on Islam. The secularism la id in the 1972 
4 
c o n s t i t u t i o n but , ne i ther the s ix point programme nor the 
1. Morning News, '3rch 31, 1985, and a lso Assam Tribune 
iGoHali) April 1, 198 5. 
2. Ar t i c l e l2 of the Const i tut ion passed on November 4, 1972, 
3. Syed?An\^ar Hussain, Islamic Fundamentalism in Bangladesh; 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l Variables and External Imputs in Rafiuddin 
Ahmad (ed) Religion Nationalism and P o l i t i c s ^n 
Bangladesh, New Delhi, South Asian Pub l i she r s , 1990. 
4. The Six point formula was presented at the subjects 
committee meeting of the convention of opposi t ion p a r t i e s 
held in Lahore in February 1966 by sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
on bel ief of the East Pakistan Awami League. This formula 
e s s e n t i a l l y sought for complete f i s c a l and p o l i t i c a l 
antonomy of East Pakis tan . He le f t the convention when 
C o n t d . . . . 
m 
eleven point progranune, a synthesis of which as considered 
to be the Magna carta of Bangladesh, had any owing on 
Secularism and even the proclamation of the Government 
dated 10 April 1971 endorced secularism^ in following 
words -
"Secularism does not mean absence of religion. 
The 75 million people of Bangladesh will have 
right to religion by law. We have no intention 
of that kind,,,, Muslims will observe their 
religion and nobody in this state has the 
power to prevent that, Hindus will observe 
their religion and nobody has the power to 
prevent that. Buddhists and Christians will 
observe their respective religions and nobody 
can prevent that our only objective is that 
nobody will be allowed to use religion as a 
political weapon".2 
The secularism and a ban on religion-based politics 
brought universal results and driven into permanent oppo-
sition to the Awami League and the Government. The Islamic 
elite linked it with Indian pressure and Indo-soviet 
3 
guardianship. 
Soon after, Mujib's role as a Statesman underwent 
changes and began to use religious symbols and sentiments 
•with political purposes. Islam became politically impor-
tant because the legitimation attempts of the nationalist 
c o n t d , . . 
the organisers of the convention refused to d i scuss on 
the formula. See Purvadesh, Dhaka Vteekly 13 February 
1966. For the d e t a i l s of formula see sheikh Mujibur 
Ralman Amader Banchar Davee-6 Dafa Karmasuchi (Bengali) 
published by Tajuddin Ahmad for East Pakis tan Anami League, 
Dhaka, 4 c h a i t r a 1372; a l so sheikh Mujibur Rahman, s ix 
po in t Formula OOr r i g h t to Live , Dhaka, March 2 3 , 1966. 
1. See Bangladesh Documents, New Delhi , 1971, pp. 281-82. 
2. See h i s speech in the cons t i t uen t Assembly, November 4, 
1982, Bangladesh Observer, November 5, 1972. 
3 . For d e t a i l s See Syd. Anwar Hussain, Foreign po l i cy of 
Bangladesh 1972-1975, Dependency Rela t ions CllO, Depart-
ment of His tory , Jahangir Nagar Univers i ty , vol .v^ 1986. 
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elites failed. The Mushtag regime used Islam for his 
political game and started his morning in mercy of Almighty 
Allah. The process of using Islam for leadership purposes 
was given coherent speed by Zia and Ershad. The principle 
of secularism was replaced by the words. Absolute trust 
and faith in the Almighty Allah shall be the basis of all 
2 
actions. Between 1982 and 1990 Ershad, made systematic 
efforts to continue the policy of rehabilitating anti-
liberation forces and of parallel Islamisation culminating 
in the 8 4 Amendment to the Constitution declaring Islam 
as a state religion. Ershad used 'Islam* more than Zia ur 
Rahman. Zia was a freedom fighter, well known for his 
honesty and integrity. Ershad on the other hand did not 
have such linkage and image. 
In the elections of 1991, religion was used at large. 
Even a Hindu candidate Dhiren Bagchi from Bangladesh vio-
lated the agreement between the two countries and started 
construction a high and well equipped embarkment along 
the Mahurl opposite Belonis. The Indian delegation objected 
to It."" The editorial in Bangladesh Times commented that 
••There is an element of positivism in the way 
Indid is viewing its relations with its neigh-
bour including Bangladesh. How far this attitude 
will be translated into action, is a matter that 
time will tell. Indias foreign secretary, Bhan-
darl said that India's intentions (for building 
closer ties) were honest", India wants coopera-
tive relations with neighbours"«4 
1. Cited in Ahmad Shafiqul Haque and Muhammad Yeekia 
Akhtar, "The Ubiquity of Islam. Religion and Society 
in Bangladesh", Pacific Affairs, vol. 60, No. 2, 1987, 
p. 205. 
2. Article 8(1A) z Article 12 declaring secularism was 
omitted. The Proclamation (Amendment) order No.l, 1977. 
3. The Financial Express, April 5, 1985. 
4. The Bangladesh Times, Dacca, April 18, 198 5, 
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Indo-Bangladesh talks on Ganges water ended without 
reaching any agreement. The delegation failed to resolve 
the problem of augmenting the Ganges flow during the dry 
season. The Ganges water dispute was a critical problem, 
some experts suggested that a permanent body of cobasin 
states ought to be set up for sharing and using trans-
national waters. There were little misunderstanding bet-
ween the two countries, Bangladesh was of the view that 
India has always been consistant in its stand, despite the 
Indo-Bangladesh Treaty of Friendship cooperation and Peace 
which goes on. 
The High contracting parties further agree to make 
joint studies and take joint action in the fields of flood 
control, river basin development and the development of 
hydro-electric power and Irrigation, than agreed to the 
concept of augmentation (India Mujib Joint Declaration of 
May 16, 197 4) then signed the Farakka Agreement of 1977 
which formally introduced the shielda, Indian scheme of 
Ganges-Brahmanputra link canal and linked the sharing of 
Ganga water to the augmentation of its flow - than revali-
dated the 1977 Farakka Agreement though 1982 Memorandum 
of understanding than belatedly sharing from augmentation 
2 
and now thinking of new approach. 
Rajiv and Irshad reached an accord on Ganga waters 
3 
similar to the earlier one , and said that the two coun-
tries have agreed that Irrigation ministers will meet 
4 
during the next few days to set up terms. The agreement 
was applauded and was said but the Rajiv Ershad understan-
ding breaks a new ground. The new agreement prescribed 
1. The Rising Nepal, Nepal, August 5, 1985, 
2. Holiday, August 16, 1985, 
3. Holiday, August 16, 1983, 
4. National Herald, New Delhi, October 19, 198 5. 
5. Bangladesh Times, Dacca, October 20, 1985, 
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t ha t the Ganga waters wi l l be shared for a period of three 
years beginning the dry season of 1986 on the same bas i s 
as la id dovm in the November 1982, Bangladesh w i l l get 
35,000 cusec of water during the dry season and India 
scHTiewhat l e s s than 40,000 cusec. 
( f ) - fence 
There are five army infantry divisional head-
quarters, with infantry brigades, two armoured, 6 artillery 
regiments and 6 engineer battallions with total strength 
of 90,000, with an additional 55,000 para military volun-
teers, including an armed police reserve and the Bangladesh 
refiles. Equipment includes 3 0 soviet T-54 and 2 0 Chinese 
Type 59 Tanks. 
Naval bases are at Chlttagong, Keptal Khulna and 
Dacca. The fleet comprises 3 former British frigates, 8 
Chinese built 3 90 tonnes fast attack craft, 4 Chinese built 
fast torpedo boats, 2 ex Yugoslav 200 ton. patrol craft 1 
British Built 140 ton. Patrol craft, 5 Indigenously built 
70 ton river gun boats, 12 auxiliaries and traing ship of 
710 tones. The man power of Navy is 600 officers and 
6900 ratings. 
Air force 
Del iver ies from the Soviet Union and China succe-
s s fu l ly have b u i l t up s t rength of 20 MIG 19, IAN-2 4 and 
3 AN-26, 20 Mi-8 b e l l , 212 B e l l , 206 L and Aious l le 111 H. 
he l icopter 10, Chinese CJ-6' primary t r a i n t e r s , 6 Magister 
armed j e t and some l i g h t a i r c r a f t . Personal s t r eng th in 
1, The Indian. Express,- New Delh i , November 25 , 1985. 
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Air force i s 4000. The strength i s sufficient to look 
after internal safety. Bangladesh i s secured on a l l four 
corners by a powerful neighbour India, v^ich acts as a 
buffer s t a t e . There i s neither any external danger to i t s 
security nor Bangladesh can create any problem to his 
neighbour. 
19s. 
C C 3 ^ndia-Maldlves Relat ions 
rn'^The P o l i t i c a l Phenomenon 
Nasir was e lec ted the f i r s t Pres ident in the walca of 
i t s independence and ruled for 21 y e a r s . In March 1975 
pres ident Nasir dismissed the Prime Min is te r , Ahmed zagin 
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and the postcof Prime Minister was abol i shed. To succeed 
Nasir who did not stand for r e e l e c t i o n , the l e g i s l a t u r e 
chose Manrooor Abdul Gayoora the then Minis ter of Transport 
who was approved by referendum in Ju ly 1978. Pres iden t 
Gayoora who took office in November announced t h a t the main 
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p r i o r i t y would be the development of the poor r u r a l r eg ions , 
while in foreign a f f a i r s the e x i s t i n g pol icy of non-
alignment would be continued. In September 19 83 and 19 88, 
Pres ident Gayoom was r e - e l ec t ed for f ive year terms. By 
a referendum with 96.37% of the vo te s . 
(b") Maldives Strategy 
The republ ic of Maldives ranks among the worlds 
25 l e a s t developed count r ies but , has an importance in the 
power, game, much grea ter than might be expected while 
most of the peoples in the world would havennot heard i t , 
but , s i g n i f i c a n t l y the s t a t e has i t s deplomatic r e l a t i o n s 
with more than 75 count r ies in the world. 
For the once ignored repub l ic of Maldives, has one 
key bargaining point in the world powergarae - i t s s t r a -
t e g i c locat ion in the centre of Indian ocean and the value 
of the s trong point has grown tremendously as the impor-
tance of the Indian Ocean has increased e s p e c i a l l y now, 
with the need to keep the o i l rou tes f r e e . The value of 
the Maldives s t r a t e g i c pos i t i on , has a l so been enhanced by 
the exis tence of the former B r i t i s h Royal Air Force Base 
and Air F ie ld on Gan, The Gan base was e s t ab l i shed by 
the Br i t i sh during world war I I and i t was, r e - a c t i v a t e d 
in 1957 as a s tag ing most between the East and the West. 
The piece of r e a l e s t a t e a l so happens t o be n a a r e s t land 
to the Anglo-American Mi l i t a ry i n s t a l l a t i o n in Diego-
Garcia in the Changes Archipelago south of the Maldives. 
Today, the Br i t i sh staging port en can i s an unoccupied 
m i l i t a r y base l i k e a ghost town. The Maldives however. 
1 . V.S. Uryan Narayan - south and South S^st Asia in the 
1990*s Konark Publ ishers A 149-Main vikas Marg, Delhi , 
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realise it is useful as a back droup for all their dealings 
with foreign powers. Foreign diplomats concerned with 
Maldives readily admit the vacant base is the important 
but, unusually, unmentioned presence behind any relations 
with Maldives, who desperately, recognize this diplomatic 
reality and have learned to play skilfully with this chip. 
Being a small and poor country, that is dependent for its. 
Survival on a peaceful Indian ocean and increasingly 
dependent on foreign exchange for its modernisation pro-
jects, has cultivated its friendship with as many and as 
politically varied countries as it can. 
Among the nations, with which Male has diplomatic 
relations are soviet union. United states, Britain, Cuba, 
China, Japan, India, Sri Lanka, Libya, south Korea, 
Pakistan, France, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, Kuwait, 
Austria, united Arab Emirate, Vanualu, Morrocco, Labanon, 
Fizi, sierro, Leone, and Colombo, It is evident that the 
diplomatic terms have been extended without any considera-
tion of size, power and financial capacity, within a year 
19 88, Maldives entered with 6 countries in various agree-
ments, India and Maldaves too, signed a cultural agreement 
aimed at developing closer bilateral cooperation between 
the two countries in the field of art, culture, archeology, 
education, social welfare, public health, mass media and 
sports, India maintained her relations with Maldives on 
the basis of equality and respect for each others territo-
rial integrity. 
Despite all its cooperation and assistance, there 
was mild ripple in New Delhi when Gayoom reported on 
questioning of the status of Indlas small mlnlcoy island 
in an Independence day speech in July 19 82. President 
said, "when I look at such prerequisites in my personal 
1, The Tribune, Chandigarh, Septeuber 19, 19 83, 
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capacity, I have to tell you the atoll • Is a part 
of the Maldives , but he asserted that he had not lodged 
any claim with India. Maldives wanted India to help to set 
up a defence academy and also increased its quota for train-
2 
ing of the military officers in Indian military academies. 
Gayoom praised India for its timely help and said : "I 
don't think India has any hegemonistic ambitions or 
designs in the region". 
Maldives entered into various agreements with 
other countries. Dhaka signed an agreement on waiver of 
visas and accord on cooperatiai in the fields of educa-
tion, culture, sports. Chief Martial Law Administration 
made a visit to Maldives on July 26-29, 1983 and hinted 
at possibility for the further development of the exis-
ting friendly and brotherly relations between the two 
countries. 
As regards Maldives and Sri Lanka relaticn 
President Gayoom said we have a specified relationship 
with sri Lanka which is our closest neighbour and also 
on gateway to the world. It is in the interest of Maldives 
to have very close links with sri Lanka. Gayocxn further 
declared that we have also found ways further consoli-
dating our traditional relations In this field of culture 
4 
trade and so c«. Lankan Dy. Minister of Foreign Affairs 
!• The SUN, sri Lanka, dated 13.11.1982. 
2. The National Herald, Delhi, September 19, 19 89. 
3. The Bangladesh Times, Dhaka, July 31, 19 83. 
4. The Ceylone, Colombo, August 11, 19 80. 
Tyronne Fernando signed 2 agreements with the Maldives aie 
was the e x t r a d i t i o n Agreement which w i l l provide the lega l 
frame work for mutual Maldives and Pakistan signed c u l t u r a l 
exchange programme in 19 89. This i s the f i r s t time Sri 
Lanka entered i n t o such as agreement outside the common-
weal th . The other agreement was about cooperation between 
the two countr ies in the f i e l d of educat ion, sc ience , 
2 
c u l t u r a l a f f a i r s , spor ts and youth a f f a i r s . 
( C) Non Alignment 
The determination of the Maldives to p ro tec t i t s n a i -
al igned s t a t u s without caring into big power pressure for 
l e t t i n g port ion of the ocean r epub l i c to be used for m i l i -
t a ry purposes should solve to boost the morale of a l l 
na t ions tha t wish t o see the Indian ocean turned i n t o a zone 
of peace. After the winding up of the Eiritish M i l i t a r y out-
f i t in 1976 i t has been a period of var ious proposals coming 
in for a lease of t h i s or tha t par t of the s t r a t e g i c i s l and 
which the Maldives government r e s o l u t e l y turned down on each 
occasiion and then prevented p r o l i f e r a t i o n of the Diego 
Garcia phenomenon. Pres ident Gayoom seems t o be determined 
t o s t ee r c lea r of a l l probable fore ign at tempts to spread 
3 
t e n t a c l e s over his t e r r i t o r i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n . The Foreign 
Minis ter dismissed an specula t ive the r e p o r t s t h a t the 
US was making over tures t o Maldives to e s t a b l i s h a 
base in can. The Minister added "we are determined 
not to allow any caie t o s e t t l e 
1. The Dawn, Karachi, Ju ly 20, 19 89. 
2 . Ceylone Daily News, Colombo, September 3, 19 81 . 
3 . The Amrit Bazar Pa t r i ka , Calcut ta , November 10, 19 82. 
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any where in our t e r r i t o r y with m i l i t a r y or s t r a t e g i c 
i n t e n t i o n s . The i s l ands are s t r i n g out in the s e r i e s of 
the cora l a t t o l s between Sri Lanka and equa tor , aff irming 
an exce l l en t locat ion for watching t r a f f i c on i n t e r n a t i o n a l 
sea laves between West and East^ VJhich i s even more s i g n i -
f i c a n t manifest i n Gayooms foreign pol icy , and in tends 
t o define the coun t r i e s non-alignment s t a t u s in terms of 
pragmatic r e l a t i o n s with a number of na t ions who might be 
wi l l ing and able to render development ass i s t ance t o Male-
without s t r i n g s . I t s decis ion to jo in the commonwealth has 
thus been prompted by des i re to breakout of the entrangement 
viiich Br i t a in has forced upon Maldives ever since the former 
3 qu i t the Gan i s l and . 
Maldives i s l and has f u l l f a i t h in the disarmament and 
for securing the s t a t u s of zone of peace for the Indian ocean 
and thus t o enable upon an inv igora t ing programme of soc io-
economic development. India has been con t ln ious ly denouncing 
the m i l i t a r i s a t i o n of the Indian ocean and the at tempts t o 
i t e n s i f y arms. In the f i r s t session of Maj i l i s (Parliament 
in 1983, Gayoora said t h a t 'The Indian ocean should become 
a zone of peace for neuclear weapons^military t ens ions and 
m i l i t a r y bases . He fu r the r added tha t the government of 
Maldives wil l s t r i c t l y abide by the non-alignment course . 
Maldives i s aga ins t airms race in the region by 
supplying an increased quantum of soph i s t i ca t ed US Arms of 
mass des t ruc t ion t o Pak i s tan . Like I n d i a , Gayoom i n h e s l t a -
t i ng ly endorced tha t the Indian ocean should remain a zone 
of peace, as resolved by UN in 1971, Foreign min is te r of 
1. The Hindu, Madras, May 7, 1982. 
2. The Indonesia Times, Indonesia , March, 1979. 
^ ' Itie Amrlt Bazar P a t r l k a , C a l c u t t a , Apri l 10, 1982. 
4. working people d a l l y , dated February 22, 1983 and Rising 
Nepal, dated Apri l 12, 1985. 
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Maldives expressed that"we wi l l not be I n t e r e s t e d in giving 
Gan to supierpowersv and fu r the r added t h a t "we wi l l not be 
allowing even ship r e p a i r s i f they are going to serve any 
fore ign m i l i t a r y interest ' . ' The s t r a t e g i c Indian ocean. 
Republic of Maldives emerging from years of i s o l a t i o n ; has 
fended off over tures from the big powers and stock an 
independent foreign pol icy pos ture . P res iden t Gayoom declared 
h i s determination to preserve Maldives non-aligned s t a t u s and 
t o l d t o Reuters in an in terv iew "Itiat he wi l l not allow the 
i s l and to be used for m i l i t a r y purposes by any big power. 
As t o h i s predecessor who wanted t o preserve the Maldives 
non-aligned s t a t u s , the present P res iden t i s also of the 
v iew ' to persue t o non-alignment po l i cy . " 
The Maldives c a l l e d for a m u l t i l a t e r a l framework t o 
ensure protect ion and secur i ty of the small s t a t e s . In 
United Nations General Assembly Fa thu l l s Jameel the Foreign 
Minis ter said tha t such a farmework i s the most f ea s ib l e 
mode, "of sound s e c u r i t y , mechanisms for the weakest members 
of the United Nat ions . The s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l i d e n t i t y of the 
weaker s t a t e s and the p r i n c i p l e s of Sovereign equa l i t y are 
not s trong enough to be impervious t o the possible v i c i s s i -
tudes of unequal r e l a t i o n s h i p . " 
Gan i s jus t 300 miles (480 km) North of the US, 
Mi l i t a ry base on the i s l and of Diego Garcia and already 
400 a runway capable of handling big a i r c r a f t s . In l ine 
1.7/^fFinancial Express , New Delhi , May 7, 198 4. 
2. I b i d . 
3.71"^ SUN, Sri Lanka, November 13, 1982, Amrit Bazar P a t r i k a , 
December 18, 1982. 
4. The Indonesia Times, Indonesia , March 5, 1979 
5. The Rising Nepal, Kathmandu, September 28, 1989. 
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with i t s policy of n e u t r a l i t y Maldives has maintained 
c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s with North and South, East and West. 
In 198 0 Maldives signed a s c i e n t i f i c and c u l t u r a l Agreement 
with sovie t Union and a Technical Cooperation accord with 
China. I t a lso made an agreement with Aus t ra l ian Government 
t o renovate in the former Br i t i sh Air Port f a c i l i t i e s for 
commercial use. 
Yf^) Maldives and South Asian Regional cooperation 
Understandingly, any cooperative e f fo r t in the expan-
ded sphere of such a neighbourhood i . e . South Asia has 
evoked f u l l support of Maldives fo r a number of r ea sons . As 
one of the smallest coun t r i es s t rugg l ing to a r r i ve on i t s 
Own, any cooperative venture i s bound to be benef ic ia l t o 
i t . To began with common act ion between the members 
of a reg ional grouping of developing coun t r i e s enhances the 
bargaining c a p a b i l i t y and manoeuverabll i ty of a l l v i s - a - v i s 
the developed South, but more so of a small s t a t e l ike the 
Maldives. Besides*under the reg ional a e g i s , j o in t funct ions 
may be ca r r i ed out in several sec tors (e .g . provis ion of 
t echn ica l s e rv i ce s , supply of information, c r e a t i o n of 
reg ional f inanc ia l i n s t i t u t i o n s , e t c . ) which may be beyond 
the capab i l i t y of an ind iv idua l country . Moreover, i n view 
of s imi la r c l imat ic and physical f ea tu re s of these s t a t e s , 
t h e i r experiences in several sec tors have been almost iden-
t i c a l , some of them who have l ea rn t t h e i r lessons the hard 
way but with a modicum of success in deal ing with c e r t a i n 
economic problems, can impart t h e i r r i c h experience t o o t h e r s . 
This i s pe r t inen t i n view of the fac t tha t regional bodies 
l ike ESCAP or Agency for In tegra ted Rural Development in 
1. The §UN, Sri Lanka, November 13, 1982 
Asia and the Pacif ic Region have, genera l ly speaking, taken 
a global macro-perspective and in the p rocess , often s i d e -
t racked the micro-problems of common regional s i t u a t i o n s . 
As such, from the beginning, when the i n t i a l d ra f t 
prepared by Bangladesh was discussed at the Foreign Secretary 
l eve l conference a t Colombo in 1981. Maldives evidence a keen 
i n t e r e s t in the proposal . In the i n i t i a l d r a f t , i t suggested 
the add i t iona l theme of hea l th which was subsequently incor-
pora ted . Fur ther , in Kathmandu Conference, the same year , 
Maldives took the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of ac t ing as the nodal 
country to prepare a de t a i l ed report on t r anspo r t which was one 
of the e igh t themes se lec ted in the de l ibe ra t i ons for concer-
ted plan of act ion a t the regional l e v e l s . During the d e l i -
b e r a t i o n s , r i g h t from Colombo t o Kathmandu t o Islamabad and 
f i n a l l y , Delhi , in August 1983, a t the foreign Minis ter l eve l 
when the South Asian regional cooperat ion SARC assumed a ce r t a l 
degree of i n s t i t u t i o n a l t r a p p i n g s , the Maldives r ep resen ta t ive 
under l ined the fact t ha t such a regional i n s t i t u t i o n can help 
f a c i l i t a t e of the sharing of experiences in harmoning and 
coordina t ing planning a t the na t iona l l e v e l s f i n a l l y , and 
mentioned by the Maldivian delegate a t the Colombo reg iona l 
cooperat ion in south Asia, "can offer a unique con t r i bu t i on 
t o the cause of promoting the understanding between the 
coun t r i e s of the region. 
C"6) ^ndia Maldives Linkages 
When Gayoom was e l ec t ed as P re s iden t , a coup was 
a t tempted. The t h i r d abor t ive coup which i r o n i c a l l y coin-
cided with the beginning of the Pres iden t t h i r d term a l so . 
r a i s ed acute dilemma for the i s l and nat ion of i n t e r n a l 
1. For the t e x t see Sri Lanka, Meeting of South Asian 
Foreign Sec re t a r i e s , 21-24 April 1981, Colombo. 
s t a b i l i t y vs external secur i ty underlying at the same 
time the c ruc i a l nature of the secu r i ty i ssue of small 
i s l a n d n a t i o n s . 
The t h i r d coup drama was engineered by Abdullah 
L a t h i f i a leading businessman with the help of some Lankan 
mercenaries hired for Us d o l l a r s 2-5 mi l l i ons e s t a b l i s h i n g 
a permanent base for Tamil M i l i t a n t s . Maldivians considered 
i t an act of t e r ro r i sm, Gayoom c a l l e d i t foreign aggress ion . 
Among the 400 mercenaries 200 had already i n f i l t e r a t e d the 
i s l a n d s ; the remaining 200 equipped with AK 47 r i f l e s and 
rocke ts p rope l l e r grenader {RPG-7) joined them on November/ 
3 a t 4 a.m. La th i f i has l e f t Male for Singapore bu t , 
a c t u a l l y was waiting to accompany the mercenaries from Sri 
Lanka. At 4.15 a.m. they at tacked the P r e s i d e n t i a l palace 
and the National Securi ty Service (NSS) head q u a r t e r s . Thfe 
at tempt k i l l e d 7 NSS guards and 13 c i v i l i a n s and in jured 
severa l people. The mercarar ies took 2000 hostages including 
Transport Minister Ahmad Mujilhabe and h is wife and captioned 
the Radio and TV S ta t i ons , power supply and foreign exchange 
u n i t s . 
Though the Coup-makers managed t h e i r a s sau l t c a l c u l a -
t i v e l y they appeared somewhat over confident since they 
f a i l e d t o capture the t e l e l i n k and a i r p o r t . Gayoom t e l e c a s t e d 2 fo r I n t e r n a t i o n a l he lp . Because of the Indian t imely decis ion 
Indian m i l i t a r y planes landed a t 8 PM at Male with 1600 
para t r oope r s and on November 3 by 4 a.m. 1600 peace-
keeping force reached Male. On November 5 the mercenaries 
1. The Asiai Week, November 28, 1988. 
2* The Indian Express . N^y^pelhi, November 9, 1988 and 
Hindustan Time3,^ew Delhi , November 4, 1988. 
3. The Hongkong Standard, Hongkong, November 4, 1988. 
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demanded free passage to Sri Lanka which was denied. A naval 
ship fired its final shot at 6:16 a.m. and the mercenaries 
surrendered at 9.25 and the coup came to an end. Indian 
help received international accolade. Nepal said " We appre-
ciate that India at the request of the Maldives President. 
Maumoon Abdul Gayoom sent military assistance to Maldives." 
The secretary of Commonwealth observed " many a small country 
is today a safer place because of India's selfless action 
2 in turning back aggression in Maldives." After the pullout 
of mercenaries, ^  small force of 500 indian TroPps was 
retained in Maldives till the situation in the Indian Ocean 
3 
archipelago stabilises. 
The Maldivian aborted coup leader Abdulla Lateefi 
tws alleged that the Tamil militant leader, Uma Maheshwaran 
had masterminded the bid to topple the government of President 
Gayoom..With his hands and feets tied and eyes blind folded 
the balding Maldivian businessman told P.T.I,, that the 
People Liberation Organization of Tamil Elam (PLOTE) leader 
wanted to get hold of the island to shift his group away 
4 
from Sri Lanka where he feared annhilation. The plot was 
hatched in Colombo and no intervention from India was antici-
pated. 
Sridhar Rao of Indian Institute said "it shows beyond 
doubt Indias willingness to project military power in terms 
of assisting its neighbours." Indias policeman role in the 
South Asian waters of the Indian ocean dramatised its capacity. 
1. The Stateman, New Delhi, November 5, 1988. 
2. The Hindu, November, 4, 1988 and Indian Express, New Delhi, 
November 5, 1988. 
3. The Hindustan Times. New Delhi, November 9, 1988. 
4. Ibid . 
5. The I n d i a n E x p r e s s . New D e l h i , November-B,, 19 88 . 
6JJ ie j iongkong S t anda rd . Hongkong, December 1 , 1988. 
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The rescue operat ion was display of I n d i a ' s m i l i t a r y power 
and the soph i s t i ca t ed s k i l l s of i t s defence p lanners . The 
d is tance for the nea res t m i l i t a r y base in south India to 
Male was 600 KM and not a mere 57 km. as in the case of 
Jafna in Northern Sri Lanka, The use of m i l i t a r y power to 
help two neighbouring governments coup with .an i n t e r n a l 
t h r e a t (in the case of Sri Lanka) and an ex terna l t h r e a t 
( in the case of Maldives}' alarmed small na t ions . 
As regards Ind ia , the e a r l i e r i n t e r ac t i on with the 
Maldives was in the main in s o c i o - c u l t u r a l spheres . In the 
1960s a number of Maldivian s tudents came to study in India 
under colcmbo Plan. In the 1970s, the re has been a marked 
increase in o f f i c i a l and unof f ic ia l t r a n s a c t i o n s . A State 
Bank of India branch was opened in Male ' in 1974 and an a i r -
l i n e service commenced in 1975. Ear l ie r the only a i r route 
t o reach Male was via Colombo, India was the f i r s t country 
to open a r e s i d e n t mission in 1976, In 1977, the Indian 
Ai r l i nes co l labora ted with Air Maldives in launching the 
coun t ry ' s f i r s t a i r service between Male and Colombo, The 
agreement has been renewed in 19 82 for another three yea r s . 
Fu r the r , s ince 1982 Air Male has s t a r t e d operat ing a b i -
weekly se rv ice Male-Trivandrxim sector t o o . 
In 197 8 the In t e rna t iona l Airport Authority of India 
won an i n t e r n a t i o n a l tender t o expand the runway of Hulule 
a i r p o r t and modernize, i t . I t completed i t s work in 1981, 
Through another agreement v i sas were abolished between the 
two c o u n t r i e s . In 19 80 India and Maldives signed a t r ade 
agreement. Besides, India has a l so provided technica l a s s i s -
tance in var ious spheres as desired by the Government of the 
Maldives. I t has grant scholarships to Maldivians t o study 
in India and province Indian Building schools , and in other 
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a c t i v i t i e s r e l a t i n g to community development programmes. 
I t has a lso agreed t o help Maldives in modernizing i t s 
f i s h i n g indus t ry . 
An i n s t i t u t i o n a l form to such soc io -cu l tu ra l r e l a t i o n s 
was provides in 1983 when Pres iden t Gayoom v i s i t e d Delhi and 
signed a c u l t u r a l agreement covering the f i e ld of a r t s , 
c u l t u r e archaeology educat ion, soc ia l welfare , publ ic hea l th , 
mass media and spo r t s . Being a free po r t , Maldives has been 
a t t r a c t i n g a large number of Indian t o u r i s t s . Thus, in 1982 
out of a t o t a l of 20,000 t o u r i s t s from Asia, about 15,000 
wei:« Ind ians . This cons t ruc t ive pa t t e rn of r e l a t i o n s between 
India and Maldives has been free of any controversy . However, 
the i ssue of Minicoy an Indian i s l and in the noirth of the 
a t o l l s t a t e crea ted a mild f l u t t e r when during the Ju ly 1982 
c e l e b r a t i o n s of Maldives independence, the P r e s i d e n t ' s brother 
Abdullah Hameed declared t h a t an i s land in the nor th of 
Maldives. Tiladummati Ato l l was always ruled by Male and 
was in fac t pairt of Maldives. The reference was obviously 
t o Minicoy i s l a n d s . Almost immediately, the Pres iden t 
c l a r i f i e d t ha t t h i s reference was to affirm the r e l i g i o -
l i n g u i s t i c - c u l t u r a l i d e n t i t y between Maldives and Minicoy 
only and t h a t Maldives was not laying any p o l i t i c a l claims 
on Minicoy. 
( -^ ) Defence 
The secur i ty problem of Maldives was not iced for 
f i r s t time at the t h i r d coup a t tempt . I t s x s e c u r i t y problem 
i s in f a c t so acute tha t development of m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y 
t o adequate defend i t s e l f i s beyond i t s capac i ty . As the 
inc iden t de«onst ra ted . Maldives did not even have enough 
s t r e n g t h to r e s i s t the coup attempt which conpelled President 
Gayoom to seek ass i s t ance from the fr iendly c o u n t r i e s . This 
i s b a s i c a l l y the most important event the c a p i t a l now f a c e . 
This i s a l so one of the main aspect Gayoom i s advocating 
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fo r Indian ocean zone of peace proposal (1020 p ) . One impact 
of the incident i s . President Gayoom des i re s to enlarge the 
s t r u c t u r e of the National secur i ty service (NSS). The 
Pres iden t has ca l l ed upon the youths of Maldives t o jo in 
NSS to reduce i t s v u l n e r a b i l i t y , ^ But, even an enlarge NSS 
can not absolute ly reduce i t s v u l n e r a b i l i t y in view of the 
thousands of small s ca t t e r ed i s l ands in the High seas, 
c o n t r o l of the vas t sea t e r r i t o r y with a population of 200000 
c o n s t i t u t e s a r e a l dilecuna for small country liXe the Mal-
d i v e s . F.M. Jameel, admits t ha t management of a soph i s t i ca t ed 
defence system i s beyond the s t a t e s capac i ty , but he is 
w i l l i n g to discuss in d i f f e r en t forums, the arrangement of 
^ 2 
a r eg iona l force which looks appealing a t the manent. 
1 . The Times of I n d i a , New D e l h i , November 20, 19 8 8 . 
2 . The F r o n t L i n e , November 26, 19 88. 
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T) 1 Indo-Nepal Rela t ions 
The s o c i a l , economic, p o l i t i c a l and h i s t o r i c a l 
binding between Nepal, and India are deeply f a ra i l i a r . The 
c u l t u r a l pa t t e rn in India and Nepal are hardly i n d i s t i n g u i -
shable , Hindus in the pain of the majori ty of the people 
in Ind ia , i s the dominant r e l i g ion in Nepal, Gorkheli, the 
o f f i c i a l language of Nepal i s a consonant of Sanskr i t . 
s i m i l a r l y , the economies of the two count r ies are in 
e x t r i c a b l y interwoven. Gorkhas are serving in the Indian Array 
They come to Ind ia in search of t h e i r l ive l ihood and a la rge 
number of them s e t t l e d in Ind ia . 
Indian r e l a t i o n s with Nepal are the outcome of B r i t i s h 
Rule . B r i t i s h India r e l a t i o n s with Nepal were based upon the 
t r e a t y of Sugauli , which Nepal had to sign a f t e r the war of 
1814-16. I t was however, a contact between two sovereign 
s t a t e s . The terms and condition of the t r e a t y do not r e f l e c t 2 
,that Nepal had surrendered her sovereignty, t o the B r i t i s h e r s . 
1. other languages and d i a l e c t s spoken and understood in 
Nepal have close resemblance to Indian language. Gorkhelt 
i s wr i t t en in Devenagri Scr ip t , Hindi, obviously i s 
understood in Nepal. 
2 . Kant Rama, Indo-Nepalese Re la t ions , I816 to 1877 Delhi, 
1968, p . 2 . 
IS? 
After independence/ the Indian Government cons tan t ly 
rece ived guestures of f r iendship from Nepal» Nepal was 
conscious t ha t p r a c t i c a l l y no government in Nepal could sur-
vive without I n d i a ' s support . 
Another t r e a t y was signed on December 21, 1923 at 
Sugauli between Nepal and B r i t i s h India and the former timely 
•obtained as "unequivocal" recogni t ion of i t s independence. In 
the f i r s t clause both governments agreed 'mutually to acknow-
ledge and respec t each o thers independence, both i n t e r n a l 
and e x t e r n a l . "The scope of Nepal 's independence however was 
l imi ted by the t h i r d clause which obl igated each other "to. 
exe r t i t s good of f ices" t o remove cause of any ser ious f r i c -
t ion or misunderstanding with neighbouring s t a t e s whose 
f r o n t i e r s adjoin t h e i r s " . 
Although defined in terms of mutual ob l iga t ion , in fac t 
t h i s ment t h a t Nepal would continue to ' c o n s u l t ' the Govern-
ment of India on r e l a t i o n s with Tibe t , sikkim, Bhutan and 
China. Clause V provided, tha t Nepal gain the r i g h t to Import 
arras and ammunition without previous Government of India 
approval so long as the i n t en t i ons of the Nepal Government 
are f r i end ly and tha t there i s no Immediate danger to India 
fran such impor ta t ions . Here again however, t h i s r i g h t was 
l imi ted in p rac t i ce if not in theo ry . This was evident from 
the t r e a t y of Sauqauli . The Nepal Government t he re fo re , signed 
a "stand s t i l l Agreement" with India in 1947 and agreed to 
continue the s p i r i t of B r i t i s h India-Nepal r e l a t i o n s . This 
was followed by a t r i p a r t i t e agreement on August 9, 1947. 
2 By t h i s agreement , Nepal agreed t o cont inue to allow 
recrui tment of Gorkhas for the armed forces of Ind ia and 
1 . Rose Leo S . , Nepal s t ra tegy for Survival , London, 1971, 
pp. 171-72. • 
2 . The p rac t i ce of recrui tment of Gorkhas had been s t a r t e d 
by the B r i t i s h long back. For d e t a i l s , see Ashad Hussains, 
B r i t i s h I n d i a ' s r e l a t i o n s with the Kingdom of Nepal,1857-
1947. Allen and Unwln, London, 1970, pp. 234-254. 
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Great Britaijti. In re turn for the r e c r u i t i n g f a c i l i t i e s / 
the Government of India managed t o f u l f i l Nepals m i l i t a r y 
needs regarding dependence production, army t r anspor t planes^ 
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c i v i l suppl ies and t r a in ing f a c i l i t i e s . 
The two very important t r e a t i e s were conducted on 
31 J u l y , 19 50 between Nepal and Ind ia , These two t r e a t i e s 
(a) a t r e a t y of peace and (b) a t r e a t y of t r ade and conmerce, 
are s t i l l considered the corner stone of Nepalese-Indo 
r e l a t i o n s . The f i r s t t r e a t y was almost a defence pa r t b e t -
ween the two c o u n t r i e s . The second t r e a t y provided for 
I n d i a ' s d i r e c t i o n s and guidance in matter of t rade and 
commerce between the two c o u n t r i e s , 
Ind ia , i n f a c t had very high s t a t e s in the secur i ty 
and defence of Nepal, such s t r a t e g i c cons idera t ions were 
repea ted ly emphasised by Prime Minister Nehru. The t r e a t y 
of peace and f r i endsh ip of 1950 provided the bas ic and 
lega l framework for the unif ied measures for mutual secur i ty 
and defence between India and Nepal. Following the t r e a t y 
for ins tance check posts were e s t ab l i shed along Nepal 's 
northern b o r d e r s . The Government of India a l so sent 
Mi l i t a ry mission t o Nepal to a s s i s t the host government 
4 in the 'Tra ining and re -o rgan iza t ion of t he Nepalese Army, 
I n d i a ' s pol icy towards Nepal has always been recep-
t ive to Nepal 's secur i ty needs . I t was bel ieved a t New Delhi 
1, Nepalese forces a c t i v i t y assigned Ind ia , in the Kashmir 
and Hyderabad m i l i t a r y canpaign in 1947-4 8. See The 
Hindu, Madras, February 16, 1950. 
2 . Muni, S.D. Foreign Policy of Nepal, Delhi, 1973, p .20 . 
3 . Malik, B.N., The Chinese Betrayal , New Delhi , 1971, 
122-124; a l so See Pradyuman P. Keran and William H. 
Jenking J r . The Himalayan Kingdom : Bhutan, sikkim and 
Nepal Prince'ton, 1963, p . 117. 
4 , see Bhasin, A .S , , Documents on Neoals Rela t ions with 
Indian and China, New Delhi 197 0, p . 37, Leo S, Rose, 
Nepal s t r a t egy of Survival , Ca l i forn ia , 1971, p . 197. 
I 
t h a t i t could be accomplished only if Nepal became s t rong, 
progress ive and s table p o l i t i c a l u n i t . The Indian Government 
t he re fo re , advocated a compromise between the Rana's and 
the " r e v o l u t i o n a r i e s " . India adopted, thus , the "middleway" 
p o l i c y . 
Ind i ra Gandhi was not able to reso lve the fundamen-
t a l dilemma of power facing India how t o be s t rong enough 
t o prevent encroachment en n a t u r a l i n t e r e s t s by out side 
powers and yet avoid in t i ra ide l ing small neighbouring s t a t e s 
by an increase of power indeed, she exacer ta ted feer by 
her forcefu l a r t s u s in the p ro tec to ra t e of sikkim and sho-
wing anger over what she ca l l ed "Anti Indian Nonsense" in 
Nepal and Bangladesh". 
Ta) Indo-Nepal bid t o mend fences 
The i c e was broken en August 25, 19 89 when P.V. 
Narasimha Rao, the then External Affa i r s , Minis ter paid a 
two day v i s i t to Kathmandu and met the King, I t was f e l t 
t h a t the two countr ies were now moving towards a phase of 
se r ious and purposeful dialogue covering almost the e n t i r e 
? gamut of b i l a t e r a l i s s u e s . ' Rajiv Gandhi, the Prime Minister 
of India and Nepal 's king Birendra Bir Bikram shah Dev a l so 
met on September 4, 19 89, in Belgrade on the occasion of 
NAM meet ing. 
C^) A QQw phase in Indo-Nepal Relat ions 
V.P. Singh, The Prime Minister of India announced 
the pol icy decis ion of his government a f t e r qcming in power 
in 1990 t h a t i t would be h i s endeavour t o normalise r e l a -
t ions with a l l i t s neighbours, including Nepal. I t was 
1. Singh, sur j i t Man, India search for Power, sage Publ i -
c a t i o n , New Delhi, p . 39. 
2, The Hindu, Madras, August 27, 1989; a l so see "welcome 
move", Sdi-corial, The Times of Ind ia , August 29, 19 89. 
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believed at New Delhi that the 1950 Treaty of Peace and 
Friendship had been under operation for the last 40 years 
but time and again Nepal had flouted it, India itself must 
do some introspection for its diplomatic land failures. It 
was felt that this time an affirmation would be sought fran 
Nepal that it would honour in letter and in spirit the 
1950 treaty and the security and conmercial pacts through 
a well devised and mutually accepted machinery and moni-
toring system,-^  
It was a landmark in the relations between India 
and Nepal when the Prime Ministers of India and Nepal, 
V.P. Singh and Krishna Prasad Bhattaral signed a joint 
conmunique on June 10, 1990, The acrimoney and bitterness 
of the past 14 months were over. It took care of their 
major concerns. The trade and transit arrangements, snapped 
on March 23, 19 89 were restored, India was relieved by the 
proper understanding and appreciation of its security 
concerns by Nepal and also the promised end of discrimi-
2 
nation against its nationals. The two sides were prompt 
with followup administrative measures to implement the 
decisions incorporated in the conmunique. The reactions 
in the two countries were euphoric. 
(C) Restoration of Status quo 
India and Nepal decided on June 15, 1990 to put 
aside the aberrations of the recent past, normalise relations 
fully and resolve status quo-anti to April 1, 1987 in trade 
and transit arrangements pending the finalisation of a 
comprehensive arrangement. The interim government of Nepal 
1. The Hindustan Times, Delhi, March 28, 1990. 
2. The Frontline, June 23 - July 6, 1990. 
ful ly exempted additional customs duty levied on a l l goods 
imported from India as well as the customs duty levied on 
primary products. 
I t was also decided that the two governments will 
take a l l necessary steps such as issue of administrative 
orders , not i f ica t ions , legislation/ordinance e t c . in order 
to ensure the status quo anti to April 1, 1987, i s restored 
by July 1, 1990 i t was agreed.^ 
The advent of the democratic era in Nepal also contr i -
buted to the happy conclusion of the t a l k s . I t was for the 
f i r s t time that the Prime Minister, and not the King, committed 
that country's government to major decisions with India . The 
change exerted a beneficial influence on the negotiations 
and the preceding exchanges thirough diplomatic channels. This 
was also the f i r s t time in diplomatic channels that agreed 
dicisions were made known through a joint communique signed 
at a press conference. 
On trade and t r a n s i t , Nepal was fully accomodated. 
The 15 points e a r l i e r designated as t r a n s i t points for 
Nepal's trcinsit trade through India with th i rd countries 
were reinstated.The 22 border points and the routes 
specified as land custcsns s ta t ions for the movement of goods 
between India and Nepal were restored. The new dispensa-
t ion was aimed to boost Nepal's exports to India. For 
instance, i t was decided that there will be customs-free and 
quota-free access for manufacturing items containing upto 
65% of Nepalese or Nepalese and Indian mater ia ls , as against 
80%J.n the pas t . The ta r i f f concession on import duty was 
also provided where the value of Nepalese and Indian materials 
1. The Hindustan Times, June 15, 1990. 
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and labour added in Nepal was 40% of the ex- fac tory p r i c e . 
I n the p a s t , i£ was 50 percent . The standby c r e d i t t o Nepal 
was enhanced from Rs. 25 crores t o Rs. 35 c r o r e s . 
In response, exemption of addi t ional custcxns duty to 
Indian goods was r e s to red by Nepal, Indian na t iona l s 
•were exempted from the ambit of the work permit scheme. The 
Indian government, to r e c a l l , had taken s t rong exception 
to the work permit for Indian na t i ona l s . In I n d i a , Nepalese 
n a t i o n a l s are t r e a t e d at par with the l o c a l s in employment 
i n the p r i v a t e sector or the government, ba r r ing the three 
a l l Ind ia -se i rv ices , and ownership of p roper ty , t r ade and 
bus ines s , idkewise India expectadthe same s t a t u s and p r i v i -
leges for Indian na t iona l s as the local c i t i z e n s in Nepal. 
Ind ia and Nepal a lso agreed to usher in a new era of coopera-
t ion between the two c o u n t r i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y in the spheres 
of i n d u s t r i a l and human resource development for the harnessing 
of the waters of the common r i v e r s for the benef i t of the 
two peoples and for the p ro tec t ion and management of the 
environment. 
Chandra shekhar became the Prime Minis te r of India 
a f t e r t he premature f a l l of the V.P. Singh government. He 
provided uns t in ted support to the l eade r s and the people 
of Nepal in t h e i r quest fo r r e s to r a t i on of democracy. He 
played an i n s p i r a t i o n a l ro l e when the democracy movement was 
being launched in Nepal. He reached I to Nepal to 
a t tend a Nepali Congress convention in December 1989 and 
l a t e r i n February 1990 when a mul t ipar ty movement was launched 
for r e s t o r a t i o n of democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s , 
. Chandra shekher ' s v i s i t t o Kathnandu on February 13, 
1991 when the parl iamentary e l ec t ions of Nepal were very 
1. I b i d . 
2 . I b i d . 
near gained considerable s ign i f i cance . He s a i d , speaking 
at a banquet hosted in his tonour by the Nepalese Prime 
Minister : "The time has come t o put our economic and 
commercial r e l a t i o n s on a comprehensive b a s i s . " 
In a s i gn i f i c an t developnent, t he two count r ies 
agreed on February 13, 199l to more ga infu l ly harness t h e i r 
water resources po t en t i a l for the bene f i t of the people 
of the two c o u n t r i e s and t o obviate the annual recurr ing 
f l o o d - r e l a t e d l o s s e s . India a lso offered Nepal a t rade regime 
which would al low Nepalese goods uninhib i ted duty f ree en t ry 
in to I n d i a . India also agreed to purchase a l l the surplus 
e l e c t r i c i t y generated by Nepal. 
I t was a lso agreed t h a t the Indian rai lway min is t ry 
would examine Nepalese proposals for the upgradation, 
expansion, extension and r epa i r of some delapidated and 
broken ra i lway l i n e s in Nepal, India a l so showed readiness 
t o a s s i s t Nepal i n building the physical and i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e fo r i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and human resources 
development, Chandra Shekhar expressed h i s view : "we, on 
our p a r t , must also fu l ly appreciate t h a t i n helping Nepal, 
we are he lp ing ourse lves , the re i s Jiothing tha t would give 
more s a t i s f a c t i o n to the people of Ind ia than the happ iness , , 
2 
prosper i ty and progress of the people of Nepal. 
The Nepali congress secured a mandate in the P r a t i -
nidni sabha e l ec t ions held in May 1991.-^ Gir i ja Prasad 
Kai ra la , t he new prime Minis ter of nepa l , became the 
complete roaster of h i s government*s a f f a i r s . He w i l l have 
t o take f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y fo r h i s po l i cy decisions»both 
1, The Times of I n d i a , Delh i , February 14, 1991. 
2, Ibid , , 
3, P r a t i n i d h i Sabha i s the Parliament of Nepal. 
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i n "the domestic and i n t e r n a t i o n a l spheres . The Nepali 
Congress be l ieves t h a t common r i ve r s between Nepal and 
India should be j o in t l y harnessed for mutual bene f i t . He 
has tremendous fund of goodwill i n Ind i a . Indian pol icy 
maters assumed tha t she wi l l cooperate with Ind ia without 
f laxinting a China card which had often in the past c rea ted 
misunderstanding in New Delhi . There i s every hope of the 
two coun t r i e s prompting the tonds of f r i endsh ip fu r the r on 
the b a s i s of equi ty and f a i r p l a y . 
^ ) .Indo-Nepalese Cooperation 
South Asia i s endowed with vast and yet unexplored 
and untapped resources hidden in seaiaeds, high Himalayas 
and huge jjopulation which can offse t to a considerable 
e x t e n t . The th ree major r i v e r systems - the Indus* the 
Ganga and the Brahmputra e f fec t the l i f e of m i l l i ons in 
I n d i a . S imi la r ly , the th ree r i v e r s flowing from Nepal i n t o 
India - Kamali, Gandak and Kosi a l so possess huge water 
resources and can br ing p rospe r i ty in whole region. 
Although, Nepal i s a small country i t has tremendous 
p o t e n t i a l i n terms of water resources . The three major r i v e r 
systems namely Kamali (Ghagra) in the f a r most, the Gandek 
in the Cent ra l Region and Kosi in the eas t b r ing the annual 
run c lose to 200000 mi l l ion cubic meters and can generate 
83 thousand MW of hydropower. The present capac i ty of Nepal 
i s simply 127 MW and i s only 0.5% of the p o t e n t i a l i t y . ^ 
Addressing the fourth SAARC Summit king Eirendra said,"Nepal 
i s wi l l ing t o cooperate in any venture fo r the multipiirpose 
development of her water resources b i l a t e r a l l y , t r i a t e r a l y 
and m u l t i l a t e r a l y for the mutual benef i t of the people in 
!• The_jjepaj. News, January, 1988. 
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the region . 
Power cooperate i s the main sphere i n which India 
can cooperate to a much extent and whiich i s a lso benef i -
c i a l to the economy of the Indian people . Next t o Braz i l , 
Nepal has the l a rges t power p o t e n t i a l i n the world. The 
est imated capac i ty of 83 thousand MW i s equiva len t to the 
combined i n s t a l l e d hydroelec t r ic capac i ty of Canada, the 
2 United s t a t e s and Mexico. 
Out of the d i f f e ren t p ro jec t s the Kbsi Multipurpose 
p ro j ec t , the Gandak i r r i g a t i o n project and the Trisubi 
Pokhra, Devi Ghat Pro jec t s are most impor tant . Kosi projec t 
was the f i r s t major project under taken j o i n t l y by Nepal 
and India in Apri l 23, 1954. The pro jec t was intended t o 
provide i r r i g a t i o n for an area of 500 sq .mi les of Morang 
Delta and generate 900 MW power ava i l ab l e t o both count r ies , 
Gandak Pro jec t was the second scheme which was aimed at 
harnessing the large i r r i g a t i o n and water p o t e n t i a l of the 
Gandak for benef i t of India and Nepal. I t was s t a r t ed in 
1959. The p ro j ec t provide i r r i g a t i o n f a c i l i t i e s for 1.43 
lakhs ac res in Nepal. The Kernali i s the t h i r d most impor-
t a n t p ro jec t in which India shared. I t w i l l generate 32 
MW of power. 
An agreement was signed on Nov. 20, 1958 for the 
cons t ruc t ion of T r i s u l i Hydel P ro j ec t . The work on the 
project was jsonpleted. on Nov. 17, 1981 and i s generat ing 
2100 MW. Another project of Devighat Hydel Pro jec t 
1. Sharma, S.N,, Energy Resources in Nepal ; Cooperation 
for Development" in Asif A, waq {ed^ South Asian 
Cooperation Industry Energy and Technology, Sage, New 
Delhi , p . 17. 
2. I n d i a , Nepal S tud ies , Vol. I I , 1989-91, p . 74. 
3. The Rising Nepal, Nepal, November 18, 1971. 
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was a l s o taken by India and Nepal in 1978 and was completed 
a t the cost of Rs. 50 c r o r e s . I t s i n s t a l l e d capac i ty was 
14.1 MW. Thus for Nepal harnessing of v/ater r e sources 
remain one of the most concerned areas of coopera t ion . 
(C ')'r^Q Indian community in Nepal and the Nepalese in India 
The word ' Indian Community includes "People of the 
Indian or igin" and denotes in broader, sense , peoples from 
• India who has migrated t o those regions in l e s se r or grea ter 
number a t one point of time or another . These express ions 
may be used for a se t of people from the Indian o r ig in 
l iv ing in any country l ike F i j i , Guyana, Maur i t ious , Surim, 
Trindad, Tobape, Nepal, pakJ.stan e t c . There seems a very 
connotation of these terms in the context of South Asia. 
Under normal circumstances these terms are used in a d i s -
pareging sense to iden t i fy a group of people d i s t ingu ished 
from others gene ra l ly , the power ho lders , or r e g i o n s , 
l i n g u i s t i c and e thn ic grounds or the underpr ivi leged in 
the s t a t e concerned. 
The Tamils are t r e a t e d t o be assoc ia ted with the 
terms "of Indian or igin" in view of the s t a t u s they hold 
in the s t a t e populat ion s t r u c t u r e " . I t i s i n s i g n i f i c a n t 
tha t Sinhalese too consider themselves fron the Indian o r i -
gin and connect them to the pedgree of Pr ince Vijaya who 
es t ab l i shed Sinhalese race in Sr i Lanka in the 6th cent\iry 
B.C. and i r r i g a t e d from the pa r t of Indian which p re sen t ly 
i s ca l l ed Or i ssa . S imi la r ly , the people of Nepal who have 
so far been r u l i n g e l i t e in the s t a t e a l so c a l l themselves, 
People of Indian o r ig in . But, they use i t only a t time of 
grievances and aggregating t h e i r demands. There are c e r t a i n 
segment of people in Nepal who under normal cond i t ions 
suffer on var ious counts and whose l i f e in Nepal i s not 
p l ea sen t . They are ca l led ' I n d i a n s ' even a f t e r t h e i r s tay 
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in Nepal for generations back, similarly Madhshis are the 
people of Indian origin in Nepal, There are about 75 lakhs 
and more Medheshis in Tarai, They face a number of problems 
relating to citizenship, agriculture business, education 
and religion etc. 
The most serious problem faced by large section 
of the Indian ccanmunity in Nepal is that of citizenship. 
Many of the Madheshis are of the openion that the Nepali 
ruling elite wants to drive them away from Nepal by not 
recognising them as citizen of Nepal, and a different 
approach is being exercised in respect of the people of 
Indian origin living in Hill areas. There are 3 type 
of Nepali citizen. The first consists of the paternal, 
the second is that of inherent citizens by virtue of both 
rights' and the third category is that of the naturalized 
citizens, neither, born in Nepal nor having Nepali ances-
tores and are living for a long time. They have created 
problems. Even after the proof that they are living in 
Nepal for long time some of the Medheshis are not being 
given citizenship rights. Initially, they are being pro-
vided temporary citizenship certificates and than try to 
get the permanent one. The task is cumbersome and some 
fails to get it. The possession of the Nepali citizenship 
certificate is a must to apply for any government job. 
Agriculture 
The tarai is known as the granary of Nepal and is 
the backbone of the economy. It produces jute, tobacco, 
oil seed-s, sugarcane, herbs, spices, timber, hidec. The 
area which is responsible for producing a substantial part 
of Nepals gross domestic product and revenue is parado-
xically faced with numerous problems. Land Reform programme 
was oriented in Nepal in 1963-64 to achieve equal distri-
bution of land ownership. But the more important goal for 
?M 
some in f luenc ia l elements was the replacement of land-
owners, t enan ts of the Indian o r ig in in the Tarai region 
with Nepalese from the H i l l s . As a r e s u l t of the ce i l ing 
provis ions 3% land was found excess and only 27 000 
hectares of land was given to the people of the Indian 
community^ 
Under panchayati Raj system a large number of 
a g r i c u l t u r i s t s have been dispossessed of t h e i r holding. 
Moreover, f o r e s t s have also been cleared b u t , desp i te a l l 
of i t Madheshis could not get any share worth mention. 
Apart from i t excessive Malguzari i s a l so being imposed 
on a g r i c u l t u r a l sector and they had to pay Rs, 70 to Rs, 
80 per Bigha. The major effect of i t goes on t o Mehshis» 
"the people of Indian o r i g i n s " . A number of r e s t r i c t i o n s 
have been imposed on the business of 'People of Indian 
o r i g i n ' . A nepali paper commented as e a r l y as 1969. 
'"If the Government of India wants t o see 
Indian in Nepal looked upon in the same way 
as Indians in Ceylon,Burma and Afr ica , i t 
has only to continue the present po l i cy of 
attempting t o p ro tec t i n economic monopoly 
of Nepal". 
The Madheshis are discr iminated aga ins t in respect 
of the education a l s o . Indian Government provide huge 
amount as a s s i s t ance for Education to Nepal Government. 
A nurabei: of Nepalese get education in Indian Un ive r s i t i e s 
without any d i sc r imina t ion . A large nxomber of Indian s tu -
dents went t o Nepal under the Colombo plan b u t , i t i s 
strange tha t lC% marks were deducted out of gross number 
for purpose of competition from the ou t s ide r s most of 
whom were Ind ians . 
The pos i t ion of Nepalese in India i s qu i t e d i f ferent 
from those people of Indian or ig in in Nepal. I nd i a 
?M 
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Government has issued guide l ines for Tribunals t o detect 
fore igners in Assam under the i l l e g a l migrants (Determi-
nat ion of Tribunals) Act of Feb. 2, 1984. The Government 
of India a l s o c l a r i f i e d i t s o f f i c i a l pos i t i on regarding 
Nepali na t i ona l s in possession of r e s t r i c t e d area permits . 
They wi l l not be t r ea t ed as i l l e g a l migrants . The person 
protected under Government of India, No t i f i ca t ion of August 
14, 1970 a re a l so protec ted . 
In India the in tens ive development of the p lan ta t ion 
and cons t ruc t ion work gave job oppor tun i t i e s to Nepalese 
migrants . Free p l o t of land were being given t o plan taken 
workers in Darjeeling and Assam while in Sikkim South of 
Bhutan. There was considerable land for rec lamat ion which 
was a g rea t asse t to the land-hungry hillmen of Nepal. 
Defence 
Nepali Army cons i s t s of 1 Royal Guard, 7 in fan t ry 
br igades and s ingle a r t i l l e r y , engineer , s i g n a l s , para-
chute and t r a n s p o r t b a t t a l i o n s , and 1 a i r squadron. Equip-
ment inc ludes 25 Fe r r e t s . Strength of a l l s e rv i ce s i s 
about 40000 and there i s a l so a 28000 strong para m i l i t a r y 
pol ice fo rce . 
Air fo rce ; independent of the army since 197 9, the 
a i r force has 3 Suyau Transport a i r c r a f t , 1 Purna h e l i -
copter and 3 Chetak h e l i c o p t e r s . An Hs 748 turboprop 
t r anspor t and 1 super Purna and 1 Purna h e l i c o p t e r s are 
2 
operated by Royal F l igh t . 
1. Quoted from the unpublished d i s s e r t a t i o n submitted i n 
p a r t i e s fulf i lment of requirement of the Master of 
Philosophy degree in J.N. Univers i ty by Nimala Das. 
2 . Manorma Year Book, 1993, Malayala K.anorma, Thi 
ruvananthapuram, p . 18 9, 
f R J Indo-Pakls tan Rela t ions 
Pakis tan came in to exis tence as a separate homeland 
of Muslim minor i ty . The word 'Pak i s t an ' was f i r s t brought 
by Muslim s tudents in Cambridge in 1933. I s lam, whether as 
s e p a r a t i s t force not in l i n e with the na t iona l main stream 
of a n t i - c o l o n i a l s truggle or as a r e l i g i o n per se ; a r a l l y i n g 
point for na t iona l uni ty of people conscious of t h e i r diff-
e ren t i d e n t i t y , has been i d e n t i f i e d by both India and Pakistan 
as the roo t of the genesis of Pak i s t an . P a k i s t a n ' s perception 
of i t s r o l e emerged frcxn the r e a l i s a t i o n of two v i t a l forces -
the area pu l l 
of south 
p u l l of 
Pakistan* s 
around the 
domination 
i t . 
This 
made the 
found and 
a f f i l i a t i o n s 
t h i s way of 
t o value 
Liyaket Ali 
of being pa r t of core dower 
^s ia and the ideologica l 
Is lamic i d e n t i t y . The 
defence po l icy revolved 
cen t r a l theme of Indian 
and safeguards t o counter 
' was the main cause which 
r e l i g i o u s t i l t more pro-
the t a l k of r e l i g i o n s 
more pronounced. Due t o 
s t r a t egy Pakis tan turned 
r e l i g i o n based p o l i t i c s . 
Khan, the Prime Minister 
of Pakis tan ta lked of the s t r a t e g i c importance of the Middle 
Eas t , of West Pakis tan bordering on I ran and Afghanistan and 
East Pakis tan bordering on Burma keeping in mind the Muslim 
2 
concent ra t ion of Indonesia . Their attempts did not prove 
successful . This phase of P a k i s t a n ' s foreign po l i cy , when 
at tempts were made to be f r iend the Arab World, was f u l l of 
1. For d e t a i l s see Pakistan : The Struggle of a Nation 1949, 
The Paradox of Ind ia-Pakis tan Re la t ions , New Delh i , 1955. 
2. Khan, Liyakat A l i , Pakis tan 
pp. 11-13. 
The Heart of Asia, 1950, 
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misunderstanding betx^'een the Arab World and Pak i s t an , 
Having exhausted the na tura l image to bring about a s o l i -
d a r i t y in the Muslim World, Islamabad sought to break 
i s o l a t i o n by al igning i t s e l f to the west, P a k i s t a n ' s 
foreign po l i cy changed when Pakis tan joined the western 
a l l i ance system. This s tep ended i t s i s o l a t i o n and provided 
i t an opportuni ty to counteract I n d i a ' s des i r e t o dominate 
2 in what she c a l l e d , her sphere of in f luence . India opted 
for non-alignment and kept i t s e l f aloof from the East-west 
and North-south con f l i c t , . I n d i a ' s stand t o keep e x t r a -
reg iona l powers from in te r fe rence in South Asia and the cold 
war, r e j e c t e d the Balance of power doct r ine enriched by 
Vtestern powers. I n d i a ' s moto for peace was based on a dual 
pol icy of se t t lement of c o n f l i c t s through peaceful nego-
t i a t i o n s . Peace was to be achieved t o tack l ing the roo t of 
con f l i c t ( s o c i a l , economic, p o l i t i c a l ) and not by taking 
3 poise of s t r e n g t h and nego t i a t ion . 
P a k i s t a n ' s pol icy r e s u l t e d thus in the replacement 
of the Regional power hegemony with t ha t of the Great power 
hegemony. The motive for a l l i ance was thus not to escape 4 geography b u t , achieve secur i ty in the context of I n d i a . 
India viewed with suspicion the ex t r a - r eg iona l l inkages 
which Pak i s tan entered with grea t powers, Nehru's c l a s s i c 
r eac t ion to P a k i s t a n ' s decis ion to en ter i n t o Us a l l i a n c e s 
was t h a t "condi t ions have q u a l i t a t i v e l y changed and i t 
a f f ec t s Indo-Pak r e l a t i o n s . In view of Pak i s t an , the major 
aspect of going, the Us a l l i a n c e was fear of Indian hege-
mony as well as the pos i t ion of the t r a d i t i o n a l mountain 
route under P a k i s t a n ' s c o n t r o l , through which the 
1. Bhutto, Zulf iker Al i , Foreign Pol icy of Pakis tan ; A 
compendiom of speeches made in the National Assembly 
of P a k i s t a n , 1962-1964, Karanchi, 1964, pp. 18-19. 
2. Mohd. Khan, Ayub, Pakis tan Pe r spec t ive , Washington, 
DC. 1966, p . 18. 
3 . Appadorai , A., On Understanding Indian Foreign Po l i cy , 
in K.P. Misra, Foreign Pol icy of I n d i a . A Book of Reading, 
New Delh i . 1977, pp. 115-116. 
4. Bhut to , Z.A. , Bi ta le ra l i sm : New Di rec t ions , Islamabad, 
1976, p . 12. 
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sub-cont inent was invaded throughout h i s t o r y . The burden 
of guarding these routes i s now borne by Pak i s t an . The 
argument was tha t a strong and s table Pak i s t an would be 
the s t ronges t bulwork ot ' s ecur i ty for Ind ia and in per-
forming t h i s r o l e , i t would gain an i d e n t i t y fo r i t s e l f . 
After independence and p a r t i t i o n of the sub-
cont inent Pakis tan was assiduously c u l t i v a t e d as an a l l y 
by the next for the cogent reason. Sir "Olaf Caroe, a well 
known expert on t h i s region, who had advised the UK and 
USA "governments". Summed up the matter t h a t "Pakistan 
has succeeded to much of I n d i a ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , for the 
Gulf Opens d i r e c t l y on Karachi Ind ia i s no longer an 
obvious base for Middle East defence. I t s tands on the 
2 f i r i n g of defence per iphery . The American i n t e r e s t in 
Pakis tan i s more or l e s s on account of he r i n t e r e s t i n 
the Gulf. 
The 1971 war had two main repercuss ions for South 
Asia, I t l ega l i s ed I n d i a ' s claim as a r eg iona l power as wel] 
as i t changed P a k i s t a n ' s percept ions of s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s 
and jjroblems. Pakistan l o s t a valuable pari: i n the form 
of East Pak i s t an ; i t was disenchanted with the United 
S t a t e s for i t s half hearted support during the war and 
turned more towards Vlest Asia and developed i t s l inkages 
with China. Speaking about the changed cirxjumstances, 
Bhutto, described tha t at the global l eve l both the United 
S ta t e s and China two f r iends of Pakis tan - s l i g h t l y 
modified t h e i r s tance. The United s t a t e s gave s l i g h t 
JL. Reply by Foreign Minis ter Hamidul Haq Choudhari to the 
debate in National Assembly on 25 March 1956, Foreign 
Re la t ions , Karachi, 1956, pp. 54-55. 
2 . S i r Olaf Caroe, The Wells of Power, Macmillan and 
Company 1951, page IV. 
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accepted to Indian pos i t ion v^en both Nixon and Kissinger 
recognised I n d i a ' s new r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s China, in an 
oblique reminded Pakis tan t h a t i t would have t o 
accept the new balance of power in south Asia . 
Pakis tan considers i t s e l f a cut above Nepal, Bangla-
desh and Sri Lanka and did not accept India* s predominance 
P a k i s t a n ' s hope i s to cut India down t o a s i ze to match 
I n d i e ' s s t r eng th . This has been the dream of a l l those 
who fragmented India in 1947 by Col labora t ing with the west . 
They have reconci led themselves t o the p a r t i t i o n as i t came 
2 
about since t h e i r dream wQs to Balkanise I n d i a . The p r e c i -
pise of a nuclear weapons race in South Asia i s between India 
and Pak i s t an , within the next f ive years both s ides wi l l 
have medium-range m i s s i l e s . Each side wi l l have to assume 
the worst of each o the r . And t h i s i s d e s t a b i l i z i n g because 
of the h a r i t r i g g e r nature of these m i s s i l e s in times of 
t ens ion . Not only do both count r ies have nuclear weapons and 
b a l l i s t i c miss i l e programmes, they have r e c e n t l y pursued 
chemical weapons as wel l . These programmes a re p a r t i c u l a r l y 
3 
worrisom becase of sontant tension and c o n f l i c t in Kashmir. 
P a k i s t a n ' s main t h r e a t percept ion of India i s based 
on the suspicion of Indian motives. In view of Pak i s t an , 
India have not reconci led t o the es tabl ishment of Pak i s t an . 
'They wi l l l ike to undo i t , i f they can, because t h e i r 
motives from the beginning have been inimical ' . For example. 
Nixon's statement of the world Annual Message, 3 May 
1973, in Asian Recorder, 9-15 J u l y , Col. 11487-88. Henby 
K i s s i n g e r ' s address to the Indian Council of World 
A f f a i r s , 28 Oct. 1974 in Foreign Affa i r s Reports, November 
1974, p . 213; Indian Ministry of Externa l Affairs Report, 
1974-75, New Delhi , p . 5. 
K.Subrahmanyam, Securi ty Pol icy: World Focus, New Delhi , 
NO 23-24 November, December 1981, pp. 5-7. 
Robert CIA Director ,Report before Congeess, New York Times, 
21 January, 1991. 
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when the Muslim r u l e r of Hyderabad delayed acceding to 
I n d i a , the s t a t e was captured by Indian using fo r ce . 
Finally, , when Pakistan had some i n t e r n a l d i f f i c u l t i e s in 
East pa}cistan in 1971, India-played an ac t ive ro le t o break 
up Pakis tan and have not stopped there* India has been 
f inding d i s r u p t i o n i s t elements l ike Sindhis for fu r the r 
fragmentation or annexation of Pak i s t an . 
In 1977, Congress l o s t i t s 30 years domination from 
the Indian p o l i t i c a l scene. The Congress was replaced by 
the Jan ta P a r t y . Jan ta Par ty introduced aggressive pol icy 
of* non-appeasement towards Pakis tan and thus i t e f fec ted 
I n d i a ' s r e l a t i o n s with Pak is tan . Fur ther more Pakis tan f i r s t 
t r i e d t o achieve pa r i t y with India in m i l i t a r y s t r eng th 
by jo in ing US sponsored Mi l i ta ry a l l i a n c e s , the Centra l 
Treaty 'Organization (CENTO) and the south East Asian Treaty 
Organization (SEATO) and l a t e r by obl ig ing China and take 
use of i t . After emergence of Bangladesh, P a k i s t a n ' s s t ra tegy 
of maintaining p a r i t y with India was f i n a l l y bur ied . Ch in i ' s 
support to Pakis tan can not always be descr ibed nn I n d i a ' s 
co s t , Pakis tan in fact l o s t much by providing China Karako-
ram High way and had opened doors for a pov^erful expensionLst 
country , moreover, introduced China with USA * with the 
obvious i n t en t i on by using two g ian t s as counter weight 
to I n d i a , without deeply th inking tha t in p o l i t i c s no one 
i s f r iend or enemy. His tory repea ts tha t China had never 
been a r e l i a b l e f r i end . 
Zia f a i l e d t o br ing about a consensus on any i s sues 
facing the coutitry and always remained under the psyche 
that dead Bhutto may turn t o be more dangerous than the 
' - • ^ I . . . I I . . _ I . I l l • I • 
1. Chibbor, M.L. Indo-Pak Reconcllation,Lectures^ page 75. 
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l iving one. The re-emergence of the mil i tary bureaucrats 
establishment in the decision making process in Pakistan 
proved dangerous portent for Indo-PaKrelat ions, when the 
pos s ib i l i t i e s of a genuine 'detente' become v is ib le for 
the f i r s t time since 1947. The common idea was that if 
Zia decides to remain in the saddle for long and if his 
legitimacy i s questioned, he may find i t increasingly 
d i f f icu l t to maintain the present process of normalization 
of re la t ions between India or Pakistan. 
The re la t ions of India with Pakistan have never been 
cord ia l . Pakistan has inever taken to their hea r t , Ind ia ' s 
policy of cooperation and has always t r i ed to s"Ow superio-
r i t y and with these objectives i t shaked hands with extra-
regional powers. John E. Owen has r ight ly observed that 
many Pakistani would l ike to see India weekened or even 
destroyed by communist China. S.S. Harrison wrote e a r l y 
in 1965.That "Frustrated and at loose ends, Pakistan 
searches r e s t l e s s ly and needlessly for a degree of recognition 
and respect out of a l l proportion to i t s s ize . I t huffs 
and puffs and s t i l l finds to i t s understandable despair that 
India i s bigger", 
Pakis tan 's a t t i tude towards India i s in fact of 
r iva l ry to the point of b i t t e r jealously. Pakis tan 's 
Foreign Minister while speaking about the re la t ions with 
India expressed "Even if India were to t r ea t us with yielding 
the tomarrow, we should only regard i t as a t r ap . Pakistan' s 
r iva l ry with India i s so deep that Pakistan has a desire 
to keep confl ic ts al ive t i l l India r ea l i s e s the need to 
se t t l e a l l dispu+:«s with Pakistan on the basis of recognised 
internat ional merit and in a sp i r i t of equali ty". Ayub Khan 
1. "Pakistan comes ful l c i r c l e" , India Quarterly, New Delhi 
Jan, March 197S, 
cha rac t e r i s ed India as the most t reacherous country whose 
p l igh ted words were worthless". Prime Minis ter Liyakat Ali 
Khan followed a ' c l inckea f l a t ' pol icy towards India v^iile 
another Prime Minister Firoze Khan Noon ca l l ed I n d i a ' t h e 
enemy of Pak i s t an . 
I t has been the pol icy of Pakis tan to keep a l i v e i t s 
d ispute with Ind ia , Pakis tan fa i l ed to c a r r y any agreement 
entered with Ind ia . I t v io la t ed the agreement of 1958 
regarding her borders with India in Kutch, under v^ich 
I n d i a ' s f r o n t i e r s in Kutch were disposed off . Evident ly , 
Pakis tan t r e a t e d the Nehru-Noon agreement of 1958, Indo-
Pak agreement of i960 and the Simla Agreement as a waste 
paper and scrummbled many problems before India to d ive r t 
the a t t e n t i o n of h i s populat ion from i t s own problems. 
Pakis tan has a root cause t h a t ' I n d i a ' s enemy i s P a k i s t a n ' s 
friend" Pakis tan shaked h i s hands with China, even though 
i t was aware tha t China was agressor and can not be bel ieved. 
Yahya Khan, gave a twis t to P a k i s t a n ' s foreign policy 
and played ac t ive par t in the world p o l i t i c s to i s o l a t e 
I n d i a . But, the e f f o r t s of Pakistan to play the ro l e of a 
powerful nat ion proved a nightmare. Economically, geographi-
c a l l y and p o l i t i c a l l y Pakis tan remained too week to compare 
with I n d i a . The separa t ion of East Pakis tan had far reaching 
consequences. I t cut short the importance of Pakis tan as a 
Muslim country and s t r a t e g i c a l l y also weekened i t s p o s i t i o n . 
Pakis tan i s I n d i a ' s most d i f f i c u l t and the most 
important neighbour. But, seldom has any t h i n g , any issue 
or any argument(been) resolved between India and Pakis tan 
Dialogue i s the most v i t a l thing between them. Their d r i f t 
towards war begins when they cease to t a l k . Ind ia -Pakis tan 
1. Bahadur, Kalim, " India-Pakis tan Re la t ions" Year Book on 
I n d i a ' s Foreign Po l i cy , 1987/88. Edited by Kumar, Sa t i sh , 
p . 83 , ex t r ac t from M.K.Rasgotra's "Dialogue with Pakistan 
Indian Express, 16 January, 1987. 
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r e l a t i o n s go back to the pre-independence conf l i c t between 
the ^ndian National Congress and the All India Muslim 
League, the two nation theory propounded by Mohammad Ali 
J innah, and the manner in which the p a r t i t i o n of the sub-
cont inent was brought about by the depar t ing Br i t i sh 
Colonial r u l e r s . 
The c o n f l i c t s and Controversies between the two 
major p a r t i e s over p a r t i t i o n were l a t e r t r ans fe r red to the 
foreign p o l i c i e s of the two count r i es and coloured t h e i r 
world view. This was s t rongly r e f l ec t ed in P a k i s t a n ' s 
Foreign Po l i cy . One plank of the Muslim League's movement 
for Pak is tan was tha t the Muslim League be t r e a t e d on par 
with the Indian National Congress. Pakis tan claimed egua l i ty 
and p a r i t y with Ind ia . Imp l i c i t in the framework was the 
Pak i s t an i awareness of the d i s p a r i t y between India and 
Pakis tan in terms of s i z e , population na tu ra l r e sources , 
and i n d u s t r i a l . Sc i en t i f i c and Technical l e v e l s . To make 
up for t h i s d i s p a r i t y Pak i s t an i leaders began to seek ou t -
2 
side support. 
Pakistan could only look-to-the United States for 
this support. The USA was alio seeking allies in Asia 
to counter the growing influence of the Chinese People 
Republic. Pakistan joined the SEATO is September 1954 and 
CENTO in 1955. Pakistan could only get an apparent sense 
of Seci:irity with the USA support. Nehru stated "That such 
See Burke,S.M., Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani 
Foreign Policies, Minnea polls University of Minnesota 
Press, 1974 for detailed study. 
Chohen, P. Stephen, The Pakistan Army, New Delhi, ^ 
Himalayan Books, 1984, p. 137. 
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a s tep imper i l led the freedom of the Asian Countr ies , 
tha t i t would upset the ex i s t i ng equi l ibr ium and cons t i tu ted 
a form of in te rven t ion in Indo-Pak problems and t h a t i t 
was a s tep towards w a r . . , . " . Large Scale Supplies of 
soph i s t i ca ted weapons by the United S t a t e s to Pakis tan 
over the decades has had a profound inf luence en P a k i s t a n ' s 
domestic and externa l a f f a i r s and p a r t i c u l a r l y on Indo-Pak 
r e l a t i o n s . The impact of t h i s on Pak i s t ans r e l a t i o n s with 
India has been t h a t the ru l ing e l i t e considered m i l i t a r y 
so lu t ions to problems, which could have been solved 
through b i l a t e r a l nego t i a t ions . Here in lays the cause of 
th ree Indo-Pak wars (1947, 1965 and l 9 7 l ) . 
Pak i s t an i Leaders fa i led to understand the gen i s i s 
of Indian Foreign pol icy of the Indian National Movements 
long s t ruggle against imperialisms* colonia l i sm and r e c i a -
lism. Nehru said "peace and freedom have t o be considered 
in t h e i r p o l i t i c a l and economic a spec t s . The economic 
problems demand urgent so lu t ion or e l s e c r i s i s and d i s -
as te r might overwhelm the newly independent count r ies" . 
The Indian experience has been tha t whenever Pakistan has 
accumulated large stocks of arms, mainly supplied by the 
United S t a t e s , i t has gone to war with Ind ia .Neither India nor 
Pakistan has solved any of the problems which led cJb war. 
1. Quoted in Haksar, P.K. (ed.) ^ehru*s v is ion of Peace 
and Secur i ty in Nuclear Age, Wew De lh i , P a t r i o t 
p u b l i s h e r s , 1987, p . 28. 
2. Bahadur Kalim,"India-Pakistan Re la t ions" Year Book on 
I n d i a ' s Foreign Po l icy , 1987, 1988,"^ Saga Pub l i ca t ions , 
New Delh i , P . 84. 
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(X") Pakistan and Islamic Ideology : 
In 1977 Zia-ul Haq took over as President of 
Pakistan on the basis of the military coup and overthrew 
the democratically elected government of late Zulfikar 
Ali Bhutto on the plea that there was a confrontation 
between the PPP Government and the opposition united front. 
On the one hand Zia ul Haq made repeated attempts to legi-
timate the military rule by associating opposition political 
parties; on the other hand he Islamizedthe Pakistan society. 
The constitution was also amended repeatedly by the General 
to meet the wishes of the Generals. 
The Muslim League was dominated by feudal aristo-
cracy and a group of professionals,merchants and leaders. 
The rich urban professionals were led by Mohd. Ali Jinnah. 
The Muslim trading communities were active in supporting 
the Pakistan movement. The reason for this was that they 
either felt inhebited by restricted opportunities in India 
or saw much greater scope for themselves in an independent 
Muslim State, 
After Pakistan emerged as a new country Muslim 
League was represented by the rich urban professionals who 
had migrated from India. The indigenous feudal aristocracy 
had not supported the Pakistan movement and it took them 
several years to reassert their power in the ruling party 
2 
of Pak i s t an . The landlocds continued to exerc i se strong 
influence in p o l i t i c s and the soc ie ty in genera l . Indiv idual 
landlords could make or break p a r t i e s by u t i l i s i n g the power 
1, S tanley, A. Kbchanek, In te rna l Groups and Development 
Business and P o l i t i c s In Pakis tan , New Delhi , 1983, 
p . 2 i . 
2. For d e t a i l s Burki, Javed Shahid, Pak is tan Under Bhutto, 
1971-1977, London, 1980, p . 10. 
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they enjoyed over the land and the i r t e n a n t s . The f ive 
year plan under Ayub Khan led to leaders who were educated 
2 in western count r ies and did not know Islam. Islam served 
only as a slogan to r a l l y Muslims belonging to a l l c l a s s e s . 
Both the Is lami ideology and the concept of Pakis tan had 
meant d i f f e r en t th ings to d i f fe ren t people. The«t rad i t iona l 
Ulama and fundamentalist groups backed by feudal forces and 
r i v a l f ac t ions of the c a p i t a l i s t a t tacked the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 
4 
and p o l i t i c a l programme of the ru l ing f ac t ion as un-Is lamic. 
The fundamentalist could always take up provocat ive theolo-
g ica l i s sues and sec t a r i an conf l i c t s to d i s t a b i l i s e any 
government. Pakis tan had five cons t i t u t i ons in fo r ty s ix 
years . In each c o n s t i t u t i o n a new def ina t ion of sovere igni ty 
had been given. In Pakis tan lopsided i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n and 
the poor and the impoverished became poorer and the in 
famous twenty two fami l ies emerged. The pol icy of promoting 
capi ta l i sm needed. C a p i t a l i s t ideologica l framework. However, 
P a k i s t a n ' s r u l i ng c l a s s e s have fa i led to evolve a c a p i t a l i s t i c 
Islam, The ru l ing c l a s s e s of Pakistan half hea r t ed ly attempted 
to impose a prefeudal and feudal Islamic ideology on a society 
which was rap id ly developing c a p i t a l i s t r e l a t i o n s of production 
1. A l i , Tar iq , Can Pakis tan Survive : The Death of a State 
Harmonds v*Drth, 1983, p . 41. 
2. For d e t a i l s see Cnowdhari Habib Ahmed, Tehr ik . 1. 
Pakis tan Aur Naynashnalist Ulma, Lahore, 1966. 
3 . Bahadur, Kalim, South Asia in Trans i t ion ; Confl ict and 
Tension, p . 137. 
4. Leonard, Binder ' s Jummat-i-Islam of Pak i s t an , New Delhi , 
1977, for the Jammati arguments against Pak i s t an . 
5. Business Recorder, Karachi, 25 Apri^l 1968. 
6. Haq-Zia-Ul Pakis tan and Islamic ideology in Hasan Gardezi 
and Jamil R-asheed (eds . ) Pakistan; The Roots of Dic ta tor -
s h i p , The P o l i t i c a l Economy of a Prope ta r ian s t a t e , 
Delh i , 1983. 
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Most of the leaders of Muslim Leaque in power a f t e r 1947 
belonged to urban profess ionals and they paid l i p sympathy 
to the promise of I s lamisa t ion of Society, The capi ta l i sm 
favoured ind iv idua l r i g h t s and freedom, democracy and 
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l governments and a lso separa t ion of ^ r e l i g i o n 
from p o l i t i c s . I t was a major t i e between the ulama's and 
the c a p i t a l i s t s , Ulmas believed tha t Muslim League leaders 
claims tha t Pakis tan vgould be an Is lamic S ta te . 
In Pakis tan Islamic fundamentalism i s an ideology 
of the dominant feudal and c a p i t a l i s t c l a s s e s , which means 
defence of p r i va t e proper ty , free t r a d e , suppression of 
democratic r i g h t s , a u t h o r i t a r i a n regime and na t iona l 
oppress ion. General Zia used Islam as a t o o l to l eg i t imise 
h i s m i l i t a r y ru l e and to a t t r a c t the genera l mass and d iver t 
a t t e n t i o n of public from the e t h i n i c a l c o n f l i c t s . He comman-
ded as the t r u e . Islamic concept the i n s t i t u t i o n of Amir 
or one man r u l e for the coxintry. Zia ' s I s lamic concept 
was r e l a t e d to i n t e r e s t free banking, enforcement of Zaket 
and Shar ia t c o u r t s . The miixjrity Muslim s e c t s l ike shias 
and Ahmedis were placed under r ep res s ive measures by the 
S t a t e . The fol lowers of Shia community found to t h e i r 
dismay t h a t they were being pressed to follow laws and 
r egu la t i ons of Sunni schools . Their voice was suppressed 
by v io l en t pol icy ac t ion . Similar ly new laws were enforced 
which almost outlawed the Ahmadi r e l i g i o n . Rights of women 
were .also reduce in the name of Is lam. Restructions were 
imposed on soc ia l a c t i v i t i e s of wcrnian. 
1. Munir, Mohammad, Jinnah to Zia , Lahore, 1980, p , 146. 
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The Pakistans rulers laid stressed on the unshakeable 
bond between the State and religion and the ruling class 
embraced religious fundamentalism. As an ardent advocate 
of the Islamic Unity, Pakistan has been making untiring 
efforts to promote world Muslim Unity on the pretext that 
Zionist expansionist menace was a threat not only to the 
Arabs but to the entire Muslims world. Pakistan maintain 
the closest possible contacts with the fraternal Islamic 
states at the highest level. 
i^) Ethnic Conflicts in Pakistan 
Ethnicity can be defined as the emergent expression 
of primordial feelings long suppressed but, now awakened, 
2 
or as a mode of seeking political redress in the society. 
It is a term which is most often applied to any group which 
differs in one or several aspects of its patterned, society 
transmitted way of life from other groups, in the totality 
3 
or that way of life or culture. Ethnic conflicts have posed 
a serious challenge to a large number of states. 
Waller Conner has described the nation as a self 
differentiating ethnic group" and the pre-requisite of a 
nationhood is an awareness that one's own group is unique 
4 
in a 'most vital sense". No where is such a crisis, so 
clearly manifested as in a multi-ethnic state like Pakistan. 
1. Kathpalis, P.N, National security Perspactive,Lancer 
International, New Delhi, p. 44. 
2. Danial, Bell, Ethnicity and social Change, in Nathan 
Glazer and Daniel Moyouhan, eds. Ethnicity ; Theory and 
Experience, Massachusetts, 1975, p. 169. 
3. See Dictionary of the Social Science, edited by Jullius 
Gould, William L, Koih compiled under the auspices of 
U.N.E.S.C.O. 
4. Waller, Corner, National Building or Nation Destroying, 
V>torld Politics, Vol. 24, No. 3, 1971-72, p. 92. 
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Pakistan bears the major ethnic threat from internal 
violence along regional ethnic identities. The Bengali's 
Sindhis, Baluchi's and Pakhtun's constitute important 
elements in Pakistan's ethnic mosaic. The primary cause of 
conflict is the Muhajir representation of their community 
among Pakistan most significant national elites. This 
has served to politicize the Muhajirs community. 
Sindh is the most ethnically diverse of Pakistan's 
frountier province, due to the international transfer of 
peoples into the promise during the subsequent to partition. 
The 1981 census disclosed that Sindh had a population of 
19.3 million of whom 10.6 million (55.7%) were Indlgenlous 
Sindhis.^ The ethnic consciousness of the Pathans, Baluchls-
and Sindhis Indicated that the feeling of relative depri-
vation has exhlsted among all the three groups and the 
present upsurge in ethnic conflict in Sindh, can be attributed 
to this factor. It is pertinent to mention here that poli-
tical violence results from an Intolerable gap between 
2 
what people want and what they get. Relative deprivation 
as conceptualized by Ted Gurr arises when an individual 
does not get v*iat he thinks Is justifiable due to him. 
Relative deprivation is the mechanism that produces frus-
tration of sufficient intensity to motivate people to 
3 
engage in political protest and violence. 
1. SouJTce adopted from GOP Population and census organi-
zation. Statistics Division 1981, Census Reports of 
Sindh Province, Islamabad, Population Census organiza-
tion, 1984. 
2. Gurr Ted, Hand Book of Political Conflict ; Theory 
and Research, Princeton, 1980, p. 167. 
3. Gurr Ted, Why Man Rebel, The Free Press, 1970, p. 5. 
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(c ) sindi. question of nationality 
The crystallisation of the sindi Nationality had 
taken place as far back as 1200 years ago. The tribal 
identification had been subordinated to the Sindhi national 
identification. A feudal nationality, so to speak came 
into existence while vestiges of tribalism remained and 
a number of secondary languages continued to consist, \«?h€n 
the Arabs conquered Sind in eight century. They did so 
by defeating a sovereign ruler of the long establishment 
state of Sind. The Arabs had difficulty in recognising 
the separate national identity of sind and even considered 
of about from Hind and India people. 
After lapse of Sind rule, two sindhi dynasties 
'Soomro' and 'Momo* ruled Sind indpendently. The Arghums 
and Tarkhans who came from Central Asia also ruled as more 
or less sovereign rulers of an independent state. In 1652 
Mughal ruler of India, Akbar imposed direct rule over sind. 
But, it did not cease to be a distinct entity. The Mughals 
never thought to integrate Sind with Hindustan. The subedars 
and faujdars of the Sarkars were no more than farmer gene-
rals of revenue. The Mughal rule was never accepted by 
the Sind public and remained in continuous revolt against 
the Mughals. Sumeja Umar, chandio and Nomri were particular-
ly noted for their resistance to alien rule. Lastly Mughals 
had to recognize the sovereignty of Sind under Kalhoro 
native rule. Despite all efforts by Iran and Afghan to win 
over sind, no fruitful efforts could be ac&ieved and sind 
maintained its sovereignity, 
^ Before the British conquered sind in 18 43, the 
latter had established itself as a sovereign state under 
1. Chopra, V.D., studies in Indo Pak Relations, Patriot 
Publishers,p, 11. 
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Talpur Yirs.Commander Hoshoo, who became a hero, raised 
the slogan of "Murvesoon, Sindh na leseon (we will die 
but will not give Sindh). Even British had to recognise 
the advanced nationality development of Sind, They declared 
Sindhi to be the official language,Muslim nationalistic 
conciousness in Sind was not only based on narrow material 
considerations but on long nourished Sindhi nationalism. 
Its social extent was extremely limited. The HUR movement 
in 1940 paid resistance to the British Rule in Sind, The 
British imposed martial law in 1942, Sent police from 
Punjab but remained unsuccessful. The Hur movement was for 
independence of Sind, Pir Sibghatullah Pagoro claimed that 
his ancestors were Guddi Nasheen of sind and will rule 
Sind, For Pakistan the task of nation building was more 
difficult than any other newly independent country. Beside 
the geographical separation of East Bengal, which had the 
minority of the countries population from west Pakistan, 
each of the five province represented a distinct nationality 
which had a fully or equal sovereign state of its own 
before the British conquest. Besides, the provinces had 
different population resources and proximity of power. 
The transfer of population from India in 1947 also 
created much difficulty to the existing mass. The removal 
of colonial rule led to an enormous concentration of power 
in the hands of civilian bureaucracy which largely belonged 
to Punjabis and Urdu speaking refuge and Kathiawari immi-
grants. The landlord class v^ich was quite powerful in 
Punjab and Sind could not excercise political hegemony. 
The Military which immerged as the paramount political 
fojJce in the coubtry dominated in all fields. 
Pakistan was aware about the position and creation cf 
Bengladesh as a result of the insDusitivity of its rulers. 
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The Balooch's people were subjected to armed suppression 
from 1973 to 1977 resulting alienation of Baloochies from 
Pakistan. The army also took hard steps against sindhis, 
vrno were claiming disparity. The main problem in Sind is_ 
demographic. In 19';17 about 1 million Hindu Sindhis left 
for India and in their place more than one million \ardu 
speaking persons from India settled in Sind. Recently 
several hundred thousand Behari from Bengi^desh have been 
settled in Sind with the result that they have been reduced 
to minority and creating disparities. The other aspect of 
discontent among Sindhis is that practically, more than half 
of the Pakistan .industries are located in Sind, but, they 
have no participation in it. The lucrative, commercial 
transportation construction and service sector, which 
comprises 55% of the Pakistan's domestic gross products are 
largely located in Sind but, Sindhis have no share in this 
sector. As regards to service class their margin comparati-
vely to the population is nil. 
Similarly, agriculture lands were the bastion of the 
Sindhis economic power. But, after creation of Pakistan 
situation has dramatically changed. More than two million 
acres of land left behind by the Hindu Sindhis in 19 47 was 
distributed among the refugees and was not allotted to land-
less sindhis. Also, over one million acres of land which 
was brought under cultivation due to construction of Kotri 
and Guddu barrages were also distributed to non-sindhis. 
It has excerbated the condition of the common Sindhis. 
The sindhis met their first political shock when their 
primate city Karachi .was separated from sind and declared 
"Federal capital Area". It put sind in ridiculous position 
of locating its government as no other city in the province 
had the infrastructure to host the provincial governir,ent. 
sindhis surplus revenues was appropriated by the West 
11% 
Pakis tan (New Pakistan) and Sindhis people hardly 
benef i t t ed with i t . In Pakis tans ebhno-po l i t i ca l ca lcu lus , 
the re i s no room for a s indhi Prime M i n i s t e r . Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto accomplished the unthinkable, b u t , had t o pay for 
i t s cosmopolitan out look. The c o n s t i t u t i o n of 1973 did not 
provide su f f i c i en t quantx;im of provinc ia l autonomy. The 
s indhis were turned as s t rangers in t h e i r own Karachi c i t y 
Sindhi schools were shut down. In 1975 a l l the pe r iod ica l s 
were banned by the government. At present only the govern-
ment and Jammat-i-Islami are allowed t o publish news papers 
in Sindhi . 
Sind comprises 23% of the Pakis tans populat ion but 
contains 60% of i t s i n d u s t r i e s , consume 42 percent of 
energy and has a per cap i t a income of 40% higher than in 
Punjab. The crux of the matter however, i s the quest ion 
of n a t i o n a l i t y which Sindhis are not ready to a l i e n a t e . 
They want and f i a r p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the democratic pol icy. 
A free hand t o develop t h e i r cul ture and na t iona l persona l i ty 
and t h e i r future without coercion. I t i s est imated that 
Mohajirs now make up about 35 percent of Sindhis populat ion. 
They are concentrated t o the major c i t i e s in Karachi and 
Hyderabad where indus t ry and commerce has t h r i v e d . The 
seeds of e thn ic con f l i c t in sindh were sown in 1947 when 
during the blood l e t t i n g which accompined decolonisa t ion 
on both s ides of the sub-cont inenta l devide more than half 
a mi l l ion Urdu speaking refugees Muslims (Mohajirs) came 
t o sindh as displaced people. 
1. The Times of Jnd ia , Ju ly 31 , 1990. 
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(d) Baluchistan Problem 
Baluchistan is a vast country in West Asia divided 
into three geographic units, the Palistan or Eastern 
Baluchistan the Iranian or Western Baluchistan and the 
Afgani Northern Baluchistan, The total area Baluchistan 
is around 7 lacks kms.having a population of 7y2 million 
people. Apart from it they are about three million ethinic 
Baluchi in sind who have merged with Sindhi population 
and have become the part of its socio-political matrix. 
When the British arrived in this part of Asia in l9th 
century, the Baluchi area consisted of several independent 
Principalities. In Sind, klat and Western Baluchistan. The 
British conquered sind and finished Baluchi power. Soon 
Punjab was subinghted and the Baluchi area of Dero Jah 
(Dere Gnezi Khan, Mushirgash Jhang and Dere Ismail Khan) 
came under British sway, British attached Khan Mehraf Khan 
in 1939 and after killing him, put his son in Khante. The 
British agreed with Iran on the occupation of Western Baluch 
area. However, due to strong resistance, Iran could not 
take possession. The Khan of Balat was made the head of the 
Baluch confederation. Before the partition of India a 
conference was held on August 4, 1947 in Delhi which was 
attended by Lord Ismay, for Liaqat Ali Khan and Sir Sultan 
Ahmed as legal advisor of Khan of Keret and Kelet was 
declared as an independent State on August 12, 1947. 
However, Khan of Kerat treacherously and unexpectedly 
announced on March 22, 1948 surrendered and anexed its area 
with Pakistan, Pakistan took over the entire administration 
and put behind bars ail the prominent leaders. In 1954 a 
party Demarook Ulus (Progressive People Party, was organized 
to struggle for the democratic rights of the people. In 
1955 Baluch leaders organized another party VSI a man Gal 
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(Peoples Party) with Agha Abul Karim as its President to 
form autonomous Baluchistan, On GX/l958 Khan of Kelat was 
arrested and put into jail with all other leaders. For 
three months the whole Zakakzai tribal area was indiscri-
minately bombed and several peoples were killed. A special 
concentration camp was opened in Quetta, After 1962 martial 
law was uplifted. Elections were held and Baluch leaders 
came in majority. Again there were disturbances and finally 
compromise was reached in 1967, In 1973 NAP came into 
power but, again NAP ministry was dissolved and troops 
were sent to takeover to look after law sorter similar with 
from hands. After the emergence of Bangladesh again an 
elected provencial government was established but that could 
not last long and was dismissed in 1973, The main reason 
of the discomfort was that Pakistan since 1958 upto ZIA had 
been under Army rule except short periods and has blotted 
the national feelings of the Baluchi people. The other 
important fact was the national awareness against the tyranny 
of the Punjabi people. Baluchi people feel that they can 
not get solution of their demands in the present set up. 
Baluchistan in fact is situated at an important 
strategic cross-road as it is wedged between Afghanistan 
to the north and gulf of Oman to the south and is of great 
importance to the US because of its proximity to the oil-
rich gulf. It has remained the centre of attention of 
Pentugow. Till the fall of shah of Iran, American policy 
makers mainly operated in this area of Pakistan through 
him. In the early seventies Iran was in the forefront of 
suppressing the movement of the Baluch people Guwdian 
reported. "What has now become clear is the recent involvement 
of the Iranian Army Aviation in the province working to-
gether with the Pakistan Army Aviation^Nine Iranian Heli-
copters and 18 crew were deployed between Dec. 73 - Kay 7 4. 
i 
Daily Aayendagan reported but m i l i t a r y b lock had shif ted 
i t s focus of a t t en t ion from the north t o the South, p a r t i 
c u l a r l y . The southern border of I ran and Pakis tan" - whic 
means the areas i n h e b i l i t e d by Baluch peop le . After the 
f a l l of Bhut to , Washington in tens i f i ed i t s e f f o r t s to ga; 
a foot hold in t h i s s t r a t e g i c area with a view « to buil( 
m i l i t a r y bases . 
I t i s now c lear but Bluchis^n has become a spring-
board for imper i a l i s t subversion and i n t e rven t i on in the 
Middle East and the Indian ocean. The area has been brought 
under the newly es tab l i shed Pakis tan i Rapid Deployment Pore 
v^ich has d i r e c t bonds with US Central Command. I t i s 
evident t ha t new type of m i l i t a r y arrangements have been 
inh ib i t ed a f t e r the CENTO has been d issolved and Baluchistan 
has been a key l ink . 
( e j Mi l i t a ry Rule in Pakis tan 
Pakis tan has been under m i l i t a r y r u l e for a p r e t t y 
long t ime. The f i r s t se r ious below to the democratic set 
up was effected in 1953 in the wake of a n t i Qadient r i o t s 
and mar t i a l law was Imposed in Lahore, which became the 
key stone in the arch of mi l i t a ry coup in Pak i s t an . 
After the incident of Lahore r i o t s . Governor General 
Ghulam Mohd. dismissed Khwaja Nizamuddin in April 1953 
desp i t e of the fact tha t he was enjoying the major i ty in the 
2 
cons t i tuen t Assembly. I t provided ample powers to bureau-
cracy and r e s u l t e d in the a l l i ance of M i l i t a r y and bureau-
cracy. In 195 4 Prime Minister Mohd. All was forced to 
1. Defence Journa l , Karachi, November, 1978. 
2. Khan, Asghar Mohd, General in p o l i t i c s : Pakis tan 
1958-1982^ Vikas Publishing House, New Delh i , 1988. 
p . 5. 
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include General Ayub W.an and General Iskander Mirza as 
Ministers of Defence and Home and thus formed a semi-
dictatorial executive. Ayub Khan imposed a new political 
system in the name of basic democracy. After ten years of 
rule he was tappled and Yahya Khan stepped into pov/er. 
In 1971. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto came to power after 
ousting Gen. Yahya 13.an on account of the defeat and dis-
aster in East Pakistan. He was the first civilian Adminis-
trator in Pakistan. Gen. 2ia Ul Haq. the C-in-C of the 
army took over in 1977 after throwing Bhutto and thus 
Pakistan again entered into Military rule. 
Pakistan is one of the many third countries, where 
military rule has been permanent feature. Some scholars 
view that military does not have any unique effect on 
social change regardless of the level of economic develop-
ment.^ Other sect of scholars are of the opinion that third 
world countries v^ere backward and outdated customs prevail 
and vhere primitive practice and culture dominate and in 
such countries technically trained civilian cadre is too 
small, the military perceives that it alone can modernise 
the country and this perception is an incentive to military 
2 take over. 
There is a strong argument that in Pakistan effective 
power within the state apparatus since the coup d* etat 
of 1958 and thus the first martial law in Pakistan was in 
fact not a seizure of power as the power was already in the 
1. ArthiiT J. smith,,in Military Role and Rub Belmount 197 4, 
Robert w. Kackman, Politicians in Uniforms, Military 
Government and social change in the Third world. The 
American Political Sciei^ ce Review, Vol. 70, no,4. 
December, 1976. 
2. Edward shiles. The Military in Political Development of 
the New States in J.-Johnson, The Role of the Military" 
in the underdeveloped Countries. New Jersey, 1982. 
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hands of those who were supposed to have i t . There i s a 
strong view tha t Is lami character i s the cause of the 
m i l i t a r y r u l e . An overa l l view of the Muslim s t a t e s shows 
tha t s o l d i e r s have governed a majori ty of Middle Eastern 
(Muslim) coun t r i e s almost continoously. In 1980 half of the 
Muslim s t a t e s were d i r e c t l y ruled by the m i l i t a r y and in 
r e s t the m i l i t a r y was the ul t imate power. 
Ayub*s contac ts with Pentagon were well known U.S.A. 
was of the view t h a t Mi l i t a ry off icer corps was a major 
r a l l y i n g po in t of the defence aga ins t communist expansion 
and pene t r a t i o n . The main cause of the emergence of Pakistan 
in i t s t e r r i t o r y was not Muslim league, but because majority 
of t h e i r populat ion was Muslim who provided support and 
followed the Muslim Leagues proposal . 
In Pakis tan bureaucracy prevai led for the f i r s t ten 
years . The r e l a t i o n s h i p between the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and 
the bureaucracy was in Pakis tan , P o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s were 
waxed, waned and suffered e c l i p s e . P o l i t i c a l leaders argued 
and reduced each other t o importance. In the meanwhile the 
s t a t e has been run by the c i v i l s e rv i ce , backed by the 
army, v^^ich has ca r r i ed on much as i t did before indepen-
2 dence. In Pak i s t an , a f t e r the f a i l u r e of Muslim League, 
the country could not bui ld the democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s 
as was done in Ind ia . After dismissal of Khwaja Nizamaddin, 
Governor General held overa l l cont ro l on power. He dismissed 
the c o n s t i t u e n t Assembly and brought Ayub i n to power. The 
Mart ia l law imposed by Ayub remained t i l l 1962, After the 
f a l l of Ayub in March 1969 power passed t o Yahya Khan. The 
defeat- of Pakis tan Army in East Pakis tan and emergence of 
1. Qiareshi, Saleem, Mi l i t a ry in the P o l i t y of Islam: 
Rel ig ion as a Basis For c i v i l M i l i t a r y , I n t e r a c t i o n . 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l Science Review, Vol. 2, No. 3 , 
1981. 
2 . Keith c a l l a r d , Pakis tan; A P o l i t i c a l study, London, 
1957, p . 5 . 
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Bangladesh, d i sc red i t ed the army and i t s legi t imacy. 
Bhutto reduced the powers of mi l i t a ry bu reauc ra t i c o l i -
grachy and removed sword of mi l i t a ry i n t e r v e n t i o n . 
Bhutto was overthrown by Gen. Z ia . General Z i a ' s 
regime was the most i so l a t ed in the h i s t o r y of Pakis tan . 
After Z i a ' s a i r c r a s h , Mrs. Bhutto, a p o l i t i c a l leader took 
over as Prime Minister of Pakistan and a f t e r a short 
i n t e r v a l Nawaz Sharif succeeded. The M i l i t a r y again put 
pressure in one way or the other and both of the Prime 
Minis te rs had t o t r y t h e i r f a t e . Mrs. Bhutto again became 
the Prime Minister of Pakis tan and thus power again 
transformed to a p o l i t i c a l leader and the m i l i t a r y fa i l ed 
t o i n t e r f e r e t h i s time due to extra r eg iona l p ressure . 
(f ) An Analysis of the Threat : 
Pak i s t an i Armed Forces have undergone a number of 
major changes in the four decades since independence, and 
p a r t i t i o n from Ind ia . Not only have t he r e been a number of 
p o l i t i c a l upheavals, but the en t i r e outlook of the country 
has changed. Important ly , the Pak i s t an i Armed fforces have 
learn t t h a t they don ' t have the s l i g h t e s t hope of an out-
r i g h t v i c t o r y in a war with India , as has been i l l u s t r a t e d 
in the outcome of the 1947, 1965 and 1971 c o n f l i c t s . Also, 
Pakis tan has l ea rn t t ha t i t can weather t he disapproval . 
of one super power with the endorsement of the o t h e r . 
Although the r e have been major upheavals s ince independence 
in 1947, the bas ic outlook of P a k i s t a n ' s foreign pol icy 
has l a rge ly remained unchanged. The primary purpose of 
i t s armed forces? o f f i c i a l l y ; i s t o render i t s sovereignty 
abso lu te^Pak i s t an ' s primary perceived , , threat i s her parent 
country - I n d i a . 
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Cg) socia l Conditions : 
P a k i s t a n ' s current population stands a t approximate 
110 m i l l i o n , iv-hich includes some 3 mi l l i on refugees from 
neighbouring Afghanistan. These Afghan refugees entered 
the country between 197 9 and 1989, the period of sovie t 
occupat ion. The Gross Domestic product has t r i p l e d t o 
almost US $ 40 b i l l i o n in 1989 compared t o a l i t t l e over 
US $ 10 b i l l i o n in 1959. And the P a k i s t a n i Defence Budget 
by over ly austered es t imat ions i s a l i t t l e over 8% of 
t h e i r GNP. Though one factor remains common with the r e s t 
of the t h i r d world, the average man's per cap i ta income i s 
l e s s than Us $ 400 per annum. 
(h) Foreign Aid and Defence Expenditure : 
The Pak i s t an i m i l i t a r y expenditure r egu la r ly 
absorbs between 40 to 50% of the Federal Budget of the 
country annual ly . The Defence Budget for the year l98 9 
was US $ 2,9 b i l l i o n . Of which 2.4 mi l l ion was from the 
Federal Budget and Us $ 500 mil l ion was from foreign a id . 
Out of t h i s foreign aid us $ 230 mi l l ion was aid from the 
United s t a t e s a lone. The 1990 defence budget for Pakis tan 
has been s e t at Us $ 3.2 mi l l ion of vAiich the United 
S ta tes has contributed US $ 290 m i l l i o n . About 3/4th 
of the foreign aid to Pakis tan comes from a consortium 
of na t ions including^the UK, USA, and ten other c o u n t r i e s . 
Between 1962 and 1974 the United S ta tes and the United 
Kingdom were the p r inc ipa l sources of foreign a i d . In 
recent t imes , however, China and Saudi Arabia, have con-
t r i b u t e d increas ing ly towards P a k i s t a n ' s Defence Budget. 
This has been by e i ther hard cash t r a n s f e r s or major con-
cess ions on the purchase of m i l i t a r y hardware, and often 
both simultaneously. Under the m i l i t a r y d i c t a t o r s h i p by 
General Zia the armed forces as a whole underwent a major 
9 
modernisat ion, though l i t t l e was done to s t rengthen the 
arms indus t ry t a se p a r t i c u l a r l y in the p r i va t e sec tor . 
The r e luc t ance t o invest has i t s r oo t s in the large 
amounts m i l i t a r y a id from the US. This a id i s the r e s u l t 
o£ agreements signed by the l a t e Gen, Z ia , under whose 
t e n e t s the US wi l l supply Pakis tan Us $ 3.3 b i l l i o n worth 
of m i l i t a r y hardware, including the General Dynamics,F-16 
Falcon and the Lockheed p-3 Orion a i r c r a f t amongst other 
i tems. 
( i ) Armed Forces : 
The o v e r a l l manpower of the P a k i s t a n i Armed Forces 
cont inues t o grow. P a r t i c u l a r l y alarming i s the fact t h a t 
the manpower of the Pak i s tan i Army w i l l exceed 500,000. 
The combined s t rengths of the armed forces ^ t present s tands 
a t 523,000 with the Army accounting for over 90=^  which 
numbers 480,000 and has close t o 500,000 r e s e r v i s t s . The 
Air Force has a t o t a l s t rength of 25,000 which does not 
include the 800 r e s e r v i s t s , while the s t rength of the Navy 
including the av ia t ion wing i s 13,000 and besides which 
are the 8,000 r e s e r v i s t s . The 271,000 s t rong pa ra -mi l i t a ry 
forces of Pakis tan include the coast guard. Rangers, and the 
National Guard which wi l l augment the armed forces in event 
of a contingency. 
Like India^and Pak i s t an i „Army r e t a i n s the Br i t i sh 
o rgan i sa t i ona l legacy. This i s h ighly evident in the army, 
where the regiment forms the bas i s of o rgan isa t ion for 
the higher br igade , d i v i s i o n , and corps leve l formations. 
The Ai'my comprises of nine corps level formations, each 
commanding two or more d i v i s i o n s . 
There are two Armoured Div i s ions , each of which 
commands two brigade headquar ters ; each of which commands 
Sketch 1: General Locations Pak Land Forces 
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five armoured regiments and tv;o mechanised infantry 
regiments and various support units. The infantry strength 
comprises of 19 infantry divisions each of which has, three 
brigade leve headquarters, one armoured regiment, one 
artillery regiment (towed) one engineer regiment, one 
signals battalion, and one supply unit. Besides these 
there exist four independent armoured brigades and eight 
independent infantry brigades, supplementing reconnaissance 
battalions, and one special force group. The comparative 
figures *re given below : 
Table 1 
Percentage of Population in the Military 
and 
Mil i t a ry Expenditure as percentage of GNP/GDP 
Country population Total Armed Force 
(in million) (in millions) 
Percentage of Military 
Population Expenditure [ 
in military as percentage 
of GNP/DP 
China 
I n d i a 
P a k i s t a n 
USA 
USSR 
1 , 0 0 8 . 1 7 5 4 .100 1.86 
-1- 4 .300 ( R e s e r v i s t s ) 
+ l 0 . 3 0 0 0 ( M i l i t i a l ) 
7 2 3 , 5 0 0 1.120 0 . 1 8 
+ 0 . 2 0 0 ( R e s e r v i s t s ) 
8 9 . 5 0 0 0 . 4 7 8 1 .14 
+ 0 . 5 1 3 ( R e s e r v i s t s ) 
+ 0 . 0 3 0 ( T r o o p s Abroad) 
2 3 4 . 5 1 6 2 . 1 3 6 1.32 
+ 0 . 0 0 5 ( R e s e r v i s t s 
i n c l u d i n g 
N a t i o n a l 
g u a r d s ) 
2 7 1 . 8 0 0 + 5 .050 3 . 7 0 
+ 5 . 0 0 0 ( R e s e r v i s t s ) 
Not a v a i l a b l e 
u n l i k e l y t o be 
l e s s t h a n 6 
p e r c e n t . 
3 . 3 9 
7 .00 
7.20 
Not available 
butunlikely to 
be less than 
8 per cent 
33 
Table 2 
M i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y Equation 
Pakistan 19 Armoured/infantry India 21 Armed/infantry 
Divisions 
Bangladesh 5 Infan t ry Divis ions 
China(in and 
around(Tibet) 28 Divisions out of her 
approximately 280 
Divisions of various 
types. 
Divisions 
10 Mountain Divisic 
52 Divisions 31 Divis'ions 
Note : Above figures are as in 'The Military Balance 
l9sg-8^ . 
As far a s the equipmental aspects of the P a k i s t a n i 
Army go, i t i s the perfect haunting l o g i s t i c s nightmare, 
requ i r ing sheer genius to make th ings worse. The major 
•weapons systems have been acquired from a v a r i e t y of sources 
v^ich include the US, the UK, China, Germany, Sweden and 
France, P r e s e n t l y , the Army i s despera te ly seeking t o mode-
rn i s e i t s armour c a p a b i l i t y . A combat development Board was 
es tabl i shed in e a r l y 1989 to make recommendations on future 
tank procurements. The main contender i s the MIAI Abrams, 
manufactured by the US based General Dynamics, Land systems 
Divis ion, Even though the US has reduced the per xinit cost 
of the MIAI, a f ina l decis ion i s as yet awaited, Meanxi^ile, 
Pakis tan i s a l so seeking the Chinese T-BO MBT, and s e t t i ng 
up a production uni t for the T-69 I I MBT with Chinese h e l p . 
The T-69 I I i s bel ieved to be the "indigenous" tank tha t i s 
expected to r o l l out sho r t ly , (around 1995-96). 
?M 
Pakis tan operates mainly US supplied M-47/485 and 
caiinese T-62/69 MBTs. The r e t r o f i t t i n g of these tanks with 
modern equipment has developed into very major programme for 
the Array. Moreover, Pakis tan has also entered in to contract 
with the US firm EMC corpora t ion t o manufacture the M-113 
armoured personnel c a r r i e r s , the f i r s t of which i s expected 
t o r o l l out around 1993-94. In the area of a n t i - a i r c r a f t 
systems, the Pak i s t an i Army i s in the process of se lec t ing 
guns, alongwith gun cont ro l and f i r e con t ro l systems.Along-
with the new guns from the Swedish firm AB b§fore manufac-
tured RBS-70 Laser s u r f a c e - t o - a i r m i s s i l e , which have alreadyU 
produced are being in teg ra ted with the fo rce . A quantum 
jump in the c a p a b i l i t y of the Army was achieved with the 
successful t e s t s of the AN2A (Lance) man po r t ab l e surface-
t o - a i r m i s s i l e , t ha t has been modelled on the bas i s of chines 
HN-5 and the HAFT-ll (Deadly) surface m i s s i l e . The Chinese 
a s s i s t a n c e in both the miss le programmes i s ev iden t , the 
AN2A i s bel ieved t o have an ind igenisa t ion content of 70?i 
with complete ind igen isa t ion before 1993, while the indige-
nous content of the HAFT remains unknown, thifough i t i s 
believed t o have a range of about 300 km. 
( j ) Nav^ : 
In the two and a hal f decades India and Pakis tan 
fought th ree wars with each o ther . All t h r ee Indo-Pak wars 
were probably the r e s u l t of Pak i s t an ' s bas ic need t o ju s t i fy 
the two nat ion theory and thereby i t s very e x i s t e n c e , since 
a secu la r , s t ab l e India c o n s t i t u t e s a s tanding negation of 
the philosophy which gave b i r t h to Pak i s tan . In an attempt 
t o combat I n d i a ' s growing s t a t u r e and t o draw a t t e n t i o n away 
from i t s own d e f i c i e n c i e s . P a k i s t a n ' s l eade r sh ip has resor ted 
in te r fe rence in I n d i a ' s i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s . I t has a l so ra i sed 
the Indian hegemonic bogey t o wean sympathy and m i l i t a r y 
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aid trom other na t ions . 
Tne army and the a i r - r o r c e nave remained che 
p r inc ipa l accors in a l l the Indo-Pak wars -brought so f a r . 
The l a s t war in 1971 witnessed the two navies playing a 
small but s i gn i f i can t r o l e . Consequently, Pakis tan appear; 
to have re -apprec ia ted the scope of the navy in the pursUu.^  
of i t s na t i ona l ob j ec t i ve s , and ass iduously followed a 
maritime po l i cy of modernization and expansion. As a r e s u l t 
of i t s post-1971 maritime s t r a t egy , the Pakis tan Navy has 
em.erged today as a leading maritime power in the Indian 
Ocean r eg ion , with the major par t of i t s naval a s s e t s being 
developed to provide i t with a formidable offensive capa-
b i l i t y . 
The Early Years (1947-72) : 
At t h e time of i t s c r ea t ion , the Royal Pakis tan Navy 
received lO ships and 3,200 men from the Royal Indian Navy. 
The ships included four f r i g a t e s , four minesweepers and 
four motor launches, while the manpower comprised 200 offic< 
and 3,000 s a i l o r s . In the ea r ly years , t h e Royal Pakis tan 
Navy made slow but steady progress . By 195 4, i t had added 
four des t roye r s to i t s f l e e t and had more than doubled i t s 
manpower t o 7,100 personnel ( including 600 o f f i c e r s ) . At 
the same t ime , the Government of Pakis tan r e so r t ed to 
vigorous lobbying for Us m i l i t a r y aid which r e su l t ed in 
t h e i r jo in ing the SEATO and CENTO, and the signing of the 
Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement between the US and 
Pakis tan governments on 19 May i954. 
In the Indo-Pak war of 1965, the US-leased submarine 
PNS Ghazi was deployed ex tens ive ly , but f a i l ed to see any 
1. Ka thpa l i s , P.N. , National Securi ty Pe r spec t i ve s , Lancer 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l , New Delhi , p . 44. 
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ac t ion . In the next war with India in 1971, the Pakistan 
Navy managed to notch i t s f i r s t ]d.ll when tow torpedoes, 
f i red from the submarine PNS Hangor, s t ruck the Indian f r i -
gate INS Khukri. The Pakis tan Navy, however, l o s t several 
ships in Indian naval ac t ion in the same war, including the 
submarine PNS CSiazi, the destroyer PNS Khyber and a mine-
sweeper ONS Muhafiz. The c rea t ion of Bangladesh further 
depleted the Pakis tan Navy v^ich thereby l o s t and depleted 
the Pak i s tan Navy. Nearly 40 per cent of i t s manpower and 
the shore es tabl ishments based in eas t while East Pakis tan 
were t r a n f e r r e d accordingly. The Indo-Pak war of 1971 seems 
to be the tu rn ing point in the growth of the Pakis tan Navy, 
which prepared i t s e l f t he rea f t e r for a g r e a t e r ro l e In the 
region. 
The P repa ra to ry years (1972-87) 
The e x i t of General Yahya Khan and h i s co t e r i e from 
the p o l i t i c a l scene a f te r the 1971, probably encouraged 
the Pak i s tan Navy to press the succeeding order for a 
greater r o l e . The value of a strong maritime c a p a b i l i t y 
in the p u r s u i t of P a k i s t a n ' s na t ional o b j e c t i v e s seems to 
have been b e t t e r appreciated by the new p o l i t i c a l order and, 
s i g n i f i c a n t l y , the Naval Headquarters was f i n a l l y shi f ted 
to the n a t i o n a l ' s c a p i t a l , Islamabad, on March 15, 1975. The 
Pakis tan Navy also prepared i t s e l f for modernisation and 
expansion, and appears to have adopted a maritime s t r a t egy 
v^ich would permit i t to develop i t s base s t e a d i l y and 
progress ive ly for t h i s purpose. 
The Expanding Years (1988 '^^^ onward) 
In the period a f te r 1987, the Pakis tan Navy undergone 
a major expansion. A glance at f igures 1 and 2 shows a sharp 
r i s e in a l l f i e l d s , v i z , tonnage and combat p o t e n t i a l , 
correspondingly, the manpower s t rength i s once again on the 
r i s e . The present expansion has thrust the Pakistan Navy 
into a leading maritime power in the Indian Ocean region, 
as i s evident from a comparison of the Indian Ocean navies 
(shown in table 1), 
The past few years have witnessed the Pakistan Navy 
coming of age, and i t s transitdon to s t a te of the ar t 
missile technology. I t has developed i t s submarine force to 
f i re the Harpoon submarine launched an t i - sh ip sea skimming 
miss i les , of range 130 km. This greatly enhances the Pakistan 
Navy's sea denial capabil i ty , and maritime offensive xx>wer. 
I t has also acquired 10 more frigates from the US and UK, 
which doubles the potency of i t s surface f leet and accords 
i t with a strong sea control capabil i ty. 
With the end of the cold war between the tvgo super-
powers, there was a poss ib i l i ty of the US discontinuing i t s 
strategy of maintaining Pakistan as a f ront l ine s t a t e . 
However, i t i s l ikely that the recent events in the Gulf 
may well have baled out Pakistan. 
Pakis tan 's Maritime Strategy : 
I t i s evident that Pakistan has formulated a clear 
and cohesive maritime strategy for a t ta ining i t s national 
object ives, and that the ongoing expansion of the Pakistan 
Navy comes a t the end of a careful planned and laborious 
period of preparation. 
In the c^se of Pakistan, th i s stands out more poig-
nantly on account^ of the limited maritime securi ty concerns, 
of the nation. Pakistan has only a 700 km coas t l ine , with 
about 250,000 sq.Jan, of Exclusive Economic Zone (EE2), I t 
does not possess any island t e r i t o r i e s , nor any known off-
shore a s se t s . The favourite cry of Pakistan for obtaining 
at tent ion and mili tary aid, for a long time now, has been 
24 
the bDgey of Indian hegemonic designs. In order to appreciate 
the baseless nature of t h i s cry, i t i s necessary to brief ly 
examine Ind ia ' s maritime security concerns. 
Pakistan has in the las t four decades pushed i t s 
mil i tary and po l i t i ca l envelope to the point where i t s 
weakness have become apparent. The '2arb-e-Momin' exercise 
in '89 and the Sind problems in early '90 indicate that the 
Army i s as yet arrogant, a carry over of the martial law 
days. More disturbing is the tendency of the Army to claim 
a capabil i ty they do not possess; and get advanturous on the 
basis of the i r claims. Which i s a decidedly dangerous thing. 
Bi la tera l re lat ions with India touched a new low in 
early 1990, with Pakistan aiding ant i - India subversives, 
and disputes on the Kashmir issue. Moreover, Pakistan 
continues to expand i t s mil i tary capab i l i t i e s beyond l eg i -
timate requirements. Even though i t i s evident that Pakistan 
cannot win a 'conventional* war against India they continue 
to prepare for t h i s eventuality. The r e su l t being that the 
ent i re South Asian region i s poised for an economically 
devastating arras race. Pakistan must seek to sort out 
b i l a t e ra l matters amicably without sabre r a t t l i n g . In the 
meantime Pakistan continues to arm i t s e l f and configure 
i t s armed forces for a possible conflict in the region. 
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PAKISTAN NAVAL DEVELOPMENT : POST 1971 
Year commissioned De-Commissioned 
1972 
1973 
19 74 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
198 9 
1990 
6 M i d g e t s u b m a r i n e s 
1 Daphne subnarine, 
2 Hainan FAC(G) 
2 G e a r i n g d e s t r o y e r s 
1 A g o s t a submar ine 
1 A g o s t a s u b m a r i n e 
2 G e a r i n g d e s t r o y e r s , 
2 H a i n a n F A C ( G ) 
4 Hegu m i s s i l e c r a t t 
1 c o u n r y d e s t r o y e r 
1 G e a r i n g d e s t r o y e r 
1 G e a r i n g d e s t r o y e r 
4 H u a n g f e r m i s s i l e c r a f t 
( A g o s t a s d e v e l o p e d f o r 
SSM Harpoon) 
2 Leander frigates, 
3 midget submarines 
(Daphnes d e v e l o p e d f o r 
SSM Harpoon) 
4 G a r c i a f r i g a t e s , 
4 Brooke f r i g a t e s 
2 p a t r o l c r a f t 
1 Type 16 f r i g a t e 
1 m i n e s w e e p e r 
1 Type 16 f r i n g a t e 
2 CR d e s t r o y e r s , 
1 CH d e s t r o y e r 
3 m i n e s w e e p e r s 
1 D ido c r u i s e r 
1 B a t t l e d e s t r o y e r 
SOURCE : J a n e ' s F i g h t i n g 1972-73 t o 1990-91 
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^ k ) Air Power s t r u c t u r e : 
Vftien P a k i s t a n was c r e a t e d in 1947, t h e a s s e t s of 
t h e e a s t w h i l e Royal I n d i a n Air Force was d i v i d e d between 
t h e two c o u n t r i e s i n t h e fo l lowing manner : 
I nd i a P a k i s t a n 
F i g h t e r Squadrons 60 20 
T r a n s p o r t Squadrons 05 10 
Equipment and s p a r e s were d i v i d e d on t h e b a s i s of 
one t h i r d of e v e r y t h i n g t o P a k i s t a n . P a k i s t a n Air Force 
( P A F ) was a l s o e s t a b l i s h e d a s an independent f o r c e . From 
t h a t d a t e onwards , t h e PAF has con t inued t o grow, both in 
q u a l i t y and q u a n t i t y . I t underwent a mass ive re -equipment 
and expans ion with American m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e programme 
a f t e r P a k i s t a n jo ined t h e C e n t r a l T r e a t y O r g a n i z a t i o n 
(CENTO) and South Eas t Asian T r e a t y O r g a n i z a t i o n (SEATO) 
i n 1955 b e s i d e s t h e j o i n t s e c u r i t y agreement w i th USA i n 
May 1954. The PAF, which had i n h e r i t e d i t s s t r u c t u r e from 
t h e I n d i a n Air Force (lAF) modelled on t h e B r i t i s h p a t t e r n , 
a l s o moved c l o s e r t o t h e American fo r ce s t r u c t u r e p a t t e r n s . 
Under t h i s American i n f l u e n c e , an Army A v i a t i o n Corps was 
c r e a t e d a s i n t e g r a l t o t h e P a k i s t a n army i n 1958 a f t e r i t s 
pe r sonne l and a i r c r e w were t r a i n e d in USA. The Naval Avia-
t i o n element was c r e a t e d i n 1975 with MR and ASW c a p a b i l i -
t i e s . However, t h i s e lement c o n t i n u e s t o be commanded by 
PAF o f f i c e r s : and PAF p r o v i d e s maintenance suppor t and 
i n i t i a l t r a i n i n g f a c i l i t i e s . 
P a k i s t a n ' s a g r e s s i o n and war wi th I n d i a i n 1965 led 
t o an American embargo on s u p p l i e s of arms t o P a k i s t a n . T h i s 
Sketch3: Air Power and Defence Bases 
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embargo was l i f t e d for a short period in October 1970 
which permit ted res tocking of spares and equipment t o a 
supply l eve l of 30 days a t the Air-base and s ix months 
reserves a t 'depot* l e v e l , besides resupply of F-104A 
S t a r f i g h t e r s and B-57B Canberra a i r c r a f t to make up for 
peacetime a t t r i t i o n e t c , Pakis tan also moved c lose to China, 
e spec i a l l y in the f i e ld of arms and equipment, and received 
generous m i l i t a r y arms supply, a s s i s t ance and aid in 1966, 
At the same t ime, Pakis tan s e t t l e d on a t h i r d , and com-
p a r a t i v e l y independent source of other weapons systems for 
i t s arms s u p p l i e s , v i z , Europe, e spec i a l l y France. This 
es tab l i shed a pa t t e rn of equipment for P a k i s t a i ' s a i r power 
which i s in evidence today, and which, ba r r ing some major 
developments in i n t e rna t i ona l r e l a t i o n s and a l ignments , i s 
l i k e l y to cont inue in the foreseable fu tu re . 
Another element in P a k i s t a n ' s a i r power has been the 
s ign i f i can t support from other Muslim coun t r i e s of Asia, 
both in kind and in cash to support arms a c q u i s i t i o n which 
expanded in a large way in 1967 with the Pakis tan-Saudi 
Arabia agreement. Concurrently, large sca le cooperation in 
the m i l i t a r y f i e ld with these count r ies has led to a s i g n i -
f i can t number of PAF a i r and ground crew being involved 
in t r a i n i n g and maintenance a c t i v i t i e s to a s s i s t these 
coun t r i e s . This has led to the twin advantage of bui ld up 
of valuable experience a t the cost of the r e c i p i e n t country, 
and a l so in an opportuni ty and valuable opera t iona l exper i -
ence to ope ra t e some of the equipment common to lAF ( e . g . 
Mig 2 1 , sU-7, Jaguar a i r c r a f t e t c ) : an oppor tuni ty PAF may 
not have been able to obta in o therwise . 
CC) Mi l i t a ry Expenditure 
Pak i s t an has a lso been rece iv ing m i l i t a r y equipment 
as aid from USA (under the Mi l i t a ry Assis tance Programme(MAP) 
in the l950-60s and more r e c e n t l y , the US $ 3.2 b i l l i o n 
25 
s e c u r i t y r e l a t e d economic and m i l i t a r y aid granted in 
1981, and $ 4.02 a id in 1987) as well as arms acqu i s i t i ons 
funded by Muslim s t a t e s , e spec ia l ly Saudi Arabia. I t a l so 
rece ive a s ign i f i can t quantum of m i l i t a r y equij»nent on 
' l e a s e ' , as indeed the recent a c q u i s i t i o n of a 8 Brooke/ 
Garcia c l a s s f r i g a t e s on lease from USA shows. An ana lys i s 
of m i l i t a r y expenditure in Pakistan tSe-e—5Urg4ire—34 ind ica tes 
t h a t : 
(a) Except for one year (1974) the m i l i t a r y expenditure 
has been progress ive ly increas ing in s p i t e of reduced 
na t iona l s ecu r i t y commitments a f te r East Pakis tan separated 
and became a sovereign s t a t e in 1971. 
(b) After a period of comparatively s t a b i l i z e d growth, 
during 1967-1978, the re has been a s i g n i f i c a n t upwards 
surge in the leve l of spending s t a r t i n g from 1978 going 
up s u b s t a n t i a l l y in 1979, when i t r e g i s t e r e d record 43 
per cent increase over the previous year . The high r a t e of 
growth coincided with the establishment of the new m i l i t a r y 
d i c t a t o r s h i p and growth of Islamic fundamentalism, A more 
s i g n i f i c a n t jump has taken place a f t e r 1986. During 1988-90 
m i l i t a r y expenditure experienced a 40 percent growth r a t e 
mostly under a democratic government and during a period 
when Indo-Pak r e l a t i o n s were showing p o s i t i v e s igns of 
improvement and the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan. 
(c) For over 20 years , Pak i s t an ' s annual m i l i t a r y expen-
d i t u r e has cons t i t u t ed on an average, over 6 per cent of 
i t s GNP, In recent years , i t has hovered c lose to 8 percent 
of the GNP. 
(d) Pa)d.stan 's m i l i t a r y expenditure may be expected to 
grow a t an annual r a t e of 10-15 percent (current values) 
by a most conservat ive es t imate . This could be s i g n i f i c a n t l y 
CJ *} A 
higher if the national government remains under mil i tary 
control/domination/influence and thereby sustain the 
mil i tary e l i t e and i t s concomitant effects . 
The above analysis is further borne out by other 
indicators of increasing mi l i ta r i sa t ion of Pakistan. 
Pakistan* s armed forces have increased by over 49 per cent 
since 1968 although i t s national security commitments 
s ignif icant ly reduced after the separation of East Pakistan 
in 1971. If the rais ing of the large reserves af ter 1972-
1973 i s also taken into account, the armed forces during 
the 20 years period (1968-1988) have grown by over 204 
percent - that i s , an annual average of 10.2 percent. 
Although the population of present Pakistan i s estimated 
to have regis tered a 22 percent increase between 1972 and 
1980, i t s per capita mil i tary expenditure had gone up 
progressively to a figure of $ 18.85 per person (see figur 
2) i . e . , a 200 percent increase by 1980, and had reached 
$ 24.8 by 1988 and onward. 
Arms transfer to Pakistan has also shown a spurt 
during the 19903, In the ten year period between 1967-76, 
to ta l arms transfer to Pakistan were valued at Us $ 831 
million (current dollars) : in the five years between 
1975-1979, Pal is tan imported arms valued at Us $ 875 
mill ion. The f i r s t package of Us aid of $ 3.2 b i l l ion 
security re la ted Economic and mil i tary aid in 1981 visualised 
50 percent for direct mil i tary aid alone. This implied an 
arms transfer to Pakistan with American aid alone amounting 
to US $ 160 million in the five year period between 1983-86. 
I t s tar ted receiving the second package worth $ 4.02 b i l l i on 
from 1987. This has meant nearly $ 2,100 million for arms 
acquisi t ions from USA under Foreign Mili tary Assistance 
(Ff4A) dui'ing the six year period. 
e 
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Maritime Role 
Pakis tan operates - a f l e e t of 4 At lant ique long-
range maritime p e t r o l a i r c r a f t which a re a l s o equipped for 
the s t r i k e r o l e with AM-3 9 Exocet sea-skimming a n t i - s h i p 
m i s s i l e s (AShM). I t i s scheduled t o ge t s i x P3c orion 
long-range maritime pa t ro l a i r c r a f t from Us Navy surplus 
s tocks . These w i l l be f i t t e d with the more capable Harpoon 
AShMs. Pak is tan a l s o maintains 12 Mirage 5P for maritime 
s t r i k e r o l e with AM-39 Exocet AshMs. I n a d d i t i o n , 6 Vtestland 
Sea King Mk-45 he l i cop te r s are a lso f i t t e d with AM-36 Exo-
c e t s . The maritime reconnaissance s t r i k e force ava i l ab le t o 
Pakis tan during t h e 1990s would be t he second l a r g e s t (next 
t o Aus t r a l i a ) i n the Indian Ocean l i t t o r a l during the 1990s. 
At the tu rn of the centi iry, the At lan t iques may provide the 
• second-s t r ing*, 
Early Warning and Air Defence 
PAP has maintained an e f f i c i e n t e a r l y warming 
coverage with mobile observer u n i t s which i s now p rogres s i -
vely l inked t o automated a i r defence command and cont ro l 
system. Six Westinghouse A N / T P S - 4 3 3-D radar EW/GCI systems 
were acqui red . PAF has a l so acquired a la rge number of low-
level e a r l y warning radar systems t o provide a near complete 
coverage of a l l of Punjab and other e s s e n t i a l areas of the 
country with adequate overlaps t o ca t e r for redundancy e t c . 
Automatic data processing system would s i g n i f i c a n t l y enhance 
the c a p a b i l i t y of the a i r ctefence ccMrroand and cont ro l system, 
In October 1989, Pakis tan e s t ab l i shed i t s Army Air 
Defence Command i n addi t ion to the e x i s t i n g PAP a i r 
Defence Command. I t made vigorous e f f o r t s t o upgrade the 
a i r defence system af ter I974i By the e a r l y 1990s, as many 
as 80 high a id low-looking r a d a r s , connected by data l inks 
and automated computerised t ransmiss ion t o the sector 
ope ra t ions . 
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140 
23 
04 
-3 5 
06 
16 
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04 
20+20 
162+20 
H e l i c o p t e r s : 
P a k i s t a n has a t o t a l f l e e t of h e l i c o p t e r s a s under 
Air Force Navy Army T o t a l 
A l o u e t t e I I I 04 04 
Supe r -F re ion 0 4 
Super Puma(SA-330 j ) -
Sea King MK 45 - 06 
Mi-8 
SA/IAR/UH-IH/Bell 
205/206 
YBman HH 438 0 4 
AH-IS - • 
T o t a l 12 10 
Force L e v e l s : 
F o r e c a s t of f o r ce l e v e l s i s more d i f f i c u l t t o 
p r e d i c t e s p e c i a l l y over a twenty year p e r i o d s i n c e t h e y 
i nvo lve f a c t o r s l i k e t h e v e r y na tu re of n a t i o n a l l e a d e r -
s h i p , t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n s and p r e j u d i c e s , i n t e r a c t i o n of 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s and o ther imponderable and 
u n q u a n t i f i a b l e p a r a m e t e r s . However, f o r c e l e v e l s may a l s o 
be t r e a t e d a s p a r t of an e v o l u t i o n a r y p r o c e s s b rough t about 
by t h e i n t e r a c t i o n of a complex i ty of f a c t o r s which n o r -
ma l ly undergo on ly m a r g i n a l changes i n t h e r a t e of e v o l u -
t i o n a r y p r o c e s s . An a t t e m p t a t f o r e c a s t can , t h e r e f o r e , 
be made, based on t h e h i s t o r i c a l c o n t e x t . 
Throughout t h e y e a r s of independence , P a k i s t a n ' s 
p e r c e p t i o n s , r e g a r d l e s s of t h e n a t u r e and p e r s o n a l i t y of 
i t s l e a d e r s h i p , have been observed wi th a s e c u r i t y concern 
viewing I n d i a as i t s p r imary a d v e r s a r y . T h i s i s e s s e n c e 
has evolved from a c r i s i s of i d e n t i t y in P a k i s t a n which. 
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while i t may reduce in i t s in tensi ty , can hardly be 
expected to disappear in the foreseeable furture. As a 
matter of fac t , the very process of mi l i t a r i sa t ion of 
Pakistan further heightens t h i s c r i s i s . The independence 
of Bangladesh in 1971, in effect , improved Pakistanis 
security s i tuat ion: i t vras reduced in size and population 
but not in mil i tary strength and was left with a geo-
po l i t i ca l ly cohesive unit and mi l i t a r i l y a more compact 
and lesser area to defend. However, inspi te of a better 
security s i tua t ion , Pakistan 's mi l i ta r iza t ion , in fact , 
increased after 1971. The significant growth of Pakistan 's 
mil i tary forces (as indicated below in respect of i t s 
Army) can thus only be explained by factors of deep-rooted 
mil i tary e l i t e jealously guarding i t s privileged position 
in society and a heightening of the c r i s i s of ident i ty 
in Pakistan and a value threat posed by Indian socio-
po l i t i ca l structure : factors which, short of a revolu-
t ion a l ter ing the course of events, are l ike ly to infleunce 
mil i tary force levels l ike along the evolutionary path 
charted so far : 
Pakistan Army 1970-71 1980-81 1989-90 
Total strength 300,000 
Infantry Divisions 11 
Armoured Divisions 2 
Independent Armoured Bde 1 
Independent Infantry Bde 
Air Defence Bde 1 
Ar t i l l e ry Bdes 2 
Armoured Recce Regts 
Special Services Group - - 6 
Army Aviation Squadrons - 6 6 + Indep. 
f l ights 
Contd, . . , 
408,000 
16 
2 
4 
4 
2 
6 
6 
480,000 
(+500,000) 
17 
2 
4 
8 
3 
8 
6 
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Aircraf t 
Tanks 
APC3 
20 
500 
100 
176 
1065 
550 
255 
1750 + 
800 + 775 
In e f f e c t , a 40 per cent increase in the Army's 
ac t ive s t r eng th too^ place in the 10 years a f te r the 1971 
war, a f t e r which Pakis tan was a c t u a l l y not respons ib le for 
the s e c u r i t y of i t s e rs twhi le Eastern Wing with 93 mi l l ion 
people, which now maintains an 103,000 s t rong armed force . 
The inc rease i s maintained in the t rend in the past two 
increase i s of much grea te r order i f r e s e r v e s and m i l i t a r y 
personnel serving abroad are a lso taken i n t o account. During 
1990-92 Pak i s t an wi l l add 775 APCS (Armoured Personnel 
Carr ie rs ) of M113-A2 type increasing the s t rength of APCS 
t o 1975. The armour (tanks) and APC r ep re sen t the s t r i k e 
elements and a l so t he focus of a i r power opera t ions - both 
h o s t i l e and f r i end ly . 
C^VY) ) Nuclear Capab i l i t y : 
Assessment of the a i r t h r e a t w i l l not be va l id without 
taking i n to account the prospect of nuclear c apab i l i t y of 
Pak i s tan . As and when Pakis tan achieves t h i s c a p a b i l i t y , i t s 
choice of de l i ve ry method against s t r a t e g i c t a r g e t s wi l l 
remain s e r i a l and the vehic le wi l l remain pr imar i ly based 
on manned a i r c r a f t , at l eas t during t h i s century . Given 
the present t rend of PAF reequipment, both Mirage and F-ie 
a i r c r a f t could be the log ica l candida tes . (Mirage I l l s of 
the French Air Force are capable of de l i ve ry of 25 KT 
t a c t i c a l nuclear weapons). PAF may be expected t o r e t a i n 
i t s opt ions for high a l t i t u d e de l ivery or a low-al t i tude 
manoeuving, one using the toss-bombing technique for which 
the F-16A's nav-a t tack system has been optimised. This would 
make the t a s k of a i r defences t i m e - c r i t i c a l and extremely 
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d i f f i c u l t without a complete day/night coverage by 
airborne e a r l y warning system and in teg ra ted automated 
a i r defence command and cont ro l systems, e s p e c i a l l y since 
the t a r g e t for nuclear a t t a c k may not be a purely m i l i t a r y 
one. 
At the same t ime, Pakis tan has been developing 
m i s s i l e c a p a b i l i t i e s . In 1987 i t i n i t i a t e d i t s b a l l i s t i c 
mi s s i l e development programme. On April 25 , 1988, i t 
launched a b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e produced by the SUPARCO 
(Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission) which 
was claimed t o be capable of reaching Delhi and Bombay -
t h a t i s , a range in excess of 800 kms. This was noted by 
the then Senator and now US Vice P r e s i d e n t , Dan Quayle, 
in , h i s May 1988 repor t t h a t , Pakis tan took a quantum lead 
forward l a s t month in i t s e f fo r t s t o develop i t s own 
b a l l i s t i c m i s s i l e a r s e n a l . . . , * The m i s s i l e was developed 
apparent ly with a s s i s t ance from China and the Federa ' . 
Republic of Germany, Pakis tan a l so launched a ' m u l t i -
stage* rocket in to deep space on 10 January 1989. The miss i le 
c a r r i e d a 150 kg payload t o 640 kns a l t i t u d e and the pay-
load was claimed t o have been recovered over na t iona l 
t e r r i t o r y . The height-payload combination would suggest 
a range of 2,200 km or more in su r face - to - sur face b a l l i s -
t i c mode. Pakis tan a l so t e s t e d i t s 'Hatf - I* (80 kms) and 
• H a t f - I I ' , which i s apparent ly based on the Chinese version 
of Scud-B design and can be developed fur ther t o ranges 
of 600-1000 kms (as I r aq with a l esse r technologica l access 
and c a p a b i l i t y did with i t s 300 kms 'Al Hussain* t o develop 
the 650 km range ' Al Abbas' version by g ra f t i ng the pro-
pe l l en t fuel tank from the e a r l i e r v e r s i o n ) . Chinese 
a s s i s t ance in fur ther m i s s i l e development cannot be ru led 
9 S'i' 
out. I t I s a lso i n s t ruc t i ve t o note t h a t Pak i s t an ' s 
miss i le programme, i n i t i a t e d in 1987, was placed under 
Dr. A.Q. Khan, the father of P a k i s t a n ' s nuclear weapon 
programme and s t i l l heading i t . 
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^f) Ind ia -S r i Lanka Relat ions 
At the t i p of the Indian peninsula, Sr i Lanka occupies 
a pos i t ion of considerable s t r a t e g i c importance overlooking 
as i t does the Sea route from the s t r a i t s of Malacca t o the 
Gulf and the Suez Canal. For India the Is land assumes s i gn i -
ficance from the fact t h a t a l l Indian Naval and shipping 
t r a f f i c , which i s not inconsiderable , must move around the 
Is land. All t r a f f i c from the eas tern seaboard ports to the 
Suez or from the Western por t s t o Japan and south East Asia 
must a l so pass by the i s l and . The proximity of the island 
and the in ternec ine conf l i c t involving the minority Tamils 
and the Sinhalese has repercussions in Ind ia , espec ia l ly in 
the Southern Indian s t a t e of Tamil Nadu, 
Surveying the externa l milieu of Lanka's foreign 
policy decis ion - making Kodlkars iden t i f i ed India as one 
2 
inevi tab le factor in Sr i Lanka's World out look. He high-
l ighted two important face t s of Colombo's perception of India 
and t i e s with China and Pakis tan to counter-balance Sri Lanka's 
3 
unequal r e l a t i onsh ip with India . Sr i Lanka adopted common 
approaches with India on i ssues as Indonesia, ( l949), the 
Suez C r i s i s (1956), Hungray (1956), disarmament problems, 
the s ta tue of mi l i t a ry p a c t s , but in mat ters of I n d i a ' s 
r e l a t i o n s with Pakistan and china, Sr i Lanka s ter red i t s e l f 
c lear of Kashmir issue observed an overa l l n e u t r a l i t y in 
4 
Indo-Paklstan wars . As regards to China, she adopted a dual 
stand and entered into an agreement with Beijing in 1952 
1. Josh i , Majoj, "Wlndo t o Sri Lanka", Indian Defence Review, 
Vol. 11-12, Ju ly , 1989. p . 104. 
2. Shalt on Kodi Kere, Foreign Pol icy of Sri Lanka, A Third 
^•torld Perspec t ive , Delhi , 1982, pp. 17x19. 
3. I b i d . , p . 18. 
4. Except perhaps provision of refusing facilities to 
Pakistan Airlines on way between West and East Pakistan. 
5. Kodikere, n. 1, pp. 60-65. 
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and instead of declaring China as an agressor in the 1962 
Sino-Indian war, summoned the Colombo powers to take the 
role of mediator. 
India and Sri Lanka solved the citizenship question 
raised by the problem of emigrant Indian labours, settled in 
2 
Sri Lanka through an agreement in 1964 and the maritime 
boundary agreement also came into effect in 1974. The 
geostrategic environment in which Indo~3ri Lanka relations 
have bsen taking place has undergone changes in some res-
pects in recent years due to a number of factors, the most 
important of which being changes in the terram of global 
politics, changes in the strategic scenario in South Asia 
itself. The new security relationship between India and Sri 
Lanka which was brought about by the escalation of Sri Lanka's 
4 
ethnic crisis after July, 1983. K.M. Paniker, and even 
politicians like Pattabhai Sitaramayya, had advocated the 
strategic unity of India and Sri Lanka and the closer union 
between the two countries for strategic reasons. A retired 
commander of the Indian Navy commented 
"Sri Lanka is ag important to India as Eire is 
to the United Kingdom or Taiwan to China....As 
long as Sri Lanka is friendly or neutral India 
has nothing to worry about but. If there be any 
danger of the island falling under the domina-
tion of a power hostile to India, India can 
not tolerate such situation endangering her 
territorial integrity".^ 
1. I b i d . , p . 27. 
2. Foreign Affairs Record, October 1964, pp. 263-265. 
3 . Ceylon Daily News, Colombo, March 27, 1981. 
4. SheIton, U. Kodikere, south Asian S t ra t eg ic Issues ; Sr i 
Lankan Perspec t ives , sage Pub l i ca t ions , New Delhi , p . 13. 
5. shelton U. Kodikare, Indo-Ceylon Rela t ions since 
Independence, Ceylon I n s t i t u t e of world Af fa i r s , 1965, 
pp. 32-35. 
6. Kaul Ravi, The IndianOcean, A S t ra teg ic Posture for India 
in T.T. Poulese, ed. Indian Ocean Power Rival ry , Mew Delhi 
In t e rna t iona l Publ ica t ion Services, 1974, p . 66. 
?l 
It was a well known fact that India's Security-
interests are coterminous with Sri lanka, and not vice 
versa India is Sri Lanka* s near neighbour hence threat 
perceptions of India are always present in Sri Lanka. 
Both India and Sri Lanka have common geographical, 
cultural, social and historicallinks. Sri Lanka came into 
contact with the west in the sixteenth country and was 
annexed by the butch from the Portguese in the middle of 
the 17th century. Sri Lanka became a Crown Colony under the 
Treaty of America in 1802 and achieved dominion statue in 
February, 1948. The migration of Indian indentured labourers 
to Ceylon started in the middle of the l9th century and in 
195 4 their number together with the number of persons who had 
migrated to Ceylon from India for business and other purposes 
2 
constituted nearly ten percent. 
India's relations with Sri Lanka has always been 
cordial, but, the question of the statues of persons of 
Indian origin in Sri Lanka has caused friction between the 
two nations. The Tamils want to enjoy the fundamental rights 
including the right to freedom of speech, expression, 
assembly religions worship and right to form trade union 
and associations. The United National party had promised to 
placate 1.2 million Tamils of Indian origin who were 
3 
defranchised in 1948, which the LITTE 6o not agree Sri 
Lanka became the member of SAARC but also desired to be member 
4 
of ASEAN while there was disagreement between India and 
1. Dher, Sri, An Anatomy of the Trincomali Deal, strategic 
Analysis, June, 1984, p. 242. 
2. Sen, Kumar Asit, International Relations, S. Chand and 
Company, N. Delhi, 1993 p. 614, Bindra, s.S. India and Her 
Neighbours, Deep and Deep Publications, New Delhi, p.293. 
3. Ib id . 
4. Cohen, P. Stephen, The Securi ty of South Asia, Vis taar 
Pub l i ca t ions , N. Delhi, p. 14, 
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Sri Lanka in international affairs, their bilateral rela-
tions were dominates throughout by the protected problem 
presented by the people of Indian origin in Sri Lanka. •'" 
Sri Lanka passed some legislative measure which is 
effect, denied citizenship or voting rights to the majority 
of its Indian immigrants. The citizenship Act of 1948 and 
the Indian and Pakistan Act, 1949 restricted citizenship 
claims to those who could prove their eligibility through 
2 
descent or contineous residence since 1939. In 1964 an 
agreement was reached between Prime Minister Lai Bahadur 
Shastri and sirimavo Bandaranaike which established for the 
settlement of 875000 persons - 300000 to be granted Sri Lankan 
Citizenship and 5,25,000 to be repatriated to India within 
a period of 15 years. Meanwhile, Sri Lankan Government agreed 
not to discriminate against those leaving and that the faci-
lities vould be accorded to them as other citizens until 
3 
the time for their departure. 
The demands of the Tamils remained generally unresolved 
and all the Tamil groups were forced to make a Tamil United 
Front in 1973. So.r.e Tamil Youths dissatisfied with the 
non-violent policies of the T.U.L.F. took up arous in the 
name of the same cause. Neelam Tirunchvelam, a prominent 
Tamil Lawyer in Colombo said "Our old conception of Sri 
Lanka as a liberal and Secular state is shered by fewer 
4 
and fewer people. Even Indian Tamils could not prove more 
helpful to Lankan Tamils. Inspite of the hopes earlier raised 
1. Appadorai A., India's Foreign Policy and Relations, south 
2. Ibid. • 
3. For complete test, See Ceylon Treaty Series No, 5, 1965 
Also Coelho, No. 172, p"^  132. 
»^ Observer, London, June 4, 1986. 
5. Amrit Bazar Fatrika, Calcutta, September 23, 1986. 
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weapons was solved through government to government 
negotiations with Pakistan and China . Us, 7th Fleet 
ships of loaded arms and ammunition and also helped train 
Sri Lankan Security forces. France Pressee in Madras 
declared that the November 10 to 14 port visit by four US 
ships led by the aircraft carrier Kittyhawk was not a meer 
goodwill call, but, part of a more to strengthen the armed 
2 3 
forces not only this Colombo purchased arms from Issael. 
Sri Lanka became south Asia's top arms market due to continued 
violence owing to Tamil Separatists crusade. Sri Lanka became 
a Central hut of sale and purchase from a needle to a battle-
4 
ship Sri Lanka acquired military equipment from Britain also 
to combat Tamil querillas. Britain supplied nine 'Congar' 
petrol boats to be used in Palk - Straits off the northern 
c 
Coast and s i x f a s t naval p e t r o l b o a t s were r e c e i v e d from 
6 
I s r a i l Jagewardene appealed t o t h e west for arms t o money 7 
and moral suppor t t o f i g h t t h e Tamil m i l i t a n t s . 
Marit ime Boundries 
S r i Lanka being an i s l a n d her n a t u r a l boundr ies 
a re t h e Sea, but i n t h e n o r t h , and in the n o r t h - w e s t e r n and 
n o r t h - e a s t e r n s e c t o r s , she shared a Common mari t ime boundry 
with I n d i a . The wate rs in t h e Pa lk Bay and P a l k s t r a i t s 
between t h e two c o u n t r i e s has been d e l i m i t e d by t h e Boundry 
Agreement of 1974, i . e . "Agreement between I n d i a and S r i 
Lanka on t h e Boundry in h i s t o r i c wate rs between t h e two 
1. Bamgkok P o r t , Bangkok, May 20, 1985. 
2 . Indones ia Times, December 2 , 1985 
3 . Hindu, Madras, J a n u a r y 25 , 1986. 
4 . T r i b u n e , Chandigarh, August 30, 1985. 
^' P a t r i o t , New D e l h i , May 2 1 , 1985 . ' 
6. Assam T r i b u n e , G o h a t i , May 2 1 , 1985. 
7. P a t r i o t , New D e l h i , May 12, 1955. 
Hf)3 
by the Sri Lankan and Indian Governments comming c loser 
indica t ions do not provide for the optimism Tamil minority 
groups demanded a separate s t a t e for the Tamil dominated 
d i s t r i c t s in the Is land nationa lying just 40 miles of the 
2 
southern Coast of India , The Lankan Government in order to 
solve the e thnic problem decided to form Provinc ia l Government 
3 
similar to those of India and Pakis tan. As the to r tuous , 
Indian mediated negot ia t ions on devising a p o l i t i c a l s e t t l e -
ment to the Sri Lanka e thnic problem wind on the Liberai ion 
Tigers of Tamil Felan (LTTTE) which humbled the Tamil Eelam 
Liberation Organisation (TELO). 
The Lankan Army planned to major offensive action 
against the quarre l a c t i v i t i e s . The warning not ices were 5 dropped from the a i r by he l i cop te r s throughout the Ja f tne . 
The Deputy Minister for Teaching requested for a United 
action against te r ror ism and said tha t the whole country 
should r e a l i s e tha t i t has t o fight the war together . The 
minis ter for secur i ty Athulathmudali declared tha t the army 
7 
would take act ion aga ins t t e r r o r i s t s . A Innovative programme 
was i n i t i a t e d by the Minis t ry of Planning t o motivate youths 
p 
for development work and leave t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t i e s . 
Sri Lanka solved the problem of finding weapons for 
i t s secur i ty forces t o f ight s epa ra l i s t Tamil q u e r r i l l e s by 
obtaining arms from Pakis tan . The .^problem of finding modern 
1. Assam Tribune (Gohali) December 20, 1986. 
2. Hong Kong Standard, Hongkong; October 30, 1956. 
3 . Morning News, Colombo, September 30, 198 5. 
4. Times of India , New Delhi , December 19, 1986. 
5. Telegraphe, Calcut ta , April 6, 1986. 
6. SUN, Sri Lanka, November 16, 1985. 
7. Telegraph, Calcut ta , June 5, 1986 
8. Indonesia Times, September 15, 1986. 
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countr ies and re la ted mat te r s" . This demarcates the boundry 
in the waters from Adams Bridge to Pakk S t r a i t s . The Second 
Agreement in 19 76, i . e . "The Agreement between Indian and 
Sri Lanka on the Maritime Boundry between the two count r ies 
in the gulf of Maaunar and the Bay of Bengal i . e . to the 
west and eas t r e spec t ive ly . The Agreement of 1974 has become 
important due to the d ispute r e l a t i n g to Kachchatives i s land . 
This is land l i e s in the Pa Ik s t r a i t s and was apportioned to 
Sri Lanka as the boundry l ine was drawing jus t one mile to 
the west of i s land . The Agreement, refered to the ' h i s t o r i c a l 
waters ' and they were accepted as such by both the governments 
at the i n i t i a l s tage; subsequently, by a Proclamation under 
Maritime zones Law, the waters on Sri Lanka side of the 
boundry l ine have been declared ' h i s t o r i c water of Sri Lanka', 
and have been further sub-divided into " in t e rna l waters" 
and t e r r i t o r i a l Sea", i . e . the waters on the Sri Lanka side 
of the Palk s t r a i t s and Palk Bay upto Adams Bridge, are 
demarcated as in te rna l waters of Sri Lanka, and the waters 
in the Gulf of Manner upto the t i p of Kalpit iya on the water 
Coast as T e r r i t o r i a l sea. Sri Lanka has declared i t s r igh t 
on the new island and have based pa r t l y on the f indings of a 
case decided by Madras High Court. In Anna Kuraaru P i l l a i V 
Muthupaya decided by Madras High Court in 1903 i t was declared 
tha t the Kings of Sri Lanka had exploited the sedentary 
f i s h r i e s in the Gulf of Mannar i . e . Pea r l s and Chank f i s h r i e s , 
from time immemorial and a reference was made to a king of 
Sri Lanka having sent a chank to emperor Ashok of Ind ia , as 
present . 
The 1974 Agreement s t a t e s tha t each of the country 
shal l have sovereignty and exclusive j u r i s d i c t i o n and control 
over the waters , i s l a n d s , cont inenta l shelf and subsoil 
f a l l ing on i t s own side of the boundry. Kachchalive i s one 
of the i s lands on Sri Lanka's side hence f a l l s under the 
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control of Sri Lanka and in view of Ar t i c l e 5 of the 
Agreement India has no r i g h t s t o free passage. 
LTTE and I n d i a ' s Securi ty 
In a l e t t e r to Prime Minister Premdasa in 1979 the 
Liberat ion Tigers of Tamil Eelan (LTTE) claimed. 
'We are nei ther murderers not cr iminals or v io len t 
f ana t i cs on the cont rary , vre are revolu t ion-
a r i e s committed in revolut ionary p o l i t i c a l p r a c t i c e . 
We represent the most powerful extra-par l iamentary 
l i be ra t ion movement." 
Sri Lanka had shows p r o c l i v i t y to s t ee r an independent 
course in South Asian a f f a i r s v i s - a - v i s i t s northern neighbour, 
as was evident in the Sino-Indian and Indo-Pak c o n f l i c t s . In 
the ea r ly e igh t i e s the influence of the U.S.A. and i t s 
European a l l i e s had been increasing ra ther r ap id ly as Sri 
Lanka under Jayawardane turned up them for weaponary and 
other a id in re turn for the VDA broadcasting f a c i l i t i e s in 
Northern Sr i Lanka and i t s Trincomalee o i l tank farm and 
harbour f a c i l i t i e s . That was seen by Indian policy makers 
as a t h r ea t to i t s nat ional secur i ty sabotaging t h i s s e l l - ou t 
became i t s immediate goal and m i l i t a r i s i n g Sr i Lanka Tamil 
discontent a ready means and method manipulation. Added to 
t h i s was the d i s t ance , d i s t r u s t and d i s l i k e between JRJ and 
India Gandhi. 
Sr i Lankan Chauvinism undoubtedly had brought 
considerably misery to Sr i Lanka's Tamils extimated to be 
2 
about 4,60,000 and put grea t s t r a i n on the s t a t e s economy 
psyche and even p o l i t i c s . Tamil m i l i t a n t s both Sri Lankan 
and loca l have impinged on p o l i t i c s , and have resul ted in 
large scale smuggling gun-running and manufacture of des-
t r uc t i ve war l ike mater ia l s with corresponding increase in 
1. sardesh Pande, LTTE and Indias Securi ty Indian Defence 
Review, Lancer I n t e r n a t i o n a l , Delhi , p . 46. 
2. Bangkok Post , Bangkok, September 30, 1986. 
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propagation of violence. 
The U.S.A. in violation of Indo-Sri Lanka Accord 
has succeeded in getting facility for Vol. broadcasting 
near P^ uttalara, South of Mannar and in keeping out India 
from the Trincomalee tank farm. Despite the LTTE* s 
thoughtless slaughter of Muslims in Arnparai, Batticoloa 
and Trincomalee, no Islamic country has raised its voice. 
The LTTE had mesmerised its people not only in Sri Lanka 
but also in Tamil nadu. Amidst the LTTE brand of obstinate 
aberration and violence, whose danger is spreading to the 
People's War Group in Andhra. The United Liberation Front 
of Assam in Assam, possibly Khalistan in Bombay and Naxals 
in Karnataka and it has succeeded in persuading us to see 
it busying itself in breaking up a slice off our country. 
India and Tamil Nadu are realising how deep and wide the 
LTTE pdison has spread in society and polity, social, 
ethnic, linguistic, religions and tamilial ties have been 
laced with centuries old economic of smuggling and fishing 
'smuggling through the coast is not new and can not be 
2 
controlled by any one Sri Lankans have enough money to 
find appropriate shelter and merge with Indian population. 
The Defence 
The army was cons t i tu ted on 10 October, 1949. I t 
cons i s t s of 5 infantry br igades , 2 reconnaissance, 2 f ie ld 
a r t i l l e r y and 1 engineer regiments and 1 s igna ls b a l l a l i o n . 
Equipment includes 18 Saladin Air mounted cars and 15 Ferrent 
Scout Cars with 40000 ac t ive r e s e r v i s t s . 
1. The Indian Express, Ju ly 30, l99 l ' 
2. The Times of India , Ju ly 22, 1991, 
NAVY 
The navy was constituted on December 9, 1950. It 
comprises 4 surveillance command ship, 2 new Colombo -
built off shore patrol vessels 6 patrol gunboats, 50 small 
patrol boats, 2 landing craft and 2 fast passenger craft. 
It has 500 officer s and 6000 ratings. 
Air Force 
The Air force was formed on October 10, 1950 and is 
equipped with 4 squadrons comprise 9 SF-260 and 4 cessne 
150/152 Trainer, 2 Iterons, 3 Hs 748, 6 Chinese built 
Y-123 2 Chinese Y-8s, 1 Super King 3, Cessne Sky Masters, 
1 421 and one cessne cardinal for general transport with 
3700 officers. 
CHAPTER - V 
GLIMPSES OF INDIA 
ir>^ 
(A) India and South Asia 
There are three cont inents on the periphery of the 
Indian Ocean, Asia to the North, Aus t ra l i a t o the East and 
Africa t o the west. By reasons of the sheer number of coun-
t r i e s and of the population involved, Asia looms l a rges t in 
the s t r a t e g i c equation, and India , as the biggest and most 
populous country emerges as the country most l i k e l y t o seek 
a major ro le in the r eg ion . In terms of s i z e , resources , 
technology and m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y t he re i s an inherent 
imbalance in t h i s region with India , containing 800 mi l l icn 
people and demonstrated pre-eminence in the i n d u s t r i a l and 
t echn ica l spheres a committed candidate for regional hegemony. 
India has been so placed in south Asia t ha t she has 
common border with a l l her south Asian neighbours, while 
none of her neighbours, shere border with each o t h e r . Such 
a geographical context lends the nat ions of t h i s region with 
a pecul iar s i tua t ion with socio-eccncroic and p o l i t i c a l 
consequences for a l l of them, south Asia has been bestowed by 
na ture a shared where - wi tha l of na tu ra l r e sources . In tha t 
sense , i t i s a composite e n t i t y . The Indian sub-continent 
comprises v i r t u a l l y the whole of south Asia, s r i Lanka and 
Maldives being a t the outer fr inge of t h i s geographical 
r e a l i t y . Apart from common inher i tance in terms of c u l t u r e , 
t r a d i t i o n and socio-economic and p o l i t i c a l l egac i e s , the 
countr ies of the sub-continent have more th ings in conmcai 
than i r r i t a n t s among them. Despite of the l i n g u i s t i c and 
r e l i g i o u s d i v e r s i t i e s and differences in mil ieu in d i f fe ren t 
pa r t s of south Asia region there does e x i s t a unique cu l t u r a l 
2 
uni ty in the sub-cont inent . The s t a t e s in t h i s region - India, 
1. Bha t t i , Maqbool Ahmad, " s t r a t e g i c Balance in south Asia**^ 
S t ra t eg ic Studies, A Quarterly journa l of the I n s t i t u t e 
of s t r a t e g i c Studies, Islamabad, v o l . XIV, No. 4, summer 
1992, p . 21 . 
2, Narain Virendra, "India and the south Asian Region : Hege-
monism versus Mutually Beneficial Rela t ionship , south Asian 
Studies , University of Rajasthan^ Ja ipu r , v o l . 25, No» 1 ^ 2 , 
r99(57~P« 65, 
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Pakis tan , Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldieves 
belong to what Curzon conceived as the Indian anpire and are 
geographically compact. 
H i s t o r i c a l l y , the south-Asian sub-continent has 
experienced a constant stream of invasions and migra t ions , 
mostly through the mountain passes of the north-western 
region, now incorporated i n t o Pakis tan , scene four to f ive 
thousand years ago, one branch of fa i r - skinned Aryans moved 
in to the sub-cont inent , pushing the dark skinned Dravidians 
towards the Deccan in the south, where they cons t i tu ted a 
d i f f e ren t e thnic e n t i t y , subsequently the Seythians, Par th ians , 
Greeks, Huns, Turkish, Mughals and Arabs a l so came i n t o the 
sub-continent providing the bas i s for a m u l t i p l i c i t y of 
languages and c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s . The l a s t foreign occupies 
were the Br i t i sh , who came by the sea, e s t ab l i sh ing t h e i r 
suze r ta in ty over the e n t i r e region by the 19th century. The 
two cen tu ry ' s of B r i t i sh Rule r e s u l t e d in the emergence of 
s u b s t a n t i a l Chris t ian m i n o r i t i e s . This mixture of e thnic 
c u l t u r a l and r e l i g i o n s t r a d i t i o n s gave b i r t h to many disputes 
t h a t e f fec t the i n t e r a c t i o n between them. 
The Br i t i sh Raj was conscious of China's south Asian 
connections and s t a t u s , and of Tibet and sia Kiang as 
( secur i ty) zones of south Asia, e s p e c i a l l y a f t e r China's 
attempt ea r ly in t h i s country to form a Himalayan Confederacy 
with Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and Tibet under Chinese patronage 
as they were a l l "subjects of China"; hence the presence of 
Br i t i sh consula tes , t rad ing marts , l i s t e n i n g pos t s , and s o l -
d ie r s in three Tibetan towns, and in Kashgar in sinkiang 
u n t i l 1947. In geographic terms, both car tographic map 
1, Chaube, S.K., "Uhderstanding south Asia, A Superstructural 
Analysis" , south Asia some Ref lec t ions , Aalekh Publ ishers , 
J a i p u r , p , 1, 
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pro jec t ions (Hercators showing correc t shapes and Arno P e t e r s ' 
showing cor rec t s izes) leave no doubt t ha t Tibet and sinking 
were geographically contiguous t o south Asia, The same i s 
t rue of the spring-board area south of Hindikush i t belongs 
e t h n i c a l l y and l i n g u i s t i c a l l y to South Asia, with another 
3000 k i l aue te r s of coninon border with present day Pak i s t an ' s 
1 North-west Front ier Province, 
The other reg iona l misconception pe r t a ins t o the 
so-ca l led Indian ocean. In ancient t imes, even in the Indian 
epic Mahabharat, t h i s waterbody was ca l l ed 'Dakina samundra'. 
Unti l not long ago the Arabs who used t h i s Ocean for t rade 
ca l l ed i t Al Bahar Al Muhit (the enclosed ocean), the Arabian 
sea being the sea of Fars (Pe r s i a ) , and the Bay of Bengal 
being the Sea of Hind or Sea of Harkund, I t was only the 
B r i t i s h Raj and i t s global maritime power tha t conceived i t 
as an Indian Imperial Lake, The sub-continent contains a 
quar te r of the human r ace , densely packed and charac ter ized 
by the " t r i p l e c r i s e s of slow economic development, i n su f f i -
c i en t p o l i t i c a l i n t eg ra t ion and a d i sorder ly arms race (which) 
2 
with and feed upon each o the r , 
India has t o play a more magnanimous r o l e considering 
her c e n t r a l posi t ion in south Asia. On some occasions I n d i a ' s 
response t o the developments in the neighbourhood have not 
been upto mark but , qu i t e often her response could not get 
the desired react ion from her neighbours as in the case of 
India-Sr i Lanka accord, which India entered honestly and 
lo s t money and power but , could get b r ickba ts from her 
ungreatful neighbour. The repeated and much debated a l l ega t ions 
1 . Hussain, Noor A,, I nd i a ' s Regional Policy ; s t r a t e g i c and 
secur i ty Dimensions, The Security of South Asia, Stephen 
P h i l i p Cohen (ad) v i s t a r Publ ica t ions , New Delhi, p , 27, 
2, Stephen Phi l ip Cohen, A special Report of the Rockefeller 
Foundation on In te rna t iona l Relat ions Research in South 
Asia, New York, 1982, p , 1, 
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of Ind i a ' s hegeraonistic designs in South Asia, the big 
bro ther ly a t t i t u d e expansionist amoitions and bul ly ing t a c -
t i c e s v i s - a - v i s her small neighbours have been made on the 
bas is of an t i - Ind ian t r a d e . 
I t i s in I n d i a ' s i n t e r e s t s to th ink in terras of the 
region as a whole, i t i s equally in the i n t e r e s t s of the 
small neighbours t o be cognizant of reg iona l r e a l i t i e s and 
imperatives of her na t iona l and secur i ty i n t e r e s t s should 
a l so be considered by her neighbours. I t i s t rue tha t a l a s t i n g 
and unhindered growth of soc ia l i n t e r g r a t i c n in the south Asian 
region can not be expected unless fences are mended at the 
p o l i t i c a l fronts e thn ic and conmunal overtones played up by 
fundamentalists forces and the unabated phenomenon of t e r r o -
rism have wieldered the p o l i t i c a l power in south Asia, The 
policy of divide and r u l e pursued by the c o l o n i a l i s t s explo i -
t ing e t h n i c a l l y mixed populaticn in a l l p a r t s of the sub-
cont inent , nay the e n t i r e south Asian region created f e r t i l e 
ground for acrimonious r e l a t i o n s h i p between south Asian nat ions 
even af te r they gained independence with ser ious soc ia l impli-
ca t ions for a l l of them. Geographical con t inu i ty has made 
migration of the people from one country to another e a s i e r . 
The worst effected country i s India which shares the boundary 
with each of south Asian neighbours and a l so shares l a rges t 
migrants . 
(B) Economic Compulsions 
Economic compulsions play a signif i c i en t ro le in 
pushing south Asian count r ies towards each other and in to a 
s i tua t ion in which I n d i a ' s neighbours stand to be in a c loser 
economic r e l a t i o n s h i p with her c^ographical s e t t i n g and the 
na tu ra l d i s t r i b u t i o n of resources are such t h a t mutual depen-
dence i s an inescapable r e a l i t y , Mis t rus t , psychological 
hang-ups a r i s i n g out of much advert ised small nation psyche 
and emphasis on competit ive ra ther than on complementary 
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nature of economy, the growing p ro tec t i a i i sm shown by the 
developed nat ions ; the inev i t ab le p o l i t i c a l s t r i n g s at tached 
to foreign econcmic a id , and the tendency of the North to 
econoenlcally dominate th© South should compel south Asian 
count r ies to corne closer to each o t h e r , spectre of Indian 
hegemony in the sphere of i n t r a - r eg iona l c o l l a b o r a t i a i 
haunts India 'n np^lghbours. This misplaced perception should 
be given up. If India had such expansionis t ambit ions, she 
would have occupied s r i Lanka when her armies were s t a l l e d 
l ega l l y or when she intervened in Maldieves and e a s i l y when 
Pakistan was defeated in 1971 and major Pakis tani forces 
were p r i s ione r s under Indian government. I t was not beyond 
her capacity t o imerge newly created Bangladesh in her 
t e r r i t o r y , which emerged only due t o her he lp . There would 
have not been any cry if Nepal had been imerged, when King 
took she l t e r in the country. 
( C) Ind ia ' s Economic and Trade Relat ions 
India *a nolghtaoura in aouth Asia aub-continon t shor© 
a number of commc«i c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . The one a l l small in 
s ize and have close proxljttiity anchor common land t rade 
f fon t i e r with India, Bangladesh, Pakis tan , and s r i Lanka 
were subject to a common Br i t i sh ru le dat ing pre-lndependence 
per iod . Agricul ture provides the main source of output 
in Bangladesh and Nepal amounting to 50 per cent of the 
GDP, while manufactured output i s r e l a t i v e l y small in a l l 
2 
the four coun t r i e s , such a c t i v i t y i s going momentum in 
employment in a l l the four coun t r i e s . In t h i s group Bangladesh 
and Nepal with GNP per capi ta a t $2 08 & / i r e a l so the l e a s t 
/^  
1.. Bangladesh 144008 sq r . kin. Nepal, Pakis tan, s r i Lanka, 
Maldleve.g and Uhutan. 
2. Bangladesh 33%, Nepal 30%, Pakistan 44% and s r i Lanka 
42% per c en t . 
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developed among the developed c o u n t r i e s . While Nepal i s 
land locked, Sri Lanka a re an is lands economy. Exports from 
the above countr ies mainly comprise of primary commodities, 
t e x t i l e and c lo th ing covering more than 70% of the t o t a l 
2 
export va lue . Merchandise imports of a l l these countr ies 
cons i s t s mostly of manufactures, the ac tua l share of which 
in t o t a l imports i s 55% bo 79%. Food items and fuels are the 
two other i t ems . 
Geographical proximity, h i s t o r i c associa t ion and 
cu l t u r a l a f f i n i t y make Indo-Nepal r e l a t i o n s unique and 
u n p a r a l l e l . Unlike other land lock countr ies Nepal can 
approach the Sea only through India . The Nearest Sea port 
Calcutta i s 800 ton. away from Kathmandu. Though Bangladesh 
has provided Nepal, t r a n s i t route via Bangladesh a lso passes 
through India . Indo-Nepalies r e l a t i o n s go back to ancient 
t imes. Sven Kautalya 's Arthshastra gives reference to t rade 
between India and Nepal. 
The i s l and of Sri Lanka has for Iridia the next land 
mass j u s t across the 23 miles of shallow wasters of Palk 
s t r a i t s . Sri Lanka have common geographical, c u l t u r a l , soc ia l 
and h i s t o r i c a l l i nks with India , which goes back to 3rd 
century BC. when Ashok the Great Sent the message of Lord 
Buddha to his f r iend King Davanampiyalise of Sri Lanka though 
his own son. 
1, Tftae share of manufacturing GDP and the r a t e of i n t e r e s t . 
2. Percentage of exports of primary commodities t e x t i l e and 
c lo th ing 
Bangladesh 
Nepal 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
India 
source - World Development Report, 19 88-89. 
25 
28 
33 
41 
33 
+ 57 
+ 37 
+ 51 
+ 25 
+ 16 
(19 86) 
(1987) 
(1986) 
(1987) 
(1987) 
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I n d i a ' s r e l a t i o n s with Bangladesh and Pakistan are 
unique. These two count r ies ^re greater in size than s r i 
Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldieves. They were pa r t s of Indian 
economy before independence. The unified economy of pre-
p a r t i t i o n India implied a considerable interdependence in 
the regional production pa t t e rn for the various p a r t s of the 
sub-continent . East Bengal, West Punjab, sind and North West 
Front ie rs comprised the r u r a l hinter land of undivided Ind ia . 
India ' s t rade with her neighbour's has increased 
since 1970. Trade which was 36.2% with Nepal, 05% with 
Pakis tan , 39.6% with s r i Lanka, in 1970, reached to 132% 
26% and 83% respec t ive ly upto 1988-89. Commercial r e l a t i o n s 
between India and Bangladesh are governed by Indo-Bangladesh 
Trade Agreement signed on Ju ly 5, 1973. This agreement was 
renewed for a fur ther period of three years . India i s one 
of the major t rading par tner of Bangladesh. While imports 
from Bangladesh have remained a more or l e s s s t a t i c , the 
exports from India have been s t ead i ly increas ing . Indo-
Nepal Trade was governed by Treaty of Trade of 1978 which 
i s in s tatus-quo and exports are being made under the per-
view of the Trea ty . Nepals exports to India pr imar i ly con-
2 
s i s t s of r i c h , b u t t e r , animal feed, ju te and t e x t i l e . 
Trade turn over between India and Pakistan has been 
low, India has accorded MFN treatment to Pakistan but , 
Pakistan does not rec iproca te the gasture to Ind ia , Govern-
ment of Pakis tan has adopted ' a l i s t of approach' . The 
l i s t of 240 items for imports by pr iva te t r a d e r s of Pakistan 
was approved in 1988 and 322 items were added to the l i s t 
in 1989-90, Most of these items have no s igni f icance to 
India , I n d i a ' s export Include t e a , be te l l ea fes , ginger 
1. Director of Trade s t a t i s t i c s Year Book, IMF I s sues . 
2. Annual Report. 1989-90, Ministry of Commerce, 
3 . Annual Report. 1989-90, o p . c i t . 
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iron ore, tubes and angles of alloys, steel, tractor tyres 
and the imports contain rock self, fish, pig iron and 
petroleum products, v/ith other countries India has limited 
exports and imports under various treaties and agreements. 
(D) The Political systems and the Role of Political 
Leadership and Political Parties ; An Indian Perception 
It is one of the axioms of the contemporary science 
of politics that party has become an indispensable factor in 
the working of the representative form of government. It 
lays down this irrefatabie rule that a political party in 
one form or another "is omnipresent". This phenomenon 
signifies the maximisation of political participation for 
the reason that it enjoins upon the members of a ruling 
community to take the people, as much as possible, in 
confidence either for the sake of observing the myth that 
the voice of the people is the voice of God or to Justify 
the very legitimacy of their leadership and authority. 
India is the world's largest and most populous 
democracy and largest developing country with a democratic 
system, surrounded by military-dominated and non-democratic 
state. It represents one of the most interesting cases of 
firm, stable and authoritative Civilian control of the 
military. It is remarkable that the appaling problems of 
low economic development, sharp differences in income, mass 
poverty, over population, illiteracy, ethnic antagonism, 
absence of any linguistic, unity, cultural fragmentation, 
social diversities, and a complex class system do not seem 
to hinder civilian control of the Indian military. The two 
1. Quoted in John J.C., Indian Government and Politics, 
Vishal Publications, Jullunder, p. 820, from Joseph la 
Palombare and Myron weiner : Politics, Parties and 
Political Developments, p. 3. 
in 
n e i g h t o u r s of I n d i a - p a k i s t a n and B a n g l a d e s h a r e c o m p a r a b l e 
o r c l o i s e l y matched t o h e r i n a number o f w a y s , y e t d i s p l a y 
d i v e r g e n t p a t t e r n s of c i v i l m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s . 
I t s a b i l i t y t o b u i l d a p o w e r f u l i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
s t r u c t u r e wh ich o r d e r e d and mode ra t ed i n d i v i d u a l d r i v e s and 
a m b i t i o n - a u n i q u e p a r t y s y s t e m , a r u l e - b o u n d a d m i n i s t r a -
t i v e and j u d i c i a l s t r u c t u r a l , p l a n n i n g m a c h i n e r y , a l ong 
n e t w o r k of au tonomous i n s t i t u t i o n s and v o l u n t a r y b o d i e s 
o p e r a t i n g a t v a r i o u s l e v e l s and p l u r a l b a s i s o f i n fo rmed 
c r i t i c i s m and d e b a t e . C u l t u r a l l y and h i s t o r i c a l l y t o o , 
I n d i a n s have shown a r e m a r k a b l e c a p a c i t y t o o r d e r t h e i r 
p l u r a l i d e n t i t i e s and t h e i r c o n s i d e r a b l e i d e o l o g i c a l ambi -
g u i t y by r e s o r t t o a w e l l l a i d o u t o p e r a t i n g h i e r a r c h y b a s e d 
on f o r m a l i s e d r u l e s and c o n v e n t i o n s . The I n d i a n s e c u l a r 
t r a d i t i o n h a s p e r m i t t e d c o n s i d e r a b l e i d e o l o g i c a l f l u i d i t y 
b u t , i t had a l w a y s l a i d e m p h a s i s on an o r d e r i n g mechan i sm. 
T h i s was c a r r i e d o v e r i n t o t h e modern p e r i o d by c o n c e i v i n g 
t h e n a t i o n a l s t a t e a s s u c h an o r d e r i n g mechan i sm, a new a l l 
I n d i a c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n b a s e d on t h e i d e a s and i d e a l s of 
t h e new i n t e l l i g e n t s i a on which t h e I n d i a n N a t i o n a l C o n g r e s s 
and t h e new s t a t e were b a s e d . The o r d e r l y g r o w t h of t h e 
2 
f i r s t two owes i t s e l f t o t h i s i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t o r . 
THE LE^^L OF POLITICAL SYSTEM'S INSTITUTIONALISATION AND THE 
ROLE OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP AND POLITICAL PARTIES TOWARDS 
INSTITUTION-BUILDING 
No o t h e r on t h e marrow of i n d e p e n d e n c e was i n s t i t u -
t i o n a l l y a s w e l l p r e p a r e d a s I n d i a was f o r s e l f - g o v e r n m e n t . 
In t e r m s of i n s t i t u t i o n a l i s a t i o n , d e f i n e d b y ' a d a p t a b i l i t y * . 
1. Cohen P . S t e p h e n , ' C i v i l i a n C o n t r o l o f t h e M i l i t a r y i n 
I n d i a ' . , c l a n d e E . J r , Welch ( e d . ) . C i v i l i a n C o n t r o l of t h e 
MiTI ' t a ry : T h e o r y and c a s e s From D e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s , 
A lbany : s t a t e U n i v e r s i t y o f New York P r e s s , 1976 , p p . 
4 3 - 6 4 . 
2 . K o t h a r i , R a j n i , Why Has I n d i a Been D e m o r a t i c - And why 
N o t , Type - S c r i p t , D e l h i , Lokayan , New D e l h i , p p . 2 9 - 3 0 . 
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'complexity', 'autonomy', and 'coherence' of its organi-
sation and procedures , according to Huntington, India has 
ranked high 'not only in comparison with other modernising 
countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America but also in 
2 
comparison with many more modern European countries'. The 
survival and sustenance of the stable and effective parlia-
mentary democracy in India rested largely on the Congress 
'3 4 
party" , the Indian civil service and the charisma of 
5 
Nehru . India not only inherited these two organisations, 
i.e. the Congress party and the administrative system, but 
these two highly de:&eloped institutions were prepared to 
assume the primary responsibilities for input and output 
functions. Additionally, the relatively slow pace of 
modernisation, and social mobilisation in India did not 
create excessively disrupting demands and strains which 
1. Huntingon, P. Samuel, Political order in Changing : 
Societies, New Haven : Yale University Press, I9b8, p.12. 
2. Ibid., p. 84. 
3. Michael Brecher views the ability of the Congress to 
handle three Prime Ministerial successions as a crucial 
index of Political development. See his Succession India 
1967 : The Routinization of Political Change', Asian 
Survey, vol. VII, no. 7, July 1967, pp. 423-43. 
4. Paul H. Appleby considered India as one of the dozen best 
administered states in the world as its civil and mili-
tary services were experienced and professional. See his 
Public Administration in India • A Report of survey 
(New Delhi ; Government of India, Cabinet Secretariat, 
1953)', pp. 8-9. Ralph Braibanti maintains that the Indian 
Civil service, dating from the early l9th century was 
appropriately hailed as 'one of the greatest administra-
tive system of all time', see his 'Public Bureaucracy and 
Judiciary in Pakistan', in Joseph Lapalombara (ed.). 
Bureaucracy and political Development (Princeton : 
Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 373, 
5. Huntingon, however, argues that the success of democracy 
in India rested more on two developed institutions - the 
Congress party and the Indian Civil Services than on the 
charisma of Nehru. See his Political Order in...... 
op.cit., p. 84. 
9 
the par ty and bureaucracy were unable to handle so long as 
these two organisa t ions maintained t h e i r i n s t i t u t i o n a l 
s t rength . 
The extraordinary leadership of Nehru for seventeen 
years i n s t i l l e d in the system a set of va lues , norms of 
behaviour and r u l e s of the game, and gave exceptional push 
and support for parliamentary p o l i t i c a l system. Nehru had 
s t i f l e d i n i t i a t i v e and leadership by o the r s by the domi-
nat ing, even domineering, pos i t ion he had held in Indian 
public l i f e . As S.K. p a t i l , a strong man of the Congress 
par ty , put in b lun t ly , while 'Nehru i s the g rea tes t asse t 
we have because he i s jus t l ike a banyan shade mil l ions 
take s h e l t e r , he i s a lso a l i ab i l i ty*because in the shade 
2 
of tha t banyan t r e e , b io log i ca l l y nothing grows' . But on the 
whole, Nehru made tremendous cont r ibu t ion towards building 
a nat ional outlook by developing the pa t t e rn s of i d e n t i f i -
cat ion between the r u l e r s and ruled and evolving a pol icy 
3 
consensus. Nehru's a b i l i t y to build na t ional consensus on 
p o l i t i c a l , economic and soc ia l s t r u c t u r i n g , firm commitment 
to parl iamentary democracy, an open soc ie ty , respect for an 
independent foreign pol icy (culminating i.n the non-aligned 
movement) have made India the most s t ab le pol icy in the 
Third Vtorld. In sum, i t was leadership in the highest sense 
provided by a man of Nehru's world s t a t u r e , ca l ib re and 
o r i en t a t i on at the helm during the formative phase of 
nationahood. His leadership provided time for the powerful 
i n t e r e s t group to learn to mediate t h e i r c o n f l i c t s through 
the cen t re , by procedures pat terned on those of the B r i t i s h 
Parl iament. 
1. Appleby, op.cit., p. 3. 
2. Quoted in The Times, December 1959, p. 22. 
3. Consult Wayne Ayres Wilcox, 'Politicians, Bureaucrats, 
and Development in India', Annals of the American Academy 
and social Sciences, vol. 358, March 1965, pp. 117-118. 
4. Kothari, op.cit., p. 31. 
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After the death of Jinnah and assassination of 
Liaquat Ali Khan in Pakistan and the bloody removal of 
Mujib in Bangladesh, the cult was that of mediocrity. 
Because the leadership that Pakistan and Bangladesh inheri-
ted was largely centred in the titanic personalities of 
Quaid - I - Azara Jinnah and Bangabandhu Mujib, respectively, 
Jinnah and Mujib ran the ML and the AL respectively like a 
General issuing orders to his troops and local commanders. 
The formative phase of the nationhood the high 
level of institutionalisation in India, has largely been 
possible because of the strength of the ruling Congress -
the oldest party of Asia which has often been called the 
heart of the Indian 'Political miracle'. The most remark-
able feature about the Congress has been its highly insti-
tutionalised character which is measurable in terms of its 
effective adaptation with changing times and contexts, its 
structural and functional complexity, and its autonomous 
and coherent performance despite factionalism and social 
2 pressures. 
As Huntington maintains, 'The decline in party strength 
the fragmentation of the leadership, the evaporation of mass 
support, the decay of organisational structure, the shift of 
political leaders from party to bureaucracy and rise of 
personalism, all herald the moment when colonels occupy 
3 
the capital. 
1. Jones W.H. Morris, Politics mainly Indian, New Delhi, 
Orient Longraa, 1979, pp. 131-43. 
2. Richard sisson, 'Party Transformation in India : Develop-
ment and change in the Indian National Congress', in Nemai 
Sadan Hose (ed.), India in the Eighties, Calcutta • Ferma 
KLM 1982, pp. 2-24. 
3. Huntington, op.cit., p, 409, 
9 
Independence, Congress, unlike other 'movement* parties 
of South Asia, such as Muslim League, Anti-Faxist People's 
Freedom League - which also originated as 'mono-functional' 
organisation and 'functional exigencies' of freedom struggle 
has neither been reduced to mere skeleton nor faced electoral 
erosion,-^ Additionally, (1967-72, 1977-79 and 1989-91), the 
congress has enjoyed a monopoly of power which has been 
characterised ^s one-party dominant system reflecting 'inter-
2 
party competition but no alternation in power. It functions 
simultaneously as a ruling party in terms of 'an authoritative 
spokesman of nation' and also as an opposition in terms of 
'affirmative agent of criticism and change'; it has been thus 
able to domesticate dissent and pre-empt counter mobilisation. 
The obvious reasons for the congress dominance were its 
3 
consensual authority , 'a unifying agent not merely in the 
obvious 'horizontal' sense in v/hich it holds together a range 
of opinions and interests, but also in the important 'verti-
cal' sense that it brings into contact and interpenetration 
all levels of politics from the most sophisticated to the 
4 
most simple and traditional. Congress provided 'the chief 
competitive mechanism' of the Indian political system in 
1. For the details of the development and regression in south 
Asian party system see P.C. Mathur, 'Origins and Develop-
ment of South Asian Party System' in his (ed.) Government 
and politics in south Asia ; The Domestic Political Scene, 
vol. 1, Jaipur : Printwell, 1985, pp. 246-72, 
2. For the full model of this party system see Rajni Kothari, 
'Party system* Economic Weekly, vol. XIII, June 3, 1961, 
pp. 8 47-5 4; and 'The Congress System in India', Asian 
survey, vol. IV, no. 12, December 1964, pp. 1161-^3. Also 
See his 'Congress System Revisited : A Decinnial Review' 
Asian survey, vol, XlV, no. 12, December 1974, pp. 1035-54. 
3; There has almost always been a remarkable ideological 
consensus around the professed goals of socialism, demo-
cracy, nationalism and secularism although the very opera-
tion of the system produced centrifugal drives. However, 
the recent Indian party system points to the disintegration 
of the consensus on which Congress retained its electoral 
success and legitimacy. See Kothari, 'The Concfress System 
in India, op.cit., pp. 1161-73. 
4. Morris Jones, The Government and Politics in India, London 
Hutchinson University Press, l'56T7~'pT~'lS3. 
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which competition has been 'internalised' and carried on 
within the ruling party. 
The Congress, like the League, was not simply a poli-
tical machine for the attainment of independence but a move-
ment with nation-wide eamifications. The ML was not as 
committed as the Indian National Congress or the Ceylonese 
nationalist leaders to parliamentary institutions. Although 
the Congress and the ML both displayed strong central direc-
tion, the leadership of the Congress was 'collective' not 
2 
'dictatorial' like that of the League. The ML had been 
to keep control of the party in a small group instead of 
popular support sought by the Congress. The socialists who 
broke away from the Congress, or the communists, Hindu 
communalists, and other group who organised their own national 
and local political parties, were not regarded by the ruling 
party as political traitors. While in Pakistan, loyalty to 
the state was often equated with political support to the 
League. 
After the brutal assassination of Mujib there was 
political chaos in the country 'The deaths shortly after 
the independence of their countries of Senanajake in Ceylon, 
of Jinnah and Liaqual Ali Khan in Pakistan, and of Aung San 
in Burma directly hastened the disintegration of their 
political parties. That the deaths of Gandhi and Patil in 
India had no such effect on the Congress was not due just 
to Nehru. The League could not develop enduring organisational 
loyalties which facilitated for the rapid degeneration of 
1. Kothari, 'The Congress System in India', op.cit. pp. 
1161-73. 
2. Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama : An Inquiry into the Poverty 
of Nations, 3 Vols. London : Twentieth Century Fund, Inc. 
1968, p. 259. 
-^  • lb id., p. 262, 
4. Huntington, op.cit., pp. 409-10. 
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1 
the League a f te r the depar ture of Jinnah , t h i s was not 
immediately ar-parent because of the charismatic au thor i ty 
2 
wielded by Jinnah in a l l sec tors of p o l i t i c a l l i f e . The 
ML was never able to e s t a b l i s h the same level of p o l i t i c a l 
dominance in Pakistan tha t the Congress did in Ind ia . The 
ML fai led to transform i t s e l f from a n a t i o n a l i s t movement 
to a broad-based nat ional pa r ty seeking to lead the nation 
on the road to democracy and planned economic development due 
to i t s weak and narrow p o l i t i c a l support base . Although i t 
took c red i t for the c rea t ion of Pakis tan , i t r a the r fa i led 
and fa t t e red in coping with the different set of post -
colonial chal lenges of p o l i t i c a l a r t i c u l a t i o n and p o l i t i c a l 
3 aggregation. 
The Congress has always been a par ty with a soft 
c e l l o rgan isa t iona l frame which i s sometimes exaggerated 
to the extent of the image of a 'mass r a l l y * . The ML, the 
Congress committed i t s e l f to a programme of soc ia l and 
economic change in l i ne with the modernisation theory. The 
Congress, t h u s , provided the new government of India with 
a programme of ac t ion , but the po l i c i e s pursued by the Muslim 
League in Pakistan during i t s f i r s t decade were throughly 
1. Morris Jones, 'Pakis tan Post-Mortem and the Roots of 
Bangladesh' , The P o l i t i c a l Quarterly, vo l . XLIII, no. 2, 
April-June 1972, p . 195. ^ 
2. See Mathur, P,L. (ed) , Government and P o l i t i c s in south 
Asia, o p . c i t , , pp. 262-64. 
3 . The Congress was more successful in aggregating d iverse 
i n t e r e s t s than was the League. The former aggregated 
diverse i n t e r e s t s and permitted them to continue while the 
l a t t e r tended to absorb them at the cost of t h e i r I d e n t i t y . 
For e laborat ion see Weiner, ' P o l i t i c s in South As ia ' , in 
Almond and Coleman ( e d s , ) , o p . c i t . , pp. 187-95 and 219-20. 
4. Morris Jones, P o l i t i c s Mainly Indian, o p . c i t . , pp. 234-63; 
and s.R. Mehrotra, 'The Early Indian National Congress 
1885-1918 : Ideas , ob jec t ives and o r g a n i s a t i o n ' , in B.R. 
Nanda ( e d . ) . Essays in Modern Indian History, Delhi : 
Oxford Univers i ty P r e s s , 1980, pp. 42-62. 
5. B.D. Graham, 'Congress as a Rally : An Image of Leadersh ip ' , 
south Asian Review, vol , VI, no. 2, January 1973, pp. 
111-2 4; S.R. Mehrotra, 'The Early I n d l a o . ^ . ' , o p . c i t . , 
Contd,. 
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to social change and national consolidation. The Congress 
drew its strength from the urban classes of northern India, 
the League largely from the wealthy Muslim landlords, who 
abhorred the reform programme of the Congress. 
The Congress played a double role as a parliamentry 
party and as a movement of social reconstruction which opera-
tes directly among the people outside the parliamentary 
institution. 
FUNCTIONING OF DEMOCRATIC INgriTUTIONS 
The success of democracy in India was partly a 
product of a long experiment with political ideas and prac-
tices and partly the integration of these with traditional 
Indian values. The basic political tradition in ancient 
India was normally monarchial, there wesre some elements such 
as the institution of saraiti, panchayat, sabha and the 
institution of Brahmin as the adviser to king, which put 
constraints on monarchial power, and, therefore, seemed 
3 
supportive of tendencies towards democracy. Pakistan did 
not enjoy the same experience of representative institutions 
as India did, 
Pakis tan , unlike Ind ia , I f t i kha r Ahmad observes : 
' , . . , inher i t ed a m i l i t a r y bureaucra t ic s t a t e s t r u c t u r e , 
a strong landed c l a s s , an almost non-exis tent i n d u s t r i a l 
Contd. , , 
pp, 42-62; Morris Jones , ' P o l i t i c s Mainly Indiah', o p c i t . , 
pp. 233-63 and M.P. Singh, 'Whether Indian Par ty System' 
A c r i s e s in Indian P l u r a l i s m ' , in Urmila Fhadnis, S,D, 
Muni and Kalim Bahadur ( e d s . ) , Domestic Confl ic ts in 
South Asia, vol , 1, New Delhi , South Asian Pub l i she r s , 
1989, p . 108. 
1. Myrdal, o p . c i t . , pp. 320-25. 
2. Horst Hartmann, P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s in India (Meerut : 
Meenakshi, 1982, p, 54. 
3 . For d e t a i l s see A.s. Al tekar , s t a t e and Government in 
Ancient India , Delhi ; Moti la l Banarasidas, 1962, pp. 
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bourgloisie and a weak commercial one. These classes lacked 
a social base, and were dependent on the state for their 
economic and political power..., 
LEGITIMACY 
During the first two decades the strength of civilian 
institutions representing effective centres of power under 
the leadership of Nehru, coupled with policy consensus of 
Congress, stable bureaucracy, flexible and sensible legis-
lative response to sanial change and growing commitment of 
masses to use the ballet box-all these lent legitimacy to 
the government, and, consequently, paved the way for the 
consolidation of democracy. On the other hand, Pakistani 
ruling classes could not acquirellegitimacy as they had a 
kind of viceregal government by civil servants in the guise 
of politicians, who were spending all their time in playing 
musical chairs for office and lacked agreement over the 
fundamental organisation and purposes of the Pakistani state. 
A change has occurred now in political sphere of the 
South Asian countries and a democratic thinking has developed 
rather than military rule. 
C o n t d . . . 
225-38 and R . c . Majumdar, H.C. Raychaudhury and Kal inkar 
D a t t a , An Advanced H i s t o r y of I n d i a , !x)ndon : Facmi l l an 
and COo, 1958. 
1. Ahmad, I f t i k a r , ' P a k i s t a n : Class and S t a t e Fo rma t ion ' , 
Race and C l a s s , v o l . XXII, no. 3 , win te r 1981, p . 240. 
9 
L 
Relevance of Non-Allqnment on India's Foreign Policy 
(a) Non-Allqnment 
Past and Present : 
Nehru's perception that the big power rivalry In a 
way protected India's security and that India should there-
fore play its part skillfully in the global balance of power 
game and thus ensure her security and power position in 
World Politics.'^ 
Nehru proposed that, as far as possible, India should 
keep away from the power politics of groups, aligned against 
one other, which have led in the past to world wars and which 
2 
may again led to disaster on an even vastal scale speaking 
at another occassion, Nehru articulated. It consists funda-
mentaly and basically of foreign relations. Once foreign 
relations go out of your hand ihto the charge of somebody else 
Elaborating on this theme, Nehru wrote in his "Defence of 
India" article published in Gandhi's Young India :.. It 
may be that some will cover her, but the master desire will 
be to prevent any other nation from possessing India. No 
country will tolerate the idea of another gaining domination 
over India and thus acquiring the commanding position which 
England occupied for so long. If any power was covetous to 
make the attempt, all others would combine to prevent this 
and to trounce the intruder. This mutual rivalry-in itself 
would be the surest guarantee against an attack of India. 
^source : Young India (Ahmedabad) 2 4th September 1935, p. 276 
and 1st October l93l, p. 234. 
This perception of Nehru continued even after independence 
and there are ample evidence to show that during the cold 
war years, Nehru wanted India to act as a balancer in the 
big power game and thus ensure her security and power posi-
tion in world politics... For details see : Girlja shankar 
BaJ Pal, "India and the Balance of Power", Indian Year Book 
of International Affairs (Madras), vol, 1, 1952, "Middle 
Ground between America and Russia", Foreign Affairs. New York 
vol. 32, no. 2. January 1954. Supposed to have been written 
by K.M. Panikkar, article argue that India had sought and 
achieve to some extent a middle ground between the United 
States and the Soviet Union, See also, P.S. Jayaramu, 
"Foreign Policy Behaviour of India, Afghanistan and the 
Himalayan Kingdoms : A balance of power interpretation", 
Contd,, 
SI 
to the extent and in t ha t measure you are not independent . 
He was keenly aware of the h i s t o r i c r o l e tha t the Indian 
National Movement was playing in the resurgence of Asia and in 
the dismantling of colonialism and racism in Asia and Africa. 
As he t o ld h i s fellow Asian n a t i o n a l i s t s in Apr i l , 1947, 
We stand at the end of an era and on the Threshold 
of a new period of h i s t o r y Asia, a f t e r a long period 
of quiescence has suddenly become important again in world 
a f f a i r s . 
. . . I t i s f i t t i n g tha t India should play her par t 
in t h i s new phase of Asian development We have 
no designs against anybody/ours i s the great design 
of promoting peace and progress a l l over world. Far 
too long, have we in Asia been p e t i t i o n e r s in 
v/estern courts and c h a c e l l e r i e s . That today must 
now belong to the past We do not intend t o be 
the piay th ings of o thers^ . 
I n d i a ' s pol icy of non-alignment does not imply pacy-
fism or passive in :difference. Nehru more vehemently explained 
the pol icy of non-alignment and said : 
"Our pol icy i s not to commit ourse lves previously 
t o follow a ce r t a in l i n e . Our pol icy i s independent 
of ac t ion . If we say we are permanently n e u t r a l , i t 
has no meaning except permanent ret i rement from 
publ ic a f f a i r s in the na t ional sense, sanyas.-^ 
In Lok Sabha on December 9, 1958 Nehru made h i s 
pol icy of Non-Alignment c ry s t a l c lear and sa id , 
"When we say our policy of non-alignment, obeviously 
we mean non-alignment with m i l i t a r y blocks. I t i s not 
a negative po l icy . I t i s a pos i t i ve one, a d e f i n i t e 
one and I hope, a dynamic one. But, in so far as 
the m i l i t a r y blocks today and the cold war a re con-
cerned, we do not al ign ourselves with e i the r block. 
Contd... 
The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vbl.L.no.4. 
Oct. Dec, 1989, pp. 519-32. 
2. Jawahar Lai Nehru, to the constituent Assembly 8 March, 
1949, In Independence and After Speeches, New Delhi GOI, 
1949, p. 340. 
1. Ibid. p. 257. 
2. Singh, Sur j i t Man quoted in I n d i a ' s Search for Power, 
sage Pub l i ca t ions , New Delhi , p . 14. 
3. Quoted in Mahajan, V.D., I n t e rna t i ona l Rela t ions , 
S. Chand and Company Ltd . , New Delhi , p . ISC 
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This in i t s e l f i s not a pol icy; i t i s only par t 
of a pol icy. Countries t a l k and act so much in 
terms of m i l i t a r y blocks and the cold war in the 
world today, t h a t one had t o lay s t r e s s on the 
fact tha t we are not p a r t i e s t o the cold war and 
we are not members of or at tacked t o , any m i l i t a r y 
block, Nehru had rea l i zed in other words, tha t non-
alignment was a log ica l necess i ty from the po in t s 
of view of I n d i a ' s economic development.** 
To quote Singham and Hune "Nehru had the a b i l i t y 
to view issues within an in te rna t iona l perspect ive 
T i to ins i s t ed on maintaining contact and holding 
regular meetings. Naseer 's p o l i t i c a l s k i l l s brought 
d i f fe ren t groups toge ther and he was e spec ia l ly able 
in committees where he methodologically achieved 
consensus, Nikrumah had the v is ion of a free 
Africa, Soekarmo provided an indomitable, s p i n i -
tedness to t h e i r act ivism. Each was an advocate 
for an i ssue t h a t became part of the in tegra ted 
set of p r inc ip l e s known as Non-alignment.1 
Nehru could see t h e emergence of the Cold war with 
a l l i t s implicat ions and dangers and r e a l i z e how the 
competition between the United Sta tes and the soviet Union 
rep resen ta t ive of the two d i f fe ren t kinds of Social and 
economic systems, has l i k e l y t o bring the colonia l world 
under g rea tes t con t ro l . India achieved i t s Independence 
in August 1947 but Nehru could see t h a t the other co lon ia l 
powers v^re not wi l l ing t o withdraw from t h e i r co lon ies . 
In 1949 the Dutch s t a r t e d an in tensive and violent agression 
in Indonesia, Nehru, now the Prime Minister of a fu l ly 
independent India ca l led the second Asian Conference in 
1. Singham, A.W. and Shir ley Hune, Non-Alignment ; In An 
Age of Alignment, Lawrence Hi l l and Co. Zed Books L td . , 
1986 p . 62. 
2. The only major wr i te r who has taken exception t o Nehru's 
r o l e as a founder of the movement i s Alvin Rubinstein 
who argues tha t T i t o was the C r i t i c a l a r ch i t ec t of non-
alignment, Rubinstein Yogoslans and the Non-Aliqned world' 
P r i sce ton Universi ty P r e s s , 1970, p . 112-118. Lex Mates, 
General Secretary of the Belgrade Conference in 1961 ful ly 
acknowledges the pioneering role of India and Nehru in 
h i s c l a s s i c work, Non-Alignment Theory and Current Pol icy , 
Belgrade 1972. 
L, 
New Delhi cons is t ing of Asian and Arab Countries t h i s 
time on a governmental level in support of the l ibe ra t ion 
movements. This led to the widrawl of the Dutch and the 
independence of Indonesia . In the l a t e r days non-alignment 
became the symbol of freedom. Carter s t a t ed the view tha t 
the non-aligned count r ies can and should make an ac t ive 
cont r ibu t ion to the resolut ion of i n t e r n a t i o n a l problems 
and t o the more favourable evolution of in te rna t iona l 
r e l a t i o n s . . 
Prime Minister Nehru, and a f t e r him a l so many other 
p o l i t i c a l leaders of young soveriegn s t a t e s , came to under-
stand tha t fu l l e l iminat ion of colonial ism and peaceful 
co-exis tance of s t a t e s with d i f fe ren t soc i a l systems are 
indispensable condi t ions for the achievement of I n d i a ' s 
3 
nat ional arms and world progress . 
Since, the 1959 summit a t Belgrade 'The world Scene 
changed dramat ica l ly . The soviet Union has bowed out and 
the presiding d i e t y of NAM, Yugoslavia, i s a shambles. The 
dismemberment of the soviet Union has far reaching impli-
ca t ions for the count r ies of NAM, As time passes we see , 
t ha t the consortium of big powers of the North; tha t known 
by the name of G. 7, are preoccupied with fur ther ing and 
consol idat ing t h e i r own economic i n t e r e s t s . The NAM in a 
s p i r i t of Trust and cooperation should i n i t i a t e d process « 
t o evolve a system to end regional wars and tens ions amongst 
1. Michael Brecher, Nehru, A P o l i t i c a l Biography, Boston 
Beecon P res s , 1962 pp. 226-238 G.H, Jansen, Afro-Asia 
and Non-Alignment, New York Freder ic A, Prakger, i960, 
pp, 51-98. 
2 . Jo in t statement following meetings between President 
Jimmy Carter and President T i t o , Office of the White House 
Press Secretary 9 March, 1978 p . 2 . 
3 . Yuri Nasenko, Kawahar Lai Nehru and I n d i a ' s Foreign Policy 
S te r l ing Pub l i she r s , New Delhi p, 206, 
?Qy 
c o 
the neighbours and should work as a check to powers 
deterimental to t h e i r i n t e r e s t . Bush emphasised the need 
for continuing American Leadership to prevent global 
i n s t a b i l i t y and pave the way for a wbrldwide movement of 
2 democracy. In the jo in t session of U.S. Congress on 
September 1,4, 1990, Bush a s se r t ed . 
"Out of these t roubled times our objec t ive -
a new vjorld order can emerge a new era free 
from th rea t of t e r r o r stronger in the pursui t 
of j u s t i f i e d and more secure in the quest 
for peace. An era in which the na t ions of the 
world. East and West, North and South, can 
proper and l ive in harmony.3 
I t i s not an exaggeration to say t h a t t^e 
western, spec ia l ly North American understanding of the 
o r ig ins and objec t ives of the non-aligned movement 
have Seen the movements o r ig in and even i t s r a i son-de - t r e 
in terms of the cold war, and are arguing tha t now the 
1 
5 
Cold war has ended. Non-alignment a l so has los t i t s 
relevance' 
The decade of the 1990s has begun thanks to the 
series of summit meetings in the closing years of the 80s 
between the soviet and American leaders resulting in the 
1. Gujral, L.K. NAM*s Role in the changed World, Third 
world Impact, Vol. 11, No. 33, September,1992 p.9. 
2. Kessings Record of World Events, Vol. 36 No. 9, September, 
1990, p. Tr^w. 
3. Jayaram, P.s. New world order, Non Alignment Movement 
And India, India Quarterly - A Journal of International 
Affairs Vol. XL VIII, No. 1. and 2, January - June, 1992. 
4. Some of the significant writings from this perspectives 
are Peter Lyon, Neutralism, Bombay Oxford University 
Press, 1964, Lawrance Martin ed. Neutralism and Non 
Aligned Movement, Bombay Popular Prakashan, 1978. 
5. Janson, J.J. the noted Journist has gone to the extent 
of daying that the nonaligned movement is deed and reedy 
for burial. See his recent writings in The Times of 
India and Deccan Herald. 
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signing of the INF Treaty by the two count r ies and a 
further decis ion to cut down t h e i r nuclear a r sena l s - with 
the winding down of the cold war. Not only has Soviet 
American r e l a t i o n s improved considerably, but the map of 
Europe has undergone tremendous changes as a r e s u l t of the 
uni f ica t ion of Germany, the v i r t u a l d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of the 
Warsaw Pact and the survival of NATO as an in e f fec t ive 
p o l i t i c a l a l l i a n c e . As a consequence of the new detente 
many of the regional c o n f l i c t s too have e i t h e r disappeared or 
lost t h e i r importance. Nearer home, China and soviet Union 
have normalised t h e i r r e l a t i o n s . All these changes in the 
global and regional p o l i t i c o - s t r a t e g i c environment r e su l t i ng 
in the dawn of the post-cold war e ra , argue some ana lys i s . 
The dismemberment of the Soviet Union has fas t 
reaching impl icat ions for the countr ies of NAM. As time 
passes we see tha t the consortium of big powers of the 
North, tha t go by the name of G-7, are preoccupied with 
furthering and consolidat ing t h e i r own economic i n t e r e s t s . 
They view the south as t h e i r f i e . The IMF, the Vtorld Bank 
and GATT are used to change our economic and socia l projec-
t i ons t o s u i t t h e i r purpose. Helplessly , we are forced 
to follow them d i c t a t e s . Sometimes the p re sc r ip t i ons are 
2 
sugarcoated but consequential r e s u l t remain the same. 
For the f i r s t time i t was rea l i sed tha t the p r e s i -
dency of the NAM was so c ruc ia l at c r i t i c a l moments in the 
world His tory . Unfortunately, nei ther our sc r ibes nor 
1. For a r ep resen ta t ive view. See, Chopra, S .N . "NAM on 
the wayout Wbrld Focus, Vol. 11, No 5, May 1990, G.H. 
Jansen has wri t ten vigorously questioning the v a l i d i t y of 
Non-alignment h i s newspaper wr i t ings . Also see M.S. 
Rajan's a r t i c l e in the same issue of world focus. 
2. Gujral , I .K. , "Third v,5orld Impact" Vol. I l l , No. 33 
September, 1992. 
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parliament comprehended this new situation whenever the 
Gulf crisis was discussed in parliament it urged to 
activate the NAM. The scribes wrote about its glorious 
past. It was neither easy nor diplomatiaally expedient 
to elucidate that the nerve centre of the NAM system had 
paralysed particularly when the conflict involve two NAM 
countries - Irak and Kuwait. At its summit the NAM must 
realise that its political tasks have not ended with the end 
of the coldwar. Political sovereigntic are still threatened 
on one plea or the other. The NAM in a spirit of trust and 
cooperation, should initiate a process to evolve a system to 
end regional wars and tensions amongst the neighbours. India 
also need to use its influence among the developing countries 
to initiate effective measures for greater south-south 
cooperation. India should also be able to persuade and 
preswise the developed world to restart the global negotia-
tions for the building up of a new international economic 
order based on equity and Justice. India has the inner 
strength and the sophisticacy to rise up to this tall order. 
(b) Relevance of Non-Alignment in India's Foreign Policy i 
The promotion of national interest is the principal 
objective of every countries foreign policy; in fact it is 
the objective of all government policy. It provides the 
•eternal' or the permanent element in a country's reactions 
with foreign countries. Lord Palmerston said we have no 
eternal allies and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interest 
are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our 
duty to follow . Very often national interests are projected 
through doctrinaire ideological or system expositions, but. 
1. Quoted in Padeiford and Lincoin, The Dynamics of 
International Politics, 1962 Macmillan and Company, 
p. 23 4". 
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even chen the primary factor influencing the u t t e r l y 
r e a l i s t i c nature of foreign a f f a i r s in the countr ies 
nat ional i n t e r e s t Nehru observed -
"Whether a country i s i m p e r i a l i s t i c or s o c i a l i s t 
or communist i t s foreign minis ter th inks pr imari ly 
of the i n t e r e s t s of tha t country. 
The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n defined -
" I n t e r e s t s ' ( a s ) what a nation f e e l s t o be necessary 
to i t s secur i ty and well-being ob jec t ives are 
i n t e r e s t s sharpened to meet p a r t i c u l a r in te rna t iona l 
s i t u a t i o n s , po l i c i e s a re thought out ways of 
a t t a in ing object ives and conmitments are specif ic 
undertakings in support of po l i cy , nat ional i n t e r e s t s 
r e f l e c t the general and continuing ends for which 
nationa a c t s . ^ 
India adopted the pol icy of non-alignment as the 
sures t way of assuming peace in a world devided by 'Cold 
war* The pol icy of non-alignment has not an accidenta l one 
but i t has the expression of a complete h i s t o r i c a l process . 
Non alignment became the logica l framework of I n d i a ' s 
foreign po l icy . An independent foreign pol icy K responded 
to the conscious and sub concious urges of the people 
impared a sense of pr ide and belorgLng and helped cement 
the uni ty of the country. Definding I n d i a ' s foreign 
pol icy , Jawahar Lai Nehru sa id , "any attempt on our p a r t . 
1. The observation of Admiral Mohan i s worth no t i ce . He 
says self i n t e r e s t i s not only a l e g i t i m a t e , but , a 
fundamental course of National Po l icy . 
2. Nehru, J . I n d i a ' s Ftbreign Policy/Government of India , 
1962, pp. 27-28. 
3 . Major Problems of United States Foreign Pol icy , 
1951-52, p . 329, The Brookings I n s t i t u t i o n , Washington 
D.C. 1951. 
4. Dutt , V.P. I n d i a ' s Foreign Pol icy , Vikas Publishing 
House, N. Delhi , p . 4. 
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t h a t i s , the government of the day here , to go too far in our 
d i r e c t i o n would c rea te d i f f i c u l t i e s in our own country. I t 
would be resented and we would produce c o n f l i c t s in our own 
country which would not be helpful to any o ther country . On 
October 13, 1949, Nehru said before the both houses of the Us 
Congress "where freedom i s menaced or j u s t i c e threa tened or 
where agress ion takes p lace , we can not be and s h a l l not be 
n e u t r a l , what we plead for and endeavour t o p r a c t i c e in our 
own imperfect way i s a binding f a i t h in peace and an unfa i l ing 
endeavour of thought and ac t ion t o ensure i t " . In order t o 
achieve i t India introduced the pol icy of non-alignment. 
Non alignment helped India to have a f r i end ly peaceful 
r e l a t i o n s h i p with China t i l l the end of the f i f t i e s . 1962 war 
between India and China was broke out not only because of 
non-aligned s t r a t egy , cont rary t o the popular b e l i e f t h a t China 
exposed our non-alignment in 1962, the re was a pe rcep t ib l e gain 
from the e n t i r e episode because of our non-aligned posture and 
s t r a t e g y . We were able t o get m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e from United 
S ta tes in the course of the war and from the sovie t Union a f t e r 
the war. The Soviet decis ion to a s s i s t India in the manufacture 
of MIG s i r c r a f t s ; the s t a r t i n g of f ive year defence plan by 
Nehru (which was continued by h i s successors) and the e f f o r t s 
during 1964-65 to secure some kind of s e c u r i t y guarantees by 
the big powers, which of course fa i led need t o be looked upon 
as a t tempts made t o argument I n d i a ' s defence c a p a b i l i t y wi thin 
2 
the framework of non-alignment , The f i n a l and the most 
rewarding e f fo r t in the d i r e c t i o n of s t rengthening I n d i a ' s 
na t iona l s e c u r i t y and non-alignment came with t h e signing of 
the Indo-sovie t Treaty on 9th August 1977. That the Trea ty did 
1, Speeches a t the Indian Council of World A f f a i r s , March 22, 
1949, Ind ias Foreign Po l i cy , Selected Speeches, September 
1946 - A p r i l . 1961, New Delh i , pub l i ca t ion Div is ion , p . 
42-50, 
2. Jayaramu, P . s . , "Jawaharlal Nehru and I n d i a ' s National 
Secur i ty" , Mainstream, vo l . 26, no. 33, May 28, 1988, 
pp. 17-20. ^'''~~' ' 
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not mean a compromise with non-alignment i s seen from the 
manner in which Mrs. Gandhi ensured a ^^ritten commitment by 
the USSR about i t s respect for Indian non-alignment of the 
tex t of the t r e a t y i t s e l f . 
India did not feel constrained by the Soviet Union, 
in the following years , in the free conduct.of i t s foreign 
policy was evident from the signing of the Simla Agreement 
with Pakis tan in Ju ly 1972, explosion of the nuclear device 
in 197 4, s ignifying our capab i l i t y t o produce the bomb, the 
need arose , and the resumption of ambassadorial r e l a t i o n s with 
communist China in 1976. Needless to say, a l l these ac t ions 
of Mrs. Gandhi not only added to the coun t ry ' s secur i ty and 
power p r o f i l e but won universal a c c e p t a b i l i t y for i t s non-
alignment s t r a t egy . Through non-aligned diplomacy India 
cautioned the Us and USSR tha t while i t welcomed the i r e f f o r t s 
a t super power de ten te , the same should not r e s u l t in a con-
dominum by them over the developing nat ions and pleaded for 
an condominum by then over the developing nat ions and pleaded 
3 
for an extent ion of detente t o the Third World . While i t i s 
debatable as to whether de tente conferred any benef i t s on 
India , thanks t o the diplomatic postures of India and other 
coun t r i e s , the super powers were forced t o exerc ise r e s t r a i n t 
in t h e i r p o l i c i e s towards the Third World. During 1976-78, 
India welcomed the USSR e f fo r t s at l imi t ing t h e i r Naval 
presence in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet in tervent ion in 
1. Bandhyopadhyaya, J . , The making of I n d i a ' s Foreign Pol icy 
(New Delh i , 1979) 2nd Edn. p . 333. For the view tha t the 
Indo-Soviet Treaty meant the death of non-alignment. 
Sec. J .D. Se th i , "Indo-Soviet Treaty and non-alignment", 
India Quaterly, vol . 22, No.3, July-September, 1971, 
2. Jayaramu, P . S . , S t ra teg ic Studies J6u rna l , vo l . 4, No, 1-2, 
1992. 
3. Foreign Affa i r s , Record, New Delhi , Government of India 
Vol. 11, No, 2, February, 1973, Sat ish Kumar, ed. Docu-
ments on I n d i a ' s Foreign Pol icy , New Delhi . 
4. Indian and Foreign Review, Vol, 15, No, 3 , November 15, 
1977, p, 5. 
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Afghanistan and India decision to abstain in UN General 
assembly voting on the subject in January 1980 when more than 
103 nations voted the Soviet Union calling for withdrawal from 
Afghanistan. 
Indira Gandhi also favoured the policy of Non-alignment, 
In a speech on August 31, 1970, she restated basic principles 
of India's foreign policy. -In particular she affirmed India's 
faith in non-alignment. There were people she said, who 
though non-alignment had not served India's interests; the 
obvious alternative was for India to be aligned. "I am sure"„ 
she said, "anybody who looks clearly at this picture will 
immediately come to the conclusion that it would not be in 
our interest to join any block. I do not think that it is an 
idealistic position. I think it is the only hard-headed 
practical path that is open to any country which wants to 
keep itself independent". 
After Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister Morarji Desai in 
the first Conference held in March 24, 1977 asserted that 
the countries foreign policy would be properly non aligned. 
The Washington Post in an article published on March 26, 1977 
stated : 
"Mr. Desai's record and India's circumstances 
alive indicate that he is most likely to pur-
sue a truer non-alignment. The history of Indo-
American relations angors strongly that it is 
not particularly in the interest of either coun-
try to try to build a patron client relation-
ship, India resent it". 
In the conference of Foreign Ministers of the Coordi-
nating Bureau on Non-aligned countries, held In New Delhi, 
from April 7, 1977, Desai assumed the members and said, 
"During our rdcent general elections, there were 
many issues which were the subject of fierce 
controversy. But the principles on non-alignment 
and the essence of foreign policy were not among 
them. I have no hesitation In assuring your Exce-
llencies that India will remain non-aligned in 
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the r e a l sense of the term". 
Foreign Minister Vajpaya in Janta Regime also 
r e i t e r a t e d I n d i a ' s commitment of non-alignment. He said, 
"This i s a welcome opportunity for us to r e i t e r a t e I n d i a ' s 
continuing adherence to the pol icy of non-alignment which 
has been the cornerstone of our foreign pol icy since indepen-
dence ? 
Rajiv Gandhi followed up t h i s t r a d i t i o n a l policy of 
non-alignment and extended I n d i a ' s hand for co-operation to 
the Third World, as also to the East and the West, V.P. Singh 
and Chandra shekhar too , did not ru l e out the policy of 
non-alignment. Prime Minister Narsimha Rao, adopted the pol icy 
of Non-Alignment and in an interview with Times said, 
"If I am to r e t a i n any independence of 
judgement and ac t ion , i t does not matter to 
me whether there are two blocks or th ree 
blocks or one block" he further added, "peo-
ple are point ing out tha t there i s only one 
block and my reply i s "do you want me to 
a l ign with i t 7 The answer i s no because I 
am to remain independent and r e t a i n my 
independence of judgement,2 
1. FAR, April/ 1977, p. 55. 
2. The Hindustan Times. August 25, 1992. 
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ClX/jLJl-Milltary Rela t ions in India ; Deter^nt t o Coup 
The B r i t i s h conquered India on the s t rength of the 
Presidency Armies. The East India company, which had been 
grauled a chater on 31 December 1600 by queen El izabeth I 
to t rade 9o\cross the world and permitted by Emperor 
J a h a n g i r ' s "Firman" in January 1613 to e s t a b l i s h a t r ad ing 
post a t sura t (which remained the headquar te rs of the 
company's western Indian Trade u n t i l 1687, when i t was 
succeeded by Bombay) supplimented i t s protec ted forces in 
1683 by adding t o i t two companies of Rajputs each 100 
strong and commanded by i t s own Rajput o f f i c e r s . This small 
force , a u x i l i a r i e s t o the Bombay-European t roops , though 
not the f i r s t Indian s o l d i e r s of the Engl ish may be regarded 
in the openion of Sir P a t r i c k Cadels as the beginning of 
the Indian Army. In 1752 Major Str inger Lawrance, who 
was appointed the commander-in-Chief of the company's forces 
in Ind ia , was subsequently deemed by the English as " the 
fa ther of the Indian Army". 
From 1776 t i l l 1857, the Bengal Army was almost 
e n t i r e l y r e c r u i t e d frc^n among the ' P u r b l a s ' and t i l l 
1857 they were viewed as brave and manly" and were mostly 
Brahmins and Rajputs . After descr ibing the "Early Beginning 
in h is book "The Indian Army" from the 17th t o the 21st 
century , Stan Menezes» surveyed' the Presidency'Armies in 
war ]?efore 1857' , as a consequence of P l a s s y , the English 
prospered and the Dutch influence dec l ined . Buxur (1763) 
supplimented Plassy by strengthening the English hold over 
Bengal and Bih.ar. By 1765, the English had subdued as far 
as Allahabad, Banaras, Faizabad, Lucknow and Emperor Shah 
Alam I I sought B r i t i s h P ro t ec t ion . In 18 93 Army organisa t ion 
1. vohra, A.M., (Lt. General Retd.) "The s tory of the 
Indian Army", U.S . I . Journa l . January-March 1993, p .103 . 
2. Menezes, 3 . 1 . , The Indian Army FrCTn the seventeenth t o 
the Twenty-First Century, Vkinq ^enguine Books. 1993. " 
p . 625. 
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commission abolished the Presidencey Army System and 
introduced unified Indian Army system. Lord Kitchner 
reorganised the Army. During world war I , more than a 
mi l l ion Indians served abroad and 60000 were k i l l ed . The 
F i r s t world war proved t o b e , as the Second world War 
was t o prove l a t e r , both an engine and c a t a l y s t for Social 
change, p a r t i c u l a r l y for the mi l l ions who served in the 
Indian Army". After appointment of Auchinlelc as C-in-C in 
India in 1941, the expension of the Indian Army s t a r t ed in 
e a r n e s t . After the Indian Army's reverse in 1962. Pres ident 
Radha KTishnan remarked" War or no war, invasion or no 
invasion, a t t ack or no a t t a c k , we must not be caught 
napping again. Vte myst increase our s t r e n g t h . . . Mi l i t a ry 
We©}£ness has been a tempta t ion , a l i t t l e m i l i t a r y s t r eng th 
may be a d e t e r c u t " , and a c t u a l l y manpower c e i l i n g was r a i s ed 
Wi Iris Indian Army t h e r e a f t e r . 
The Civ i l Mi l i t a ry Rela t ions 
The major blow to the Autonomy and influence of 
the m i l i t a r y - e s p e c i a l l y t o the only subs t an t i a l s e rv ice , 
the army was s t ruck on Independence Day, August 15, 1947, 
when the pos i t i on of commander-in-Chief in India was 
abolished and three Chiefs were made respons ib le to the 
Defence Minister and were c o l l e c t i v e l y , the profess ional 
m i l i t a r y advisers to the government. The os tens ib le 
reason for t > i s d r a s t i c reduct ion in the r e l a t i v e influence 
of the chief of the army t o promote balanced growth among 
serv ices and t o follow a l l 'modern' armed forces which 
have each of the three se rv i ces under an independent chief . 
1. Ib id 
2 . conen, P. Stephen, The Indian Army: I t s cont r ibu t ion 
to the Development of a Nation, Mookherjee S.K., ^" 
Oxford Universi ty P r e s s , New Delhi , p . 171 from 
Venkateswaran, A.L., Defence Organization in Ind ia . 
N, Delhi , Publ ica t ion Divis ion, ' ~ ~ * 
Sketch 2: Indian Army: Peacetime Locations 
303 
301 
There were a l so other reasons . The only chellange t o the 
c i v i l i a n au thor i ty could come from the numerically dominant 
army, reducing the au tho r i t y o£ i t s Chief t o the point 
where he was not even f i r s t among equals made i t eas ie r t o 
balance off the army with the other two s e rv i ce s . 
The strengthening of the c i v i l serv ice dominated 
min i s t ry of Defence was a second c r i t i c a l organiza t ional 
change. The m i l i t a r y had a l so been under c lose f inanc ia l 
sc ru t iny of the minis t ry of Finance, Some bureaucra t ic 
change were a lso made in the warrant of Precedence. A 
sec re t a ry in the government of India ranked lower than a 
l i eu tenan t -genera l u n t i l l 1947; afterwards he was made t o 
be ranked t o a fu l l genera l . The Chief Secretary of a s t a t e 
formerly ranked with b r i g a d i e r s , a f te r independence he was 
made t o t ank with a major genera l . In 1948, the Chief of 
the Army Staff, ranked with judges of the Supreme Court 
of I nd i a , bu t , was senior t o Chief Min i s t e r s outs ide t h e i r 
s t a t e s or the secre tary General of the External Affairs 
Minis t ry , In 1951. Chief of the Army Staff became junior 
2 
t o Chief Minis ters ou t s ide . 
All these changes r e su l t ed in the reduct ion of the 
m i l i t a r y ' s r o l e in the decis ion making process . The m i l i t a r y 
was thoroughly indoctr inated with the p r inc ip l e of c i v i l i a n 
con t ro l and never pro tes ted against the reduction of i t s 
own powers. Krishna Menon's formulation of the proper 
r e l a t i o n s h i p between the c i v i l m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s were 
c l e a r l y 
He asse r t ed : 
" I t i s wrong for the army to t r y to make po l i cy . 
Their business i s t o be concerned with m i l i t a r y 
1. I b id , 
2. For an army o f f i c e r ' s view of these changes see Brig. 
S.K. s inha . Career Prospects for Officers in Armed Forces, 
U .S . I . JQurnal^LXXXXVIII, No. 412, July-September,1968 
263-269 and of Matters Mi l i t a ry , Vision Books, 1980,p.30. 
t a c t i c e s . Mi l i t a ry planning and arrangements and 
th ings of t h a t kind must remain in the hands of 
the Government and even inside t h e Government these 
ques t ions ^re l a rge ly conditioned by f inance, I 
b e l i e v e , the statement t h a t was made r e c e n t l y , t ha t 
s t r a t e g y was l e f t with the army, was due t o misuse 
of terms. The Government i s not going t o say tha t 
i t wants one company here or two companies t he r e , 
b u t , the Government wi l l c e r t a i n l y say we should 
a t t a c k Pakis tan or we should not a t t a c k Pakistan 
"or" we should accept t r a i n e e s from Indonesia and 
Malaysia" or th ings of tha t kind; these a r e a l l 
ma t t e r s of p o l i c y . . . . of course , m i l i t a r y matters 
a re near ly quest ions of e x p e r t i s e , s t r a t egy includes 
cons idera t ions tha t are r e l a t ed t o our p o l i t i c a l 
o r i e n t a t i o n . ^ 
There i s an i n t e r e s t i n g pos tu la t ion on the organisa-
t i o n a l m a t t e r , " . I f the off icer corps a re o r i g i n a l l y divided 
in to land, seeu and a i r elements and than i s unif ied under 
the leadersh ip of a s ingle overa l l s t a f f and m i l i t a r y 
commander-in-Chief, t h i s change wil l tend t o increase i t s 
au tho r i t y with regard to other i n s t i t u t i o n s of Government, 
I t wi l l speek with one voice instead of t h r e e . Other group 
wi l l not be able t o play off one port ion of the off icer 
2 
corps aga ins t another. The s ta tue of t he Armed Forces was 
decl ined a f t e r Independence both in soc i e ty and s t a t e . The 
absence of any apparent t h r e a t t o Indian Secur i ty during a t 
l ea s t the f i r s t decade of Independence re inforced the be l i e f 
t h a t Gandhi had shown the Super ior i ty of moral over physical 
force . There was, t hus , philosophic ba r i e r t o a t tacking undue 
" 4 < 
glamour or importance t o a m i l i t a r y uniform. X.n independent 
India,A steady Shrinkage of the economic content of an officer* 
1. Quoted in Brecher, Michael, India and world P o l i t i c s , -
London, Oxford Univers i ty P re s s , 1^68, p . 260. 
2 . Samuel, P . , Huntington, Soldier and S t a t e , Harvard 
Univers i ty P r e s s , 1957, p. 87. 
3 . Kavic, J . , Loren, I n d i a ' s Quest for Secur i ty , Univers i ty 
of Cal i forn ia P r e s s , 1967, p, 2 l l . 
4. I b id . 
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emoluments a l s o s t a r t e d , "Lt, Generals lo s t t he i r former 
en t i t l ements to gun s a l u t e s , and m i l i t a r y o f f i ce r s leave 
and t r a v e l concessions were a l so terminated and reduced, 
Dxiring the f i r s t decade a f t e r independence the Defence 
p o r t f o l i o seemingly ca r r i ed l i t t l e v;eight in the Cabinet. 
In t h i s evolving pa t t e rn of C iv i l m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s h i p , 
dec is ions on defence mat te rs were t a t en depending on 
indiv idual services being able t o present t h e i r cases fu l ly 
and frankly to the appropr ia te c i v i l i a n o f f i c i a l s c l e a r l y 
2 
made the dec is ion . This arrangement, however, had a ser ious 
flaw because the ignorance of c i v i l i a n o f f i c i a l s about 
m i l i t a r y mat te rs i s not complete as t o be a se l f -evidence 
and in con t rove r t ib l e f e e t . 
During t h i s period a m i l i t a r y coup took place in 
Pakis tan in 1958 which fur ther v i t i a t e d the atmosphere of 
surpicion and mis t rus t of the Indian m i l i t a r y among p o l i t i -
ca l c i r c l e s in Ind ia . This feer was na tu ra l as in some 
newly independent coun t r i e s m i l i t a r y ru le was adopted. This 
view may p rec i se ly be explained in words of Kuneramangalam, 
He sa id ; 
'Pre-independence, our n a t i o n a l i s t l e a d e r s , even 
a t the hight of the non-cooperation movement, 
never t r i e d t o involve Indian o f f i c e r s in na t iona l 
p o l i t i c s . This B r i t i s h t r a d i t i o n which was t a c t i t l y 
accepted by our p o l i t i c a l l eaders , has con t inued . . . 
unl ike our p o l i t i c a l l eadersh ip . League leaders 
were ge t t ing Muslim o f f i ce r s involved in p o l i t i c s 
immediately before and a f t e r independence.The r e -
fo r e , p o l i t i c i s a t i o n of the Pak i s t an i Officer ceridre 
was there fron s t a r t . . , . Our poli t icians have a 
very r e a l fear of a m i l i t a r y take-over . I had once 
explained t h i s t o the Defence Min i s t e r , Chavan, 
1. Kavic, J . Lome, I n d i a ' s Quest for Secur i ty , Univers i ty 
of Cal i fornia P ress , iy67 page 147,445, 144 & 158. 
2 . Jeo Johnson, The M i l i t a r y and Society in Lat in America, 
Staugu Universi ty P r e s s , 1954, p. 152. 
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when I was vice Chief and he voiced t h i s £eer 
about General Chaudheri, I could not make any 
r e a l headway in convincing him t h a t he was 
t a l k i n g nonsense. The main c u l p r i t was X. Who 
spent most of his time keeping an eye on succe-
ssive c h i e f s , who never thought of c o u p s ' . 1 
General Thimyya, who had taken over as the Army Chief 
in 1957, came in conf l i c t with Menon's in te r fe rence in the 
Army promotions and his p e r s i s t e n t misrepresenta t ion of 
2 
service views on mi l i t a ry pol icy t o Nehru, Thimyya resignec 
and was persuaded by Nehru t o take back h i s r e s i gna t i on , but 
the controversy did immense damage t o the morale of the ' 
off icer corps . 
"Towards the end of h i s many in New Delhi who 
became jealous of him. One of them was a p o l t i -
c ian and the other was a s o l d i e r . Both were very 
i n f l u e n t i a l men and both were equa l ly ambitious 
p a r t i c u l a r l y , the s o l d i e r . A p l o t was hatched 
by these two to pu l l Timmy down in p a n d i t j i ' s 
eyes and thus to lower h is image genera l ly" .3 
Hoivever, the plot did not work. After the setback suffered 
by Indian , in the hands of Chinese, Thimayya was appointed 
to the most prest igeous na t ional Defence Council . During 
another t enure , a canard was l e t loose t ha t Thimayya was 
planning a Coup. General, S.P.P. Thorat , who was a close 
fr iend of Thimayya and who, as per the Army's expec ta t ions , 
should have succeeded Thimayya, r e c a l l s :' 
1. Mangaloom, Kumar PP, DSO, Ex-Chief of the Army Staff, 
in h is answer to a quest ionable for authors book 
Mi l i t a ry Leadershio to present Mi l i t a ry COUD, Lancer 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l , New Delhi , l9S6, 
2. Kavic, J . Lome, I n d i a ' s Quest For Secur i ty , Univers i ty 
"of Cal i fornia P res s , 1967, p. 157. " 
3 . Thorat , S .P .P . , DSO in correspondence with the author 
Concerning his book. Mi l i t a ry Leadership t o Present 
Mi l i t a ry Coup, Lancer I n t e r n a t i o n a l , N'ew Delhi , l986. 
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"Yes, there was an attempt in 1960-61 aga ins t 
Thimayya but, i t had nothing t o do with Civi l 
m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s and i t was not intended to 
frame the General for an attempt to intervene 
in the country 's p o l i t i c s . The at tempt was 
intended to lo^^er Timmy* s image in the eyes 
of the prime Minis te r , Pandit Jawahar Lai Nehru, 
Timmy was r e a l l y a blue-eyed boy of Pandit j i .He 
was t r ea t ed l ike a member of h i s house hold and 
a valued fr iend. Na tura l ly , there were off icer 
described tha t there was never any attempt by 
any chief t o intervene m i l i t a r i l y in the p o l i t i -
cal l i f e . A feel ing of feer was created by the 
ac t i on of some senior o f f i ce r s carrying t a l e s , 
maligning seniors by flasehood and l i e s by ima-
ginary anti-Government mores of Sen io r s . . .Th i s 
was much to the l ik ing of c e r t a i n p o l i t i c i a n s 
and c i v i l i a n o f f i c i a l s , who encouraged, aided 
and abet ted such despicable a c t i v i t i e s . In i960, 
a rumour was set a foot of General Thimayya 
s taging a coup. Tanks, armoured cars and infant ry 
from some formations near Delhi were brought to 
Delhi without knowledge of the c h i e f . 1 
When the country was griped under debacle of 1962 and 
when General Thaper res igned, the obvious choice t o succeed 
him was General Chaudhari, The Home Minis ter Lai Bahadur 
Shas t r i showed reluctance to appoint him as Army Chief, 
because he had p o l i t i c a l ambitions. Mr. L.P. Singh la id 
hands on the biography of Abrahims Lincoln and readout the 
following t o General Hooker : 
"I have placed you a t the need of the Army of the 
Potomac. Of course , I have done t h i s upon what 
appears to me su f f i c i en t reason, and yet I th ink 
i t ^ b e s t for you to know tha t I have heard in 
such a way as to be l ieve i t , of your r e c e n t l y 
saying tha t both the Army and the Government nee-
ded a d i c t a t o r . Of course , i t was not for t h i s , 
bu t , i n sp i t e of i t , t h a t I have given you the 
1. s^gar Moti, (Lt. General) i s correspondence with autho: 
concerning his book ' M i l i t a r y Leadership to present 
M i l i t a r y coup ' , Lancer I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 1985, 
command. Only those Generals who gain success 
can be set up as d i c t a t o r s . vAiat I know ask of 
you i s mi l i t a ry success , and I wi l l r i s k the 
d i c t a t o r s h i p " , 1 
Having read the passage the Home Secretary advised the 
Minister for Home that f i r s t requirement was to f ight 
Chinese and consequently General chaudheri , has appointed 
Army Chief. For some time the feers of coup were accen-
tuated a f t e r 1962. Nehru \.;rote t o Bertrand Russel l in 
December 1962 tha t the danger of the m i l i t a r y menta l i ty 
spreading in Ind ia , and the power of the Army increas ing . 2 
In fac t there i s no chance of any m i l i t a r y coup in 
Ind ia . General Bewoor, the chief from 1973 t o 1975 observed 
tha t there i s l i t t l e chance t o day t h a t the Armed Forces 
can e f fec t a p o l i t i c a l change by ge t t ing themselves in to 
power. They are being used as a unified fac tor as the only 
r e l i a b l e body in the country t o ensure haw and order and 
they are being wooed by the powers in the cent re by meeting 3 
t h e i r needs in terms of f i n a n c i a l and career prospects . 
Ind ia has a c o n s t i t u t i o n in which the re i s a pro-
vis ion for handle almost every type of p o l i t i c a l and 
f inanc ia l i n s t a b i l i t y . From the Punjab Trouble to the 
Hazratbal episode, the Army has stood by the Central 
Government to safe guard the law and order pos i t ion without 
any cas t and creed cons ide ra t ions . 
Chibber, M.L. "Civil M i l i t a r y Rela t ions in India : I t s 
Relevance to Developing coun t r i e s" . A p resen ta t ion a t 
the XlVth world congress of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l P o l i t i c a l 
Science Association (IDSA) August 28 to September 1, 
1988, Washington. 
Autobiography of Bertrand Russe l l , vo l . I I I , Allen & 
Unwin, London, 1959. 
Bewoor, G.C. in correspondence with for h i s book 
' M i l i t a r y Leadership to Prevent Mi l i t a ry Coup', Lancer 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l , New Dell-ii"] l986. " 
305 
The position in other SAARC countries is different. 
There are no chances of any military coup in Ehuta9, 
Maldieves and Nepal as the army strength is linited. As 
regards to Bangladesh and Pakistan, the position is abso-
lutely different and both the countries have ccme out of 
the military pressure in the near past but the political 
ambitions of the army are still alive. 
3^8 
The Mi l i t a ry Balance 
The comparison of conventional forces in south 
Asia i s d i f f i cu l ty India and Pakistan have fundarnently 
d i f f e ren t prospectives on the question of m i l i t a r y balances 
To use some of the American Terminologies used during the 
SALTI negot ia t ions^ Pakistan has es tab l i shed e s s e n t i a l 
equivalence ' with Ind ia , while India , has sought t o 
achieve 'Equal s e c u r i t y ' taking in to account the "Chinese 
th rea t " India sought merely matching c a p a b i l i t i e s with 
Pakistan in 1950s and e a r l y 1960s, and a s l i g h t edge 
between the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistan ;vars. Thus f o l l o -
wing the American m i l i t a r y aid to Pakistan under the SSATO 
and CENTO defence pacts forged in 1954 and 1955, India 
sought t o offset Pakis tani acquis i t ions of American F-.86 
Sabre, F-104 s t a r f igh te r and B-57 Canberra Combat a i r c r a f t 
and the M-47/48 Patton Tanks by purchasing Br i t i sh F-6 
Hunters Fighters and B-1 Canberra bombers, The French 
Mystere IV Fighter Bombers and Br i t i sh Centurion and French 
AMX-13 tanks .^ 
The Quality and quant i ty of Indian m i l i t a r y pro-
curements before the shock of the 1962 sino-Indian war 
c e r t a i n l y did not exceed the m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s of 
Pakis tan . During t h i s time Pakistan had two armored 
d iv is ions to Ind ia ' s one d iv is ion while the t o t a l number 
of infantry d iv is ions were 8 for Pakistan and 10 for 
India . The united States had made Pakistan the seccnd 
l a rges t r ec ip i en t of Mi l i t a ry Assistance Programme (MAP) 
aid , providing some $ 650 mill ion aid but , the admitted 
f ac t i s tha t Ind i a ' s m i l i t a r y forces are so superior t o 
1 . Raju^G.C. Thomas, The mi l i t a ry Balance in south Asia, 
S t r a t eg i c Studies Journa l , vo l . 3, No. 1(^, 1990, 
Centre for s t r a t e g i c Studies , A.M.U., Aligarh, p . 28. 
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t h o s e of P a k i s t a n t h a t even US Aid can n o t do any t h i n g , 
o t h e r t h a n improve Pakis t<ans a b i l i t y , t o d e t e r I n d i a n 
a t t a c k s . The p o s i t i o n may be made c l e a r f rcm t h e t a b l e 
g iven b e l o w . 
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s o u r c e j A s i a n S t r a t e g i c Rev iew, 1991-92 ( IDSA) . 
I t shows t h a t I n d i a n has a m a s s i v e l e a d i n m i l i t a r y 
manpower, i n m i l i t a r y s p e n d i n g , and arms i m p o r t s . I n d i a n 
m i l i t a r y s p e n d i n g has e x c e e d e d by 150% i n t h e l a s t few 
y e a r s , and I n d i a ' s a d v a n t a g e i s i n c r e a s i n g . In 19 87 -88 
I n d i a s p e n t 125-12 b i l l i o n r u p e e s and was fou r t i m e s of 
Pakis tan , Because of the Himalayas/ India faces only a 
l imited per ipheral t h r e a t from the PRC, and Bangladesh i s 
now more a dependent a l l y than a t h r e a t . India has great 
s t r a t e g i c depth .^ts major c i t i e s and economic f a c i l i t i e s 
are fa r from the Pak i s t an ' s t a rge t while a l l of Pakistan 
c i t i e s , economic t a r g e t s and m i l i t a r y t a r g e t s are within 
easy f lying range of even Ind i a ' s shor ter range a t tack 
3 f ighterso 
The Balance of Mi l i t a ry Manpower 
India has made major reduct ions in i t s m i l i t a r y 
e f fo r t s since i t s v ic to ry in 1971 but , s t i l l i t has three 
times men in m i l i t a r y than Pakis tan. In 1970 Pakistan t r i e d 
to maintain a large standing army, but , could not afford 
due to f inanc ia l burden and now, had attempted to maintain 
a large r e se rve . I n d i a ' s pargo n^ili tary forces are much 
4 
b e t t e r t r a ined and equipped than those of Pakis tan . 
I nd i a ' s supe r io r i t y in army manpower i s matched by 
i t s overa l l super io r i ty in ground forces conbat un i t s and 
equipment. This i s as a r e s u l t of both Indias supe r io r i t y 
in equipment and the s t ruc tu re and h i s to ry of the Indian 
and Pakis tani Armies. The Indian army has txo armoured 
d iv i s i ons , one mechanized d iv i s ion , lA i n fen t ry d iv i s i ons , 
seven mountain d iv i s ions and 19 independent b r igades . 
The Pakis tani army has two armoured d iv i s ion , 1<3 infantry 
1 . Defence secur i ty Assistance Agency (DSAA), Foreign 
Mi l i t a ry s a l e s . Foreign Mi l i t a ry Construction sa les 
and Mi l i t a ry Assistance Fac t s , Washington, Department 
of Defence, September 30, 19S6. 
2. Janes Defence weekly. May 30, 19 87, p , 1040. 
3 . U.S. S t ra teg ic I n t e r e s t , Himalayan Books, New Delhi, 
p . 16. 
4 . I b i d . , p . 18. 
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d i v i s i o n s / and 12 independent b r igades . I t i s one t h i r d 
to one half of 
Indian fo rces . 
    the ccrnbat and service support avai lable to 
1 
Ind i a ' s advantage in the s ize of i t s array's manpower 
i s matched by an overa l l supe r io r i ty in the qua l i ty and 
quan t i ty of i t s land f o r c e s . Although, Ind i a ' s numeric 
lead of 5i3 in tanks i s not s t r i k i n g i t s q u a l i t a t i v e 
supe r io r i t y of i t s armor force i s qu i t e evident . Most of 
the Indian army equipment i s of soviet or igin and i s being 
replaced, by indigenously produced, soviet T-72s tanks 
2 
are being replaced by Vijayants BMPils and BMP-23 are 
being placed in place of BTR-60 PB, Indian army i s based 
cai B r i t i s h t r ad i t i on and i s made up of combat elements. 
The ac t ive Indian army has 12,60,000 regula rs se lec ted 
out of the 86 mi l l ion men betweai 18 and 30 years of 
age. India has 3200 main b a t t l e tanks to equip i t s 
armoured d i v i s i o n s . The Indian produced Vijayanta i s 
sa id to be a weak l ink in Indian armor« I t i s l i g h t and 
i t s armor i s i n su f f i c i en t t o modern an t i - t ank weapons. 
I t s chass i s can not carry the needed addi t iona l armos to 
make the Vijayanta Survivable. The T-54/553 tanks are 
s imilar t o Pak is tan ' s Chinese Type 59s but , have more 
modern range f inders , t ransmissions and engine. Indians 
have added sheet metal t o change p r o f i l e of the i r gun 
4 ba r r e l s and are being modernized with b e l l e r s igh t s laser 
1 . IISS, Mi l i t a ry Balance 1986-87, p . 153-166. 
2. Department of Defence, soviet Mi l i t a ry Power 1986, 
Washington, GPO, 1986, p . 130. 
3 . USS, The Mil i ta ry Balance 1985-1986, p . 122. 
4. G. Jacob, I n d i a ' s Army, Asian Defence jou rna l , 
September 19 85, p . 16. 
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range f i n d e r s . •'• The Indian army i s l a rge ly an infantry 
force with l imi ted motor t ransport and i s b e t t e r machanized 
1 
3 
2 
than Pakistan and have 1360 modern MICVs and armoured 
personal c a r r i e r s . 
India has far more a r t i l l e r y s t r eng th than Pakistan 
and can supply much larger r a t e s of ammunition to the 
front and are a l so truck mounted 122 mm rocket launchers . 
India has Mark 11^105 mm self propelled guns and 400 Bofors 
4 
FH-77B 155 mm se l f -p rope l led howitzers. Indian array a lso 
has soviet 5A launchers . Overall q u a l i t y of Indian Army 
a i r defence are far be t t e r than those of Pakis tan . The 
Pakistani Array has l imited numbers of c r o t a l e m i s s i l e s , 
i t has only obsolete CS A-1 heavy SAJM system and does not 
have modern radar guided AA Guns. India has ten d ivis ions 
of mountain t roops . 
T_he—P^ki-stan Army 
Pakistan fee l s tha t i t has reached proport ionate ly 
very close to Indian m i l i t a r y s t r eng th . But, i t f a i l s to 
recognise t ha t the modern mi l i t a ry power primeurily r e s t s 
upon i n d u s t r i a l might and t h i s power determines the s t r a -
tegic importance of the country, since Pakistan is not 
highly i n d u s t r i a l i s e d s t r a t e g i c a l l y , a f t e r Afghanistan 
1 . Ib id . , p . 18. 
2. IISS, Mi l i t a ry Balance, 1986-87, pp. 153-155. 
3. Jacob, o p . c i t , p . 20. 
4. Military Balance Asia and West Pacific, Asian Defence 
Journal, January 19 85, p. 20. 
5. IISS, Military Balance 19 86, 19 87 p. 153. 
"the US need to pro tec t Pakistan" i s much reduced, while 
there i s a genuine prospect of a cons t ruc t ive Ajnerican-
Indian r e l a t i onsh ip" wrote p o l i t i c a l s c i e n t i s t scalapino 
r e c e n t l y . 
Pakistan has adopted a policy of offence against 
Indiao Under some mispercaption i t has engaged i t s e l f in 
a more aggressive policy^ including i n i t i a t i n g war without 
no t i ce . The offence-defence balance s tud ies have been 
ca r r i ed out in the USA in r e l a t ion to . ccntainrnent theory , 
J e r v i s , Quester and Levy show tha t when offence i s or 
i s thought to be easy ( ioe . s t a t e s can expand a t low 
cost) then nat ional leaders worry more about secur i ty and 
do more to p ro tec t i t . By cont ras t ing when defence i s 
eas ie r (espec ia l ly when i t i s easy t o d i s t i ngu i sh between 
offensive and defensive c a p a b i l i t i e s ) s t a t e s can pro tec t 
5 
the i r t e r r i t o r y with greater confidence a t lower cos t . 
In addi t ion to d i r ec t m i l i t a r y ac t ion , Pakistan has 
resfcrted t o c l ades t i^e sub-version and propaganda. Walt 
in his 'Origin of Alliance* has s ta ted t h a t such corapaigns 
r a r e l y succeed, even against r e l a t i v e l y weak governments, 
and India i s comparatively strong nat ion in s i z e , popu-
l a t i o n , na tu ra l resources , p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y and 
1, s r ivas tava , H.K., "The India-Pakistan s t r a t e g i c Debate ; 
The Hold-off Approach", s t r a t e g i c Studies Journal , 
vo l . 5, No. 1 6. 2, 1992, p . 79; Robert A. Scalapino, 
The US and Asia - Future Prospect, i n Foreign Affa i rs , 
Winter 1991-92, p . 10-40. 
2, Robert J a r v i s , "corporation under the secur i ty Dilemma", 
^" World P o l i t i c s , No. 2, 1978, p . 167-214. 
3« (»orge Quester, Offence and Defence i n the In te rna t iona l 
System, wi l ly , 1977. 
4. Jack S. Levy, "The offence-Defensive Balance of Mi l i ta ry 
Technology", In In te rna t iona l Studies , Quarter ly, No,3, 
1984, p . 219-238. 
5. Stephen Walt, "The Case for F in i t e Containment", 
In t e rna t iona l secur i ty , summer, 19 89, pp . 5-59. 
6. Stephen Walt, "The Origin of Al l iance" , I thaca, 1987. 
2U 
V 
m i l i t a r i l y . Pakistan i s using these t a c t i c e s in ra in and 
these mechanization may s t r i k e back a t Pakistan once i t 
i s found that i t nas cooled off t o s u s t a i n . 
Pakistan Army has the same B r i t i s h her i tage as 
Indian Army« The Pakistan Army of 620000 regu la rs i s 
adequately supported by the population of 113.1 mi l l i on . 
The dominant e thnic group is that of Punjabi who dominate 
65%. The second most prevalent group i s t h a t of Pathan 
tribesmano The Pakistan has a lso a reserve force of 
2 500000 which ere so ld i e r s re leased fran ac t ive se rv ice . 
some t h i r t y thousand Pakis tani so ld ie r s a re serving in the 
armed forces of twenty two countr ies ranging from Saudi 
Arabia and Jordan to Lib iya . The Pakis tan i Army i s p r i -
marily an infant ry force. Twenty two regiments are equi-
pped with roughly lOOO PRC Type 59 t anks , and have poor 
gund's and f i r e control system. Pakistan has brought 
Chinese copies of the same a r t i l l a r y pieces t h a t India 
bought from the Soviets . In addi t ion Pakistan i s purcha-
sing greater number of US se l f -prope l led a r t i l l e r y . The 
few hel icopter owned by Pakistani Air Force are not 
capable of moving more thcin two b a t t a l i o n s and are only 
su i ted for la i sson d u t i e s . 
1 . Mi l i t a ry Balance^ Asia and West P a c i f i c , Asian Defence 
journal^ January 19 85<. p« 40, 
2. Ib id . 
3 . Hons, Carol, Pakistan to Boost i t s Gulf secur i ty 
Force, The Chris t ian science Monitor, March 5, 19 81, 
p . 1. Kaufman T. , 22 Nations are ava i l i ng themsleves 
of so ld i e r s fran the Pakistan Army, New York Times, 
February 6, 1981, p . 4 . 
4 . Simon 0. Dwyer-Russell, Pakistan to Arms MBTs with 
B r i t i s h arms, Janes Defence Weekly, December 28, 19 85, 
p . 1388. 
^ ' I IS5 , Mi l i t a ry Balance 1985-1986, Kacobs Pakistans 
Army, p . 18* 
315 
US i n t e l l i g e n c e experts est imate t ha t Pakistan 
Army could defend against Indian invasion for a few days 
to a few week. This accurately r e f l e c t s the numerical 
unoalance in sides force , s t rength and order of b a t t l e . 
Pakistan w i l l do be t t e r in defence on ly . I t s array i s 
though now strong but had l i t t l e offensive capab i l i t y . 
Pakistan has weak air defence forces and lacks clear 
s t r a t e g i c ob j ec t ives . 
The Balance of Air Force 
India has such a high margin of supe r io r i t y tha t 
none of the arms the US plans to ship Pakistan would do 
more than strengthen i t s deterent c a p a b i l i t y . India 
possesses a 4 i l advantage over Pakistan in al l-weather 
f igh te r and a t t ack a i r c r a f t . Qua l i t a t i ve ly , the Indian 
Air Force must a lso be considered one of the bes t equipped 
services in the th i rd world, Indian Air Force asse t s are 
being improved as MIG-23s, MIG-27 Ploggers and HIG-29/ 
Fulcrums armed with AA-7 and AA-8 (Aphid) MIG-21 equipped 
with AA-2 (Atoil) AAM.~ India has 31 Jaguar a t t ack f igh-
t e r s , 165 MIG-27 MS and a t l e a s t 40 MIG-29 Fulcrums and 
at l e a s t 24 French Dassault Mirage 2000 Hs. This compares 
with Pakistan order of 10 F-l6YBs and roughly 100 
3 Chinese F-5 and Xian J-7 f i g h t e r s . 
Despite the addit ion of 46-50 F-165, Pakistan 
Air Force possesses a f l e e t of predorainently Chinese 
furnished combat a i r c r a f t , but , t ha t are far in fe r ior 
1 . O p . c i t . . . page 26, 
2. Two Squadrons of MI G-29s ca l led Baz have been 
assembled at Nasik fec tory , James Defence weekly. 
May 30, 1987, p . 1846. 
3. IISS, Mi l i t a ry Balance 1986-87, pp. 153-155. 
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t o Indlae The Chinese F~6 (MIG-19) i s t rouble some and 
need frequent repai rso This imbalance in the a i r i s 
matched by the imbalance in ground based a i r defence 
systems. India has 30 ba t t a l i ons of SA-2 and SA-3 surface 
t o - a i r miss i l e s in addit ion to i t s 120 SA-6 f i r e un i t s 
Pakistan only has a token su r face - to -a i r mis s i l e force 
of s ix b a t t e r i e s of c ro t a l e miss i l e s with four f i r e u n i t s . 
I n d i a ' s overwhelming numeric supe r io r i ty can gain rapid 
dominance over i t s neighbour 's smaller and ant iqueted 
a i r f o r c e . Indian force i s large modern with a t o t a l 
s t rength of 850 a i r crafty The Indian Air Force has a 
t o t a l ac t ive manning of 113000 men compared to only 17600 
for Pakis tan . This gives nearly s ix times Pak i s t an ' s 
ac t ive a i r force manpower, India has a l so the advantage 
of be t t e r command and control and b a t t l e management systein, 
b e t t e r sensors and more s t r a t e g i c depth, 
Pak i s t an ' s Air Force i s much smaller than the 
Indian Air Force and i s less modern. Due t o the l imited 
s t r a t e g i c depth of the country, Pakis tani a i r bases are 
located within s t r i k i n g range of India, while Pakistan 
has l imi ted t a r g e t s to s e l ec t from the f i gh t e r range 
problem. Indian Air Force has a numerical and q u a l i t a t i v e 
advantage over Pakis tani Air Force. I t i s a l so important 
t ha t F-16A and other a i r c r a f t in the Pakis tan Air Force 
2 
can not face MIG-21 or MIG»23 threat* 
The Balance of Naval Forces 
I n d i a ' s Navy enjoys numeric as well q u a l i t a t i v e 
supe r io r i t y over Pakis tan . India has conducted a large 
sca le expansion programs. In 1971 Indo-Pakistan war, 
1 . IISS, Mi l i t a ry Balance 1986-87, pp. 154-185. 
2 . O p . c i t . p . 47a 
1 
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the Indian Navy was able to carry out a successful sea 
blockade of Pakis tan . Pakistan's In fe r io r naval c apab i l i -
t i e s are the r e s u l t of I t s smell f l e e t of aging surface 
combatants of Br i t i sh and Chinese or igin« 
The Indian Navy i s a formidable force when 
compared t o other navies in the a rea . No local Navy 
including tha t of Pakistan i s able to compete on the open 
sea with the Indian Navy. I nd i a ' s Navy i s l a r g s . India has 
two a i r c r a f t c a r r i e r s Vikrant and Hermes. Each c a r r i e r 
has a capaci ty for 18 sea Harriers and 4 he l i cop t e r s . 
India has 17 sucmarines while Pakistan has only 6. 
Pakistan Navy i s smell force India has the force to 
control the sea lanes t o Pakistan, and Pakistan can do 
l i t t l e t o stop i t . Pakistan i s s t i l l dependent on foreign 
supplies for i t s m i l i t a r y and can not afford a long war 
during which India can cut i t s ocean l i f e - l i v e . 
Estimate 
I n d i a ' s population and land area i s almost e ight 
times the s ize of Pakistan compared t o the e s s e n t i a l l y 
equivalent population s izes of the United s t a tes and the 
Soviet Union (USSl) Indian Mi l i t a ry preponderance in south 
Asia i s p r ec i s e ly , the goal of Indian defence policy to 
maintain peace and s t a b i l i t y i n the r eg ion . According t o 
Professor A . F . K . Organiski of University of Michigan^ 
•the weaker s t a t e dare not to a t t ack , while the stronger 
s t a t e need not a t t ack* . Even when wars do take place , 
often i t occurs because the weaker s t a t e i s attempting 
to catch up in the m i l i t a r y balance with the stronger 
s t a t e . The fac t tha t there has been no Indo-Pakistan 
1 . Grazebook A.W., I n d i a ' s mounting Mi l i t a ry Might, 
Paci f ic Defence Reporter, September 19 86, p . 18. 
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wars since the l a s t in December 1971 a t t r i b u t e s to Ind ia ' s 
m i l i t a r y preponderance. After the crea t ion of Bangladesh^ 
India now appears determined to maintain i t s m i l i t a r y 
super io r i ty on the subcontinent . 
On the eve of the 1971 war with Pakistan, the Indian 
army consis ted of 830000 men and included one armoured 
d i v i s i o n . There were 13 infant ry d iv i s ions and 10 mountain 
d iv i s ions against China along the Himalayan f r o n t i e r s . 
Against t h i s , Pakistan Army consis ted of 365000 men inc lu -
ding 2 armoured d iv i s i ons , 12 infantry d i v i s i o n s . The 
Indian Navy consisted of 47000 men and the Pakistan Navy 
consis ted of 10000 man, 4 smaller I t a l i a n Daphne-class 
submarines and 3 destroyer e s c o r t s . There i s a greater 
2 q u a n t i t a t i v e imbalance in the a i r and at sea . 12 armoured 
hel icopter d i s t r i bu t ed among 50 squadrons. Indian Navy had 
expanded to 47000 mi l i t a ry personal along with 2 c a r r i e r s , 
5 des t royers 21 f r i g a t e s , 17 sutoar ines and another 34 
pa t ro l and cos t a l combat v e s s e l s . 
Comparatively, Pakistan i s consis ted of 620000 man 
organised in to 7 corps Headquarters including 17 infantry 
d iv i s ions , 2 armoured d i v i s i o n s , 12 independent armoured 
br igades . I t had 2100 MBTs. There are 25000 men in a i r 
force equipped with 451 combat a i r c ra f t organized i n t o 
12 f igh te r squadrons. 
The Indo-Pakistan balance of mi l i t a ry forces on 
the ground measured in terms of mi l i t a ry personal i s 1.26 
The Mi l i t a ry Balance 1971-72 London, I n t e r n a t i a i a l 
I n s t i t u t e for s t r a t e g i c s tud ies , 1971. 
Raju, G.C, Thomas, The Mi l i t a ry Balance in south Asia, 
S t ra teg ic s tudies Journa l , A.M.U.,Aligarh, v o l . 3, 
No. 1'2'2, 1990, p . 34. 
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m i l l i o n t o 620000 ( r a t i o 2.5s1) and measured in terms of 
main b a t t l e tanks i s 3200 to 2100 ( r a t i o of 1 .8:1) . 
After tv;enty two years/ the s i t ua t i on has substan-
t i a l l y changed in south Asia* 3y 1992^ the Indian Army 
consis ted of approximately 1626 mi l l ion m i l i t a r y personal 
in 5 reg iona l commands and 10 corps headquar ters . This 
includes 19 infantry d iv is ions 11 mountain d iv is ions suppli-
roented with 8 armoured, 7 in fan t ry , one mountain and 3 
independent a r t i l l a r y br igades . The Indian army car r ied 
34-50 main Bat t le Tanks organized in to 5 Air Conmands. 
Indian Air Force now comprise 115000 men and car r ied 836 
combat a i r c r a f t . 
Indias naval expansion i s genera l ly unrelated to 
2 
the t r a d i t i o n a l s ino-Pakistani t h r e a t . The growth of the 
Indian Navy since the 1971 war has been based on a wider 
s t r a t e g i c perspect ive and proximate object ives to e s t a b l i s h 
sea power and defend I n d i a ' s Trade and t o pro tec t the 
mineral resources within i t s 2oO miles economic zone. 
The basic problem in south Asia i s that India 
perceives i t s e l f as an Asian power with the need for m i l i -
tary c a p a b i l i t i e s tha t r e f l e c t , i t s s i ze and land boun-
d a r i e s , while Pakistan would l ike to keep India m i l i t a r i l y 
on leve l with i t s e l f . Pakistan claims t h a t India i s 
1 . The Mi l i t a ry Balance 1989-90, London, In te rna t iona l 
I n s t i t u t e for s t r a t e g i c Studies , 1989. 
2» The h i l i t a r y Balance 1989-90, London, In te rna t iona l 
I n s t i t u t e for s t r a t e g i c s tud ies , 19 89. 
3 . Robert H. Bruce, Ed. The Modern Indian Navy and the 
Indian Ocean, Perth, Austral ia Centre for Indian Ocean 
Regional Studies Curtin University of Technology, 19 89, 
pp. 105-108. 
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determine, to undo p a r t i t i o n and absorb i t in to a greater 
India , India do not th ink in t h i s d i r ec t i on . India could 
have done i t qu i t e read i ly in 1971 when i t occupied East 
Pakistan and has poised to crush the demoralized Pakis tani 
m i l i t a r y forces along i t s borders with West Pakis tan, 
Raju G.C, Thomas, The Sources of Indian Naval 
Expensico, A Sheley J . T e l l i s , Securing The Barrack; 
The l o g i c . Structure and Objectives of India's Naval 
Expansion in Robert H. 3rue Ed., The Modern Indian 
Navy and the Indian Ocean, pp. 95-108 and pp. 5-50, 
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CHAPTER - VI 
REGIONAL PROBLEMS 
^ U §1 
(h) Terrorism in India 
The Indian Terror ism and Disruptive A c t i v i t i e s 
(Prevention) Act 1989 in sub-sect ion (1) of Section 3 of 
the Act def ines Terrorism, 
•whoever with i n t en t to overawe the Government 
as by law es tab l i shed or t o s t r i k e t e r r o r in 
the people or any sec t ion of the people or to 
a l i e n a t e any sect ion of the i>eople or to adver-
sely a f fec t the harmony amongst d i f f e ren t sec t ion 
of the people or to adversely i.-S-2— -'*" r.' " ' 
:_ _ " •. .. ; „- _>-_- J ' " t i i-_-^ui . c-.i . 
any acts or things by using bombs, dynamitic or 
other explosive substances or inflamable subs-
tance or fire arms or other lethal weapons or 
poisons or noxious gases or other chemicals or 
by any other substance (whether geological or 
otherwise) of a hazairdous nature in such a manner 
as to cause or it is likely to cause, death of or 
injuries to any person or persons or loss of, or 
damage to or destruction of property or disrup-
tion of any supplies or services essential to the 
life of the community or detains any person and 
threatens to kill or injure such persons in order 
to compel the governments or any other person to 
do or obtain from doing any act canmits a terro-
rist act'. 
It is comprehensive definition of terrorism and 
includes all or most of the; acts of violence. Modern terro-
rism draws inspiration from Nietzsche, popularised by 
dartre and his discipline-s-by identifying certain political 
'' ' 1 
situations which justified violent correctives. The impact 
of Anarchists on the use of violence in society is also 
2 
highlighted by some writers. Michael Bakunin in, 'The 
Revolutionary Catechism', 1989, has defined 'Day and Night' 
Johnson, Paul, seven Deadly sins of Terrorism, in 
Benqunim Netanyabu (ed,). International Terrorism, 
Challenge and Response. Jerusalem, 1981, p. 16. 
Joseph A. Dowling, Prologumene to a Psycho-historical 
study in Martus H. Livingstone, et.al., International 
Terrorism in Contemporary world, Connecticut, 1978, 
pp. 224-25. 
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the terrorists activist must have single thought, one single 
purpose merciless destruction'. •• Bakunin has justified terro-
rism and had said^'Let us put our trust in the eternally 
creative source of life. The urge to destroy is also a 
creative urgel^ Walter has said 'Violence may occur without 
terror, but not terror without violence*. He has defined 
terrorism, the most flagrant form of definance of the rule 
of law,^ as process of terror is a compound with three 
elements, the act or threat of violence, the emotional reac-
tion and the social effects.^ oleg Zinam has defined terro-
rism as the 'use of threat of violence by individuals or by 
organised groups to evoke fear and submission to attain 
some economic political, socio-psychological or other object.' 
Acts of terrorism sponsored and launched by one 
country against another using violence and lethal force 
with a view to achieving long term political or strategic 
objectives is a facet of modern warfare. The aim of the coun-
try which sponsors and abets terrorism and insurgency can 
range from destabilisation and weakening of a government or 
a central authority to the break up of the existing social 
and political order, in the targeted country. The state 
which sponsors terrorism or insurgency is actually waging 
an unconventional war which terrorists or insurgents are 
generally used as convenent tools, till a particular stage, 
1. As cited in Robett A. Friedlander, 'Terrorism and 
Political Violence'. 
2. Eugene Victor Walters, Terror and Resistance ; A study 
of political violence. New York, lysy, p. 5. 
3. Paul Wilkinson, political Terrorism, New York, 1971, p.l37w 
4. Walter, No, 1, p, 13, 
5. Oleg Zinam, Terrorism and Violence' in the Light of 
Theory of p i ^ o n t e n t and F r u s t r a t i o n , in Martus Livingston, 
e t . a l . n. 5, p , 241, 
6. Karim, Afs i r , Counter Terrorism ; The Pakistan Factor , Lancer Papers , p , IT ---—--—————— 
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The country sponsoring terrorism or insurgency 
provides financial help, often through voluntary organi-
sations or emigrants^ vTeapons^  training^ safe sanctuaries and 
other facilities for launching operations. In fact the 
terrorist or insurgents have a close relationship with 
sponsors and are substitute for the regular and irregular 
enemy troops operating inside enemy territory. In words of 
Ifanle, 'Sponsored Terrorism' which uses surrogated warfare 
to unlevish a reign of terror by using force both at the 
moral and physical plains, meets these basic requirements 
and qualify as 'war', because the purpose of such actions 
is to break the existing physical and psychological ties 
that bind a country or a people together by applying various 
asymmetrical pressures on the targeted state'. 
Terrorism in Punjab and Jammu Kashmir represents a 
classical manifestation of sponsored terrorism. It is 
beyond doubt that Pakistan has launched a well planned 
.surrogate operation with far reaching political and strate-
gical aims, Pakistan has been sponsoring and supporting 
terrorist and insurgent movement in these states and reli-
gious susceptibilities have been exploided to found unrest. 
Before independence, Punjab stretched from New 
Peshwar in the North to just short of Delhi in the South, 
from the Indus River in the West to tte Yamuna in the East, 
During the period prior to the British leaving, the 
unionist party held sway in Punjab and its leadership was 
vested in the hands of the big landed magnates of the 
Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs, 
After independence, the Muslim factor was removed 
from Punjab. The Hindus and Sikhs came face to face with 
the adoption of the policy of having Hindi as National 
language, Urdu was out. In 1949 sachar formula was 
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adopted and made the provision for the language of the 
majority to be taught. After adoption of democratic system 
of government, power became the goal of leaders. The Akalis 
have decisive on SK till 1966^ but, could not came to hold 
power. There was a call for Punjab suba so that Akalis may 
come to power. 
There were so many problems including the capital, 
boundary, river water allocation between Punjab and Haryana 
as ripartan states and Rajasthan. None of the issues could 
find amicable solution. The Akali Party left the politi-
cal pressure and turned to religious agitation to garner 
support on these questions. 
The Nahar Roko Morcha, which arose out of a lack 
of basic policy on the sharing of river waters, turned 
violent and led, to many incidents of killings. In order to 
cut traditional Akali leaders to size, led to the rise of 
sant Bhinderan wala, who became out of control soon. 
Pakistan is undoubtedly trying its best to 
increase mischief in India and keep India occupied with 
slow attrition. Pakistan sponsored terrorists in every 
possible >^y. It supplied most sophisticated weapons, 
provided training and enlairged a line of communication 
to disrupt the communication links of the security line. 
The area of assistance to terrorists was large 
enough as may be evident from the recoveries of arms made 
during 1986 to 1993 and the killings. 
LEGEND 
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Index of t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t y from 1986 to 1993 
Deaths and Arms Recoveries 
AK R i f l e 
Hand Guns 
Other R i f l e s 
RPG-7 
UAC/GVMG 
Remote Con t ro l 
Exp los ives 
Radio Se t s 
Pe r sons k i l l e d 
P o l i c e k i l l e d 
T e r r o r i s t k i l l e d 
1986-89 
766 
3125 
1253 
48 
29 
-
-
1 
4937 
399 
1478 
1990 
646 
556 
405 
. 3 3 
50 
11 
390 
4 
28 49 
506 
720 
1991 
475 
789 
833 
23 
33 
•m 
202 
3 
3161 
495 
1494 
1992 
479 
542 
1118 
45 
26 
-
1604 
10 
1520 
251 
2109 
1993 
131 
79 
186 
11 
2 
-
197 
6 
231 
14 
258 
source : Lancer papers . 
Organised ass i s tance t o Punjab t e r r o r i s t s by 
Pakis tan began in April 1985, The t e r r o r i s t man power came 
from the thousands of youths who had crossed over to Pakis tan 
during the army operat ion in June-August 1989. 
The year 1992 brought a turn around for the s i t u a -
t i on in I n d i a ' s t roubled Punjab which had been recked 
by a decade long m i l i t a n t movement demanding a separate 
nat ion for I n d i a ' s 17 mi l l ion s ikhs . Between the year 
1986 and 1989 the s i t u a t i o n went p rec ip i tous ly down h i l l 
with k i l l i n g s , ex to r t i on and as sau l t becomining more and 
more common. By the beginning of 1990 th ings were despera te 
in the s t a t e . In December 1990 army was sent t o r e t r i e v e 
the s i t u a t i o n . The aborted Rakshak operat ion led to a 
1. The Times of I n d i a , New Delh i , May 19, 1988. 
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resurgence of terrorism, now across the length and breath 
of Punjab. 
The source of the Punjab terrorist movement always 
lay outside India. Sikhs settled in Canada helped Punjab's 
terrorists with motivation and money with the active colla-
boration of Pakistans intelligence agencies. Besides 
providing regular financial help to the terrorists, these 
foreign sikhs have been giving fund for the purchase of 
arms and ammunitions. In March 1987 the Daljit Singh sethon 
arrived in Pakistan from Canada with sizeable funds for 
buying arms for the terrorists. Infiltrators apprehended 
by the BSP revealed that the top sikhs extremists Gurjit 
Singh of AISSF, Nirwair Singh and Jagir Singh, spokesman 
of the Panthak Committee Malkant Singh Ajnalo of the 
Khalistan commando Force and Ajaib Singh of Daudami Taksal 
received training in Pakistan for which Pakistan has opened 
several training centres near border area. 
The biggest achievement of Rakrhak 11 lies in the 
feet that not a single case of army high handedness or 
strocity was reported in the state. The army concentrated 
on winning the hearts and minds of the people through 
civic action. 
The Army's role RAKSHAK 111 or the use of the army 
post RAKSHAK 11, since the installation of the Beant Singh 
government is likely to be a more broad based one. In the 
rural areas this will translate into suppressing militancy 
and an executive administrative load. In urban areas it 
will mean visible presence and a decisive say in the anti 
terrorist security. The action by army has changed the 
vernacular of the terrorism and is at setback to Pakistan 
1. Times of India, New Delhi, May 19, 1988. 
'?^ 
which was considering to built a separate nation on the 
lines of Bangladesh, 
The situation in Punjab and J & K bear a close 
resentlance to each other. Another element common to both 
is Pakistan's support and atetment of the terrorists. The 
immediate and long terms objectives and actions of terro-
rists in Punjab and J & K appears similar at first sight, 
but, these differ vastly in scope and long term objectives. 
The main motivation for terrorist violence in Punjab stems 
from an urge for vengeance. This urge singles with vague 
dreams of a separate state in Kashmir the main motivation 
comes from religious affinity with Pakistan and a definate 
aim to secede from the Indian union. 
*? 
u n 
(B^ Kashmir Issue 
The cold war came to an end by crumbing of the Berlin 
wall, collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and dis-
appearance of the soviet Union from the political map of 
the world. But the Kashmir question is still unresolved and 
is getting extra ordinary recognition as a long standing 
issue in the world's most volatile region of south Asia. It 
is the immediate cause of continuing mutual suspicions 
distrust and ceaseless acrimony between India and Pakistan, 
Both countries have a highly emotional involvement in 
Kashmir and the relation between India and Pakistan have 
become increasingly bitter as a result of the unsettled 
Kashmir dispute. 
The present time global situation has altered while 
the tension resulting from Kashmir remains the same. The 
United states and to a certain extent, China share common 
interests in ensuring that the two belligerent nations of 
south Asia do not inadvertently stxamble into a major 
conflagration that neither India nor Pakistan could afford, 
and that could even lead to the escalation of nuclear race. 
The state of Jammu and Kashmir came into being in 
its modern form as a result of that ignominious "Sale deed" 
commonly known as the "Treaty of Amritsar". The sale deed 
was signed on the 16th of March, 1846, when the British 
Government had sold the state of Jammu and Kashsnir to Gulab 
2 
Singh for a sum of Rs. 75 million. It is pertinent that 
Hen^y Montgomery, Lawrence who had signed the 'Sale deed' 
referred to it as a very ^ questionable stroke of policy, 
1. Journal of the Research society of Pakistan, University 
of Punjab, Lahore, p. 17. 
2. Ganguly, sumit, "Avoiding war in Kashmir", i^ oreian 
Affairs, Winter, 1990-1991, p. 57. 
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which had been arranged beforehand and v/hich had brought 
woes innumerable on the happy Kashmiris. Eversince we 
handed it over to the Dongra Rajput, Gulab Singh, who paid 
us down at once in hard cash, which he had stolen from the 
Lahore Derbar'. 
Pakistan always argued for Kashmir's economic and 
strategic importance for it. Prime Minister Liyakat Ali 
Khan asserted the Kashmir is like a cap on the 
head of Pakistan. If I allow India to have this cap off 
2 
our head than I am always at the mercy of India. Kashmir 
became of even greater value for Pakistan. Zafrullah 
Khan once said, 
"The possession of Kashmir can add nothing to 
the economy of India, or to the strategic 
security of India. On the other hand, it is 
vital to Pakistan, should Kashmir accede to 
India, Pakistan might as well from both the 
economic and the strategic point of view, 
become a feudatory of India or cease to exist 
as an independent sovereign state".^ 
Kashmir has a character of its own. Its location on 
the rings of Sino-Tibetan plateau. Central Asian Highland 
and Indo-Gangetic Plain, gives it considerable strategic 
significance in the south Asian Subcontinent. However, 
Jammu and Kaslmir were the nucleus of the "Mandala" 
doctrine around which revolved Nehru's foreign and security 
Khan Zaman Mirza, "Historical, Human and Moral Dimen-
sions of the Kashmir Issue", Muzaffarabad, Kashmir 
Liberation Cell, 1990, p. 4. 
John G. Stoessinger, Why Nations Go To war, London, 
Macmillan Ltd. 1987, p. 122. 
Mahnaz Z. Ispanani, Road and Rivals, The Politics of 
Accession The Bordel'and of Asia, London ; 1-3 Tauris 
& CO. Ltd. 198 9, p. 18 4. 
LI Gen (Retd.) Sardeshpande, S.C.S., Kashmir : India's 
test Case, Defence India, vol. 1, No, 1, October 1992. 
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policy and India's relations with regional and external 
powers of all sizes. The Kashmir issue was the product of 
the partition and has been lingering on for the honourable 
solution acceptable to both India and Pakistan since 1947. 
The prime Ministers of India and Pakistan exchanged corres-
pondence of the issue but, the American military aid to 
Pakistan changed the climate of the subcontinent so much 
2 
that the bilateral negotiations became unthinkable. 
The Kashmir issue is more an ideological conflict 
than a territorial dispute. For Pakistan, the Kashnir 
issue is a continuation of the Pakistan movement on the 
basis of two nations theory. For India, Kashmir is a 
reafirraation of its conanitment to secularism and democracy. 3 
With a sizeable Muslim population, it was but natural 
that the Muslim League should have the princely state of 
Kashmir in its character of demands for a separate Islamic 
state. The congress party decried such moves on the part 
of Jinnah and the Muslim League and stressed that the coun-
try should not be mearly divided on religious lines. 
History, however took a different course and the country 
was partitioned in 1947 amidst one of history's most tragic 
holocausts. It goes to the credit of jawahar Lai Nehru 
for handling Kashmir issue with so much of diplomatic 
and political dexterity. He made it clear that India will 
4 
not be a willing pawn in any body's power game. 
1. Hasan A. Noor, "India's Regional policy. Strategic and 
Security Dimensions", in the security of South Asia, 
edited by Stephen Phili'o Cohen, Vistar Publications, 
New Delhi, 1987, pp. 29",. 31. 
2. Bindra, 3, S. , India and Her NeighboxBTs, Deep and Deep 
Publications, New Delhi, p. 44, Reproduced from The 
Statesman (ed,) Unfortunate start, November 12, 1964. 
3. "Year Book On India's Foreic^ n Policy", edited by 
Satish Kumar, Sage Publications, New Delhi, p. 35. 
4. Boon, No. 21, p. 24. 
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The wars of 1965 and 1971 succeeded in freezing 
the problem of Kashmir in the time frame of 1947-48. The 
Simla Agreement of 1972 accepted that cease-fire line of 
December 17, 1971 shall he respected by both sides without 
prejudice. Pakistan continued to raise the issue of 
Kashmir at various international forums. In Jakarta, the 
two leaders, Nawaz Sharif and Nersimha Rao tried to solve 
the Kashmir problem and hoped to make some headway in this 
2 
regard. But, could not reach to any conclusion. In the 
heat and passion of political polemics and religious 
fanticism, the real issue of Kashmir has been side-tracked. 
The concept of secular democracy, which is the foundation 
of independent India, is forgotten and Pakistan is presen-
ted as muslim majority area. This theory of religious 
state hood can not be accepted because the same question 
mark the fate of 100 million Muslims staying in India 
willingly and honourably. The J,K,L,F. is altogether with 
Pakistan and has not appreciated any move on these grounds. 
Hashim Qureshi, the exiled leader of JKLF has criticised 
the policy of Pakistan based on Islamic Fundamentalism 
and asserted that "This is rubbish Why isn't Pakistan doing 
anything about Bosnia or the 400 Muslims deported from 
Israel or the Kurds in Turkey - whom are they trying to 
fi 4 
fool. The position in Kashmir has become more critical. 
A more powerful Ladakh Buddhist Association (LBA) has 
come forward and have pressed that "An attempt to impose 
a solution to the Kashmir problem without taking into 
account the aspirations of the people of Laddakh will be 
opposed tooth and nail by the Ladakhis". 
1. The Times of India, New Delhi, February 20, 1990. 
2. The Indian Express, New Delhi, September 4, 1992, 
3. The Hindustan Times, New Delhi, September 23, 1992, 
4. The Indian Express, New Delhi, March 8, 1993, 
5. The Indian Express, New Delhi, March 15, 1993. 
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( r'^ '^ he International Dijnenslons 
The uprising in occupied Kashmir presents the first 
serious possibility of altering the political status quo 
in south Asia since the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971. 
The Kashmir uprising, coupled with a virtual state of 
insurgency among the Sikhs in East Punjab, provides a 
situation where two regions under Indian control, both 
having a non-Hindu majority are in revolt. The uprising 
in Kashmir can be viewed from three different perspectives. 
First Pakistanis are pleased that unlike 1965, this time 
around, it is a pvurely indegenous upsurge rooted in 
decades of deprivation, despotism and alienation by the 
rulers in Delhi. Second, in this age of self determination, 
which has recently been manifested in Eastern Europe and 
even in the Soviet Union Pakistan feels that its case for 
a plebiscite in Kashmir, which has the endorsement of the 
United Nations, is legally and morally strong. Pakistan 
bases its case for self determination of the people of 
1. Apart form holding joint demonstrations in places like 
London, supporters of the Khalistan movement and Kashmiri 
freedom fighters tend to derive moral and psychological 
sustenance from each other's struggle. VThen the treat 
of war against Pakistan was invoked early in the Kashmir 
uprising. The All India Sikh Students Federation (AISSF) 
passed a resolution in support for the Kashmiris while 
also urging Sikhs to support Pakistan in the event of 
a war with India", see "AISSF faction for support to 
Pakistan". The Times of India, March 1, 1990; singh, 
Rahul'*. Two festering sores of India : Kashmir and Punjab 
back to centre stage","Dialogue, July 26, 1991, 
2. It is generally accepted that Pakistan tried and failed 
to foment an uprising in Kashmir in August 196 5, an 
event that provided the curtain-raiser for India's 
attack on Lahore on September 6, 1954, sparking the 
second Pakistan-India war on Kashmir - For an appraisal 
of Pakistani motivations for the action in Kashmir and 
implications for Pakistan of the 1965 war. See : Hussain, 
Mushahid, Pakistan's Politics : The Zia Years, Progre-
ssive Publishers, Lahore : 1990, p. 5-11. 
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Jammu and Kashmir on the successive UN Resolutions 
calling for, "a free and impartial plebiscite". These 
resolutions were passed on August 13, 1948, and January 
5, 1949 resolutions which India initially accepted but, 
later reversed on the plea that Pakistan, by entering into 
a military alliance with US, had altered the region's 
security environment. Third, the ferment in Kashmir needs 
to be viewed in the context of the general unrest that is 
evident in the strategic "Islamic crescent of Conflict" 
which begins at Israel and goes through India with the 
Intifida in Palestine, the struggle in Lebanon and Afgha-
nistan, the stirrings in Azerbaijan and the uprising in 
Kashmir. Additionally, with the unravelling of the post 
world war II status quo in East Europe, a similar process 
2 
in underway in South Asia. The situation in occupied 
In August 1953, when Indian Prime Minister Nehru and 
Pakistan Prime Minister Mohammad Ali met in New Delhi, 
it v;as reported that "Nehru had told Mohammad Ali that 
it should be possible to hold the plebiscite in Kashmir 
in April 1955 or at least between April and October 1955. 
The plebiscite administrator was to be appointed by the 
end of April 1954", as stated in Noorani, A.G. , India, 
The Superpowers and the Neighbours, south Agian Publi-
sher$. New Delhi : 1985, Chapter on Nehru and his 
Diplomacy" p. 12; Nehru finally reneged on commitment 
to a plebiscite on Kashmir in a policy speech to the 
Indian Parliament on March 29, 1956 when he asserted 
that the accession of Jammu and Kastroir. On the basis 
of the document of accession signed by the Ruler of 
the State, was "legal and constitutional". 
For variations of this theme, see : Charles Kranthammer 
"This Islamic 'arc of crisis' Traces a Global Intifida" 
in The Washington Post reproduced in International 
Harald Tribune (IHT). February 17-18, 1^50; Mushahid 
Hussain "From Israel to India : Contours of a changing 
world" The Nation, August 12, 1990; Pakistan's success 
fin internationalizing Kashmir is evident from the fact 
that the 20th Islamic conference of foreign Ministers, 
meeting in Islamabad, Turkey, during August 4-8, 1991, 
unanimously expressed "concern at the alarming increase 
in the indiscriminate use of force and gross violations 
of human rights committed against innocent Kashniris" 
and the 48 Foreign Ministers of the organization of 
Islamic Conference (Olc) also called for "the res-ect 
of their (Kashmir) human rights including the right of 
self-determination". y ^j-
0') 
Kashmir today is actually "India's Bangladesh". Kashmir 
and the recent election in India in 1989 had no locus 
standi in occupied Kashmir since there was hardly a 2°/r turn-
out. Pakistan Army eventually ended up as army of occupation 
would behave. United States was not very helpful to the 
Kashmirs or to Pakistan, The US position can be summed up 
as follows : The US accepts that "Fastair is a disputed 
territory and that Pakistan and India should resolve the 
issue between them as agreed in Simla in 1972"; the US had 
privately conveyed to Pakistan that it is opposed to raising 
the Kashmir issue in the UN security council or even inter-
nationalizing it via such forums as the Die; The US even 
threatened during April-May 1990 to cut aid to Pakistan if, 
Islamabad was found to be supporting Kashmiri freedom 
fighters, as such Pakistani assistance, in the US view 
would to "aiding and abetting state terrorism". In July 
1991 for the first time international conference on the 
Kashnir issue was organised in the United States. The 
organisers were the Washington based Kashmiri^ American 
council and the members of London based world Kashmir 
Freedom movement. The small but, affluent Kashmiri-American 
community, mostly enterprising professionals, were enthu-
2 
siastic supporters of this conference. The conference was 
For American views of Kashmir see, "US Now Opposes 
plebiscite in valley" by Hussain, Mushahid, The National, 
April 23, 1990; 'US Considers Kashiiir a Time-bared Issue" 
by Kowahid H. Shah in The Nation, April 27, 1990, How to 
help Prevent a war between India and Pakistan by seling 
Harrison, originally published in. The Washington Post 
and reprinted in IHT, April 24, 199U; Also Text of 
Letters by us Ambassador Robert B., Oaklety to Sardar 
Qayyum Khan, President Azad Kashmir, November 14, 1990. 
For an appraisal of the conference. See : Hussain 
Mushahid, "International Conference on Kashmir", The 
nation , July 21, I99i, Ludwiana A. Joseph "International 
Conference on Kashnir", Dialogue, August 2, l99i; s.M. 
Koreishi, "Journey to North America", The Muslim. 
August 3, 1991. 
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not just significant because it was the first such success-
ful gathering in US, but, it also brought into focus a 
new perspective and fresh insight into the Kashmir issue, 
with even Lord Anebury, Chairman of the British Parliamen-
tary Human Rights committee, suggesting that "the Kashmir 
issue should be placed before the UN decolonization commi-
tteeV'-'' An important aspect brought to light in the historical 
context of Kashmir was a reference to the book being 
written on the subject by the eminent British historian, 
Alastair Lamb, he said to have made two key revelations, 
among others, in his study. One, that the instrument of 
Accession, which India treated as the legal basis of its 
occupation of Kashmir, was signed, post dated, by the Hindu 
ruler of Kashmir after the Indian Army landing in Srinagar, 
2 
as the Indians have always made it out to be. 
Alike. Punjab, Pakistan sponsored terrorists in 
Jammu and Kashmir, the general mass considered Pakistan 
responsible for all terrorist activities in Kashnir. A 
international symposium on terrorism appealed to the United 
States to take stern action, against Pakistan in order to 
3 force it to desist from supporting terrorists in Kashmirj 
and condemned state sponsored terrorism. American Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) pointed out that the Pakistan's 
1. Aveburey, Lord, "Kasrmir : Duplicity in Diplomacy", 
The News, (Islamabad), August 22, 1991. 
2. Alastair Lamb also provided this perspective during 
his presentation at the Seminar on Kashmir Organized 
at Oxford University on June 23-24, 1990 which was 
attended by participants from Pakistan, India, UK, USA 
and USSR. For an evaluation of Mountbatten's role, 
see also : Khan Zaman ^ -iirza, "Lord Mountabattan and 
the Tregedy of Kashmir", The Muslim. .-August 4, 1991. 
3. The Indian Express. New Delhi, May 19, 1992. 
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m i l i t a r y in t e l l igence used nacrot ics p r o f i t s to fund 
s e p a r a t i s t movement in Ind ia . The paper asser ted t h a t 
2 i a ' s two p i l o t s used p r e s i d e n t i a l a i r c r a f t to smuggle 
hereoin - one to the United States during s t a t e v i s i t . 
He did have man in his entourafe who used t h e i r pos i t ion to 
2 
promote criminal i n t e r e s t s including n a c r o t i c s . The CIA 
d i r ec to r t e s t i f y i n g before the Senate Jud ic ia ry Committee 
said - Pakistan has supported the Kashmiri and Sikhs groups, 
which have been waging long running insurgencies aga ins t 
I n d i a ' s cen t ra l government. Indian government complained 
t o t he UN Commission on human r i g h t s t ha t Pakistan was 
o f f i c i a l l y sponsoring t e r r o r i s t s and subversion in Jammu 
and Kashmir, 
An important aspect brought t o l i gh t in the h i s t o -
r i c a l context of Kashmir was a reference t o the new book 
being wr i t t en on the subject by the eminent B r i t i s h h i s t o -
r i a n , Alas ta i r Lamb he said t o have made two key r e v e l a t i o n s , 
among o t h e r s , in h is study. One, t ha t the instrument of 
Accession, which India t r ea t ed as the legal bas i s of i t s 
occupation of Kashmir, was signed, post da ted , by the Hindu 
ru l e r of Kashmir a f te r the Indian Army landing in s r inaga r , 
as the Indians have always made I t out to be» a l i k e 
Punjab, Pakistan sponsored t e r r o r i s t s in jammu and Kashmir. 
General mass considered Pakis tan respons ib le for a l l t e r r o -
r i s t a c t i v i t i e s in Kashmir, A in t e rna t i ona l symposium on 
t e r ro r i sm appealed t o the United s t a t e s to take s t e rn act ion 
aga ins t Pakistan in order t o force i t to d e s i s t from 
5 
supporting t e r r o r i s t s in Kashmir, and condemned s t a t e 
1. The Indian Express, New Delhi , February 25, 1992. 
2. The Indian Express, New Delhi , Apri l 23, 1992, 
•^' The Indian Express, New Delhi , January 1,1992. 
4. The Indian Express, New Delhi , May l9 , 1992. 
5. I b i d , , February 25, 1993, 
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sponsored terrorism . American Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA) pointed out that Pakistan military intelligence used 
narcotics profits to fund separatists movement in India. 
The paper asserted that Zia's two pilots used presidential 
aircraft to smuggle heroin - one to the United states during 
state visit. He did have man in his entourage who used their 
position to promote criminal interests including narcotics. 
The CIA director testifying before the Senate Judiciary 
committee said - Pakistan has supported the Kashmiri and 
Sikhs groups which have been waging long - running insur-
gencies against India's central government. Indian Govern-
ment comrlained to the UN commission on human rights that 
Pakistan was officially sponsoring terrorists and subversion 
in Jammu and Kashmir. 
The United States has changed its verdict now on 
Kashmir, In rejecting the Instrument of Accession, which 
binds the state of jammu and Kashmir with India, Washington 
has come out of the closet to openly state its long 
cherished inclinations only the language was more courtly 
when secretary of state Dean Acheson asked the embassy in 
New Delhi in a secret message back in 1949 to convey the 
Indian Government that its insistance on the legal position 
was not serving its interests and it should be more flexible 
to facilitate a solution of the problem. The 'problem* 
as the State Department saw it, was not the withdrawl of 
Pakistani invaders which was the basis of New Delhi*s 
complaint to the Security Council, but, the balancing of 
1. The Indian Express, New Delhi, February 25, 1992. 
2. The Indian Express, New Delhi, April 25, 1992. 
3. The Indian Express, New Delhi, January 1, 1992. 
4. Bidyut sarker,'Kashmir : India's Bleeding sore'. 
The Economic Times, New Delhi, November 6, 1993, 
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of claims by both countr ies to the former pr incely s t a t e . 
Even t o t h i s aay, i t i s t r ea t ed as a d i spute about t e r r i t o r y . 
Mr. Henry cabout Lodge, ambassador a t the UN, advised the 
Sta te Department in the mid 1950s t h a t acceptance of the 
o r i g i n a l Pakistan aggression would ' u n f a i r l y reverse s i tua t ion 
in favour of I n d i a ' . 
Pakistan has reasons to fee l g rea t fu l the Pakistan 
more than any other country subserved US i n t e r e s t s in 
Afghanistan where Soviet t roops had t o make a r e t r e a t 
followed by the downfall of the Marxist regime. Pakis tans 
past help and future usefulness hold appeal for the Securi ty 
establ ishments of the western world which has saught special 
exemption for i t from the l i s t of t e r r o r i s t s t a t e s . The 
f r ightening aspect of i t s regular army f i r i n g machine guns 
i n t o Somali demostrators and k i l l i n g 23 people in the name 
of UN Peace keeping force I s unforge t tab le . 
The consistency of US pol icy on Kashmir over the 
years may no longer be j u s t i f i e d in the present circumstances. 
The f ac t s narrated by Alas ta i r Lamb in the Seminar about 
instrument of accession on June 23-24, 1990 at Oxford 
Univers i ty have no lega l bear ing, a f te r 46 years of acce-
ssion of s t a t e in Ind ia , the instrument can not be challenged. 
24 I 
(J)) The slachen Glacier Dispute 
The Siachen Glacier boundary dispute was added to 
the r o s t e r of major issues in Indo-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s for 
the f i r s t time in April 198 4, ( i ) The name of siachen 
s i g n i f i e s , A robe of garden ' . The area which i s an ideal 
mountaineering ground, i s the l a r g e s t g l ac i e r region in 
2 
the world out side the polar reg ion . 
The Siachen g lac ie r i s hemmed in by the Sal toro 
Ridge l i n e , an offshoot of the Kara Korams, to the West 
and the mam Kakakoram range to the West and the main 
y-- ,\ 
Kakakoram range to the Eas t . The ^ a l t o r o r idge l ine o r i g i -
> c 
nates from Sia Kaugri a t a high 'of 2 4500 fee t and has an 
A 
a t t i t u d e bracke t of 19,000 to 24,000 f e e t . The major passes 
on t h i s l i n e are Siala a t 20,000 fee t and Bilefond La a t 
18,500 f e e t . I t forms a watershed and i s the focal point 
of the cur ren t conf l i c t in the a rea . The Siachen g lac ie r 
i s 76,4 km long. I t i s the second l a r g e s t g l ac i e r in the 
world. I t o r i g i n a t e s fran Indlfa Col. The Nubre r i v e r o r i g i -
A 
nates from i t s snout and flows South t i l l i t meets the 
Shyok r i v e r . To the West of the Sal toro Ridge l ine l i e s 
Pak occupied B a l t i s t a n sprawling in the Karakoram under 
whose shadow l i e the G i lg i t and Skardu a r ea s . In the 
North East l i e s the Shakesgam Valley, an area of 5,000 
sq.km. ceded i l l e g a l l y by Pakis tan to China in 1963. To 
the East of Karakorams. l i e s Aksai chin under Chinese 
con t ro l . 1. For d e t a i l s see . Robert G, Wirsing, Pakis tans Securi ty 
under Z i a . 1977-1988, The Pol icy Imper ia t ives of a 
Per iphera l Asian s t a t e . New York, St. Mar t i n ' s Press 
1991. 
2. Ahalwat, S .S . , The Siachen Impasse, Indian Defence 
Review, Ju ly 1988, Lancer I n t e r n a t i o n a l , New Delhi , 
p. 44. 
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The root cause c' 
of the problem is the non-demarcation of the line of con-
trol (LC). After the Karachi Agreement in 1949, the Cease 
Fire Line was demarcated only to N/98 42. Pakistan claims 
the LC to be in a direct streight line joining N/9842 to 
Karakoram Pass North of the Indian Dault Bag Ouldi out-
post. The Indian understanding of the LC is based on 
Terrain configuration which runs along saltoro Ridge Line 
upto sia Kaugri. India claimed that its resort to military 
action had been prompted by intelligence reports of an 
imminent move by Pakistan army. Logistical operations 
mounted under conditions virtually without precedent any-
where in the world, were a constant nightmare for both 
countries. The struggle over siachen was linked with long 
fastering conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. 
The first war over the territory had culminated in July 
1949. Karachi Agreement providing for the establishment 
of UN supervised cease fire line drawn between the two 
armies. The controversy later erupted over the wording 
of the agreement, specifically over the nebulous statement 
that the CFL from the last named location (Khor) given in 
the summary. Verbal description of it, moved "thence North 
to the Glaciers. Pakistan rejected this version and held 
1. chibber, M.L., siachen - The Untold Story 'A Personal 
Account, Indian Defence Review, 1990, p, 150. 
2. Pakistan's Forward Lines were accessible, hence its 
logistics were easier. Pakistan's Army Chief reported 
in 1989 that the cost of supporting India's Troops on 
the Siachen was 9 or lO times as great as Pakistan's. 
The Husllm, Karachi, September 14, 1989, See also A 
run chacks. The High Price of siachen. The Indian 
Express, New Delhi, July 2, 1989. 
3. Agreement Between Military Representatives of India 
and Pakistan regarding the establishment of a cease-
fire Line in the state of jammu and'Kashmir, 27 July 
1949 (S/AC12/TC4) in K. sarwar Hasan (ed.). The 
Kashmir Questions; Documents on the Foreign Relations 
of Pakistan, Karachi, Pakistan Institute of International 
Affairs, 1966, po 229. 
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that 1949 delimitation agreement contained no reference to 
to the CFL beyond No. 98 42. Neither of the two wars that 
India and Pakistan faught in 1965 and 1971 resolved the 
issue, but, resorted to force of arms in 1980's. The two 
countries are involved in more complicate question of 
boundary dispute and none is ready to take smallest step 
towards settlement of the siachen sector boundary conflict 
and the question has involved the Kashmir problem as a 
whole. 
From January 1986 and June 1989, India and Pakistan 
held many rounds of talks over siachen Glacier. The talks 
were started when Rajiv Gandhi was in power on Indian side 
and Zia ul Haq was on Pakistan's side. In India, Rajiv 
Gandhi was assassinated and in Pakistan Zia had been killed 
in an air crash but, the problem could not be solved. The 
face to face talks of the two on 17 December 198 5 but, 
could not reach to definate results except the regions 
first nuclear confidence-building measure - not to attack 
each others nuclear installation. 
The talks held in this connection could not prove 
fruitful. But, both India and Pakistan reached to the 
conclusion that the costs on continued military confron-
tation on the Glacier outstripped the pulative benifits 
of possession and expect to reach some emicable solution. 
1. The Tashkent negotiation resulted in an agreement by 
the two sides to withdraw all arm.ed forces to the 
position both countries held in before outbreak of 
hostilities, thus reaffirming CFL. The July 1972 Simla 
Agreement following in l97l conflict, did not reaffirm 
the 1949 CFL. Accordingly a New Line of control was 
drawn up on a series of maps and were signed by senior 
military representatives of the two countries on 11 
December, l972. Because there were no troops beyond 
No. 98 42, the line was not further draqn. 
3^8 
'(E) The canal Water Dispute 
The water dispute between India and Pakistan arose 
after the partition of India, sir Radcliffe's award was 
basically responsible for it. The Indus-water system has 
six rivers, the Indus, the Jhelu, the Chenab, the Ravi, 
the Beas and the Sutlej. Five of the six rivers have their 
upper reaches in India. Radcliff line cuts across the 
Sutlej and the Ravi while the boundary between Pakistan 
and Kaslmir crosses the remaining three, Indus is reached 
by the remaining five at Punjab in west Pakistan, These 
rivers are so interlinked with each other by a series of 
canals that in case there is shortage of water in one, a 
main link canal can drawn water from another. Before the 
partition, the irrigation system was treated as a whole. 
In 1947, when the line dividing the former province of 
Punjab was drawn it cut right across this system and India 
was given control over the headworks of the canals. The 
Ferozpur weir on the Sutlej river from which the Dipalpur 
canal takes its start is on the border in Indian territory. 
The sulemanki weir in the Montgomery district has its 
important eastern training works in Ferozpur. The head-
works of the upper Bari Doad canal which irrigates both 
Indians and Pakistani soil are with India at Madhopur on 
the river Ravi, The dispute over the distribution of water 
arose when after the partition, India desired that the 
Government of Pakistan should use river water by building 
link canals from the western rivers. Pakistan did not 
like the suggestion of India and was not prepared to 
agree to any diminution of supplies from these and claimed 
her right as the lower riparian under international law. 
1. Khan Hafez ur Rehman, "Indo Pakistan Water Dispute", 
Pakistan Horizon, vol. XII, No, 4, December l959, 
pp. 323-24. 
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An agreement was reached between India and Pakistan in 
May 1948 under which in due course Pakistan was to tap 
alternative source for the waters of the eastern rivers. 
Pakistan considered the canal waters dispute more graver 
than that about Kashmir, because it involved the possi-
bility that splendidly fertile large portion of West 
Pakistan v;ould be reconverted to desert and her industrious 
cultivators made beggars. 
On April 1, 1948 India decided to close the canals 
crossing the border between the two countries Keith 
callard described except malice. While discussing the 
impact of the dispute on the Indo-Pak relations Eugens 
R. Black President of the world Bank wrote that the 
relations between the two along the border intermittently 
throughout the decade that followed Five Years after parti-
tion India and Pakistan troops were still facing each 
other behind sand bags and barbed wire at irrigation head-
works along the frontier this was most likely to lead 
2 
to all out war. 
.. Keith c a l l a r d , Pakistan : A P o l i t i c a l Study (London, 
1957) p . 312, Also see . No war Declarat ion and Canal 
Water Dispute; Correspondence Between the prime Minister 
of India and Pakis tan , Karachi; Government of Pakis tan , 
n . d , , For the Indian case , see Indus-Water d ispute : 
Facts and Figure , New Delh i , Government of I nd i a , 
Ju ly 1954. 
2. See for more d e t a i l s Choudhury, G.w., P a k i s t a n ' s 
Rela t ions with India , o p . c i t . , pp. 128-133, Jawed 
Tufa i l , "The World Bank and the Indus Water T r e a t y - I l l " 
Pakis tan Horizon, vo l . XIX, No. 2^.3 1966, Rushbrook 
Williams, "The s ignif icance of Indus water Treaty" , 
Asian Review, vo l . L^/11, 1961, pp. 164-170. 
A group of experts studied the problem after a 
tour of the Indus basin and submitted a plan in 1954. 
After six years of hard work the World Bank succeeded in 
convincing the two countries to accept a draft treaty. It 
was formally signed on September 19, i960 at Rawalpindi 
by the prime Minister of India and the President of 
Pakistan. The crux of the agreement was that India should 
for irrigation purposes use the three easterly stream in 
the basin Sutlej Beas and Ravi and Pakistan the three 
westerly - Chenab, Jhelum and Indus. 
Both the countries had made various attempts to 
solve the problem of the construction of a barrage by 
India at Farrakka. The matter is still alive. 
1. Eugene R. Black, The Indus : Moral for Nations,, 
New York Times Magazine, December 1, i960. Also see, 
David E. Lilenthal,"Another Korea in the Making", 
Collier, August 1951. 
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("FJ The Ganges water Dispute 
The countries of the South Asian region share the 
same ecology, governed by the mighty Himalayan and same 
life style originating from the same cultural heritage. 
Based on ethinic, religions, political and other factors, 
the political map of the countries of this region has 
been drawn, but ecology remained the same. Therefore, 
development activities of every single division of this 
unit which are done on the basis of their own need is 
bound to put their relationship. Bangladesh, situated in 
a delicate region is the lower riparian of the common 
rivers, like deforestation and their impact on the 
environment, agriculture and economy of Bangladesh very 
much determine the relationship among the co-riparian 
states. It has an area of 35.85 million acrev.of which 
about 22.85 million acres (65.77%) are cultivable. The 
population exceeds llO million which makes Bangladesh one 
of the most densely populated regions of the world. 
The river Ganga has highly seasonable flows. 
Eighty per cent of its annual flow takes place during the 
four months of July to October. Nearly 82% of the rain-
fall in the Ganges plain also occurs from June to 
September. Therefore, the monsoon flow is enough to 
meet the requirements of both the riparian. More acute 
problem is faced during the dry season when the flow is 
insufficient to meet the need of both the countries. 
Hence any major harnessing of the Ganges water during 
dry 'season upsets its natural equilibrium and bring 
about a whole chain of -important and interrelated 
recerucussion. The problem has become critical after 
1. Islam, Mahid, "The Ganga water Dispute : Environmental 
and Related Impacts on Bangladesh", BISS Journal, 
vol. 12, No. 3, 1991, p. 272. 
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the diversion of its water by India from Farakka. The 
Farakka Barrage Project, sanctioned by the Indian government 
in April i96 0, was to divert the water of Ganges through a 
feeder canal into the BhagirathiHHooglly river for the 
improvement of navigation for Calcutta port. Siltation of 
the Hooghly river has always been a headache for the Indian 
government. But, the experts, international as well as 
national, never considered the project a solution to this 
problem." M. Abbas, an expert on Ganges-water problem 
said, that the real purpose of the barrage is to control 
the river for supplying Ganges water to the Indian states 
of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. The barrage also provides 
a communication link across the river.' More important 
factor is that the barrage offers to India, a political 
leverage in her dealings with Bangladesh?* 
By 1970, the construction of the Farakka barrage was 
complete except the feeder canal. After the liberation war 
and independence of Bangladesh, some positive developments 
took place, viz., the creation of 'Indo-Bangladesh joint 
river commission' to develop the waters of the common 
rivers but not the question of water, sharing and a joint 
declaration at the Ministerial level to augment the dry 
season flow, became ready for operation of Ganges by 1974 
the feeder canal of the barrage. 
In November, 1977, the parties entered into an 
interim agreement on the sharing of the Ganges dry season 
flow at Farakka as a short term solution to the dispute. 
The 1977 agreement expired on November 1982, In October 
1982, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed between 
1. Abbas, B.M., Op.cit. p. 14. 
2. Nurul I s l am Nazem and Mohammad Humayun K a b i r , " I n d o -
Bangladesh common Riversand water Diplomacy", B I l s s 
pape r s No, 5, December 1986, p . 11 , 
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the countries as an interim arrangement for the sharing of 
the Ganges water for the next two dry seasons instead of 
renewing of 1977 agreement. The MOU also expired in Kay 
198 4. India and Bangladesh signed a fresh accord in 198 5 
and reiterated that the basic problems of inadequate flows 
of water in the Ganga/Ganges available at Farakka during 
the dry season imposes sacrified on both countries and 
2 
that the long term solution lies in augmenting these flows. 
However, the agreement was asserted by both countries. 
India and Bangladesh again had talks on sharing water of 
the four main rivers. Bangladesh made it clear that an 
enormous amount of good political will was required to 
4 
resolve the vexed problem. The present position is that 
there has been a deadlock. In pursuance of the provision 
of the 1977 agreement, both India and Bangladesh came up 
with their respective versions of long terra solution of 
the problem, neither of which is acceptable to the other. 
Bangladesh rejected India's proposal on the ground that 
the link canal would davide Bangladesh, it would take away 
much of her precious land and also dislocate and disrupt 
a huge population and the life and will also cause a damage 
to the ecological balance of the country, A huge chunk 
of the land will be isolated from the main land since both 
the ends of the link canal will be within the territory 
of India. On the other hand, India rejected the Bangladesh 
proposal on the ground that India , as a matter of policy, 
v/ould not accept the inclusion of third party in this 
case, Nepal. 
1. Ttie Hol iday , November 2 9, 1985. 
2 . The Bangladesh Times, Dhaka, November 1 1 , 1985, Hol iday 
November 2 l , 198 5. 
3 . The Times of I n d i a , New D e l h i , November 22 , 1985, Dawn 
K a r a c h i , October 19, 1985 and Nat iona l Herald (New D e l h i , 
October 19, 1985. ^ 
4. The I n d i a n E x p r e s s , New D e l h i , February 3 , 1992. 
5. Nurul I s l am Nazem and Humayian Kab i r , o p . c i t . c i t , p . 17. 
3: 
Impacts 
On Environment : 
Change in hydrology : Due to the diversion of the 
Ganges there has been a change in hydrology in Bangladesh. 
The water level of Hardenge Bridge fell below the minimum 
ever recorded, i.e. 23,000' cusecs as compared to a histori-
cal average of 64,43 0 cusecs. The water level registered 
at 17 feet compared to 22 feet while the ground water level 
2 
fell by 5 feet. The off take of the river Gorai, the main 
distributory of the Ganges is at the point of extinction 
3 
due to heavy siltation. 
Flood : Apart from deforestation and melting of ice in 
the upper region, the barrage contributed to a great extent 
to the flood in Bangladesh. Diversion of the silt free water 
into the upstream pushes a large volume of silt into the 
rivers down stream, thereby decrease the carrying capacity 
of the rivers. It has been shown in a study that 3C^ of 
the country is subject to flood due to spill over from 
major rivers while the flood small rivers cover about 40?o 
4 
area of the country. 
On Socio-political Life : 
Ganges issue always played an important role in 
socio-political life of Bangladesh, The issue has political 
implication too. Government's failure to resolve the problem 
with India is always a matter of public resentment, 
solution of Farakka barrage problem is one of the common 
issues in the political activities in Bangladesh. 
1. Begum-, Khurshida, Tension Over The Farakka Barrage : A 
Techno-Political Tangle In south Asia, UPL, Dhaka, 
1987, p. 131. 
2. Ibid. 
-3 see for d e t a i l . Begum, Khursh ida , o p . c i t . p . 131-135. 
Huda, M. and Choudhary, J . U , , "Flood and Eros ion" 
Paper p r e s e n t e d a t a Reg iona l conference on Floods and 
E r o s i o n , Dhaka September 7 -10 , 1989, p . 9 . 
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((ji>) The Boundary Dispute 
"Nothing in my long political career" wrote Prime 
Minister Nehru to Premier Chou En-lai on October 27, 1962 
"has hurt and grieved me more than the fact that the hopes 
and aspirations for peaceful and friendly neighbourly 
relations which we entertained and to promote which my 
colleagues in the Governrnent of India and myself worked so 
hard, ever since the establishment of the Peoples Republic 
of China, should have been shattered by the hostile and 
unfriendly twist given on India-China relations during the 
past two years". India was astonished on the sudden 
unfriendly action of China to whom it went out of way to 
plead the cause of china in the United Nations and all 
along opposed all parts which were set up to isolate china. 
On January 23, 1959, chou En-lai wrote to Nehru 
about the 50,000 squire miles of Indian territory and 
claim it. In 1954, when Indian Prime Minister visited 
China, he mentioned to Chinese leaders that he has seen 
some maps showing wrong boundary between the two countries. 
The Chinese prime Minister took it easy but, in 1956 when 
he visited India, accepted the Mc Mohon Line as the border 
between India and China (Map No, 4). But, on January 23, 
1959 Chou En-lai wrote to Nehru, "It was true that the 
border question was not raised in 195 4. When negotiations 
were being held between Chinese and Indian sides for the 
agreement on trade and intercourse between Tibet region 
of China and India. This was because conditions were not 
yet ripe for its settlement". In fact China obtained 
effective control over Tibet by that time and Chinese army 
was well entrenched across the border of India, china 
waited till his incursions into remote areas occupied 
parts of Indian territory. In 1957 china constructed a 
road across the Aksai Chin area of India and stopped 
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India petrolling in the occupied areas. In nev; of the 
deterioration in relations between two countries India 
wrote to Chou En-lai on February 8, i960 suggesting a 
meeting between the two. The meeting held on April i960 
only confirmed serious differences, but, could not be of 
much value. 
In 1962 Chinese troops stepped up their forward 
patrolling in the Western sectors. In July 1962, Chinese 
troops encircled an Indian post in the Galwan Valley. 
Suddenly on September 8, 1962, Chinese troops marched 
across the Eastern sector which followed on October 20, 1962 
by massive attack by China on western and Eastern sectors of 
the border, overwhelming the limited Indian Frontier Posts. 
Chinese attack was preplanned, Klaus Mehnert has asserted, 
"we must assume that the C.c. Senior also approved the plan 
for attacking India;!'in Himalayas, for on October 20, 1962, 
less than a month after its conclusion, war brokeout on 
the Sino-Indian border". The decision to use against India 
was taken at the highest level. Peoples daily came out 
within a weak of Chinese action justifying the military 
2 
ac t ion . India considered china l i ke an aggressive power 
determined to humilate i t s neighbour, while for China, 
i^ c 3 
India was a dese r t e r frcm the a n t i I m p e r i a l i s t camp". 
On October 24, Primier Chou En- la i put forward h i s three 
point proposal for cease f i r e and disengagement. However, 
1. Klaus Mehnert : Peking and Moscow, pu lna in , 7^ew York, 
1963, p . 429, 
2. More on Nehru's Philosophy in the Light of the Sino-
Indian Boundary Question", Peking Review, Mo. 2 , 1962.. 
3. New Times, November 14, 1951. O. Ovestove "The P a r l i a -
mentary E lec t ions in India "Bol ' shaik March 1952. 
soviet p r e s s Trans la t ion , April 15, 1952. 
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the net result of the Chinese invasion was a serious blow 
to what Soviet had gained in India. It was obvious that she 
(china) lost the sympathy even of the Asian people. The 
attack on China's newly emerging friendship with Pakistan. 
Her neighbour (Pakistan) a member of the aggressive SEATO 
pact. But with this appendage of the capitalists the CPR 
is now negotiating pact of friendship. Dramatically, on 
November 21, 1962 they announced their unilateral cease 
fire and withdraw 20 k.m, behind the Mc Mahon Line "the 
1959 Line of actual control" in Eastern sector and 20 km, 
behind the line of their latest aggression in Ladakh which 
called "1959 line of actual control" In Western sector. The 
Chinese took illegal possession of 14500 sq,miles in Indian 
territory. Speaking about the Sino-Indian war Harold Hinton 
said, "India precipitated war with stronger enemy on whose 
disposition it had no adequate intelligence, and who had 
evidently made considerable effort from the abtumn of 1959 
to the spring of 1952 to avoid hostilities, but, who had 
watched the steady advance of India troops in the Western 
2 
sector with growing concern". Professor John K, Galbriath 
took a similar view of Chinese action and said, "During the 
proceeding summer, there had been evidence of increasing 
pressure and support from various sources in India for 
military action do more the Chinese out of the area which 
they claimed. In the light of this, one can immagine the 
1. It should be interesting to end this appraisal of the 
Sino-Indian border war with the following reflections by 
Galbraith on its consequence for India relations with 
the out side world "As a result of this episode, there 
has been a radical change in Indian foreign policy". 
This greater cautions has inevitably resulted in 
a considerable loss of influence. The Indians in the 
future will be a good deal more popular but, a good 
deal less powerful. Bulletin, pp, 3-4. 
2. Dawn, October 3, 1959. 
259 
Chinese coming up xvith the notion of a major military 
demonstration to show the Indian that this kind of military 
policy had no future. 
In order to break the stalemate and to provide a basis 
for agreed cease-fire arrangements» the representative of 
the six Afro-Asian countries (Ceylon, Burma, Indonesia. 
Cambodia, UAR and Ghana) met at Colombo between lOth and 12tb 
December 1962 and adopted, "that these proposal which could 
help in consolidating the cease-fire, once implemented 
should pave the way for discussion bet^ v'een representati>'es 
of both parties for the purpose of solving problems entail-
ed in the cease-fire position. Indiaaccepted the proposal 
in toto but, china placed reservations. Nevertheless, some 
progress was made in 1989 in the boundary dispute when both 
sides agreed in the joint communique to create a favourable 
climate and condition for a fair and reasonable settlement 
? 
through peaceful and friendly co-operation, A joint 
working group was set up at Vice Ministerial level v.'hich 
met for first time in 1989 and it was resolved, "Not to 
dwell on past differences but to look to the future in a 
practice, workman like and realistic manner in order to 
reach a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement 
of the boundary question. Peace and Tranguility should be 
main aim. Need for confidence building was recognised,"^ 
1. Alexeyev, A. "The Political situation in India", 
New Times, October 31, 1951. 
2. Lai, John, India and China : Need for give and Take" 
The Times of India, January 9, 1989. 
3. Ministry of External Affair, Annual Report, 1989-90, 
p. 18. 
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After an interval of nearly 31 years, India and China 
agreed on September 7, 1993 on reduction of military forces 
along the border and leaving it to their experts to deter-
mine the alignment of the Line of Actual Control (LAC) 
wherever, there were differences. The agreement which laid 
down the framework for maintaining peace and tranquility 
along the LAC said the "extent, depth, timing and nature 
of reduction of military forces will be worked out through 
mutual consultations". It further asserted that "India and 
China will continue their search for a fair, reasonable and 
mutually acceptable settlement of the boundry question. 
1. The Indian Express, September 8, 1993. 
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CHAPTER " V I I 
THE ECONOMIC RESOURCES AND DEFENCE EXPEIOITURE OF 
SOUTH ASIAN COUNTRIES 
Ol 
^ y il 
Sconoralc Resources and Defence Expenditure of south Asian LA J 
Countries 
(a) Bconomic Resources 
When man f i r s t of a l l arroed himself with spec i a l l y 
se lec ted s t i c k s and s tones , the economics of defence was 
born. For thousands of years providing the f igh t ing , equip-
ments have remained the primary economic cos t s of defence, 
Sarly f igh t ing equipments were simple. One produced the sword, 
Speer or bciw, e t c , l a s t ed for a long time, required l i t t l e 
maintenance and could be replaced with comparative e a s e . 
Hence, t h e i r cost or economy was almost n e g l i g i b l e . In 
ancient t ime, i t was t rue t ha t the conquest of a t e r r i t o r y 
meant a tangible advantage to the conqueror, i t ment the 
exp lo i t a t i on of the conquered t e r r i t o r y by the conquering 
s t a t e i t s e l f t o the advantage of t h a t s t a t e and i t s c i t i z e n s . 
I t f requently meant the enslavment of the conquered people 
and the acquis i t ion of wealth in the form of s laves as a 
d i r e c t r e s u l t of conquering war. In medieval t imes, a war 
of conquest means a t l e a s t Immediate tangib le l od ty . More 
r ecQi t ly , In colonisat ion period, newly discovered land and 
pre-emption of such t e r r i t o r y by one p a r t i c u l a r nation 
secured an advantage for th» c i t i z ens of t ha t na t ion , i t i s 
tha t i t s over flowing population found homes in condit ions 
t h a t were preferably to the soc ia l or p o l i t i c a l condi t ions 
imposed by the a l i en n a t i o n s . The appl ica t ion of new inven-
•^ions and manufacturing techniques t o Inmition of war made 
man more e f f i c i e n t k i l l e r . Development of r i f l e s , guns, 
m i s s i l e s , bombs, nuclear banbs, ships and p lanes , chemical 
and b io log ica l weapons and ABM, IRBM, ICBM tremendously 
Increased the weight of defence economy. 
1 . J a l Naraln, K, Kumar Datta, Bfconcanlcs of Defence, 
Lancers Books, New Delhi, 1989, p , 11 , "^  
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The old fa t ions about the defeated to pay for the 
conquerer disappeared during the 1914-18 war. The Versa i l l e s 
Treaty 1919 only assijRJed tha t the vanquished would pay the 
cos t and preferably a b i t raore. In 1945 i t was again e s t a -
bl i shed t h a t i t was not possible for the defeated na t ions 
t o pay r epa ra t ions , with the r e s u l t t ha t economic advantages 
froro war disappeared t o some extent while the cost of defence 
increased t o a great ex t en t . 
The tyranny of fa te i s tha t in the past the week 
count r ies had to suffer while in the present days the 
under-developed or spec i f i c a l l y the developing countr ies are 
suffer ing most due to heavy pressures on t h e i r economic 
ca l cu lus , some recent economists have explained tha t the 
bas ic problem of developed countr ies i s the problem of 
affluence "rather than s c a r c i t y " . These count r ies have won 
over the problem of s ca rc i t y and poverty, bu t , are facing 
the problems created by affluence and growth of problems 
of mental t ens ions , optimum use of l e i s u r e , luxury and 
1 longer i ty e t c . 
Today even, two-third of the world is lying in 
povert . The per capita income of south Asian countries is 
so low that the majority of them is lining at the subsis-
tence or near subsistence level. 
•ra)India 
India i s the worlds l a rges t and most populous demo-
cracy and l a r ^ s t developing country with a democratic 
system. I t represents one of the most i n t e r e s t i n g cases of 
f i rms, s t a t e s and au tho r i t a t i ve c i v i l i a n cont ro l of the 
m i l i t a r y . I t i s remarkable but the appal l ing problems of 
1. For d e t a i l s see csalbraith, j . K . , The Affluent society, 
London, Hamiltai, 195 8. 
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low economic developments sharp differ ©ices in income^ mass 
poverty, over populat ion, i l l i t e r a c y , e thn ic antagcxiism, 
absence of any l i n g u i s t i c un i ty , c u l t u r a l fragmentation, 
soc ia l d i v e r s i t i e s , and a complex <ilass system do not seem 
to hinder c i v i l i a n control of the Indian m i l i t a r y . The two 
neighbours of India-Pakistan and Bangladesh are comparative 
or c lose ly matched to her in a number of ways yet display 
divergent pa t t e rns of c i v i l m i l i t a r y r e l a t i o n s . 
India occupies a dominating pos i t ion in Indian Ocean 
and pro jec t s southward to western Asia and the r i c e produc-
ing lands in south-west Asia. I nd i a ' s physical locat ion i s 
2 
sea f rontage . In an evaluat ion of the geographical loca-
t i ons tha t are advantageous to na t ions , frontage on the 
sea rece ives f i r s t considera t ion, because the sea expedites 
a l i ve ly exchange of goods and i dea s . I n d i a ' s cen t ra l pos i -
t ion on the main trade route between Europe and the Par East 
v ia mediterranean, the Red sea, the Indian Ocean and the 
s t a i t s of Malacca provides favourable commercial connexion 
with the r e s t of the world.India i s enc i rc led by countr ies 
cur ren t ly in P o l i t i c a l s p o t - l i g h t . Both in the west and East 
Pakistan maintains a conmon boundary with I n d i a . 
India occupies a cen t r a l posi t ion in southern Asia. 
F ina l ly , Ind ia ' s s ignif icance in the geopol i t i c s of Europe 
and Asia (and ind i r ec t ly of the whole world) i s consider-
a b l e . I t s loca t iona l r e l a t i o n s h i p t o Europe i s such tha t 
under ce r t a in p o l i t i c a l condit ions i t could assume a dec i -
s ive pos i t ion in the s ta tegy of world c o n t r o l . India need 
1 . stepnen P. Cohen, Civi l ian Control of the Mi l i t a ry in 
Indias clande, Clande E . J r . wetch (ed) s Civi l ian Control 
of the Mi l i t a ry i Theory and Cabs From Developing Country, 
Allbany s t a t e University of New York Press ; 1976, pp. 43-64. 
2, India has 3300 miles of sea f ron t i e r s as ccxnpared to 
about 8,200 miles of land f r o n t i e r . 
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not rely upon a s t rategic position for po l i t i ca l importance. 
The adequate size and corapact form of the country i s favou-
rable and optimum for purposes of defence as well as effec-
t ive policy. The larger a s ta te i s , the greater i s the 
probabil i ty of i t s containing a large population (man-power) 
and a r ich array of natural resources, and therefore, the 
greater is i t s likelihood of being po l i t i ca l ly strong and 
econanically wealthy. Power today tends to accompany s ta tes 
of large or gigantic s ize . Glorious s ize , however, i s costly, 
luxury and a dense transportation pattern i s needed to weld 
the country into one po l i t i ca l whole for building a strong 
s t a t e . 
The compact areal form of India has created i t s own 
set of environmental conditions. In general, compactness 
has increased unity and has greatly fac i l i t a ted the develop-
ment of the country as a whole, and i s part ly responsible 
for i t s po l i t i ca l and econcanic unity and strength. Relief 
features are also used as c r i t e r i a for measuring the poten-
t i a l i t i e s of a po l i t i ca l area. The re l ief pattern and 
geological structure determines the land u t i l i za t ion and 
mineral po ten t ia l i t i es of a country and is key to the 
developnent of i t s national economy. The surface charac-
t e r i s t i c s determine penetrabil i ty during war time and 
access ib i l i ty , usabil i ty and a rea l cohesion during peace, 
time. This unique geographic periphery of India has fac i -
l i t a t ed defence. Flanked on tne north by the world's 
highest mountains, the country is also protected from the 
winter cold of the north. 
Fortunately, a large portion of Northern India i s 
plan^iwell suited topographically to agr icul ture . Fortuna-
tely also much of th is area is favoured by a moist climate, 
within th is northern plain i s the greatest concentration 
of people in a l l India, and also contains the po l i t i ca l 
nucleus or core area* in which the nat ion was germinated 
and nur tured . Much of the economic v i t a l i t y cent res in t h i s 
zone. The coasts of India have not in modern times len t 
themselves to the development of a maritime na t ion . The west 
coast of India i s e s s e n t i a l l y the r e s u l t of submergence and 
in the nor th , Kcnkan, has good harbours of the via type; 
in the south, Malabar has several lagoons and roadsteads 
protected oy suianarine mud-banks, surat and Goa in the age 
of Renaissance discover ies and Bombay and Cochin in modern 
times t e s t i f y t o ttre maritime t r a d i t i o n s in Kcnkan and 
Malabar. The East coast of India i s not so well provided 
with harbours. Yet frc»n the Sast coast the Hindu emigrants 
brought c i v i l i z a t i o n t o Burma, Cambodia, and the £^st Indias 
and even founded powerful empires. During the middle of 
the 14th century Majapahit se t up a powerful s e a - s t a t e , and 
the flowering of Indian cu l tu re in Java a t t h i s period 
represen t s the supreme achievement of the Hindus in south-
East Asia. Her long sea-frentage and cen t r a l pos i t ion in 
the Indian ocean, as already s t a t ed , i s of permanent p o l i -
t i c a l and economic s ign i f i cance . The p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l 
pa t te rn has been less d i r e c t l y affected by the t e r r a i n , but 
even here the importance of the two h i s t o r i c a l f r o n t i e r -
zones the Araval l i h i l l s , and the satpura h i l l s and the i r 
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cont inuat ion upto Chota Nagpur i s ev iden t . The t o t a l inven-
tory of physical resources possessed by India includes 
minera ls , water, s o i l and na tura l vege ta t ion . In t o t a l 
quant i ty many t imes, such as mi l l ions of tones of coal 
reserves or thousands of square miles of arable land, 
1 . For the general theme, see K. Panikar, K.M., India and 
the Indian Ocean (1945). I t i s suggested t h a t Panikar 
regards south-East Asia synonymous with fur ther th inks 
in terms of former maritime expansion. 
2 . For a fu l l e r discussion of some e f f ec t s of I nd i a ' s 
bu i ld sea. W. Gorden Pas t and O.H.K. spate (Ed i to r s ) , 
The Changing Map of Asia, A P o l i t i c a l Geocgaphy (1950), 
pp. 121-124. 
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sound iropressive, in terms of per c a p i t a . Although India 
i s not so r i c h in economic minerals as the U.S.A. ^ t i s by 
no means d e f i c i e n t . This country i s indeed the world ' s 
dominant source c£. a t l e a s t two minera ls , mica and i lmeni te ; 
i t shares with Russia in being the wor ld ' s main producer of 
manganese, and possesses perhaps the world l a rges t reserves 
of high-grade iren o r e . In addi t ion , the re are adequate 
reserves ava i l ab le of many other minerals such as aluminium, 
magnesium, t i tanium, e t c . Our reserves of r e f rac to ry mine-
r a l s are e spec ia l ly s a t i s f a c t o r y ; they are both considerable 
and varied-chromite; kyani te , f i r e - c l a y s , magnesite, dolo-
mite , s i l i c a and bauxite b r i c k s . I nd i a ' s shortcoming com-
p r i s e mainly the non-ferrous meta l s . I n d i a ' s coal reserves 
are not large but they are suf f ic ien t for some time to ccxne. 
In o i l , a commodity as necessary to the nat ion as blood to 
the indiv idual , India holds much l e s s hope, but the poss i -
b i l i t y of making synthe t ic gasoline br ightens the p i c t u r e . 
To sum up, excepting for a few minera ls , I n d i a ' s mineral 
p o s i t i a i i s , on the whole s a t i s f a c t o r y . 
The water resources of India are immense for the 
developnent of i r r i g a t i o n and hydro-e lec t r i c energy. I t 
has been estimated that out of the t o t a l quan t i ty of 1,350 
mi l l ion acre f ee t of water ava i lab le in the country, only 
about s ix per cent has been u t i l i z e d so f a r , r e s t running 
waste to the sea. The i r r i g a t e d area represen t s 13.5 per 
cent of the cul turable land and 21 per cent of the land 
ac tua l ly under c u l t i v a t i o n . The po t en t i a l water power 
resources of India are of the order of 35 t o 40 mi l l icn KW 
of which only 0.5 mi l l ion KW has been developed so f a r . 
1 . For I n d i a ' s mineral resources See Dunn, J . A . , ores and 
Minerals in India ; Present and Future Pos i t ion . Trans-
ac t ions of the National I n s t i t u t e of Science of Ind ia , 
v o l . I I , No. 8, pp. 377-82 (1947). 
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More than th ree- four ths of the people of India look 
to the s o i l for the i r sustenance. For count less generat ions , 
the c u l t i v a t i o n of arable land has been the chief means of 
supporting hundreds of mi l l ions of people of t h i s country. 
Floods* droughts, excessive pressure on land and pr imi t ive 
condi t ions of ag r i cu l tu re combine t o prevent the emergence 
of India as a s t rong modern power. With a population of over 
841.1 mi l l ion and with a per cap i ta income of Rs. 5471.00. 
In 1955, the United Nations world Economic Survey, l i s t e d 
55 countr ies ahead of India in terms of per capi ta income 
while in 1977 she was behind 110 out of the l i s t of 128 
coun t r i e s . ^ While I n d i a ' s per cap i ta income i s 310, Pak i s t an ' s 
365, s r i Lanka 510, Maldleves 470 and t h a t of Bangladesh 
and Bhutan 208, 160 d o l l a r s r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
since independence in 1947, India has been one of 
the most inwardlooking, protected economies in the world s 
For many years , foreign t rade was i n s i g n i f i c a n t and foreign 
investment was ac t ive ly discouraged. Many of the count ry ' s 
i ndus t r i e s were state-owned, i ne f f i c i en t and loss-making. 
A comprehensive system of i n d u s t r i a l l i c e n s i n g t h r o t t l e d 
the p r iva te s ec to r . Between 1965 and 1980, the Indian 
econcauy grew a t an annual average of 3.6 per cen t , a r a t e 
t h a t compares favourably to h i s t o r i c a l exper ience. In 19 84, 
Rajiv Gandhi began a moderate and pragmatic e f fo r t t o 
l i b e r a l i z e the econony. The p ro -am attempted to modify 
impor t - subs t i tu t ion p o l i c i e s , bo ls te r c a p i t a l markets, and 
e s t a b l i s h a l ess burdensone l icens ing system, giving 
business greater l a t i t u d e in determining t h e i r production 
volumes. Exports were encouraged through a more ccanpetltlve 
1 . Ma norma Year Book 1993, Mommen Mathew, Kerala, India , 
p . 405. 
2 . United Nations, World Sconomic survey. New York, 1987. 
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exchange rate. High marginal tax rates were lowered to a 
degree. Their main effect was to encourage the development 
of a growing urban middle class, increasing support for 
reform among some educated professionals, bu't lowering it 
among the populist opposition. This crisis promoted India 
to implement a new round of reforms under a minority 
government formed by Narasimha Rao after the. June 1991 
elections. The new reform initiatives included interest rate 
liberalization, encouragement of private industry, abolish-
ment of export subsidies, and elimination of import licen-
sing. Foreign investors were allowed to own up to 51% of 
most local firms. The industrial licensing system was 
abolished for all but 18 industries. Only 8 lines of business 
compared with dozens before, were reserved exclusively for 
state-owned firms. The rupee was made partly convertible in 
February 1992. Trade liberalization was approached very 
timidly, however, quantitative import controls were removed 
for many types of capital goods, but remain in effect for 
consumer goods. Import tariffs were lowered, but the top 
rate remained at 11% (down from 15%). 
.((;?} Pakistan 
Pakistan was emerged on the basis of religion and 
was a geographical absurdity and led to its further parti, 
tion in 1971. Lord Mountbatten predicted in the very 
beginning that the eastern wing of Pakistan would break 
away from Pakistan in the quarter of a century. In fact 
British wanted to break up India, into several sovereign 
1 . ijarry Collins and Dominique Lapierre, Freedom at Mid-
night, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1975', p. 162. 
s t a t e s , thinking tha t the aresultant weak s t a t e s would 
remain t i e d to Br i t i sh as independent dominions. 
S.D. Muni a l so expressed tha t ' the Br i t i sh in 
decisicMi, conscious or otherwise regarding the s t a t e s of 
pr incely s t a t e s of Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir added 
s i gn i f i c an t l y to the conf l i c t po ten t i a l inherent in the 
2 Indo-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s h i p " , jawahar Lai Nehru r i g h t l y 
observed tha t ' the question of Indo-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s h i p 
was a psychological thing r e s u l t i n g from the way, the sub-
cont inent was divided between India and Pakis tan . There 
was a complete emotional upset of the people in India and 
Pakistan because of t h i s . Expressing h i s views on future 
of Pakistan he commented tha t "in t h i s way we sha l l reach 
3 
t h a t United India sooner than otherwise, sarder Pate l 
was op t imis t ic and went fur ther to say tha t 'sooner than 
l a t e r we sha l l be united in common a l l i g i ance of our 
country", Mohd, Ali Jinnah reacted sharply on these views 
of Indian leaders and said t h a t ' i t i s very unfortunate 
t ha t vigorous propaganda has oeen going on tha t Pakistan 
i s near ly a temporary roedness and the Pakistan w i l l have 
t o come i n t o the Union as a pa r t i nen t , rependent, e r ro r ing 
1 . The point became clear in the Br i t i sh Cabinet Conmittee 
paper t ransmit ted by Lord Ismay to Lord Marutbattas in 
the TelecffaiTi, no. 6043, May 9, 1947, pp, 723-728. The 
t r ans fe r oi power, v o l . x quoted in J a s j i t Singh (ed) 
India and Pakistan ; Cr i s i s of Rela t ionship , Lancer 
Pub l i she r s , Pr ivate Ltd . New Delhi, 1990, pp. 117-118. 
2 . Muni, S.D., south Asia, Vikas Publishing House, New 
Delhi, 1980, p . 40. 
3 . Quoted in Menon, V.P. , Transfer of Power in India, 
Calcut ta , 1957, p . 139. 
4 . Quoted in Burke, M,s , , -Pakis tan 's Foreign Policy ; A 
His to r i ca l Analysis, London, 1973, p . 9 . 
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son. Ind i a ' s involvement in Pak i s tan ' s Eastern wing and 
emergence of Bangladesh strengthened the f ee l i ng of 
Pakistan tha t ' India has plans t o destroy or weaken Pakistan 
2 in order to dominate i t * . 
When composite India was divided, Pak i s t an ' s share 
was about one f i f t h of the area and the highways, about 
one s ix th of the population and r a i l l i n e s , about one 
seventh of the cu l t iva ted land, a t en th of the army, a 
segfnent of big land lo rds , a minority of the educat ional 
middle c l a s s , very few of the shopkeepers, t r ade r s profe-
ss iona l c lasses and a r t i s a n s , only a few thousand i n d u s t r i a l 
workers almost none of the minerals , f r ac t ion of i n d u s t r i a l 
equipment, mi l l s for her three four th of the j u t e crop 
and only one major port Karachi and another port a t Chi t ta -
gong (now in Bangladesh). 
Pakistan has three of the l a r g e s t count r ies as i t s 
neighbours. China with a population of over one b i l l i o n , 
or a quar te r of the e n t i r e world populat ion, "India with 730 
mil l ion people and the soviet Uriion (before d i s in teg ra t ion) 
with a population of 257 m i l l i c n . Add the population of 
Iran (210 m i l l i o n ) , Afghanistan (19 m i l l i o n ) , Pakistan 
(100 m i l l i c n ) , to t h i s region and i t has half of the world 
population in i t s bosom. Three of wor ld ' s four l a r g e s t armed 
forces belong to Pak i s t an ' s neighbours. Russia (363,000), 
China (4 3,25,000), and India (11,20,000). The one missing 
great m i l i t a r y power i s the United s t a t e s of America 
1. Quoted in Chopra, surendra a r t i c l e , Indo-Pak Rela t ions , 
in Pandav Nayak (ed) Pakistan i society and P o l i t i c s , 
south Asian Publ ishers , Kew Delhi, 19 84, p . 37. 
2. Forence, A. Val i , P o l i t i c s of the Indian Ocean Region i 
The Balance of Power, The Free Press , New York, 1976, 
p . 46. 
3 . Bindra, S.S. , India and Her Neighbours, Deep and Deep 
Pub l ica t ions , New Delhi, p . 22 ex t r ac t quoted from j . E . 
spencer and W.H. Thomas, Asia Sast by South ; A Cultural 
c^oqraphy'. New York, 1971, p . 332. 
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(20,68,000) . America does not enjoy the d i s t i n c t i o n of 
being Pakistan *s neighbour but has never theless great 
i n t e r e s t in the area because of i t s proximity t o the Gulf. 
All the four great m i l i t a r y powers of the world are invo l -
ved in the a rea . India clalms# proudly enough, t o be the 
wor ld ' s l a rges t democracy. 
Pakistan has very close r e l i g i o n s , e t h n i c , l i n g u i s -
t i c and c u l t u r a l l ink with her muslim neighbours . In fact 
same t r i b e s s t raddle the borders between the coun t r i e s . The 
pathans are the l a rges t e thnic group in Afghanistan. They 
c o n s t i t u t e 40% of the Afghan populat ion, and are akin t o 
some 8 mil l ion pathans l i v ing in Pakis tan , s imi la r ly , 
Bluchis l ive in Pakistan, I ran and Afghanistan, since t h e i r 
independence in 1947, Pakis tan, and India have fought three 
wars, the l a s t being in 1971, in which Pakistan was, as 
the Indians put i t , 'cut t o s i ze* . 
Pakistan i s bounded to the west by I r an , t o the 
north by Afghanistan and the \JS3R to the Northern by China* 
to the East and south by India and to the south by the 
Arabian sea. The t e r r i t o r y has an area of 796095 sq.km. and 
i t s population i s 11,31,63,000 with per cap i ta Inccane of 
365.-^ 
On economic front Pakistan s t a r t e d off w e l l . I t 
included the extremely r i c h a g r i c u l t u r a l areas of Punjab 
and a p o t e n t i a l l y more homogeneous populat ion, Punjab 
and slndh which are about 75 per cent of the r u r a l popu-
l a t i o n , produce more than 90 per cent of the coun t r i e s , 
wheat, more than 95 per cent of the r i c e , and" 100 per cent 
of i t s co t ton . The remaining two provinces^ Baluchistan "" 
1 . Manorma Year Book 1992-93 and l£he statesman Year Book 
1992-93, Mac Millan Press L t d , , 1993, pp. 954-955, 
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and the North west Front ier Provinces are by comparison, 
poor. The majority of the population l i v e s in v i l l ages* 
the urban population i s 2 8.3 per cen t . 
Economically, Pakistan i s one of the poorest in the 
world. The grow r a t e of GNP i s 6.1% per annum as i s the 
growth r a t e of industry ag r i cu l tu re and expo r t s . But, from 
the s t r a t e g i c var iab les and sec tors through which growth 
i s sustained over time seem t o show dec l in ing t r end . 
Government pronouncements in the Press suggests a sense 
of s a t i s f ac t ion at the level and growth of domestic inves t -
ment. The r e a l growth r a t e in Qross Domestic Investment 
followed a decl ining trend from 5.8 per cent in 1976-77 
to 3.4 per cent in 19 83-84 percentages of GNP declined 
from 17.6 per cent i n 1976-77 to 13.9 in 1983-84 and now 
10.95 per cent and the publ ic sector investment declined 
from 12 per cent to 8.6 per cent in the 1983-84. 
The foreign exchanges earnings of the country are 
based not on a sus ta inable export of goods but , on the 
uncertain remit tances from Pakis tani workers inMiddle East, 
The growing debt serv ic ing burden i s indicated by the fact 
t ha t in the year 1977 as much as 44 per cent of gross 
dtsiDursement were returned in the form of debt servic ing 
of old loans . By 1987, t h i s f igure increased to 87 per cen t . 
several s tud ies have highlighted the problem of paucity in 
Pakis tan . According t o Naseem's sindy the poverty £ime in 
the urban sector i s specif ied as l e s s than Rs. 375 per ~ 
2 year . But, the r u r a l poverty ind ica tes tha t the number 
of people below poverty l ine did not decrease these days. 
Pakistan Economic survey, 1985-86, Islamabad Government 
of Pakis tan, Finance Division, Economic Advisors Wing, 
pp . 25-27. . 
I , Naseem, s.M., "Mass Poverty in Pakistan ; some 
Preliminary f ind ings" . The Pakistan Developnent 
Review, 1975. 
Contd . . . 
1 
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All the ava i lab le evidence suggests t h a t with a low 
domestic saving r a t e and rap id ly increas ing r e l i ance on 
foreign aid the economy of Pakistan i s en te r ing a period 
over the next decade when i t may be faced with the grain 
choice of s tagnation i n per capi ta income or a very high 
debt serv ic ing burden, 
: CO Bangladesh 
Bangladesh i s located in the de l t a of the congas and 
Brahmaputra r i v e r s in the nor th eastern pa r t of the Indian 
sub-cont inent . Until 1971 i t was par t of Pakis tan . I t has 
an area of 55,126 square miles (142776 sq.kra.)"and i s one 
of the most densely populated areas in the world. In about 
4 per cent of the t o t a l area densi ty exceeds 2000 persons 
per square mi le . The t o t a l population was 100.6 mi l l ion in 
1987^ and a t present i s 14 3-999. 
The people of Bangladesh are among the poorest in 
the world. Overwhelmingly, dependent on backward a g r i c u l t u r e , 3 
Incane, per capi ta in 19 87 was US $ 150 but a t present i s 4 US $ 209. The combined e f fec t of s i t u a t i o n , s o i l e ros ion, 
decreased leve l of surface water and increased s a l i n i t y i s 
so grave for Bangladesh tha t s t a b i l i t y of the country i s 
Contd . . . 
I I . Allaudin, Ta la t , "Mass Poverty i n Pakis tan . A Further 
Study", The Pakistan pevelopnent Review, 1975. 
I I I . Hussain Akmal, Report on Rural Population Bstimates. 
Study for the National Human sett lement Policy, 
Government of Pakistan Environment and' Urban Affa i rs , 
1983. 
IV. Mujahid, G.3.S. , A Note on Measurement of Poverty and 
Income Inequa l i t i e s in Pakis tan. The Pakistan 
pevelopnent Review, 1978. 
1 . The world Development Report 19 87, New York Oxford 
un ivers i ty Press , Published for world Bank, 1987, p .202. 
2 . Manorma Year Book, 1993. 
3 . I b id . 
4 . Manorma Year Book, o p . c i t . p . 186. 
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a t r i s k , sectors l ike a g r i c u l t u r e , indus t ry of navigat ion, 
acquicul ture of the northern as well as south western par t 
of Bangladesh has been suffer ing ser ious se tbacks . The t o t a l 
net crop area of 6.85 mi l l ion a c r e s . Out of which 1.57 
mi l l ion acres i s pa r t l y or fu l ly e f fec ted . This amount to 
22.92% of the net cropped a rea . In 1988-89 t o t a l area 
2 
effected for shortage of water was 38449 hectares and i s 
inc reas ing day by day. 
With too l i t t l e money avai lab le for food, i t i s not 
su rpr i s ing tha t few other consumption goods are ava i lab le 
t o remove the monotony of the l i f e . In 1969-70 the consum-
pt ion in t e x t i l e was est imated a t 7.5 yards per heed, in 
1972-7 3 had dropped to 5 yards per head and apparently 
3 has remained a t tha t leve l since well below 9 yards . 
id) Bhutan 
Along the lof ty r idges of the eas te rn Himalayas l i e s 
the kingdom of Bhutan, with an area of about 18,000 square 
mi l e s . Bhutan i s larger than Switzerland. I t s loca t ion 
between the Assam-Bengal p la in of India t o the south and 
the Chinese occupied Tibetan Plateau to the nor th gives i t 
ccnsiderable geopol i t i ca l s ign i f i cance . 
1 . A. Hanan, Impact of Reduced Low Flow of the Ganges, a 
paper presented a t a seminar organized by the Department 
of water Resources Engineering BUST, August 23, 1980, 
p . 11 . 
2 . Information received from the office of Bangladesh 
Water Development Board BWDB. 
3 . The Bangladesh Bccaiomic Review, v o l . 1 1 , No.l , January 
1974, Dacca, The Quarterly Journal of the Bangladesh 
I n s t i t u t e of Development Sconomics, pp. 737-91. 
74 
Bhutan's undefined t r a d i t i o n a l boundary with TilDet 
follows for the most par t the c r e s t of the oreat Himalayan 
Range, Chinese maps show pa r t s of Bhutan t e r r i t o r y within 
China, and occasional minor incursions of Chinese troops 
have been reported along with the border . Bhutan's boundary 
with India l i e s to the south of the Himalayan Range in the 
Duars p lan . The Indo-Bhutan boundary evolved as a r e s u l t 
of the B r i t i s h annexation of a major por t ion of the Duars 
region of Bhutan adjoining Assam and Bengal between 1841 
and 1864. To the north eas t borders Arunachal Pradesh, and 
t o the south-west i t borders the Indian s t a t e of sikkira, 
south of the Chumbi va l l ey i s T ibe t . Despite i t s great bea-
uty , Bhutan remained one of the 5th poorest nation in the 
world, with an estimated per cap i ta annual income of about 
$ 160. 
Although the planned economic development began only 
in 1961, under the father of the present king Jigne singye 
Wangchuk Bhutan o f f i c i a l s have hes i t a t ed a t moving out too 
quickly in the i r ancient land. Part of t h e i r concern stemps 
from the fac t tha t what they see as outside inf luences could 
damage Bhutan's i den t i t y as an independent nation with i t s 
own d i s t i n c t c u l t u r e . 
The one major advantage, Bhutan enjoyed e a r l i e r was 
the fact t ha t with i t s very small population (1.3 mil l ion) 
there was not the same pressure of population as in a g r i -
cu l tu re t i l l i t opened out in development work. Money 
economy changed the e n t i r e economic ba lance . The country 
being e n t i r e l y raountaineous, a g r i c u l t u r a l p o t e n t i a l was 
obviously even today, ecological surveys so far show no 
encouraging prospect of subs t an t i a l and high value minerals 
except dolomite, gypsum, lime stone and scxne poor q u a l i t y 
coal depos i t s . I t s only economic p o t e n t i a l i s in hdryo-
e l e c t r i c power, i f developed proper ly . Bhutan(economic 
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c o n s t r a i n t s / therefore , are obvious, with hardly anything 
to export t o the outside world and dependent almost t o t a l l y 
for i t s bas ic imports* i t s economic growth has to have a 
l imi ted perspec t ive . Dependence on outside labour and tech-
n i c a l s k i l l s fur ther l im i t s i t s op t ions . 
' C ^)sri Lanka 
Sri Lanka i s s i t ua t ed a t the southern extremity of 
the Indian sub-continent separated frcro i t a t the narrowest 
point by only 22 miles of sea, ca l led the Palk s t r a i t . 
I t l i e s between 6° and 10° north of Squator, and on longi -
tude of 79° t o 81° e a s t . In s ize s r i Lanka i s one of the 
medium-sized is lands in the world, being 270 miles long 
and 140 miles wide. In area , i t i s 25,332 square miles 
(16,2 mi l l ion acres) almost the s ize of I reland or Tasmania. 
The Island has a mountainous t e r r a i n in the cen t r a l 
pa r t with an average elevat ion of 3700 f e e t surrounded by 
an upland area ranging between 1000 to 3000 f e e t . The r e s t 
of the country ccraprises a coas ta l p la in broad and narrow-
ing in the e a s t , west and the south. There i s an abundance, 
of r i v e r s , a l l s t a r t i n g in the cen t ra l h i l l s and flowing 
outwards t o the Indian ocean. More than three qua r t e r s of 
the area i s arable and the climate i s admirably su i ted 
for most t r op i ca l c rops . 
According t o 1981 census, s r i Lanka had a population 
of 14.9 mil l ion an increase i s 17 per cent since 1971. I t s 
per cap i ta inccane i s $ 420. A s t r i k i n g fea ture of s r i 
Lanka's demographic s t ruc tu re has been the high proport ion 
of chi ldren under the 15 years of age - 43 per cent of 
the t o t a l populat ion. In the developed coun t r i e s , t h i s 
group i s not more than 22 t o 30 per cent of the populat ion. 
Also the geographical d i s t r i bu t i on of population in 
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Sr i Lanka i s very uneven. Nearly 70 per cent l ive in about 
30 per cent of the land in the socal led wet zone. In the 
dry zone, the Jaffna Peninsula in the nor th has the g rea t e s t 
concentrat ion with more than two t h i r d s of those who i n h i b i t 
t h i s zone* 
The vast raajority of the people - some 11,5 of the 
14.9 mi l l ion people, l ive in the r u r a l a r e a s . Although 
the standards of l iv ing in the r u r a l areas i s very low, 
there has not been any marked migration t o the urban a r ea s . 
The economy of Sri Lanka depends la rge ly upon three a g r i -
c u l t u r a l export commodities, two of which have developed 
s ign i f i can t ly only within the past hundred year t e a , rubber 
and coconut. The income derived from these exports i s 
hardly suf f ic ien t to buy food, which ceylon does not 
produce in suf f ic ien t q u a n t i t i e s t o feed herse l f . Tea, 
however, now covers most of syn the t i c s . 
s r i Lanka i s having a hard time economically. Like 
other developing countr ies she i s t r y ing t o modern indus-
t r i a l dynamism. Meanwhile, there are nexing and danc^rous 
s t r a i n s ; tremendous population growth, decreased world 
demand for ceylon 's money crops, f a i l u re of the country to 
be self support ing, p o l i t i c a l unres t , labour t roubles and 
des t ruc t ion of crops . The country i s too much dependent 
on foreign aid and i t s own earning power i s diminishing. 
The export products are subject to severe f luc tua t ions in 
the world market p r ices as well as t o the influence of 
other f ac to r s beyond nat ional con t ro l , such as the develop-
ment of s u b s t i t u t e , changes in manufacturing p rac t i ces 
e t c . This has a l so en ta i l ed considerable r i s k . In the 
words of many economists argue tha t what i s needed i s not 
j u s t a t igh ten ing of f i s c a l management, important though 
t h i s i s . But a l so a red i rec t ion of government resources 
i n t o more productive areas of the economy. To compensate 
*? 
o 
t h e outcome, one major advance tha t the government made in 
1984 was to devise a v iab le investment plan for turning 
round s r i Lanka's much neglected three e s t a t e crops sector 
( t ea , rubber and coconut) . 
i e ) Maldives 
Maldives is land i s a chain of cora l a t o l l s on a r i s e 
in the Indian Ocean s t r e t ch ing north to south, l i e to 
south-west of s r i Lanka. The t o t a l length of the chain i s 
550 mi les , and i t cons i s t s of 17 groups, d i s t r i b u t e d p o l i -
t i c a l l y in to 13 and embracing a t o t a l of twelve hundred 
I s l ands . All of these are very small in area and l e s s than 
200 are inhabi ted. Male, residence of the na t ive President 
and cent re of t r ade , i s but caie mile long by three qua r t e r s 
of a mile wide. The population of the whole chain was 
20 0,000 in 19 84. The people resembles with Sinhalese in 
t h e i r personal appearance and speak a language c lose ly akin 
t o Sinhalese. The Is land are covered with coconut palms 
and y ie ld m i l l e t and f r u i t as well as coconut produce. The 
economy i s based en f i sh ing industry along with tourism. 
Shipping and coconut process ing. The per cap i t a income was 
US $ 400 estimated in 1982 which i s f a i r l y high in t h i s 
r eg ion . At present i t i s $ 470. 
The rapid growth in gross na t iona l product (GNP) 
achieved in the f i r s t half of the 19 80s est imated a t 10 
per cent annually, on average-stemmed mainly from the expan-
sion of f i she r i e s and tourism sec to r . The output in f i s h -
e r i e s sector was more than double between 19 82 and 19 85 owing 
to the rap id increase in the number of mechanized f i sh ing 
boats and the establishment of improved fuel d i s t r i b u t i o n 
1. Manorma Year Book, 1983, p . 192. 
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and f i s h co l lec t ion system. But the development in shipping 
sec to r , another inainstay of the Maldivian economy, are not 
favourable, Maldives had developed a t h r iv ing maritime Indus-
t r y , expanding i t s f l e e t of ocean going vesse l s t o 41 in 
1981; the f l e e t ' s t o t a l earning in tha t year reached $ 
43.5 mi l l ion , almost equal to count ry ' s GNP, The i n t e r -
na t iona l recession tha t began in 19 82 led t o a se t back 
in the shipping industry from which i t never recovered, 
with mounting losses t o t a l l i n g $ 14 mi l l ion during 1982-84, 
the shipping industry had to be reorganized under d i f fe ren t 
management with a subs t an t i a l l y reduced f l e e t s ize and 
leve l of opera t ions . 
Although ag r i cu l tu re and manufacturing have not 
been important to the ove ra l l eccxiomy owing to t he i r l imi -
ted po t en t i a l and small domestic market, the recent 
emphasis on improving t h e i r l inkage with the tourism 
sector may spur s ign i f ican t growth in those s e c t o r s . To 
overcarie labour shortage, educational and t r a in ing f ac i -
l i t i e s are being improved, and operat ions in sec tors are 
being mechanized to reduced labour demand. Overal l , the 
Maldivian economy can be expected to achieve 6-7 per cent 
growth r a t e over the medium term without encountering 
balance of payments d i f f i c u l t i e s . Outstanding debt service 
leve ls are projected to r i s e only moderately, implying a 
continuing decl ine in debt to GDP as well as debt service 
r a t i o . 
Throughout these coun t r i e s , ag r i cu l tu re continues 
t o be the dominant branch of production. Product iv i ty in 
a g r i c u l t u r e , in cont ras t t o those p a r t s of the world where 
ag r i cu l tu re embraces a smaller share of populat ion and 
production, i s the main determinant of na t iona l l eve l s of 
income and l i v i n g . Moreover, there are narrow l imi t s to 
the extent to which imports can be r e l i e d on to feed an 
0 ' 
increas ing population; and since any increase in income 
per head from present low levels w i l l a l s o considerably 
increase the demand for food, the raanland r a t i o , together 
with the u t i l i s a t i o n of land and of the labour ava i lab le 
to work i t , i s of c ruc ia l importance for the prospects of 
development and in problems of planning for development. 
The problems ot population and labour u t i l i s a t i c n , here, 
are commonly known as over populat ion, unemployment, under-
employment, semi or seasonal employment. A huge d i s p a r i t y 
i s supposed to e x i s t between a g r i c u l t u r a l resources and 
the man power stocked up in a g r i c u l t u r e . Because the land 
i s over-crowded, much of the avai lable labour supply i s 
unemployed or i s employed at a very low leve l of produc-
t i v i t y , often assumed t o be zero a t the margin and, indeed, 
for ins ide the margin. The coro l la ry i s t h a t the main 
requirement for achieving higher over a l l p roduc t iv i ty , 
which i s the aim of economic development, roust be t o reduce 
the agrarian density by "skimming off" the redundant man 
power in the v i l l a g e s . The problems of labour u t i l i z a t i o n 
and population are cen t ra l to the economic development, of 
these c o u n t r i e s . The following tab le show the per capi ta 
income of these countr ies s 
Table 
Name of the country Per c a p i t a l income Per cap i t a inccxne 
(US $) 1986 (US $) 1993 
Bangla Desh 160 208 
Bhutan 150 160 
India 290 310 
Maldives 400 470 
Nepal 150 160 
Pakistan 350 365 
Sri Lanka 400 420 
source J World Bank Report. 
Sd 
The highest per cap i ta income i s of Maldives followed 
by Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Maldives i s a group of t i ny 
Is lands having a t o t a l population of 200,000 i t s impact i s 
i n s i g n i f i c a n t . They have nothing a t the stake as far as 
defence and economic ca lcu la t ions are concerned. The f igures 
aioout Pakistan are highly misleading. The increase in income 
i s dependent on the regular flow of money from Gulf coun-
t r i e s which i s decreasing day by day. Their economy i s not 
s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t , s r i Lanka again i s a small country having 
a population of 14,9 m i l l i a i . I t s econcany i s badly effected 
by growing terrorism in tha t country. As Pres ident Jaye-
wardene has ap t ly warned, "Development w i l l be close chapter , 
if we do not crub terrorism c e r t a i n l y i t i s p r a c t i c a l l y a 
closed chapter in the nor th a l ready. The bulk of humanity 
l i v e s in India, Bangla E^sh, Nepal and Bhutan which are 
having income frcxn $ 260 to 150. If we compare t h i s per 
cap i ta income to other seven r i c h e s t countr ies of the 
world, the difference alone speaks about i t s e l f and does 
not need any comments. 
[ B J Dsfencs Expenditure of the SAARC count r ies 
Various h i s to r i ans fron Gibbon t o Toynbee have 
analysed the underlying causes of a nat ions r i s e t o g rea t -
ness and i t s f a l l t h e r e a f t e r . Two recent authors C c r r e l l i 
Barnett and Paul Kennedy, have done a s imi la r study in 
t h e i r t h e s i s . The col lapse of the Br i t i sh Powers and The 
Rise and Fa l l of the Great Powers. Both s tud ies bring out 
a growing dependence of such nations on m i l i t a r y power t o 
meet a l l t h r e a t s to the i r i n t e r e s t s i n various pa r t s of 
the globe, which get acquire during growth of t h e i r economy 
and which l a t e r on, became a milestone round the i r necks, 
dragging tha t economy i n to a regress ive mode of an unaffor-
dable defence burden. 
?S1 
There i s a competing t rade of elements in a nat ions 
economy which according to Kennedy, demands a careful ^ 
balance a t a l l t imes. These are 'defence* •development* and 
•domestic consumption*. Excessive a t t en t ion t o one implies 
ignoring one or both of the other two. India*s defence expen-
d i tu re which has not exceeded 4% of i t s C3NP, i s not exce-
s s i v e , India has seme major achievements, such as Qreen 
Revolution, doubling of l i f e expectancy since 1947, s p l i t t i n g 
of the Atcan, and sending the s t a t e l i t e in to space, not t o 
mention leadership of the Non-aligned Movement, these weak-
nesses of the Indian economy appear in exp l i cab l e . However, 
Sighth Plan i s l i ke ly t o aim high percentage of growth 
from 5.5 per cent to 8 per cen t . 
India*s defence expenditure has accounted for 15 to 
18 paise in every rupee tha t has been spent by Central 
Government. I t i s a large sum for a developing country, but , 
I nd i a ' s defence i s to be matched with t h a t of Pakistan and 
China, The developed world i s no longer to engage in a hot 
war but , to deter one from occuring. T i l l t h a t time I n d i a ' s 
1 defence preparedness has to be in a s t a t e of readyness . 
The Finance Commissions background paper, reproduced 
had assessed the GDP for the Eighth Plan period as Rs. 
30,52,498 c r o r e . Defence get 4 per cent of t h i s GDP and the 
army*s share remain a t 44 per cent of the defence a l loca -
t i o n . The acquis i t ion of 155 mm Howitzers alone c a r r i e d a 
2 
cos t of Rs. 1400 crore in foreign exchange. India , though 
had made a beginning launch a defence indust ry a t home 
p r io r to the Sino-Indian c o n f l i c t , but , the urgency to 
1. Pendise, K.S. , A Calculus for I n d i a ' s Regional Power 
Sta tus , Indian Defence Review, January 19 89, p . 102. 
2 . F inancia l Express, New Delhi, May 4, 1988, 
2EZ 
r epa i r the damage caused by e a r l i e r neglect of the defence 
services came in to operation af te r the c o n f l i c t . The 
growing dependence for m i l i t a r y hardware of foreign sources* 
whether eastern or western, has created i d e a l condit ions 
for India t o enter the deb t - t r ap , ba i ted with soft loans 
and long-period of repayment t o match those given t o Pakis-
tan by USA rehing . The Indian economy i s pe r i lous ly close 
t o such an event . The i n s t i t u t e of In t e rna t iona l Finance, 
Washington, DC, USA has assessed tha t I n d i a ' s ex te rna l 
debt has exceed Rs. 100000 crore by the end of 1989-90 and 
2 
the i n t e rna l debt i s above Rs, 1,60,000 c r o r e s . I n d i a ' s 
defence spending a t 3 t o 4 per cent of i t s Gtoss Domestic 
Product (GDP) as ccBipared t o chinas 10 per cent for a num-
ber of years or Pak i s tan ' s 7 per cent year a f t e r year. 
Forty years a f te r independence, the Indian 
forces have to remain constant ly a l e r t a l l a l a i g the bor-
ders and in t he i r cantonments, ever ready t o repeat an 
operat ion Trident , l ike mobil izat ion tha t because necessary 
during ear ly 19 87 before sxercise Brass Tacks could be 
exerc ised, Indian Army has t o care i t s 15600 km borders 
with a l imi ted s t rength of 1,1 mi l l ion so ld i e r s which China 
had a force of 2,300,000 so ld ie r s for 21,000 km border and 
Pakistan 4,50,000 army man for a small border of 64 80 km, 
a t the r a t i o of 70 ,1 , 109.1 and 69.1 s o l d i e r , lom of border 
1 . swaminathan, s.A. Siyar, How Much DO We Owe ? 
Indian Express, March 16, 19 89. 
2 . I b i d . 
3. News Report, Indian Express, November 14, 1988. 
4 . K,S. Pendix, I n d i a ' s Defence Budget - A Case for 
b e t t e r planning. Digest, Lancer Publ ishers Pvt . L td . , 
New Delhi, v o l , 1, p , 5§. 
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r a t i o . The Indian Navy have a l so 7600 ton long coast l ine 
and 2 mi l l ion sq.km. of the exclusive economic zone t o 
keep free from in t ruders , besides ensuring secur i ty of 
300-odd Island possessions and of the sea-laws for normal 
t rade and ccmmerce. For the Air Force, whose 45 squadron 
s t rength has remained unchanged for long and had to work 
in the change circumstances. 
I nd i a ' s defence expenditure was Rs. 168.4 8 crores 
in 1949-50, a mear baga te l le compared t o Rs, 13,000 crores 
proposed four decades l a t e r in 19 89-90 and Rs. 
in 1992-9 3. The value of rupee i s 12.2 paisa against i t s 
purchasing power in I960. Figures of I n d i a ' s defence spen-
2 ding for 1960, 1970 and 19 80 and 1990 are in Appendix A 
and graphical comparison i s 'J^i Annexure 1 to the appendix. 
I t w i l l reveal tha t India has not spent a t any stage a t 
t h a t of Pakistan and china. Those who suggest tha t in view 
of universa l disarmament policy Indian economy growth to 
defence i s s luggishness , f a l l t o r e a l i z e tha t a fu ture 
con f l i c t may erupt v i o l e n t l y with hardly any subs t an t i a l 
warning per iod. K. Subrahraanyam has r i g h t l y expressed -
' In the current i n t e rna t iona l s t r a t e g i c 
environment, India has no optical but to 
keep up a ce r ta in basic level of defence 
preparedness. The highly dubious argument 
tha t t h i s defence e f fo r t i s cos t ing the 
country a great deal of development has to 
be challenged, while our defence e f fo r t 
has remained a t a constant level around 3.5 
1 . T he Mill t a r v_ Ba lance , 1987-88. 
2 . Raju C. Thcms, Defence of India , Annex 4, p . 215. 
Quoted in Ind i a ' s Defence Budget - A Case for b e t t e r 
planning. Digest Lancer Publ ishers , New Delhi, v o l . 1, 
p . 68, 69. 
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to 3.7 per cent of GDP, our saving and 
investment r a t e s have gene up fron around 
11 per cent in the ear ly 1960s to nearly 
double tha t f igure in the ear ly 19 80s. I t 
has not r e su l t ed in commensurate increase 
in growth r a t e , and if our c a p i t a l r a t i o 
has cane down, one has to look for reasons 
elsewhere and not seek easy explanat ions in 
defence expenditure . I t i s qu i te l i k e l y 
t ha t reducing the defence e f fo r t s by 1 to 
1.5 per cent w i l l not lead to any more 
increase in the pace of development than 
what stepping up by 10 t o 11 per cent has 
done in the l a s t two decades. 
Ross H. Munro, wr i t ing in cover s tory on India in Time 
In te rna t iona l of 3 April 19 89 mentioned t h a t India there 
i s su rp r i s ing l i t t l e debate about secur i ty i s s u e . For 
most pa r t , the publ ic , according to him i s not aware of 
2 
the m i l i t a r y balance in the sub-cont inent . Peter Druker 
advised r i g h t l y tha t services need i s not to be raear 3 business l i k e , but , to be more e f f ec t i ve . 
Present ly , the t h r e a t r e of war has sh i f ted from the 
i n d u s t r i a l i s e d world t o the develqping na t i ons . Out of the 
170 c o n f l i c t s , tha t has taken place since second world war, 
over 160 have occurred in the developing world, engaging 
165 na t ions . The global m i l i t a ry expenditure on defence 
has reached to one thousand b i l l i o n d o l l a r s . Nearly 25 
Subrahmanyam, A Conceptual Framework for Peaceful 
Co-existence In India And I t s Neighbours, Lancer In t e r -
na t i ona l , New Delhi, p . 133. 
Munro, H. ROSS, Superpower Rising, Time I n t e r n a t i o n a l , 
Apri l 3, 1989. 
Peter F. Druker, Management - Tasks Respons ib i l i t i e s 
P rac t i ce , Cambridge Journal of Economics, September 1978. 
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d e v e l o p i n g c o u n t r i e s a re r e s p o n s i b l e for 80 per cen t of 
m i l i t a r y expend i tu r e in the deve lop ing w o r l d . 
During the Rajiv Gandhi yea r s (19 84-89) defence 
was pa id more s e r i o u s a t t e n t i o n . I n f a c t t h e defence 
e x p e n d i t u r e dur ing t h i s p e r i o d in a b s o l u t e terms r e g i s -
t e r e d t h e s h a r p e s t i n c r e a s e as canpared t o any o the r 
p e r i o d , s ince I n d i a ' s independence , some s i g n i f i c a n t 
a l t e r n a t i o n s were a l s o made i n the defence budget accoun-
t i n g . Defence pens ions were de l inked from the Defence 
s e r v i c e E s t i m a t e s . A s i g n i f i c a n t development i n defence 
budget ing dur ing the Raj iv yea r s was t h a t for t h e f i r s t 
t ime the defence e x p e n d i t u r e was taken i n t o account by 
t h e P lann ing Commission, The seven th plan document p r o -
j e c t i n g e h t t o t a l expend i tu r e a t Rs . 45000 c r o r e s i , e . 4% 
of the than GNP. During h i s f i v e yea r s t e n u r e defence 
e x p e n d i t u r e i n c r e a s e d from 6661 c r o r e s t o in 19 84-85 t o 
Rs . 14500 c r o r e s in 1989-90. showing a i n c r e a s e of 19.8%. 
The t o t a l defence expend i tu re du r ing t h e Raj iv 
Gandhi pe r iod was as given below. 
Appendix A 
INDIA'S DEFENCE BUDGETS SINCE THE SIXTIES (Rs. Cr . ) 
Year Defence 
Budget 
Cen t r a l 
Budget 
% of Defence 
Budget t o T o t a l 
C e n t r a l Expendi ture 
Six t i es 
1961-62 
1962-63 
1963-64 
1964-65 
1965-66 
1 . subra 
312.49 
473.91 
816.12 
805,80 
884.75 
hmanyam, K . . Peace 
2,027.18 
2,513.13 
3,167,21 
3,527,40 
3,915.95 
and the Arms Race, 
15.4 
17.0 
32.4 
22.8 
22.6 
o p . c i t . 
Ccntd. . 
p . 1155. 
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1966-67 
1967-68 
1968-69 
s e v e n t i e s 
1970-71 
1971-72 
1972-73 
197 3-74 
1974-75 
1975-76 
1976-77 
1977-78 
197 8-79 
1979-80 
E i g h t i e s 
19 80-81 
19 81-82 
19 82-83 
1983-84 
1984-85 
19 85-86 
1986-87 
19 87-88 
19 88-89 
1989-9 0 
908.59 
970.14 
1,015.26 
1,183.60 
1,411,00 
1,600,00 
1,753.00 
2 ,157.00 
2 ,410.00 
2 ,615.00 
2 ,752.00 
2 ,945.00 
3,373.00 
3,800.00 
4 ,600 .00 
5,350.00 
6,633.30 
6,671.00 
7 ,987.00 
10,477.00 
12,000.00 
13,200.00 
13,000.00 
4 ,618.94 
4 ,599,59 
4 ,700 .46 
5,726.00 
7 ,053,00 
7 ,867.00 
8,438.00 
10,107.00 
12,643.00 
14,184.00 
15,568.00 
18,417.00 
19,324.00 
22,808.00 
26,554.00 
34,241.00 
34,836,00 
43 ,879.00 
53,112.00 
64,426.00 
67,640.00 
75 ,783 .00 
82,161.00 
19.7 
21.1 
19.5 
20.5 
20 .0 
20.4 
20 .8 
21 .3 
19.0 
18.4 
17.7 
16.0 
17.4 
17.3 
17 .3 
15.6 
16.2 
15.2 
15.0 
16.2 
17.7 
17.4 
15 .8 
The share of the three services in revenue 
expenditure in 19 84-85 was 671, 8.6 and 24.3% for Army, 
Navy and Air force r e spec t i ve ly , in 1988-89 and 19 89-90 
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t h e s h a r e of t h e Army came down m a r g i n a l l y t o 7 2 , 3 % and 
7 2 . 5 % p e r c e n t r e s p e c t i v e l y b u t , t h e s h a r e of Navy and 
Air f o r c e was i n c r e a s e d . The c o m p a r a t i v e f i g u r e s a r e g i v e n 
a s below : 
Append ix - B 
DEFENCE BUDGETS : 1987 t o 1990 (Rs c r ) 
Revenue 
E x p e n d i t u r e 1987-88 1988-89 1988-89 1989-90 BE RE 
Army 
Pay and 
A l l o w a n c e s 2 , 4 0 8 . 7 5 2 . 3 4 4 . 9 9 2 , 6 2 9 . 2 5 2 , 3 5 8 . 9 7 
S t o r e s 2 , 6 5 5 . 4 7 2 , 6 5 5 . 0 0 2 , 7 1 7 . 5 2 2 , 6 6 4 . 2 6 
works 3 7 1 . 4 8 3 8 0 . 5 0 3 7 4 . 5 0 3 6 8 . 1 8 
O t h e r s 1 , 0 4 2 . 1 7 1 , 2 1 6 . 6 1 1 ,126 ,13 1 , 1 2 5 . 3 0 
Navy 
p a y and 
A l l o w a n c e s 135 .00 140 .00 150.00 157 .86 
S t o r e s 3 6 7 . 7 0 428 .83 3 8 6 . 0 0 3 7 1 . 4 3 
works 4 7 . 0 0 5 0 . 0 0 6 0 . 0 0 6 0 . 3 6 
O t h e r s 133 .30 136 .00 178.00 1 6 7 . 1 4 
A i r F o r c e 
p a y and 
A l l o w a n c e s 3 8 6 . 1 5 3 7 0 . 3 8 412 .20 3 7 8 . 6 9 
S t o r e s 1 , 0 3 5 . 7 6 1 ,082 .00 1 ,074 .80 1 , 1 4 5 . 5 2 
works 120 .00 120 .00 138 .00 130 .00 
O t h e r s 1 1 3 . 7 6 134 .07 155.35 1 4 5 . 1 9 
C a p i t a l o u t l a y 
Land 3 7 . 5 0 6 0 . 7 0 3 5 . 8 0 5 0 . 0 5 
C o n t d . , 
38, 
Revenue 
E x p e n d i t u r e 
C o n s t r u c t i o n 
Army 
Navy 
A i r F o r c e 
198-/ 
2 5 9 . 
100 . 
8 0 . 
' - 88 
12 
00 
60 
1988-89 
BE 
260 . 
103 . 
8 2 . 
,00 
,00 
,50 
1988-8 9 
RE 
2 8 4 . 
105 . 
9 8 . 
00 
,00 
70 
198 9-90 
2 7 8 . 
102 . 
104 . 
57 
14 
0 4 
A i r c r a f t & A e r o e n g i n e s 
Army 10Q80'; 2 0 . 0 0 17 .45 18 .57 
Navy 2 6 1 . 6 0 441 .17 406 .00 3 3 2 . 4 3 
A i r F o r c e 9 2 0 . 4 8 1 ,040 .30 1 ,054 .00 976 .86 
Heavy & Medium 
V e h i c l e s 
O t h e r equ ipmen t 
Army 
Navy 
A i r F o r c e 
Nava l F l e e t 
O r d n a n c e F a c t o r i e s 
R & D 
O t h e r s 
45 .82 
5 0 5 . 1 7 
. 3 , 5 0 
6 6 . 9 3 
3 9 7 . 8 0 
2 5 4 . 0 0 
8 1 . 1 4 
106 .05 
5 9 . 5 1 
700 .00 
8 . 0 0 
149 .24 
3 7 8 . 0 0 
3 3 8 . 0 0 
120 .40 
172.00 
113 .93 
5 6 4 . 7 9 
5 .00 
' 94 .93 
412 .50 
3 1 1 . 0 0 
123 .35 
100 .26 
101 .74 
7 7 2 . 6 7 
4 . 6 4 
95 .72 
473 .57 
3 6 1 . 9 1 
125 .83 
108 .17 
NOTE : RE = R e v i s e d E s t i m a t e 
BE = Budget E s t i m a t e 
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C O N C L U S I O N 
Thanks to the s e r i e s of summit meetings tha t took 
place between Soviet Union and the American leaders during 
the closing year of 1980*s - while the INF Trea ty eliminated 
an e n t i r e c l a s s of nuclear weapons , the Conventional Forces 
Reduction Treaty envisaged the el iminat ion of ce r t a in l eve l s 
2 
of Conventional Weapons from Europe - the 1990*s^began h e r a l -
ding the down of wars^ has come to be fashionably described as 
the post cold war era in world p o l i t i c s . Not only Soviet-
American r e l a t i o n s improved s u b s t a n t i a l l y , bu t , the map of 
Europe undergone s ign i f i can t changes with r e -un i f i ca t i on of 
Germany, the v i r t u a l d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of Warsaw Pact and the 
survival of NATO as a large p o l i t i c a l a l l i a n c e . The fee l ing 
of the ' de ju re ' in the West about i t s m i l i t a r y and ideological 
v ic to ry i s manifested in such pronouncements as the "End of 
3 
the His tory" . I t i s not easy to say tha t the end of the cold 
war brought the end of the power r i v a l r i e s between the major 
powers. The r e t r e a t of Soviet Union from the world p o l i t i c s 
and the emergence^ "uni -polar world" with t he United s t a t e s 
as the only sxirving superpower, posed v i t a l new challenges 
to our decision-makers. 
The soviet Union i s now, more incl ined towards Europe 
and United s t a t e s than Third world coun t r i e s , soviet Union, 
has been urging India t o resolve i t s problems with China and 
1. For d e t a i l s see, Mehrotra, o .N, , "The IFN Treaty : A Step 
toward Nuclear Arms Reduction", s t r a t e g i c Analysis , vo l . 11, 
No. 12, March, 1988. 
2. For d e t a i l s , See, The Times of Ind ia , November 11, 1990. 
3 . See Fancis Fukuyama, "The End of the His tory" , The National 
I n t e r e s t " , Summer 1989 quoted us R. Jayaramu, P . S . , Trends 
in world P o l i t i c s and the Challenges to Indian Foreign 
Pol icy, P o l i t i c a l Science, The Indian P o l i t i c a l Science 
Associat ion, p , 5. 
4. For the new tha t the World may not r e a l l y be uni-polar 
See Raja Mohana, G., "The New World Orders : Myth of 
American I t edge money. The Times of Ind ia , March 18, 
1991, 
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Pakistan peacefully and bipateral ly with the emerging new 
world order in the post-Gulf war period, the world has wit-
nessed numerous spectacular developments and adjustments in 
the domain and scope of international re la t ions . There is a 
new kind of security environment in which the nation-states 
are most l ikely inclined to enlarge the i r conception of 
security in a world becoming increasingly inter-dependent. In 
a larger, frame work, the subject of security has come to 
involve the whole paraphernalia of protecting and promoting 
v i t a l national in teres ts and perennial core values in-the 
changing world, implying the absence of rea l or potential 
threats whether posed by external sources or internal tu r -
moils. 
More signif icantly, their security concensus are 
broadening to encompass the economic issues, the ecological 
degradation and other non mili tary th rea t s . The debt problem 
of the developing nations has received increased at tent ion 
though the steps taken so far fa l l very much short of what i s 
needed. There i s s t i l l a considerable flow of recourses from 
the South to the developed world, culminating in further rece-
ssion of economy of the former. The debt t r ap worsens the 
developmental process and ultimately endangers security. As 
regards ecological dimention of non-military t h r ea t s , there 
i s a perceptible sensi t isat ion in a l l parts of the planet 
earth about the grave dangers of the environmental degradation 
due to the continued emission of carbondioxide and other 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the emission of chloro-
fluorocarbons gradually depleting the ozone layer. As a resul t 
narco terrorism has crossed national dimentions. Terrorism, 
both an t i - s t a t e and state-sponsored, i s also flaring up. 
1. During his v i s i t to India in 1988 in reply to Question 
from press, Gorbachev said that he favoured Indian jand 
China resolving the i r disputes peacefully and b i l a t e r a l l y . 
%)• tj X 
mostly coupled with r e l i g i o u s , e thn ic , i deo log ica l , separa-
t i s t and r e l a t e d tendencies . I t has given r i s e to i n d i s c r i -
minate and se l ec t ive use of violence or t h r e a t to use violence, 
including murder, sbotage and subversion, the dest ruct ion 
of public property and records and in some cases the hijacking 
of a i r l i n e s and sh ips , holding passengers as hostages, the 
capture of the holy p l ace s , kidnapping government o f f i c i a l s , 
diplomats and business execut ives . 
I t i s a l together appropr ia te to r e v i s i t the South 
Asian count r ies r e l a t i o n s in t h i s "secur i ty" frame of reference 
Asian secur i ty i ssues are based on the reg ional countr ies pur-
s u i t s . Global, regional and domestic compulsion add to these 
complex, set of t h r e a t s . 
South Asia and New Vtorld Order 
With the rupture of the bipolar system and the emer-
gence of new cent res of power, and l ike any other region in 
the world, south Asia has s t a r t e d experiencing the r e a l i t i e s 
of a new polycent r ic world. In the new polycent r ic world. South 
Asian count r ies would be guided by new paradigms and parameters 
as compared to what we have been used t o in the pas t . South 
Asia i s one such region in which the vanables of regional 
s ecu r i ty problems are autonomous and indigenous but the i n c l i -
nat ion of ex t ra - reg iona l powers for increas ing interdependence 
and cooperation in various f i e l d s would pave t he way of s t a -
b i l i t y and socio-economic development, u l t ima te ly leading to 
the peace and t r a q u i l l i t y In the whole reg ion . However, a 
polycentre i n t e rna t iona l order would undoubtedly make i n t e r -
s t a t e r e l a t i o n s in t h i s region more complicated, because a l l 
the seven nation s t a t e s of South Asia - Ind ia , Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Sr i Lanka, Nepal and Maldives are deve-
loping count r ies and are passing through d i f fe ren t stages of 
development and n a t i o n - s t a t e bu i ld ing . Certain speculat ions 
are being made by a number of scholars and nat ion secur i ty-
or iented experts on the poss ib le paradigms of in te rna t iona l 
9 
Oj 92 
reg ional and nat ional s e c u r i t y in a po lycent r ic world. 
There i s a deep-seated element of contention between the 
la rges t but^ cont inenta l power, India and i t s smaller neighbours. 
India i s motivated by both i t s h i s t o r i c a l impulses and contem-
porary perceptions to continue i t s dr ive for hegemony to main-
t a i n peace in the region. As a response, the smaller powers 
would n a t u r a l l y make e f f o r t s to ensure t h e i r survival as a 
sovereign s t a t e s . While o ther countr ies of the region are too 
weak economically and m i l i t a r i l y to stand up to India . Pakistan 
i s the one regional power which has pe r s i s t ed in r e s i s t i n g 
the Indian dr ive for hegemony. Not withstanding the India 
pressure by i t s e l f , Pakis tan has had to conduct an ac t ive 
diplomacy, and also entered in to an a l l i ance r e l a t i o n s h i p with 
the west a t the hight of t he cold war, not so much out of a 
genuine fear of commUnist expansion, as out of a des i re to 
p o l i t i c a l and mi l i t a ry leverage in the face of Indian t h r e a t . 
P a k i s t a n ' s fears in t h i s regard are imaginary for S t ra teg ic 
ana lys i s in India make no secre t of t h e i r new t h a t Pakis tan 
c o n s t i t u t e s t ha t one o b s t i c l e to what they consider t o be 
I n d i a ' s na tura l and des t ined r i s e to the pos i t ion of paramount 
2 power in the region. ^ 
Despite the c r ed i t ab l e beginning of SAARC and the Indo-
pak commission, i t i s evident t ha t the enormous difference in 
s i ze and power between India and the other cons t i tuen t s of 
South Asia give r i s e t o misgivings among i t s neighbours. 
Pakis tan f inds , i t d i f f i c u l t to reconci le i t s e l f to I n d i a ' s 
pre-eminence in South Asia; i t s pol icy makers emphasize t h a t 
Pakis tan can never accept such a s i t u a t i o n . 
Singh, J a g j i t , "India-China - Cooperation or confrontat ion" . 
Indian Defence Review, January 1991, p , 24. 
Bhat t , Maqbool Ahmed, " s t r a t e g i c Balance in South Asia", 
S t ra teg ic Studies , A q u a r t e r l y journal of the I n s t i t u t e of 
S t ra t eg ic Studies , Islamabad, vo l , XIV, No. 4, Summer 1992. 
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"The India draws from h i s to ry t he s t reng th and 
wi l l needed to f u l l f i l l h i s graved d e s i g n . . . 
The Indians regard themselves as the i n h e r i t o r s 
of the glory of B r i t i s h I n d i a . , . . Mrs. Gandhi i s 
h o s t i l e to any power t h a t refuses to accept I n d i a ' s 
preeminent p o s i t i o n , and in t h i s the Chief c u l p r i t 
i s Pak is tan , about whom the Indian prime Minister 
has a f ixa t ion bordering on the pa tho log ica l1 . I t 
was Ind i ra Gandhi who was the a r c h i t e c t of t he up-
heaval of 1^71 which culminated In the d i s -
i n t eg ra t i on of P a k i s t a n " . ! 
P a k i s t a n ' s stances to the Indian approach and i t s over 
a l l foreign pol icy outlook can be seen a t two speci f ic l eve l s • 
t ha t deal ing with problems of t he region and the other with 
i t s r e l a t i o n s with the super powers. Speaking of the key 
fac to r s in P a k i s t a n ' s ex terna l r e l a t i o n s Foreign Minister 
Yaqub Khan s t a ted "Islamabad's pol icy on Afghanistan and 
v i s - a - v i s India and within tha t framework i t s t i e s with the 
super powers, now c o n s t i t u t e s , the most important area of 
2 
count r ies foreign pol icy . At the regional level Pakis tan 
considers shimla Agreement to be equivalent t o a No War Pact 
and the problem of Jammu and Kashmir t o be a problem of con-
t inuing concern which should be solved on the bas i s of Simla 
4 
Agreement and the re levant U.N, Resolut ions . 
I n t r a - r eg iona l Dimensions of south Asian Secur i ty I ssues 
India and Pakistan s t i l l remain trapped in the nightmare 
of enmity and tension. 
The two count r ies could have s e t t l e d down to good 
neighbourly co-existence with commonalities of languages and 
cu l tu res fos te r ing mutual sympathy, t r u s t and understanding. 
The important thing i s t h a t since 1947, India and Pakistan 
1. Akram, A , I . , "Shadows over South Asia", The Muslims, 
Islamabad, January 1984, 
^* Kesshiga Contemporary Achieves, June 13, 1981, Col. 30919, 
The Times of India , Bombay, November 19, 1981. 
3 . India Lok sabha. Debate No. 16, Col. 3 43. 
4. India Rajya sabha. Debate, No. 16, Col, 35. 
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have not only saddled with b i t t e r and mutually an tagonis t i c 
postures agains t each other but have a l so fought three wars. 
Among the d isputes and major i ssues t h a t have incessant ly 
aggravated t h e i r secur i ty concerns are the b i t t e r legacy of 
the pa s t , Kashmir d ispute alongwith linked i s sues of s iach in , 
^iullur Lake Barrage, communalism and the e thn ic d is turbances , 
i n t e rmi t t en t domestic problems the indulgence of ex t ra - reg iona l 
powers, nuclear quest ion and the current Kashmiri turmoil and 
the t e r r o r i s t a c t i v i t i e s . 
Pak i s t an i leaders every now and then harp on the Kashmir 
i s sue ; The i n t e rna l pol icy of Pakistan demands tha t t h i s issue 
be kept a l i v e . No par ty or government, c i v i l or m i l i t a ry can 
afford to forget Kashmir a t t h i s stage in the evolution of 
Pak i s tan . Pakistan consider Kashmir 'A cap on the head' while 
India needs i t from the s t r a t e g i c point of view. 
A plethora of l i t e r a t u r e on these claims and counter 
claims has been wri t ten and i s a v a i l a b l e , U.S.A. and the 
European Economic Community have urged both India and Pakistan 
t o reso lve t h e i r outstanding problems b i l a t e r a l l y within the 
framework of the Simla Agreement, China, another important 
ac to r in the polycentr ic world order , wants t h a t both India 
and Pakis tan should find a " jus t solut ion" t o Kashmir d ispute 
through b i l a t e r a l peaceful nego t i a t ions . As regards I n d i a ' s 
t i e s with Pakis tan , though the two coun t r i e s have been able t o 
1. Gupta s i s i ^ r , Kashmir ; A study in India-Pakis tan Re la t ions , 
Bombay, 1967; Lt.Gen. K.K. Nanda, "The Kashmir Problem", 
Defence Seminar, vo l . 1, No, 2, August, September l 99 l , 
Kashmir Dispute : Myth and Real i ty an o f f i c i a l r e l ea se of 
the Government of Pak is tan , January, 1991; Ms Fahnida 
Ashraf ' s answers to a se t of ques t ionnai re on "Kashmir 
Dispute and the Indo-rak Rela t ions , received from the 
I n s t i t u t e of S t ra teg ic s tud ie s , Islamabad, November 28, 1990; 
Pervaiz I . Cheema, "Secur i ty in South Asia", south Asia 
Journa l , vo l , 4, No, 3 , January-March, 1991; Bhabani Sen 
Gupta, "Kashmir Key I s sue" , The Hindustan Times, The Hindu> 
November 30, 1991, Kuldeep Nayar, "Kashmir : A Way Out", 
TheTIindustan Times, Ju ly 15, 1991. 
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i n i t i a t e an agreement on the non-at tack of each others nuclear 
and other key i n s t a l l a t i o n s , the b i l a t e r a l r e l a t i o n s have gene-
r a l l y suffered because of the growing help to t e r r o r i s t . Some 
of the pronouncements of P a k i s t a n ' s Prime Minister Nawaz 
Sherif t h a t h i s government would continue to support t e r r o r i s t 
a c t i v i t i e s in Kashmir and Punjab have contr ibuted to a d e t e r r i o -
r a t i o n of Indo-Pak r e l a t i o n s . 
Another major factor aggravating Indo-Pak secur i ty concern 
i s the nuclear i s sue , with China being a nuclear power and 
Pakis tan crossing the nuclear th reshold , India has not closed 
i t s nuclear op t ion . Public evidence ind ica t e s tha t both s t a t e s 
a re within easy reach of nuclear device . Indeed the present 
ambiquous s i t u a t i o n seems t o su i t the i n t e r e s t s and pocket 
books of both coun t r i e s . A Pakis tan i bomb would mean the loss 
of American f inanc ia l and m i l i t a r y support and would be f o l l o -
wed by a much larger Indian programme. An Indian bomb might 
led to g rea t e r pres t ige in the developing world but , i t too 
would be followed by a Pak i s tan i equal izer and might endanger 
I n d i a ' s access to western high technology. 
while advocating in t e rna t iona l peace and disarmament, 
India has sustained a throny arms race with Pakistan which 
has created ever higher degree of In secu r i ty for both. This i s 
a f a l l a c y . I t i s imperective connectedness of secur i ty pol icy 
with defence preparedness t o multidimensional approach t o 
s e c u r i t y . At the diplomatic l e v e l , i t c a l l s for a sh i f t towards 
p o l i t i c a l techniques of conf l i c t r e so lu t ion and confidence 
bui lding measures. As a matter of f ac t , India has brought 
almost a l l south Asian nat ion - s t a t e s except Pakistan within 
the confines of her Informal regional secur i ty framework. In 
the case of Nepal, Bhutan and Sri Lanka, formal t r e a t i e s . 
1. Cohen, Stephen P h i l i p , Conclusion, The Security of South 
Asia, (ed.) Vistar Pub l i ca t ions , New Delhi , p . 226. 
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accords and agreements have connected these countr ies with 
the regional secur i ty framework of Ind ia . Most s i g n i f i c a n t l y , 
even through Nepal might have s t r ived to balance China 
against India in the diplomatic game, Nepal could not , but 
follow the Indian l ine on a l l s ecur i ty i s sues affect ing sout 
Asia in a polycent r ic world order . India had for more than 
two decades been persuading Nepal to agree t o a common endea-
vour on water resources development and proceeding with 
hyde/multipurpose pro jec t s on common r i v e r s . 
As regards Bhutan, i t i s worth mentioning tha t the way 
in which Bhutan finds accommodation in the secur i ty frame-
work of the South Asian sub-system i s s t i l l marked la rge ly 
by the s t r a t e g i c perceptions of the past and the China fac to r , 
Bhutan agreed, t o be guided by the advice of the Government 
of India with respect t o i t s foreign r e l a t i o n s . Under A r t i c l e 
VI of the Treaty 1949, Bhutan could procure m i l i t a r y hard-
ware and other defence i tems, through Ind ia , only with the 
support and approval of Ind ia . 
Like other south Asian nation - s t a t e s , Bhutan a l s o 
faces the problems of development and nat ion - s t a t e bu i ld ing . 
At the same t ime , the ethonic Nepalese fac tor in the southern 
Bhutan c o n s t i t u t e s an emerging th rea t t o i t s in te rna l s t a b i l i t y 
and s e c u r i t y . Bhutan's King Jigme singye wangchuk elaborated 
his count ry ' s secur i ty concern in the following manner, "our 
people in the rainotiry. Second, they f e l t t h a t Sri Lankan 
Tamils are going to win and Sr i Lanka i s going to be s p l i t , 
in Nepal the peoples movement has been successful , and India 
has the Kashmir problem as a lso in Assam and Punjab, so the 
time was conducive t o r e v o l t agains t the government". 
Turning towards Indo-Sri Lanka scenar io , i t can be 
speculated t h a t the s t r a t e g i c and p o l i t i c a l dimensions of 
1. Chadha, Kumkum, "We are not f ight ing for the throne" , 
an in terview of Bhutan King J . s . Wangchuk, published in 
The Hindustan Times, November 17, 1981. 
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thei r security framework have been rapidly changing on the 
basis of emerging patterns of relat ions between them over the 
recent years, India 's perception of Sri Lanka factor has 
been compounded by an ensemble of many considerations. There 
has been, f i r s t l y , the influence of Tamils on the domestic 
po l i t i cs of both colombo as well as New Delhi, Secondly, there 
has been serious threats to India 's security due t o the influx 
of refugees of Sri Lankan Tamil origin as the fal l-out of the 
escalating sinhala-Tamil ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka since 
July, 1983 and evidently, India ' s approach and direction to 
the management and resolution of th i s c r i s i s . There have also 
been, th i rd ly , some i r r i t a n t s in the Indo-Sri Lanka relat ions 
that related to the po l i t i ca l and diplomatic behaviour of Sri 
Lanka Government towards India. Furthermore, Geo-political 
and geo-strategic and responses to Sri Lanka turmoil. 
The intensification of the ethnic turmoil since 1983 
onwards created a si tuation in which Sri Lankan Government had 
to sign the Indo-srl Lanka Agreement in 1988 which not only 
enabled the Indian forces to enter Sri Lanka with the specific 
goal of restoring peace and t ranqui l l i ty in i t s s t r i fe- torn 
areas but also prevented Sri Lanka to make i t s Trincomebe port 
available for mili tary use by any country in a manner dele-
ter ious to India 's maritime and other i n t e r e s t s . I n i t i a l l y , 
the Indo-Sri Lanka, accord brought Sri Lanka into the fold of 
mutual security system and also strengthened Indo-sri Lanka 
re la t ions . India resolve to pursue the strategy that if exter-
nal support was needed to meet the domestic upheaval in any 
neighbouring country of South Asia. 
As regards Bangladesh, i t can be stressed that i t s major 
security concerns are the product of i t s domestic vulnerabi-
l i t i e s , the challenges of nation - building, the t r i b a l sub-
nationalism in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the environmental 
challenges, the high population growth ra te and i t s divergent 
perception and position on the issues of mutual interest 
•^f <J O 
vls-a-vis India. A section of the public opinion in 
Bangladesh, including the government circle itself, subscribes 
to the view that the Indian factor overshadows the rest of 
2 
external threats to the security of Bangladesh. Negotiations 
on eastern water settlement and the transfer of Tin Bigha 
through the Indo-Bangladesh Agreement of 1974 have been 
striking examples. As the Supreme Court has decided in favovir 
of the transfer of Tin Bigha to Bangladesh and transfer has 
taken place, this should be followed to remove the last hurdle 
in enforcing the 1974 Agreement. This would certainly open 
fresh avenues of mutual trust and cooperation in other fields, 
B.G. Verghese has rightly observed that "India has much to 
gain from Bangladesh than a few additional cusecs of water in 
the lean season or some mud flats in the sunderbans and there 
could be a whole host of mutually beneficial trade between 
them. The idea does not appear to have crossed the mind of 
policy makers. Hereto, diplomacy could secure development, 
communication, national integration and security in what is 
3 
one of the most vulnerable parts of the country". 
As regards Maldives, it can be visualised that for all 
practical purposes, its political stability and interests 
be protected and promoted within the framework of the SAARC, 
and India should be more inclined to do so as a consequence 
of thee commonalities of interests in the Indian Ocean. 
Maldives was already indebted to India for its ready support 
to foil a coup be Elat on November 3, 1988. Equally, notably 
is the fact that the SAARC Heads of State or Government not 
only condemned the attempt to destabilise the Maldivian 
1. Karim, M. Iqbal, "Security perceptions of Bangladesh", 
Strategic Analysis, vol. XIII, No. 11, Feb., 1991, 
pp. 1275-96. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Verghese, B.C., n. 9, p. 33. 
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Government, but also strongly criticised, "These acts of 
violence which disrupted the peace and security of a member 
state", and extended their full solidarity with the Government 
of Maldives. Indian support to foil the coup attempt in 
Maldives has sent some wrong signals abroad, particularly in 
2 
Australia. 
Taken as a whole in the intra-regional perspective, i t 
can be speculated that South Asia i s an Indo-Centric region 
to the extent that India in capable of playing as the central 
actor in th is region on account of i t s tangible elements of 
power and performance. The Indian objectives have not only 
been to strengthen defence preparedness for t rad i t iona l mili-
tary roles but also to support the cause of "non-interference" 
and "non-aggression" in the region. India ' s South Asian nei-
ghbours on the contrary "avoid any public commitment to the 
Indian security system, but the i r own securi ty policies are 
based upon the assumption of an Indian guarantee against 
3 
extra-regional aggression". India now faces greater threats 
to i t s t e r r i t o r i a l in tegr i ty , sovereignty and development 
from domestic turmoils which are thriving rather than slowing 
down. 
Counting the external dimensions of threats, the point 
can be made that India still has disputed borders, and bears 
the responsibility of protecting her long coastline and off-
shore interests and scattered island territories. In such 
situations, India needs to maintain a certain level of 
'military built up' for larger security role. It requires a 
formidable base of strategic, political, economic, scientific 
1. See Joint Press Release, Fourth SAARC Summit, Islamabad, 
1988. 
2. All, Mujtaba, and vanghen Bruce, "Asian-Pacific and 
South Asia Security Dilemma", Mainstream, vol. XXX, 
No. 7, December 7, 1991, pp. 18 and 21. 
3. Leo E. Rose, n. 5, p. 381. 
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and technological s t rengths to get r i d of harmful t h r e a t s . 
An Approach to Securi ty In the Post Cold War Era 
In the context of the overa l l s ecu r i t y environment and 
underlying perceptions of ac tua l and p o t e n t i a l t h r e a t s , the 
point can be made tha t a s ign i f ican t r eg iona l , and perhaps 
global r o l e awaits India t h a t incapable of adjust ing her 
p o l i c i e s to the emerging s i t u a t i o n s . India being drawn sys-
temat ica l ly i n to the secur i ty dialogues process now evolving 
gradual ly in the broader framework of the Asia-Pacif ic region, 
I t implies t h a t no n a t i on - s t a t e can be free from "harmful 
t h r e a t s " . 
In view of the secur i ty environment and underlying 
perceptions of ac tua l and po t en t i a l t h r e a t s , the point can 
be made t h a t a s i g n i f i c i e n t r eg iona l , and perhaps global 
role awaits India and admittedly India i s a regional power. 
Despite, a l l the plus points said above, some scholars have 
put t h e i r views in a d i f fe ren t way. Kimit I s r a n i and Haku 
I s r an i has depicted tha t ' Ind ia being r i c h in resources and 
having a big land area and a large populat ion could have 
become a superpower a f t e r independence bu t , did not mainly 
of the two reasons given below : 
1, "India has almost never had the r i g h t people in the sea ts 
of p o l i t i c a l power. 
2. The wrong people in the sea ts of p o l i t i c a l power, of 
course, could not take the r i g h t approaches to solve the 
count r ies problems and lead the country in the r i g h t 
d i r e c t i o n " . 
So far making India a great nat ion they emphasized 
tha t "the need to prepare an exceedingly bold and imagi-
nat ive blue p r i n t . Hence, l e t us lay down the po l i c i e s 
and jBrograms tha t we are going t o follow in various pheres 
of nat ional l i f e over the next twelve years" . Speaking 
1. I s r a n i , Klmat and Haku I s r a n i , India a superpower ?, 
Lancer I n t e r n a t i o n a l , New Delhi , pp. 2 -3 . 
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about I n d i a ' s education l eve l , they have the reasons to say 
tha t the l i t e r a c y p ic tu re on a l l India level i s even more 
dismal. The level of l i t e r a c y as revealed by the 1981 census, 
was only 3 5 per cent for the country as a whole. The cons-
t i t u t i o n of India provided for free and compulsory education 
for a l l chi ldren u n t i l they complete the age of 14 years 
within a period of 10 years . But, in 1980, only 65% of the 
chi ldren in the age group of 6-11 at tended schools and the 
percentage decreased t o 42 per cent in respect of the age 
group of 11-14 years . These scholars have a cause to say 
t h a t : 
" I t means t h a t as many as 500 mi l l i on , or about 
the population of America and Russia put toge-
t h e r , are hardly making any cont r ibu t ion t o the 
enrichment of the country. These 500 mil l ion 
cons t i t u t e two-thi rds of our 'human resources ' 
t ha t we can not afford to neg lec t . I t i s r e a l l y 
mind-boggling to th ink as t o what India can not 
achieve, given the addi t ional backing of these 
500 mil l ion people with the power of l i t e r a c y 
to guide them. At present these 500 mil l ion are 
a kind of permanent drag on I n d i a ' s economic 
resources" .1 
Speaking about the energy c r i s i s in India , they have 
vehimently commented tha t : 
" I t i s a matter of great Shocme tha t even though 
India i s endowed with very r i c h energy sources 
from solar through water t o nuclear , the country 
suffers not only from acute shortage of power bu t , 
power i s c o s t l y and i t s supply i s fau l ty . This 
hopeless s t a t e of a f f a i r s , in the area of power 
supply in the country i s a t t r i b u t a b l e t o var ious 
causes" .^ 
Michael Holdonty, former Pres ident of the American 
Association of Petroleum, Geologists , while addressing 4500 
petroleum industry o f f i c i a l s in September 1979 said : 
1. Ib id , p . 6. 
2. O p . c i t . No. , p» 10. 
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"The world probably has as much undiscovered 
fuel under ground as has been discovered so 
far and as such there is great urgency to 
search for and find new oil reserves. During 
the 1990s, half of the worlds production will 
come from fields not yet found and that the 
largest undiscovered fields are thought to be 
in Asia". 
India after independence has not yet been able to 
explore sufficient oil resources. According to the Western 
Chart Saturn is Sextile to Neptune which shows the country* s 
abundance in oil. 
In the field of water power, the total annual supply 
of water in Indian Rivers is estimated to be 25 million 
cusecs. Of this hardly 10 per cent is utilized and the rest 
runs to waste. In the Second World War Germany and Japan were 
defeated. Japan also had to bear the burnt of two atomic 
bombs. Both the countries were in complete ruins when the war 
ended. But, the surprising post-war economic growth in Japan 
and West Germany followed by similar economic miracles in 
Taiwan, South Korea and tiny Singapur are trying to tell us 
something important which India has failed to follow. 
Dr. shashi Gadgil, Professor of Managerial Sciences 
at Long Island University, New York said : 
"India needs creative Juices of thousands of 
entrepreneurs to pull up its economy by its 
boot straps. Don't tell them what they can not 
do, but, what they can do - what they are free 
to do. Let them build. Let them manufacture and 
market in a free market economy and they will 
create jobs by the millions. Even the zealot 
par excellence - the Peoples Republic of China 
has turned to individual entrepreneurship and 
the free market. Let us accept the fact that a 
socialist pattern of society and centralized 
planning has failed". 
1. Sreeramamurthy, A., India's Horoscope, Astrological Mac^ azine 
pp. 556-57. 
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Anon pointed out t h a t any cause i s ^ los t cause in 
Ind ia . Without a reduct ion in populat ion. Today about 75 
per cent of the world 's population l i ve s in the under-
developed count r ies . About 50 per cent l ive in extreme poverty. 
In add i t ion , the l ess developed na t ions , including India have 
the highest b i r t h r a t e s in the world. I t i s reported t h a t a 
person born in the r i c h indus t r i a l i zed countr ies wi l l consume 
during h i s l i f e time about t h i r t y t imes ^s much as a person 
born in Latin America, Africa and Asia. The root of the pro-
blem i s tha t the populat ion does not increase in ar thmetical 
progression, i . e . by simple consecutive addi t ion (1 ,2 ,3 ,4 etc) 
bu t , in geometrical progression i . e . by exponential growth 
or mul t ip l i ca t ion 1,2,4,16 e t c . This exponential growth r a t e 
for population i s a great po ten t i a l danger for India . The 
growth r a t e which was 5.75% in 1911, 84.25% in 1951 has 
reached to 254.005i in l99l and i s 843.93 mi l l ion .^ 
As regards I n d i a ' s defence these scholars have t h e i r 
2 
own th inking . On the bas i s of 'Force Ratio* India stands a t 
No, 16 maintaining 1.6% Pakistan a t No. 11 having 5.2% and 
I s r a e l 46.2%, which i s the highest in the world m i l i t a r y pov '^er. 
General MacArthur descr ib ing about f a i l u r e s of armies once 
said : 
"The History of failure in war can be summed 
up in two words : Too Late. Too late in compre-
hending the deedly purpose of a potential enemy, 
too late in realizing the mortal danger, too 
late in preparedness : too late in uniting all 
possible forces for resistance, too late in 
standing with one's trends". 
India has a very bitter experience of suffering 
Ignoble defeat at the hands of the Chinese in 1962. Inspite 
of heavy cost of defence, India is not in a state cf 
1. Manorama Year Book 1993, Koilayam Kozhikode, Kochi, p. 394. 
2. A Nations Force Ratio is the number of its full-time 
active-duty military personnel per 1000 population. 
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continuous a l e r t Far Eastern Economic Review mentioned tha t 
'money i s spent in India but , i t i s spent badly*. 
Lyndon H. Laronche, J r . and other Us experts by using 
advanced computer projec t ions in a program e n t i t l e d 'The 
I n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n of India ' 1980-2020 from backwardness to 
i n d u s t r i a l power in 40 years have predic ted tha t India could 
emerge as a super power next only to the USA and Russia 
i f j i t f inds answers to i t s economic problems". 
In t h i s 'Comment' I attempt an overview and an ana lys i s 
of I n d i a ' s emerging s t a t u s as regional super power. Tracing 
the h i s to ry of I n d i a ' s emergence as a reg iona l power the 
f i r s t and formidable indica tor was Indo-Pak war of 1971 
which led t o the sp l in t e r ing of Pakis tan and emergence of 
an independent Bangladesh. I t was a grea t v ic to ry a t arms 
for India and power p res t ige of the Indian army. The second 
such ind ica to r ap^jeared in April 198 4 when Indian troops as 
a consequence of P a k i s t a n ' s in t rus ions moved sh i f t l y in 
Siachen Glacier area and occupied key a reas on the high 
Sai toro r idge l i n e . The t h i r d opportuni ty arose in the 
summer of 1985 when Indian troops a s ' t h e forward pol icy ' 
penetrated in to h i t h e r t o unoccupied t e r r i t o r y along the 
India-China border t o check P a k i s t a n ' s movement. The fourth 
ind ica to r of I n d i a ' s emergence as a super power appeared in 
the winter of 1986-87 when India organized "Exercise Brass 
Tacks" involving about 150000 t roops . In Ju ly 1987 Sr i Lanka 
came the f i f th ind ica tor when India entered with Sr i Lanka 
in to "Indo-Sr i Lanka Accord", 
India has the fourth la rges t armed forces in the 
world. The f i r s t in south Asia. I t has the m i l i t a r y leader-
ship and combat power po ten t i a l to f ight a war on two fronts 
and i t s Air Force to support the land forces . The Air force 
has a s t r a t e g i c a i r l i f t capaci ty making airborne and a i r 
t ranspor ted opera t ions . The Indian Navy i s gradual ly emerging 
as a formidable blue nat ions and i s s i x t h in the world. 
i(]5 
I n d i a ' s expansion and modernization of her armed forces place 
i t in a unchallengable pos i t i on . There i s no doubt t ha t India ' 
s i z e , population her s t r a t e g i c locat ion in the Indian ocean 
region, between the South-West and South-East Asia, her power-
ful i n d u s t r i a l and technological p o t e n t i a l , her economic 
v i a b i l i t y make her the dominant nation of south Asia. 
On p o l i t i c a l grounds India marks the h i s to ry of 
unintrupted cons t i t u t i ona l government, devoted t o the p r i n c i -
p les of democracy, secularism and non-alignment. There may be 
d i f fe rences of opinion between North-south, Hindus-Muslims, 
problems may a r i s e between s t a t e s to s t a t e s bu t , a l l c i t i z ens 
howsoever divided, stand uni tedly when the nationalism i s 
chal lenged. In a balance sheet of non-alignment, the f r iendly 
r e l a t i o n s tha t India b u i l t up and maintained with most of 
the coun t r i e s , the economic help and t echn ica l ass i s tance 
she received from count r i es of both blocks and Important role 
she could play in the world a f fa i r s p a r t i c u l a r l y in c o n t r i -
buting t o the lessening of tensions are mat ters t ha t need to 
be included on the c r ed i t s ide . 
The nat ional power i s a function of mater ia l a s s e t s 
e . g . (a) geographical s ize and loca t ion , (b) s ize of popu-
l a t i o n , (c) economic s t rength and development of sc ience , 
technology and indus t ry , soc ia l and p o l i t i c a l o rgan isa t ions 
and i n s t i t u t i o n s and (e) m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t y including the 
s i ze and s t ruc tu re of armed forces , q u a l i t y and quan t i ty of 
weapons system, doc t r ines and s t r a t e g i c s of employment of 
m i l i t a r y forces - the f ive determinants are considered impor-
t a n t for na t ional power. 
In concluding I would l ike to r e s t a t e the parameters 
within which the arguments in t h i s study have been presented 
1. Sr ivas tava , H.K. "The India-Pakis tan s t r a t e g i c Debate : The 
HoIdKDff Approach, S t ra teg ic Studies Journa l , vo l . 5, No.l 4 
2, AMU, Aligarh, p . 78. 
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and the assumptions have been made. South Asia has some 
unique features. The ratio of population to resources is 
very unfavourable and some of the poorest nations in the 
world belong to this region. Nearly fifth of the world 
population live in South Asia, which is 2,7 per cent of 
the world's land surface and half of its area is unfit 
for agriculture. The manufacturing sector is still in 
infancy. The size of population is massive and the size of 
economy of south Asia is very small. The GPD is only one 
forth of Germany and l/4 times of Netherland. The per capita 
income is lowest in the world and is less developed,^ 
India has the largest area, the highest population, 
the profounding natural resources and commandable strong 
army to protect its borders, a navy to safe guard its ports 
and trade and no other dountry of south Asia can standby 
India in industrial developments. It is only India which 
has the capacity to act as a check to extra-regional powers 
from interference in the region. India is a guarantee of 
peace to small neighbour, a treasure of resources to needy 
neighbours and a ray of hope in the region. It is the best 
out of the good neighbours, economically more sound than 
any other SAARC country, militarily more strong than any 
other country in south Asia and politically more realistic 
than six nations. The study reveals undoubtedly, "the 
emergence of India as regional power". 
1. Ahmed Emajuddin, "Regional Cooperation in south Asia 
and India's Role**, IPSA Journal. January-March 1983, 
p. 407. 
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